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i Abstract 
Abstract 
The  central  thesis  defended  here  is  that  we  can  have  truth  and  objectivity  in  accounting.  We 
do  not  contend  that  this  potential  is  presently  realized:  On  the  contrary,  we  argue  that  certain 
contradictions  immanent  to  capitalism  give  rise  in  late  modernity  to  crisis  tendencies  in 
financial  accounting  as  a  way  of  knowing  -  epistemological  crisis.  We  do  contend  that 
accounting's  tendencies  to  epistemological  crises  can,  at  least  in  theory,  be  overcome.  We 
begin  to  defend  this  view  by  considering  accounting  as  an  essentially  descriptive  activity. 
The  account  given  by  the  philosopher  Donald  Davidson  of  the  very  possibility  of  knowledge 
is  used  to  justify  the  view  that  intersubjectivity  is  all  the  foundation  we  need,  or  can  have,  for 
objectivity,  and  to  defend  our  claim  that  we  can  have  accounting  knowledge,  that  is,  true 
accounts/descriptions  of  an  objective  and  intersubjectively  accessible  public  world.  The 
defence  here  is  against  those  theorists,  including  those  inspired  by  certain  strands  of  the 
phenomenological,  (post)structuralist,  and  hermeneutic  traditions,  who  would  deny  the 
possibility  of  any  such  objectivity  in  accounting. 
Using  an  analysis  of  the  history  and  debate  surrounding  the  issue  of  accounting  for 
deferred  tax  in  the  United  Kingdom  (UK),  we  endeavour  to  locate  accounting  in  terms  of  the 
dichotomy  the  philosopher  Bernard  Williams  draws  between  science  and  ethics.  We  find  that 
the  descriptive  and  normative  are  inextricably  entangled  in  accounting  concepts  in  much  the 
same  way  as  they  are  entangled  in  thick  ethical  concepts  such  as  `chastity'  or  `courage'.  We 
recognise  that  the  descriptive  aspect  of  accounting  can  not  be  neatly  distinguished  from  the 
normative  and  dealt  with  separately.  Furthermore,  following  Williams,  we  argue  that 
difficulties  associated  with  the  objective  validation  of  the  normative  dimension  of  thick 
accounting  concepts  renders  knowledge  held  under  them  vulnerable  to  destruction  by 
reflection.  Reflection  may  reveal  the  essentially  local  or  perspectival  nature  of  the  normative 
dimension  of  our  thick  concepts;  it  may  undermine  them  by  forcing  us  to  recognize  just  how 
far  short  they  fall  of  any  normative  objectivity.  We  argue  that  descriptive  objectivity  can  not 
be  separated  from  normative  objectivity  in  modern  accounting.  We  therefore  accept  that  in 
our  increasingly  rational  and  reflective  modern  society,  descriptive  knowledge  of  the  world 
held  under  accounting  concepts  will  be  progressively  undermined  unless  the  normative 
validity  of  those  concepts  can  somehow  be  objectively,  and  in  modernity  that  means 
rationally,  established/demonstrated. 
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We  turn  to  Jürgen  Habermas'  theory  of  discourse  ethics  to  defend  the  possibility  of 
normative  objectivity  in  accounting.  We  argue  that  accounting  norms  might  ideally  be 
objectively  validated  through  the  application  of  communicative  rationality;  that  is,  they  may 
attain  an  objective  legitimacy  founded  upon  intersubjectivity.  The  defence  here  is  against 
those  theorists  including  those  inspired  by  emotivist  and  scientistic  thinking,  who  would 
reduce  rationality  in  the  accounting  domain  to  instrumental  or  purposive  rationality,  and 
place  the  normative  beyond  any  rational  determination  and  consequently  beyond  any 
rationally  based  objectivity.  Habermasian  discourse  theory  offers  the  possibility  that  the 
normative  dimension  of  accounting  concepts  may  be  objectively  validated.  We  may  then 
accumulate  descriptive  knowledge  of  the  objective  world  in  terms  of  those  objectively 
validated  concepts,  that  is,  from  the  objective  point  of  view  of  those  concepts. 
We  conceive  of  objectivity  as  always  a  matter  of  degree,  with  the  more  objective 
positions  being  those  which  are  more  open  to  intersubjective  agreement,  that  is,  the  more 
inclusive  and  less  narrowly  perspectival  views.  We  recognise  the  Habermasian  moral  point 
of  view  as  the  perspective  of  reason,  albeit  communicative  reason.  This  perspective  is  narrow 
in  so  far  as  it  excludes  the  other  of  reason,  that  is,  all  that  can  not  be  consciously  articulated. 
We  recognise  that  Habermasian  discourse  ethics  relies  upon  an  inadequate  conception  of  the 
subject  insofar  as  it  appears  to  demand  the  co-presence  in  real  argument  of  relatively  unified, 
transparent,  and  autonomous  subjects  who  have,  know,  and  can  articulate  and  act  on  their 
interests.  The  thesis  concludes  by  arguing  that  the  rationality  of  discourse  ethics  stands  in 
need  of  being  supplemented,  but  not  replaced,  by  a  poststructuralist  and  psychoanalytic 
sensitivity  to  alterity  and  the  unconscious;  that  which  is  immune  to  discursive  retrieval  and 
communicative  reason.  We  find  such  a  sensitivity  in  the  work  of  psychoanalyst  Jacques 
Lacan.  To  illustrate  the  rich  Lacanian  conception  of  the  subject  we  offer  a  view  of  the  firm, 
the  subject  of  financial  accounts,  as  a  split  subject;  divided  between  conscious  and 
unconscious.  This  sketch  of  the  firm  as  divided  subject  also  stands  as  a  contribution  to  the 
developing  theory  of  the  firm  as  moral  agent,  which  has  been  inspired  by  Donald  Davidson's 
conceptualisation  of  the  subject/agent. 
Throughout  the  thesis  we  use  recent  work  of  the  ASB,  and  the  debate  it  has 
occasioned,  to  contextualize  and  focus  the  analyses  we  offer. 
iii Preface 
Preface 
This  thesis  is  intended  as  a  modest  contribution  to  the  "unfinished  project  of  modernity"  (see 
Habermas,  1981c,  1985a).  It  defends  the  possibility  of  objectivity  in  accounting  by  applying 
aspects  of  the  work  of  certain  philosophers,  including  Donald  Davidson,  Jürgen  Habermas 
and  Jacques  Lacan,  to  the  accounting  problematic. 
The  thesis  is  presented  in  a  somewhat  unconventional  in  form  which  some  readers 
may  find  unsettling  and  inconvenient.  At  the  core  of  the  presentation  are  five  chapters,  each 
of  which  has  been  written  in  such  a  way  that  its  conversion  into  a  separate  refereed 
publication  might  be  achieved  with  a  need  for  minimal  modification.  Those  five  chapters  are 
preceded  by  an  introduction  that  sets  out  in  broad  terms  the  theses  defended  in  those  chapters, 
and  they  are  followed  by  a  conclusion  that  reviews  the  defence  made  and  reflects  upon  its 
adequacy.  Preambles  have  been  written  to  each  of  the  chapter  with  the  intention  of  providing 
sign-posts  which  will  help  the  reader  locate  the  chapter  in  the  context  of  preceding  and 
following  material  and  the  thesis  as  a  whole.  The  reader  will  not  find  explicit  `literature 
review'  or  `methodology'  chapters,  and  the  justification  of  our  allegiances  is  normally 
allowed  to  remain  implicit.  Our  central  commitment/allegiance,  to  a  Davidsonian  world  view 
is  tested  and  justified  through  the  critique  presented  of  less  adequate  positions,  including 
Putnam's  internal  realism,  Searle's  external  realism  and  Rorty's  pragmatism.  Throughout, 
a  methodology  of  logical  and  philosophical  analysis  is  adopted,  and  applied  to  accounting 
practice,  theory  and  debate,  in  particular  as  it  appears  in  the  recent  work  of  the  United 
Kingdom  (UK)  Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB)  and  the  responses  their  work  has 
provoked. 
The  presentation  format  occasions  a  certain  degree  of  repetition.  Extended  and 
blatantly  repetitive  passages  are  identified  as  such  so  that  the  reader  may  omit  them  without 
significant  loss.  We  have  not  always  excised  repetitive  passages  on  the  grounds  that  some 
readers  may  find  the  repetition  and  recapping  on  previously  presented  ideas  useful.  We 
apologize  to  those  readers  who  find  the  repetition  they  encounter  here  tedious  and  irritating. 
An  effort  has  been  made  to  avoid  sexist  language.  However,  rather  than  adopt 
complex  solutions  to  the  problem,  the  simple  expedient  of  alternating  between  the  feminine 
and  masculine  pronouns  has  been  adopted.  We  regret  any  residual  traces  of  sexism  that  the 
reader  may  detect  in  the  language  employed. 
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Introduction 
This  thesis  is  motivated  by  the  conviction  that  accounting  has  emancipatory  potential.  From 
the  outset  we  assume  that  social  emancipation  must  rely  on  rational  critique,  which  itself 
must  be  based  upon  our  knowledge  of  the  objective  conditions  in  the  world  we  share;  we 
argue  that  financial  accounting  can  provide  us  with  such  knowledge.  The  essential  thesis  that 
we  will  explicate  and  defend  here  is  that  we  can  have  truth  and  objectivity  in  accounting.  We 
recognize  that  this  potential  is  presently  frustrated  by  the  distortions  of  capitalist  modernity 
but  argue  that  those  distortions  can  be  overcome.  Initially  we  treat  accounting  as  an 
essentially  descriptive  activity  and  use  the  philosopher  Donald  Davidson's  account  of  how 
it  is  possible  for  us  to  have  knowledge  of  any  type  to  justify  by  inference  the  view  that  we 
can  have  accounting  knowledge  of  an  objective  publicly  accessible  world.  We  recognize  that 
in  order  to  fully  and  convincingly  address  the  problem  of  objectivity  in  accounting  we  must 
directly  engage  with  its  normative  dimension.  We  use  the  issue  of  accounting  for  deferred 
tax  to  focus  an  analysis  of  accounting  in  terms  of  the  distinctions  the  philosopher  Bernard 
Williams  draws  between  science  and  ethics.  We  come  to  recognize  that  the  descriptive  and 
normative  are  inextricably  entangled  in  accounting  concepts  in  much  the  same  way  as  they 
are  entwined  in  thick  ethical  concepts  like  `treachery'  and  `cruelty'.  Williams  argues  that 
whilst  reflection  may  justify  scientific  knowledge,  it  will  tend  to  destroy  knowledge  held 
under  thick  (ethical)  concepts.  We  acknowledge  that  impediments  to  the  objective  validation 
of  the  normative  dimension  of  thick  concepts  like  `profit'  or  `chastity'  may  render  knowledge 
held  under  such  concepts  vulnerable  to  erosion  by  reflection.  Reflection  may  destroy  such 
knowledge  by  revealing,  as  Williams  thinks  it  must,  that  the  thick  normative  concepts  under 
which  it  is  held  are  essentially  local  and  lacking  in  objectivity. 
In  search  of  an  alternative  to  the  rather  depressing  prospect  painted  by  Williams  of 
the  destructive  progress  of  rationality  and  reflection,  we  turn  to  the  work  of  the  philosopher 
Jürgen  Habermas  and  in  particular  to  his  theory  of  discourse  ethics.  We  see  this  central  aspect 
of  Habermas'  work  as  an  extension  of  the  Davidsonian  project  to  the  normative  domain,  and 
we  employ  it  to  defend  the  view  that  we  can  have  normative  objectivity  in  accounting.  We 
contend  that  through  an  appropriate  institutionalization  of  communicative  rationality  we  may 
objectively  validate  the  normative  position,  or  point  of  view,  in  terms  of  which  we 
accumulate  accounting  descriptions  of  the  world.  If  the  moral  dimension  of  accounting 
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concepts  were  thus  objectively  validated  the  descriptive  knowledge  held  under  them  would 
not  be  vulnerable  to  destruction  by  reflection  in  the  way  that  Williams  fears;  indeed  reflection 
would  then  tend  to  justify  accounting  knowledge. 
We  conceive  of  objectivity  as  always  a  matter  of  degree,  with  the  more  objective 
positions  being  those  which  are  more  inclusive  and  can  command  high  levels  of 
intersubjective  consensus.  At  the  less  objective  end  of  the  spectrum  are  those  local  and 
narrowly  perspectival  views  that  can  command  only  limited  intersubjective  agreement 
because  they  are  in  some  way  exclusive  or  not  generally  accessible.  The  Habermasian  moral 
point  of  view  of  discourse  ethics  is  the  perspective  of  communicative  reason;  it  is  narrow  in 
so  far  as  it  excludes  the  other  of  reason,  that  is,  all  that  can  not  be  discursively  retrieved  and 
articulated.  We  conclude  the  thesis  by  arguing  that  the  Habermasian  perspective  needs  to  be 
broadened,  and  thus  made  more  objective;  it  needs  to  allow  footholds  to  the  unconscious  and 
the  inarticulate  from  which  they  might  disrupt  the  automatic  functioning  of  reason.  We 
contend  that  the  rationality  of  discourse  ethics  needs  to  be  supplemented,  but  certainly  not 
replaced,  by  sensitivity  to  alterity  and  the  unconscious;  that  is  a  sensitivity  to  that  which  is 
immune  to  discursive  retrieval  and  communicative  reason.  We  find  a  basis  for  such  a 
sensitivity  in  the  work  of  the  post-structuralist  psychoanalyst  Jacques  Lacan.  In  the  following 
paragraphs  of  this  introduction  we  will  outline  how  the  thesis  that  we  have  just  sketched  in 
the  broadest  of  terms  will  be  developed  and  defended  in  the  following  chapters. 
In  Chapter  1  "Financial  Accounting,  Crisis  and  the  Commodity  Fetish"  we  introduce 
certain  themes  of  the  thesis  and  set  the  context  for  the  analysis  presented  in  subsequent 
chapters.  In  particular,  we  begin  to  consider  the  impact  of  processes  of  reflection  and 
rationalisation,  characteristic  of  the  development  of  modernity,  on  accounting  conceived  of 
as  both  a  descriptive  and  as  a  normative/prescriptive  enterprise;  as  both  scientific  and  as 
moral  practice.  We  argue  that  certain  contradictions  immanent  to  capitalism  give  rise  in  late 
modernity  to  crisis  tendencies  in  financial  accounting  as  a  way  of  knowing  -  epistemological 
crisis.  We  analyze  those  tendencies,  manifest  as  crises  of  rationality,  legitimacy  and  motive, 
in  terms  of  a  Habermasian  account  of  the  evolution  of  society.  We  argue  that  the  processes 
of  rationalisation  and  reflection  attendant  upon  the  modernisation  of  society  have  torn 
accounting  from  its  traditional  anchorage  and  legitimating  resources.  In  this  and  other 
chapters  we  use  an  analysis  of  the  certain  recent  work  of  the  United  Kingdom  (UK) 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB)  to  ground  and  give  a  practical  focus  to  the  ideas 
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presented.  We  argue  that  the  controversy  surrounding  the  ASB's  efforts  to  develop  a 
conceptual  framework  for  financial  reporting  under  the  title  of  a  "Statement  of  Principles  for 
Financial  Reporting"  (ASB,  1995b,  1999a,  1999d),  reveals  the  contradictions  and  crises 
tendencies  immanent  to  financial  accounting  in  capitalism.  And  we  interpret  the  conceptual 
framework  for  financial  reporting  project  undertaken  by  the  UK  Accounting  Standards  Board 
(ASB)  in  recent  years  as  an  attempt  to  restore  a  measure  of  spurious  objectivity  and 
legitimacy  to  UK  financial  reporting. 
In  chapter  2  "Accounting  Knowledge"  we  use  Davidson's  analysis  of  the  conditions 
of  possibility  of  knowledge  to  justify  an  anti-representationalist  conception  of  accounting 
knowledge  and  objectivity.  The  Davidsonian  account  we  give  of  the  possibility  of  accounting 
knowledge  recognises  that  intersubjectivity  as  all  the  foundation  we  need,  or  can  have,  for 
objectivity.  To  help  clarify  and  justify  the  view  we  favor  we  contrast  it  with  a  selection  of 
essentially  dualist  strands  of  accounting  theory  which  each  cast  doubt  on  accounting's 
capacity  to  give  knowledge  of  an  objective  publicly  accessible  world.  These  views  draw  their 
inspiration  from  certain  elements  of  the  phenomenological,  (post)structuralist,  and 
hermeneutic  traditions. 
The  primary  aim  of  chapter  3,  "Objectivity  in  Accounting  -  The  Case  of  Deferred 
Tax",  is  to  develop  our  consideration  of  the  Davidsonian  view  of  the  possibility  of  objectivity 
in  accounting  introduced  in  the  previous  chapter.  In  chapter  2  we  implicitly  assumed  that  the 
descriptive  and  normative  dimensions  of  accounting  are  separable  and  that  we  could 
therefore  sensibly  bracket  the  normative  and  focus  on  accounting  as  essentially  descriptive 
activity.  In  chapter  3  we  directly  address  the  moral/normative  dimension  of  accounting  and 
recognize  that  it  creates  problems  for  accounting  objectivity.  The  application  to  accounting 
of  a  Davidsonian  conception  of  objectivity  as  intersubjectivity  is  explored  here  in  terms  of 
the  contrast  drawn  by  the  philosopher  Bernard  Williams  between  the  prospects  for  objectivity 
in  science  and  ethics.  Using  an  examination  of  the  history  and  debate  surrounding  the  issue 
of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  in  the  United  Kingdom  to  help  focus  our  analysis,  we 
endeavour  to  locate  accounting  in  terms  of  the  dichotomy  that  Williams  draws  between 
science  and  ethics.  We  find  that  the  descriptive  and  normative  are  knotted  together  in 
accounting  concepts  in  just  the  same  way  that  they  are  entangled  in  thick  ethical  concepts 
like  `chastity'  or  `brutality'.  We  recognize  that,  whilst  in  science  we  can  reasonably  expect 
world-guided  reflection  to  lead  us  towards  more  objective  conceptions  of  reality  and  to 
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justify  our  perspectival  knowledge,  in  ethics  reflection  can  not  be  world  guided;  the  world 
can  not  guide  us  to  more  adequate  conceptions  of  the  "good  life".  Not  only  can  reflection  not 
justify  ethical  knowledge  it  may  destroy  it  by  forcing  us  to  recognize  how  far  short  our 
ethical  concepts  fall  of  any  universal  objectivity.  On  this  analysis  it  seems  that,  insofar  as 
accounting  entails  an  ethical  dimension,  we  can  not  reasonably  expect  reflection  on 
accounting  concepts  to  lead  to  more  objective  conceptions  of  reality;  indeed  we  should 
expect  reflection  to  undermine  local  accounting  knowledge.  In  search  of  some  relief  from  this 
rather  bleak  prospect  we  return,  to  Habermas'  work.  We  draw  in  particular  on  his  analysis 
of  the  evolution  of  society  and  his  theory  of  discourse  ethics,  for  a  vision  of  how  accounting 
norms  might  attain  objectivity,  that  is,  how  they  might  ideally  be  rationally  justified  so  as  to 
command  universal  agreement.  Habermas  argues  that  in  modernity  the  ethical  sphere,  which 
in  traditional  society  had  appeared  as  a  totality,  breaks  into  two  components:  the  moral  and 
the  evaluative.  Moral  questions  being  those  that  can  be  approached  rationally  in  terms  of  the 
generalizability  of  interests,  and  evaluative  questions  being  those  which  are  accessible  to 
rational  analysis  only  from  within  the  horizons  of  a  particular  historical  form  of  life. 
Habermas  shows  how  moral  norms  of  action  can  be  objectively  validated  through 
communicative  reason,  that  is,  through  the  institutionalisation  of  what  he  calls  "discourse 
ethics".  We  argue  that  accounting  regulations  may  be  viewed  as  moral  norms  and  that  an 
objective  validity  for  normative  accounting  concepts  might  be  achieved  through  the 
application  of  communicative  rationality  in  democratic  processes.  We  conclude  chapter  3 
with  a  discussion  of  the  implications  of  Habermas'  discourse  ethics  for  accounting  policy 
making,  and  its  implications  for  the  appropriate  role  for  conceptual  framework  for  financial 
reporting  projects. 
Whilst  in  chapter  2  we  defended  the  possibility  of  objective  financial  reporting 
against  the  poststructuralist/postmodernist  "totalized  critiques"  of  reason  and  objective 
knowledge.  In  chapter  4  "Validity  in  Accounting  Standard  Setting  and  the  Presuppositions 
of  External  Financial  Reporting"  we  seek  to  defend  accounting  from  those  theorists  who 
seem  to  want  to  reduce  reason  in  accounting  to  instrumental  reason.  The  analysis  presented 
here  is  again  shaped  by  the  work  of  Donald  Davidson  and  Jürgen  Habermas;  it  represents  a 
consolidation  and  development  of  our  view  of  the  application  of  central  elements  of  their 
thinking  to  accounting  practice  and  regulation.  In  particular  we  extend  our  consideration  of 
practical  issues  concerning  the  application  of  Habermas'  discourse  ethics/communicative 
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reason  in  accounting.  The  chapter  responds  to,  and  critiques,  the  analysis  presented  by 
Shapiro  (1997  &  1998)  of  the  presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting  and  the  maxims 
and  of  rational  argument  in  accounting  standard  setting.  We  use  Shapiro's  analysis  as  a 
counterpoint  to  our  own  very  different  views  on  the  philosophical  foundations  of  objectivity 
in  financial  reporting  and  validity  in  accounting  standard/norm  setting.  We  thereby  hope  to 
contribute  to  an  ongoing  debate  concerning  what  is  at  stake  in  disputes  about  truth, 
objectivity  and  validity  in  accounting  and  accounting  standard  setting. 
In  chapter  5,  "The  Reporting  Entity  as  Divided  Subject",  we  recognise  that  the 
Habermasian  conception  of  communicative  rationality,  that  we  have  advocated  as  a 
foundation  for  the  possibility  of  normative  objectivity  in  accounting,  relies  upon  a  flawed 
conception  of  the  subject/agent  of  discourse.  It  apparently  demands  the  co-presence  in  debate 
of  impossibly  unified  and  self-transparent  agents  that  know  and  can  fully  articulate  their 
interests.  We  accept  the  force  of  the  post-structuralist  critique  of  the  Habermasian  position, 
that  foregrounds  a  need  for  sensitivity  to  the  "other  of  reason"  that  which  is  immune  to 
rational  articulation  -  the  unconscious.  We  recognize  that  the  rationality  of  discourse  ethics 
needs  to  be  supplemented  by  sensitivity  to  alterity,  and  we  locate  such  a  sensitivity  in  the 
psychoanalyst  Jacques  Lacan's  conception  of  the  divided  subject;  the  subject  split  between 
conscious  and  unconscious.  We  explain  the  Lacanian  perspective  by  sketching  an 
interpretation  of  the  firm  as  reporting  entity  as  a  divided  Lacanian  subject.  We  hope  that  this 
sketch  may  incidentally  enrich  the  development  of  conceptions  of  the  firm  as  moral  agent. 
We  conclude  by  arguing  that  a  Lacanian  sensitivity  to  alterity  is  consonant  with  an  ethic  of 
absolute  responsibility  for  the  Other  that  could  make  good  the  motivational  deficit  that 
attends  the  abstraction  of  the  Habermasian  moral  point  of  view;  the  rationality  of  discourse 
ethics. 
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In  this  thesis  we  aim  to  defend  the  view  that  we  can  have  objective  knowledge  in 
accounting.  Our  defense  of  the  possibility  of  accounting  objectivity  relies  above  all  on  the 
philosopher  Donald  Davidson's  account  of  the  possibility  of  constative  knowledge  and 
Jürgen  Habermas'  justification  of  the  possibility  of  normative  validity.  We  will  turn  to 
Davidson's  work  in  chapter  2  and  to  Habermas'  work  on  the  objective  validation  of 
norms  in  chapter  three.  In  this  chapter  we  intend  to  set  the  context  for  our  subsequent 
analysis  of  the  financial  reporting's  potential  for  descriptive  and  normative  objectivity  by 
examining  its  present  condition.  We  will  introduce  here  certain  themes  that  will  be 
returned  to  in  subsequent  chapters,  in  particular  we  will  begin  to  consider  the  impact  of 
processes  of  reflection  and  rationalization,  characteristic  of  the  development  of 
modernity,  on  accounting  conceived  of  as  both  a  descriptive  and  as  a  normative 
enterprise.  We  will  argue  here  that  in  capitalist  modernity  financial  accounting  as  a  way 
of  knowing  faces  crisis  -  epistemological  crisis. 
In  this  chapter  we  analyze  financial  accounting's  tendency  to  crisis  in  terms  of  a 
Habermasian  account  of  the  evolution  of  society,  and  use  the  recent  efforts  of  the  UK 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB)  to  produce  a  conceptual  framework  for  financial 
reporting  to  give  focus  to  our  discussion.  We  find  that  the  contradictions  immanent  to 
financial  accounting  in  capitalism  are  manifest  as  tendencies  to  crises  of  rationality, 
legitimacy  and  motivation.  We  argue  that  accounting's  traditional  taken-for-granted 
legitimacy  is  eroded  by  the  progress  of  rationalization  and  reflection  in  modernity,  and  we 
interpret  the  ASB's  conceptual  framework  project  as  an  attempt  to  restore  a  measure  of 
spurious  objectivity  and  legitimacy  to  UK  financial  reporting. 
In  subsequent  chapters  we  will  defend  the  view  that  financial  accounting  may 
obtain  objectivity  and  legitimacy  through  rational  processes  and  in  particular  through  the 
application  of  communicative  reason.  We  recognize,  however,  that  in  late  capitalism  the 
processes  of  rationalization  have  become  pathological  and  have  in  fact  tended  to 
undermine  financial  accounting  as  a  way  of  knowing.  In  the  following  paragraphs  we 
offer  a  very  brief  sketch  of  the  processes  of  rationalisation  and  differentiation  that 
Habermas  identifies  as  operating  in  the  evolution  of  western  society.  This  sketch  is 
intended  to  help  put  the  present  crisis  in  financial  reporting  into  perspective  and  to  give 
some  indication  of  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  challenge  associated  with  the  realisation  of 
the  promise  of  communicative  rationality  in  accounting. 
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Habermas  sees  two  distinct  processes  of  rationalisation  at  work  in  the  evolution  of 
society:  a  rationalisation  of  the  lifeworld  and  a  rationalisation  of  the  system.  The  term 
"lifeworld"  refers  to  all  of  those  aspects  of  human  life  and  relations  -  social,  cultural  and 
personal  -  that  are  co-ordinated  and  reproduced  through  communicative  action  and  thus 
language.  The  symbolic  reproduction  of  society  through  the  lifeworld  can  be 
distinguished  from  its  material  reproduction  through  systems  of  action.  The  material 
development  of  modern  society  is  initially  facilitated  by  the  rationalisation  of  the 
lifeworld  and  in  particular  the  development  of  modern  law.  This  rationalisation  of  the 
lifeworld  is  marked  by  a  transition  from  social  integration  based  upon  ritual  and  sacred 
symbols  to  an  integration  motivated  by  the  shared  understandings  based  on 
communicative  action,  that  is,  integration  and  cooperation  structured  by  consensus  on 
norms.  Habermas  calls  this  transition  the  "linguistification  of  the  sacred".  The  increasing 
complexity  of  society,  particularly  the  complexity  of  its  material  reproduction,  stretches 
the  integrative  capacity  of  communicative  action  (social  integration),  which  is  always  to 
some  extent  affected  by  the  interpretative  difficulties  attendant  on  language  as  an 
integrative  medium.  Therefore,  as  society  evolves  it  becomes  more  and  more  reliant  on 
systems  integration,  that  is,  integration  that  comes  about  as  an  unintended  consequence  of 
action.  Perhaps  the  prime  example  of  systems  integration,  is  the  automatic  allocation  of 
resources  through  market  operations.  Over  time,  in  important  fields  of  action,  particularly 
those  involving  markets  and  state  administration,  the  integrative  role  of  language  is 
increasingly  taken  over  by  the  alternative  steering  media  such  as  money  and  power. 
Eventually  the  system  achieves  a  high  degree  of  independence  from  the  lifeworld.  In 
itself  this  process  of  rationalisation  can  be  seen  as  one  of  evolutionary  advance.  However, 
in  capitalism  the  process  becomes  pathological.  The  need  to  manage  the  crisis  tendencies 
immanent  to  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  institutes  an  expansionist  tendency  in  the 
system,  so  that  the  system  steering  media  of  money  and  power  intrude  into  the  lifeworld. 
This  "colonisation  of  the  lifeworld"  damages  those  areas  of  society,  which  rely  on 
integration  and  reproduction  through  communicative  action,  that  is,  all  of  those  social, 
cultural,  and  personal  aspects  of  life  which  rely  on  symbolic,  as  opposed  to  material, 
reproduction.  The  process  of  rationalisation  becomes  damaging  when  the  social  tensions 
generated  by  capitalist  exploitation  drive  the  system,  which  has  slipped  out  of  the 
normative  control  by  the  Lifeworld,  to  colonise  and  undermine  the  symbolic  reproduction 
of  the  of  the  Lifeworld. 
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We  contend  that  the  ASB's  conceptual  framework  project  reveals  financial 
reporting  in  process  of  rationalisation.  Our  analysis  of  resistance  to  the  ASB's  proposals, 
outlined  in  chapter  1,  suggests  that  accounting's  transition  to  modernity,  through 
rationalisation,  has  been  painful  and  is  as  yet  incomplete.  Many  of  accounting's 
"everyday"  practitioners  and  users  are  found  to  be  clinging  tenaciously  to  remnants  of  a 
pre-modern  accounting  structured  by  the  myth  and  ritual',  and  to  the  remnants  of 
legitimacy  associated  with  traditional  authority.  We  find  accounting  in  the  process  of 
becoming  little  more  than  a  mere  adjunct  to  a  systems  based  integration  of  society 
founded  on  the  free  and  automatic  operation  of  markets  and  progressively  moving  beyond 
any  normative  /  lifeworld  control. 
Whilst  the  transition  from  traditional  to  modern  society  is  marked  by  the  struggle 
between  reason  and  its  other  -  the  "sacred",  modernity  itself  is  characterized  by  the 
tension  between  communicative  and  instrumental  rationality  -  lifeworld  and  system.  A 
central  of  concern  of  Habermas'  work  has  been  to  waken  us  to  the  emancipatory  potential 
of  communicative  reason,  which  he  argues  both  his  predecessors  in  critical  theory  and  the 
poststructuralist/postmodernist  theorists  have  failed  to  recognise.  For  Habermas,  the  early 
critical  theorists  made  the  mistake  of  equating  reason  with  purposive-instrumental  reason, 
while  the  postmodernists  relinquish  reason  altogether.  The  tension  between  the  two 
modes  of  reason  in  modern  capitalism  reflects  a  tension  between  capitalism  and 
democracy,  which  correlate  with  alternative  modes  of  integration  -  instrumental  and 
communicative  reason  respectively.  In  chapter  1,  which  we  now  turn  to,  we  see  evidence 
of  this  tension  in  the  accounting  standard  setters'  attempts  to  gain  a  semblance  of 
democratic  legitimacy  for  a  program,  which  is  essentially  driven  by  instrumental  reason 
and  the  imperatives  of  money  and  power. 
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"The  aim  of  socialism  is  to  liberate  the  rich  diversity  of  sensuous  use-value 
from  the  metaphysical  prison-house  of  exchange-value  -  to  emancipate 
history  from  the  specious  equivalences  imposed  upon  it  by  ideology  and 
commodity  production.  " 
(Eagleton,  1991,  p.  127) 
Introduction 
The  UK  Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB)  recently  published  a  draft  conceptual 
framework2  for  financial  reporting  (ASB,  1995b).  The  draft  proposes,  inter  alia,  that 
practice  should  move  towards  a  balance  sheet  orientated  current  value  accounting  model. 
As  might  well  have  been  anticipated,  the  proposals  have  run  into  a  wall  of  opposition 
from  preparers  and  auditors.  In  this  chapter  we  set  out  to  explore  two  questions.  Firstly, 
why  has  the  ASB  adopted  such  obviously  controversial  proposals?  And  secondly,  why  do 
the  proposals  provoke  an  almost  visceral  resistance  in  some  quarters?  It  is  not  our 
intention  to  give  "full"  answers  to  these  questions,  and  we  will  not  draw  on  the  vast 
literature  concerning  the  putative  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  alternative  accounting 
models.  - 
We  analyse  the  ASB's  proposals  and  the  reaction  to  them  in  terms  of  the  crisis 
tendencies,  which  are  immanent  to  capitalism;  we  investigate  the  pressures  and 
contradictions,  which  have  impelled  accountancy  in  the  UK  to  the  edge  of  the  abyss: 
"...  the  Accountancy  Profession  is  standing  on  the  edge  of  a  precipice  and 
is  in  danger  of  taking  a  giant  step  forward....  " 
(The  Group  of  Scottish  Finance  Directors,  1996,  p.  358) 
The  chapter  contains  seven  parts.  We  begin  by  briefly  contextualising  the  ASB's 
proposals  in  terms  of  fundamental  income  measurement  alternatives.  We  then  outline  the 
ASB  proposals  and  the  response  they  have  provoked.  In  part  three  we  begin  to  develop 
the  foundations  of  our  analysis  -  accounting's  reflection  and  reproduction  of  commodity 
fetishism.  In  the  fourth  part  of  the  chapter  we  initiate  an  immanent  critique  of  commodity 
fetishism  in  accounting.  We  begin  to  unpick  financial  accounting's  false  equation  of 
exchange-values  and  use-values.  We  do  so,  by  developing  the  implications  of  research  on 
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the  psychology  of  choice  which  reveals  that  use-values  of  prospects  can  not  be  separated 
from  how  they  are  represented,  in  mental  accounts,  and  understood  by  human  beings,  and 
therefore  can  not  be  grasped  by  exchange-value  relations  between  things.  In  the  fifth  part 
of  the  chapter  we  relate  the  analysis  developed  in  the  previous  part  more  directly  to 
financial  accounting,  and  in  particular  the  ASB's  proposals.  We  argue  that  whilst  in  terms 
of  the  abstraction  of  exchange-values  wealth  is  conceptually  homogeneous,  in  terms  of 
use-values  wealth  is  heterogeneous.  And  we  suggest  that  the  ASB's  proposals  threaten  to 
push  accounting  further  towards  the  rational  abstraction  of  exchange-value  and  away 
from  its  traditional  unquestioned  legitimacy  and  residual  connection  with  use-values.  In 
the  penultimate  part  of  the  chapter  we  develop  our  analysis  of  the  origins  of  the  ASB's 
proposals  and  the  controversy  surrounding  them,  using  Habermas'  (1973)  exposition  of 
the  crisis  tendencies  immanent  to  advanced capitalism  as  an  analytical  framework.  In  the 
final  part  of  the  essay  we  return  to  the  key  issue  of  accounting's  reflection  of  the 
commodity  fetish  -  accounting  as  identity  thinking  -  and  consider  the  implications  for 
critical  accounting. 
Basic  income  measurement  alternatives 
Accounting  income  may  be  determined  in  two  fundamentally  different  ways.  It  may  be 
calculated  as  the  change  in  the  worth  (net  assets)  of  the  business  during  a  period, 
excluding  the  change  resulting  from  the  transfer  of  resources  to  and  from  owners.  This 
approach  reflects  a  long-standing  consensus  that  business  income  must  ultimately  be 
understood  in  terms  of  wealth  enhancement  (see  Gellein,  1987,  p.  60),  and  corresponds 
closely  with  certain  conceptions  of  income  developed  by  economists.  It  implicitly 
requires  current  value  measurement  of  assets  and  liabilities  as  it  makes  little  sense  to 
define  income  in  terms  of  the  change  between  two  balance  sheets  unless  those  balance 
sheets  reflect  some  measure  of  current  value.  In  this  chapter  we  will  refer  to  this 
approach  as  either  the  current  value  or  economic  income  approach. 
The  alternative  approach  to  income  measurement  allows  only  realised  gains  to  be 
recognised  in  accounting  income.  It  requires  the  institution  of  revenue  recognition  criteria 
and  rules  for  the  allocation  of  costs,  that  is,  the  matching  of  costs  against  recognised 
revenue  (see  Paton  &  Littleton,  1940).  We  will  refer  to  this  profit  and  loss  account 
orientated  method  as  the  matching  approach.  It  might  seem  that  both  systems  might  tend 
to  produce  the  same  results.  This  is  not  so  -  the  current  value  approach  allows  unrealised 
gains  to  be  included  in  income  whilst  the  matching  approach  does  not.  Furthermore  the 
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revenue  recognition  criteria  applied  under  the  matching  approach  are  more  demanding 
than  the  criteria  for  recognising  changes  in  the  value  of  assets  and  liabilities  applied  under 
the  current  value  approach.  This  is  because  the  matching  approach  embodies  the  idea  that 
revenue  should  only  be  recognised  once  it  has  been  earned,  that  is,  revenue  recognition 
should  be  based  on  performance.  Financial  accounting  practice  has  been  dominated  by 
the  matching  approach  for  almost  all  of  this  century  3,  and  revenue  recognition  criteria 
have  been  dominated  by  the  concept  of  prudence.  The  current  value  approach  has 
theoretical  appeal.  However,  the  approach  is  unattractive  to  both  preparers  and  auditors4, 
and  its  translation  from  theory  to  practice  has  been  difficult  and  highly  controversial  (see 
Miller  et  al,  1994,  p.  142).  The  American  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board's 
(FASB)  efforts  to  develop  a  conceptual  framework  for  accounting  were  effectively 
"derailed"  by  the  current  value  issue  in  the  early  1980's.  And  "experiments"  with  its 
application,  as  current  cost  accounting,  by  both  the  FASB  (Statement  of  Financial 
Accounting  Standards  (SFAS)  No.  33  -  Financial  Reporting  and  Changing  Prices,  1979), 
and  the  Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC)  in  the  UK,  (Statement  of  Standard 
Accounting  Practice  (SSAP)  No.  16  -  Current  Cost  Accounting,  1980a),  ended  in  failure. 
The  collapse  of  SSAP16,  due  to  preparer  non-compliance,  "resulted  in  a  serious  loss  of 
confidence  by  and  in  the  ASC"  (Whittington,  1989,  p.  195). 
Despite  the  controversial  nature  of  the  current  value  issue,  standard  setters  have 
been  unwilling  to  drop  it  entirely  from  their  agendas.  In  recent  years  the  FASB  has  issued 
a  number  of  accounting  standards  requiring  disclosure  of  fair  value  information  (see 
Barth  &  Landsman,  1995).  However,  the  FASB's  approach  has  been  cautious.  They  have 
required  fair  value  information  principally  in  respect  of  financial  instruments.  And  whilst 
initiating  fresh  proposals  for  the  reporting  of  comprehensive  income  (FASB,  1996)  they 
have  recognised  that  given  the  lack  of  preparer  enthusiasm  for  the  fuller  application  of  the 
concept5  "a  project  that  considers  all  aspects  of  comprehensive  income,  including 
recognition  and  measurement  of  its  components,  is  not  practical  at  this  time"  (see  Johnson 
et  al,  1995,  p.  133).  The  same  degree  of  caution  has  not  been  shown  by  the  ASB  in  the 
UK6. 
The  way  ahead  for  UK  financial  reporting 
The  publication  by  the  ASB  of  a  "Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting" 
exposure  draft  (1995b),  has  brought  the  current  value  accounting  issue  back  to  the  centre 
of  contemporary  financial  reporting  debate  in  the  UK.  The  exposure  draft  is  wide  ranging. 
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We  will  focus  on  certain  key  features,  which  are  particularly  relevant  to  the  concerns  of 
this  chapter. 
Gains  and  losses  are  defined  in  chapter  3  of  the  exposure  draft  as  increases  or 
decreases  in  ownership  interest,  other  than  those  relating  to  contributions  from  or 
distributions  to  owners  (ASB,  1995b,  para  3.47).  Ownership  interest  itself  is  defined  as 
the  entity's  assets  less  its  liabilities  (ASB,  1995b,  para  3.39).  The  determination  of  entity 
performance  becomes  essentially  derivative  of  the  measurement  of  assets  and  liabilities  in 
the  balance  sheet,  and  the  key  issue  becomes  "getting  the  balance  sheet  right".  Only  a 
very  small  proportion  of  the  one  hundred  and  seventy  five  published  responses  to  the 
exposure  draft  were  positively  supportive  of  the  balance  sheet  orientation  put  forward  by 
the  draft.  Table  I  presents  a  basic?  analysis  of  our  interpretation  of  comments  on  this 
issue: 
Table  I  Analysis  of  comment  on  the  Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial 
Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  (ASB,  1995b) 
Comment  on  the  draft's  proposals,  which  favour  the  adoption  of  a 
balance  sheet  orientation,  (comments  alternatively  expressed  in 
terms  of  a  preference  for  the  matching  approach). 
Classification  Number  of  Supportive  Opposed  No 
of  responses  unequivocal 
Commentators  comment 
Users  10  10%  30%  60% 
Preparers  91  3%  52%  45% 
Accountants  54  2%  48%  50% 
Academics  12  -  33%  67% 
Others  8  13%  37%  50% 
Measurement  is  dealt  with  in  chapter  5  of  the  draft,  and  a  preference  for  current 
values  is  made  plain:  "practice  should  develop  by  evolving  in  the  direction  of  greater  use 
of  current  values  to  the  extent  that  this  is  consistent  with  the  constraints  of  reliability  and 
cost",  (ASB,  1995b,  para  5.38).  Table  II  presents  our  analysis  of  comment  on  this  issue 
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and  shows  that  preparers  and  accountants  tend  to  be  quite  clearly  opposed  to  significant 
extension  of  the  use  of  current  values: 
Table  II  Analysis  of  comment  on  the  Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial 
Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  (ASB,  1995b) 
Comment  on  the  draft's  proposal  that  the  use  of  current  values  in 
accounts  should  be  extended. 
Number  Supportive  Supportive  Opposed  No 
in  principle  unequivocal 
with  comment 
reservation 
on 
practicality 
Users  10  40%  -  30%  30% 
Preparers  91  3%  1%  84%  12% 
Accountants  54  2%  7%  69%  22% 
Academics  12  -  -  42%  58% 
Others  8  50%  -  25%  25% 
The  presentation  of  gains  and  losses  is  dealt  with  in  chapter  6  of  the  exposure 
draft.  It  is  suggested  that  the  statement  of  total  recognised  gains  and  losses,  a  statement 
introduced  by  Financial  Reporting  Standard  No.  3-  Reporting  Financial  Performance 
FRS.  3,  ASB,  1992c),  should  become  the  key  performance  statement:  "In  assessing  the 
overall  financial  performance  of  an  entity  during  a  period,  all  gains  and  losses  need  to  be 
considered.  The  statement  of  total  recognised  gains  and  losses  (as  its  name  implies) 
reports  the  total  amount  of  the  gains  and  losses  recognised  in  the  period  ... 
",  (ASB, 
1995b,  para  6.20).  The  chapter  6  proposals  would  discard  the  traditional  rule  that  only 
realised  profits  appear  in  the  profit  and  loss  statement  and  would  require  that  the  profit 
and  loss  account,  and  the  statement  of  total  recognised  gains  and  losses,  report  the  gains 
and  losses  that  arise  in  the  period,  irrespective  of  when  they  are  realised,  (ASB,  1995b, 
para  6.25).  The  distinction  between  realised  and  unrealised  gains  and  losses,  which  has 
been  a  cornerstone  of  conventional  accounting,  would  be  relegated  to  notes  to  the 
accounts,  (ASB,  1995b,  para  6.24).  Our  analysis  of  comment  on  the  proposal  that  the 
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realisation  principle  be  abandoned  is  shown  in  table  III.  Few  commentators  supported  this 
proposal.  We  have  recorded  commentators  as  opposed  to  the  ASB's  proposals  on  any 
issue  only  where  they  have  made  specific  statements  to  that  effect.  This  issue  did  not 
excite  as  high  a  volume  of  direct  comment  as  the  proposal  that  greater  use  be  made  of 
current  values.  Many  of  the  comments  opposing  greater  use  of  current  values  could  be 
more  liberally  interpreted  as  opposing  any  change  to  the  "tried  and  trusted"  historical  cost 
and  realisation  based  accounting  model.  We  thus  consider  that  table  III  probably 
understates  the  extent  of  real  opposition  to  the  ASB's  proposals. 
Table  III  Analysis  of  comment  on  the  Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial 
Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  (ASB,  1995b) 
Comment  on  draft's  proposals,  which  would  abandon  the  traditional  rule 
that  only  realised  profit  appears  in  the  profit  and  loss  account, 
(comment  alternatively  expressed  in  terms  of  support  for  the  prudence 
concept). 
Number  Supportive  Not  No  unequivocal  comment 
supportive 
Users  10  10%  10%  80% 
Preparers  91  3%  39%  58% 
Accountants  54  6%  52%  42% 
Academics  12  -  42%  58% 
Others  8  13%  50%  37% 
Chapter  6  of  the  exposure  draft  goes  on  to  draw  a  distinction  between  profits  or 
losses  arising  form  operating  activities  and  gains  and  losses  resulting  from  changes  in  the 
value  of  assets  and  liabilities  held  to  enable  those  operations.  The  latter  would  be  dealt 
with  in  the  statement  of  total  recognised  gains  and  losses  (ASB,  1995b,  para  6.27),  and 
never  feature  in  the  profit  and  loss  account.  All  other  gains  and  losses  would  be  dealt  with 
in  the  profit  and  loss  account,  (ASB,  1995b,  para  6.28).  The  proposals  would  tend  to  lead 
towards  a  "standardised"  profit  being  reported  in  the  profit  and  loss  account  without 
regard  to  the  terms  of  transactions  that  the  company  has  undertaken.  For  example 
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revaluation  of  loans  would  lead  to  interest  expense  being  recognised  in  the  profit  and  loss 
account  at  current  rates  irrespective  of  the  contracted  rate.  The  revaluation  of  leasehold 
interests  would  standardise  lease  charges  to  the  market  rate  irrespective  of  the  lease  terms 
negotiated  (Ernst  &  Young,  1996a,  p.  7).  In  effect  the  profit  and  loss  account  would  no 
longer  present  a  full  statement  of  gains  and  losses  arising  from  operations;  some  of  those 
gains  and  losses  would  be  dealt  with  elsewhere  -  in  the  statement  of  total  recognised  gains 
and  losses.  Ernst  and  Young  describe  the  proposed  division  of  gains  and  losses  between 
the  profit  and  loss  account  and  the  statement  of  total  recognised  gains  and  losses  as 
entailing  a  "serious  degrading  of  the  profit  and  loss  account",  (Ernst  &  Young,  1996a,  p. 
13).  Many  of  the  commentators  on  the  exposure  draft  focused  on  this  issue  (ASB,  1996a, 
p.  6).  Our  analysis  of  comments  table  IV  shows  that  very  few  commentators  were 
supportive  of  the  ASB's  proposals: 
Table  IV  Analysis  of  comment  on  the  Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial 
Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  (ASB,  1995b)  - 
Comment  on  the  draft's  proposals  concerning  the  division  of  gains 
between  the  profit  and  loss  account  and  the  statement  of  total 
recognised  gains  and  losses,  which  elevate  the  significance  of  the  latter 
statement,  and  correspondingly  threaten  to  reduce  the  profit  and  loss 
account  to  a  normalised  statement  of  operating  results. 
Number  Supportive  Opposed  No  unequivocal  comment 
Users  10  40%  30%  30% 
Preparers  91  3%  46%  51% 
Accountants  54  2%  54%  44% 
Academics  12  -  25%  75% 
Others  8  13%  25%  62% 
Finally,  chapter  1  of  the  exposure  draft  attempts  to  clarify  the  objectives  of 
financial  statements.  It  suggests  that  the  objective  of  financial  statements  "is  to  provide 
information  about  the  financial  position,  performance  and  financial  adaptability  of  an 
enterprise  that  is  useful  to  a  wide  range  of  users  for  assessing  the  stewardship  of 
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management  and  for  making  economic  decisions"  (ASB,  1995b,  para  1.1).  This  espousal 
of  a  decision  usefulness  purpose  for  financial  statement  may  appear  to  be  innocuous. 
However,  as  table  V  shows,  this  definition  excites  significant  opposition. 
Table  V  Analysis  of  comment  on  the  Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial 
Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  (ASB,  1995b) 
Comment  on  the  draft's  proposal  that  financial  statements  should  have 
the  objective  of  "of  providing  information  about  the  financial  position, 
performance  and  financial  adaptability  of  an  enterprise  that  is  useful  to 
a  wide  range  of  users  for  assessing  the  stewardship  of  management  and 
for  making  economic  decisions"  (ASB,  1995b,  Para.  1.1),  (may  be 
expressed  in  terms  of  a  call  to  stress  stewardship  over  decision  making, 
and/or  in  call  for  emphasis  on  shareholders  as  primary  user  group). 
Number  Supportive  Opposed  No  unequivocal  comment 
Users  10  10%  20%  70% 
Preparers  91  -  22%  78% 
Accountants  54  4%  35%  61% 
Academics  12  -  33%  67% 
Others  8  13%  13%  74% 
Those  opposed  to  the  definition  are  concerned  primarily  that  it  might  raise  "unfulfillable" 
expectations  and  thereby  expose  directors  and  auditors  to  litigation. 
We  hope  we  have  succeeded  in  conveying  the  weight  of  opposition  facing  the 
ASB.  Their  proposals  are  substantially  opposed  by  the  preparers,  auditors,  and  academics 
and  have  received  a  mixed  response  from  users.  However,  the  proposals  do  succeed  in 
winning  the  virtually  unqualified  approval  of  one  highly  significant  user  group:  The 
Institute  of  Investment  Management  and  Research  which  represents  the  investment 
analysis  profession  in  the  UK.  They  enthusiastically  endorse  the  call  for  greater  use  of 
current  value  information  and  agree  with  the  ASB  that  the  objectives  of  financial 
statements  should  include  the  provision  of  information  to  a  range  of  users  for  making 
economic  decisions: 
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"It  is  right  that  the  setters  of  accounting  standards  should  explicitly 
recognise  that  some  users  will  be,  involved  in  the  process  of  determining 
whether  to  buy,  sell  or  hold  securities  of  a  company,  ... 
it  is  right  for  the 
exposure  draft  to  highlight  the  predictive  value  of  financial  information  as 
a  key  characteristic  relating  to  content.  " 
(Institute  of  Investment  Management  and  Research,  1996,  p.  445) 
The  debate  surrounding  the  development  of  the  ASB's  draft  Statement  of 
Principles  has  been  vigorous.  The  ASB  received  more  letters  of  comment  on  it  than  on 
any  other  document  it  has  exposed  (ASB,  1996,  p.  1).  Each  of  the  chapters  of  the 
exposure  draft  was  initially  issued  as  a  discussion  document,  and  the  lines  of  opposition 
clearly  drawn  before  the  issue  of  the  exposure  draft  in  November  1995.  Ernst  &  Young 
have  taken  a  lead  in  opposing  the  ASB's  proposals  (Ernst  &  Young,  1993  &  1996a),  and  a 
relatively  high  percentage  of  commentators  on  the  exposure  draft  directly  refer  to  Ernst  & 
Young  in  making  their  own  response.  They  have  described  the  proposed  draft  as  "an 
academic  diversion  that  will  not  serve  the  interests  of  financial  reporting  practice"  (Ernst 
&  Young,  1996a,  p.  3),  and  challenged  the  ASB's  authority  to  proceed  with  the  project, 
saying;  "...  we  do  not  believe  that  the  ASB  should  use  British  industry  as  a  test-bed  for 
academic  theories  on  accounting,  and  we  question  whether  it  has  a  mandate  to  do  so" 
(Ernst  &  Young,  1996,  p.  3).  In  the  face  of  hostile  comment  the  ASB  has  accepted  the 
need  for  fuller  discussion  before  they  proceed  to  a  finalisation  of  the  Statement  of 
Principles. 
Commodity  fetishism  and  identity  thinking  in  financial  accounting 
In  this  section  of  the  chapter  we  develop  the  foundations  of  our  analysis  of  the'  squabble 
surrounding  the  ASB  'Statement  of  Principles'  project.  These  foundations  lie  in 
accounting's  reflection  of  the  contradictions  and  crises  tendencies  immanent  to 
commodity  production. 
In  Capital,  Marx  (1867)  begins  his  economic  investigation  of  capitalism  with  the 
analysis  of  the  commodity  form.  He  shows  that,  through  the  exchange  process,  the 
qualitative  differences  between  commodities  are  suppressed  as  use-values  become 
dominated  by  the  abstract  quantitative  equivalences  of  exchange-values,  and  that  the 
social  relations  between  men  and  women,  capitalist  and  worker,  come  to  be  dominated  by 
the  relations  between  inanimate  commodities: 
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"The  mysterious  character  of  the  commodity-form  consists  therefore 
simply  in  the  fact  that  the  commodity  reflects  the  social  characteristics  of 
men's  own  labour  as  objective  characteristics  of  the  products  of  labour 
themselves,  as  the  socio-natural  properties  of  these  things.  Hence  it  also 
reflects  the  social  relation  of  the  producers  to  the  sum  total  of  labour  as  a 
social  relation  between  objects,  a  relation  that  exists  apart  from  and  outside 
the  producers.  ...  It  is  nothing  but  the  definite  social  relation  between  men 
themselves  which  assumes  here,  for  them,  the  fantastic  form  of  a  relation 
between  things.  I  call  this  fetishism...  " 
(Marx,  1867,  pp.  164-165) 
Marx's  analysis  exposes  the  real  disjunctions  in  capitalism  between  substance  and 
form  and  reveals  the  ideological  power  of  exchange  to  forge  equivalences  between 
incommensurables:  concrete  inequalities  and  exploitative  social  relations  appear  as 
abstract  equivalences,  for  example,  exploitative  wage  relations  appear  as  equal  exchanges 
of  the  commodities  of  money  and  labour.  He  reveals  ideology's  material  foundations  in 
fetishised  commodity  production  and  exchange:  market  exchanges  are  real,  not 
imaginary,  and  effected  through,  and  reflected  by,  significant  social  institutions  which 
lend  the  semblances  they  produce  a  robustness  and  naturalness  which  is  difficult  to 
penetrate. 
Accountants  are  the  commodity  fetishists  par  excellence:  they  embrace  the 
specious  equivalence  between  exchange-value  and  use-value,  and  take  for  granted  the 
dominance  of  exchange-values  in  their  representations  of  events.  By  dealing  almost 
exclusively  with  the  sterile  quantitative  abstraction  of  exchange-value,  they  help 
reproduce  the  ideological  grip  of  the  fetishised  commodity  on  social  relations.  From  this 
perspective,  financial  accounting  in  capitalism  is  unremittingly  oppressive.  As  it  raises  up 
relations  between  thing  and  thing  in  exchange,  it  suppresses  far  richer  relations  between 
people  and  things  -  use-values. 
Marx's  analysis  of  exchange  value  and  commodity  fetishism  was  adopted  by 
Adorno  as  a  model  for  a  wide-ranging  critique  of  bourgeois  ideology.  For  Adorno  (1966), 
exchange  and  false  equivalences  are  at  the  core  of  all  ideological  thought.  Ideology  is 
"identity  thinking",  a  type  of  rationality  which  strives  to  subsume  the  plurality  of  all 
particular  things  within  unitary  systems  of  concepts.  It  works  to  homogenise  diverse 
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phenomena,  '  to  make  the  different  interchangeable  (fungible),  to  forge  and  hold  in  place 
spurious  equivalences  between  concepts  and  objects,  ideas  and  the  material  world.  Order 
and  control  at  the  level  of  concepts  is  achieved  in  systems  of  thought,  at  the  expense  of 
the  suppression  of  many  of  the  qualitative  dimensions  of  the  objects  those  systems 
pretend  to  grasp.  Identity  thinking  can  not  penetrate  the  form  of  social  systems  and 
scrutinise  the  "nonidentical"  -  that  which  "defies  subsumption  under  identity  -  the  'use 
value',  in  Marxist  terminology"  (Adorno,  1966,  p.  11).  It  can  never  reveal  the  true 
exploitative  nature  of  the  social  relations  of  production,  which  determine,  in  so  many 
ways,  the  way  we  live. 
The  magic  of  the  commodity  fetish  is  powerful  and  real.  However  it  is  not  beyond 
challenge.  Marx  recognises  that  the  antithesis  immanent  in  the  commodity  form  "imply 
the  possibility  of  crisis"  in  capitalism  (Marx,  1867,  p.  209);  that  immanent  contradiction 
could  drive  the  system  to  a  point  where  it  could  not  continue  to  operate  without  radical 
structural  change.  To  constantly  reproduce  the  mystification  of  the  commodity  form,  a 
good  deal  of  ideological  work  needs  to  be  done.  Financial  accounting  itself,  in  taking  the 
primacy  of  exchange-values  for  granted,  is  a  powerful  ideological  support  to  the 
commodity  form.  However,  accounting,  as  an  ideological  sub-system  of  capitalism 
reflecting  and  reproducing  the  commodity  fetish,  contains  within  itself  the  seeds  of  crisis; 
accounting's  unitary  system  of  concepts  is  inadequate  to  grasp  and  hold  their  object.  In 
any  system  the  object  is  always  more  than  the  concept,  "what  is,  is  more  than  it  is" 
(Adorno,  1966,  p.  161).  However  in  accounting  the  inadequacy  of  the  concept,  exchange- 
value,  to  speak  of  the  object,  use-value,  is  of  an  absolute  and  chronic  nature.  Financial 
accounting  presents  a  systematic  unitary  account  of  relations  between  things,  which 
excludes  the  plurality  of  person-to-thing,  and  person-to-person  relations. 
The  framing  of  decisions  and  mental  accounts 
In  this  section  of  the  chapter  we  use  advances  in  the  study  of  psychology  of  human  choice 
to  illustrate  the  incapacity  of  exchange-value  to  close  its  grasp  on  its  object,  use-value. 
We  draw  the  implications  of  research,  which  shows  that  the  meaning  of  wealth  depends 
upon  how  it  is  represented  and  understood  -  on  our  mental  accounting  for  it.  We  focus  on 
the  "universal  commodity",  money,  the  unit  of  account,  and  show  that  humanity  and  its 
representational  heuristics  can  not  be  separated  from  the  meaning  and  value  of  even  the 
most  abstract  of  commodities  at  the  heart  of  the  unitary  systems  of  exchange  value 
accounting. 
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Mental  accounts  are  psychological  frames  within  which  decision-makers  are 
hypothesised  to  organise  representations  of  the  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  an  event 
or  option.  The  mental  accounts  concept  is  derived  from  prospect  theory  (Kahneman  & 
Tversky,  1979).  Choice  under  Kahneman  &  Tversky's  prospect  theory  is  postulated  to 
follow  a  two  phase  process  of  editing  and  evaluation.  Editing  is  a  mental  accounting 
phase  in  which  prospects  are  represented  in  terms  of  gains,  losses  and  neutral  outcomes 
with  respect  to  some  reference  point.  The  establishment  of  reference  points  is  crucial  and 
will  depend  upon,  inter  alia,  expectations  and  aspirations.  In  phase  two,  edited 
representations  are  evaluated  according  to  a  value  (utility)  function  with  three  key 
characteristics:  (i)  it  is defined  over  gains  and  losses  (rather  than  states  of  wealth)  which 
are  reference-point  dependent,  (ii)  losses  have  more  hedonic  intensity  than  gains  of 
equivalent  size,  (iii)  there  is  diminishing  marginal  value  of  both  gains  and  losses  as  size 
increases.  Together  these  characteristics  yield  a  value  function  that  is  concave  for  gains, 
convex  for  losses,  and  steeper  for  losses  than  for  gains. 
Kahneman  &  Tversky  make  the  linkage  of  mental  accounts  and  prospect  theory 
clear  using  modifications  of  the  following  scenario,  introduced  in  Tversky  &  Kahneman 
(1981,  p.  457): 
"Imagine  that  you  are  about  to  purchase  a  jacket  for  $125  and  a  calculator 
for  $15.  The  calculator  salesman  informs  you  that  the  calculator  you  wish 
to  buy  is  on  sale  for  $10  at  the  other  branch  of  the  store  located  20  minutes 
drive  away.  Would  you  make  a  trip  to  the  other  store?  " 
The  financial  advantage  versus  the  inconvenience  can  be  framed  in  terms  of  a  minimal, 
topical,  or  comprehensive  account,  as  follows: 
(i)  A  minimal  account  would  include  as  a  cost  the  inconvenience  of  travelling  to  the 
other  store,  and  the  financial  advantage  as  simply  $5. 
(ii)  A  topical  account  relates  the  consequences  of  choice  to  a  reference  point 
determined  by  the  circumstances  of  the  decision.  In  this  case  because  the  saving  is 
associated  only  with  the  calculator  the  financial  advantage  will  be  represented  as  a 
reduction  of  the  price  from  $15  to  $10. 
20 Chapter  1:  Financial  Accounting,  Crisis  and  the  Commodity  Fetish 
(iii)  A  more  comprehensive  account  the  saving  could  be  framed  in  relation  to  the  price 
of'  the  jacket  and  the  calculator  and  more  broadly  still  in  relation  to  other 
expenses. 
Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1984)  suggest  that  people  spontaneously  organise  decision 
problems  in  terms  of  topical  accounts.  They  test  the  suggestion  by  first  noting  that  topical 
organisation  of  the  problem  together  with  the  concavity  of  the  prospect  theory  value 
function  in  the  domain  of  gains  would  lead  to  a  prediction  that  willingness  to  travel  to 
save  $5  on  the  price  of  a  calculator  would  be  inversely  related  to  the  price  of  the 
calculator  and  be  independent  of  the  price  of  the  jacket.  They  tested  the  prediction  by 
modifying  the  problem  in  which  the  price  of  the  two  items  were  interchanged,  the  price  of 
the  calculator  being  given  as  125.  Clearly  this  modification  leaves  the  problems 
identical  in  terms  of  minimal  and  comprehensive  accounts.  As  predicted  the  proportion  of 
subjects  who  said  they  would  make  the  trip  fell  significantly  when  the  problem  was 
modified:  68%  of  88  respondents  were  willing  to  travel  to  save  $5  on  a  $15  calculator, 
only  29%  of  93  respondents  were  willing  to  travel  to  save  the  same  amount  on  a  $125 
calculator.  The  differences  in  response,  obviously,  can  not  be  explained  in  terms  of 
wealth  effects  -  Tversky  &  Kahneman  (1981),  propose  that  they  can  be  explained  as  an 
effect  of  psychological  accounting. 
Subsequent  research  has  produced  numerous  replications,  extensions  and 
applications  of  the  mental  accounting  effects.  However,  little  consideration  seems  to  have 
been  given  to  the  implications  of  the  effect  for  financial  accounting.  Some  of  those 
implications  are,  we  believe,  indirectly  illuminated  by  Shefrin  &  Thaler's  (1988)  use  of 
the  mental  accounts  concept  to  explain  savings  behaviour  and  in  particular  violations  of 
the  classic  life-cycle  theories  of  saving. 
The  life-cycle  models  of  saving  and  consumption  developed  by  Modigliani  and 
Brumberg  (1954),  and  Friedman  (1957),  predict  that  rational,  utility-maximising 
consumers  will  smooth  year  to  year  consumption  towards  an  amount  consistent  with  their 
lifetime  conception  of  permanent  income.  To  do  this  people  would  have  to  behave  as  if, 
each  year,  they  calculated  the  present  value  of  their  total  wealth,  including  their  future 
income,  and  set  consumption  for  the  year  equal  to  the  amount  receivable  from  an  annuity 
with  a  present  value  equal  to  their  estimated  wealth.  The  collapsing  of  future  income  and 
present  assets  into  a  single  measure  of  wealth  is  based  on  an  assumption  that  wealth  is 
fungible;  that  its  form,  or  source,  is  not  relevant  to  the  analysis. 
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The  classic  life-cycle  models  of  saving  are  elegant  and  eminently  rational,  yet 
they  are  among  those  economic  theories  which  do  not  fit  well  with  the  way  research 
indicates  people  actually  behave  (Hall  &  Mishkin,  1982;  Wilcox,  1989).  The  main 
problems  which  emerge  from  empirical  test  of  the  theory  are,  firstly,  that  consumption 
seems  too  sensitive  to  current  income  to  be  consistent  with  classic  life-cycle  theories  and 
rational  expectations,  and,  secondly,  that  the  marginal  propensity  to  consume  (MPC) 
wealth  seems  to  vary  across  forms  of  wealth.  People  typically  have  very  low  MPC's  for 
pension  wealth  or  home  equity,  and  very  high  MPCs  for  current  income  and  windfall 
gains.  Various  ad  hoc  amendments  to  classic  life-cycle  theory  have  been  advanced  to  try 
and  improve  its  fit  with  actual  behaviour. 
Shefrin  &  Thaler  (1988)  suggest  a  parsimonious  explanation  of  the  failure  of  the 
classic  life-cycle  models.  They  question  the  implicit  assumption  of  the  traditional  life- 
cycle  models  that  the  labelling,  or  the  framing,  of  wealth  is  irrelevant  because  wealth  is 
fungible.  Their  behavioural  life-cycle  theory  assumes  that  various  components  of  wealth 
are  represented  in  different  mental  accounts.  The  posited  psychological  motive  for  the 
differentiation  being  that  it  is  part  of  a  technology  of  self-control  in  which  some  accounts 
are  more  resistant  to  the  temptation  of  consumption  than  others.  They  argue  that  the 
source  and  size  of  a  change  in  wealth  will  affect  how  it  is  categorised  within  an  internal 
representation  system  containing,  in  broad  stylised  terms,  the  following  mental  accounts: 
a  current  income  account  with  an  MPC  of  close  to  unity;  an  asset  account  with  an  MPC  of 
close  to  zero;  and  a  future  income  account,  with  an  MPC  somewhere  between  zero  and 
unity  (also  see  Thaler,  1990).  The  behavioural  life-cycle  theory  proposes  an 
understanding  of  wealth  in  which  "labels  matter". 
Investigations  of  the  anomalies  of  inter-temporal  choice  reinforce  and  develop  the 
suggestion  that  the  labelling  of  wealth  may  affect  its  subjective  value.  When  making 
inter-temporal  choices  people  are  not  consistent  in  their  use  of  discount  rates,  as 
economists  suggest  they  should  be.  Various  behavioural  regularities  in  the  effective 
choice  of  discount  rate  have  been  identified,  including  a  "magnitude  effect"  whereby 
discount  rates  used  decline  as  the  amounts  increase.  Lowenstein  &  Thaler  (1989),  propose 
a  mental  accounting  explanation  of  the  magnitude  effect.  They  suggest  that  small  windfall 
gains  may  be  entered  in  high  MPC  mental  current  income  accounts,  whilst  larger  amounts 
are  entered  in  mental  asset  accounts  with  low  MPCs.  The  cost  of  delay  in  receipt  of  small 
windfalls  may  then  be  interpreted  as  foregone  consumption,  whilst  the  cost  of  delay  in 
receipt  of  a  larger  amount  may  be  perceived  in  terms  of  forgone  interest.  A  magnitude 
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effect  would  then  occur  if  were  more  painful  to  forgo  consumption  than  to  forgo  interest. 
The  magnitude  effect  suggests  that  the  subjective  utility  of  a  gain  will  depend  in  part 
upon  whether  it  is  entered  in  a  mental  income  account  or a  mental  asset  account:  whether 
it  is  perceived  as  consumable  or  as  merely  a  source  of  interest.  And  the  effect  suggests 
that  preparers  of  financial  accounts  may  add  or  destroy  value  by  influencing  users'  mental 
topical  recording  of  gains  and  costs. 
The  research  discussed  above  reminds  us  that  value  is  always  subjective  and 
dependent  upon  human  understanding  and  representational  frameworks.  It  indicates  that 
use-value  can  not  be  detached  from  its  representation  in  human  minds;  it  is  always  a 
person-to-thing  relation  and  can  not  be  captured  by  thing-to-thing  exchange-value 
relations. 
Mental  accounts  and  financial  accounting  practice  and  theory 
Wealth  has  a  dual  character:  exchange-value  and  use-value.  In  terms  of  the  abstraction  of 
exchange-value,  wealth  is  conceptually  fungible;  homogeneous.  In  terms  of  use-values, 
wealth  is  multifarious;  heterogeneous.  Despite  the  ideological  pressure  of  commodity 
fetishism,  people  seem  to  organise  their  mental  representations  of  wealth  in  topical 
accounts,  which  treat  it  as  non-fungible;  multifarious.  We  find,  in  the  traditional  topical 
organisation  of  financial  accounts,  a  reflection  of  the  mental  accounting  categorisation  of 
wealth  and  changes  in  wealth,  which  reveals  the  multifarious  nature  of  human  concerns 
and  use-values  breaking  into  accounts  of  exchange-values. 
The  mental  accounting  categories  appear  to  be  associated  with  psychological 
mechanisms  for  disciplining  and  control  of  consumption  (see  Shefrin  &  Thaler,  1988). 
Financial  accounts  have  traditionally  served  a  similar  function.  Hicks  identifies  the  basic 
need  for  income  measurement  in  terms  of  giving  "people  an  indication  of  the  amount  they 
can  consume  without  impoverishing  themselves"  (Hicks,  1946,  p.  172).  The  role  played 
by  financial  accounting,  in  informing  and  restraining  consumption  decisions,  is  given 
legal  recognition  in  European  law  which  takes  realised  profits  as  the  basis  of  permissible 
distributions  to  shareholders  (see  UK  Companies  Act,  1985,  para.  263(3)). 
Traditional  financial  accounting  facilitates  the  identification  of  a  financial 
accounting  current  income  broadly  consistent  with  mental  current  income.  The  prudence 
convention  requires  that  revenue  is  normally  recognised  in  the  profit  and  loss  account 
only  "when  realised  in  the  form  of  cash  or  other  assets  the  ultimate  cash  realisation  of 
which  can  be  assessed  with  reasonable  certainty"  (ASC,  1971,  para.  14.  b).  Unrealised 
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holding  gains  are  therefore  excluded  from  the  traditional  financial  accounting  income 
statement,  just  as  they  are  generally  excluded  from  mental  income  accounts9.  Financial 
accounting  practice  also  normally  requires  the  separate  disclosure  of  income  which, 
because  of  its  "size  or  incidence",  is  exceptional  (ASB,  1992c,  para.  5).  The  separate 
disclosure  of  exceptional  income  would  allow  its  assignment  to  an  appropriate  mental 
account,  dependent  upon  the  size  and  incidence  of  the  gain  -  large  amounts  of  windfall 
income  may  be  assigned  to  mental  capital  accounts  with  low  MPCs10.  Similarly  financial 
accounting  practice  customarily  makes  a  clear  distinction  between  operating  profits  and 
capital  gains.  For  example  FRS.  3  (ASB,  1992c,  para.  20),  requires  that  gains  or  losses  on 
the  sale  or  termination  of  an  operation  or  on  disposal  of  fixed  assets  should  be  shown 
separately  from  operating  profit  on  the  face  of  the  profit  and  loss  account.  The  clear 
labelling  of  realised  capital  gains  facilitates  their  allocation  to  appropriate  mental  income 
accounts  -  with  MPCs  lying  somewhat  below  those  applicable  to  realised  operating 
income".  Traditional  financial  accounting  practice  effectively  recognises  that  wealth  is 
not  fungible.  We  interpret  the  relation  between  mental  accounts  and  financial  accounts  as 
an  instance  of  human  need  protruding  through  the  abstraction  of  exchange-values  in 
accounting;  humanity  breaking  into  the  abstraction  of  thing-to-thing  relations. 
In  contrast  to  traditional  financial  accounting  practice,  the  economic  income 
perspective  implicitly  assumes  that  wealth  is  fungible.  From  that  perspective  Alexander 
(1950)  defined  a  company's  profit  as  the  amount  the  company  could  distribute  to 
shareholders  and  remain  as  well  off  at  the  end  of  the  period  as  it  was  at  the  beginning.  In 
which  case  income,  in  the  absence  of  new  contributions  of  capital  or  distributions,  can  be 
expressed  as:  Y,  =  Vi  -  Vi.,,  where  Y1  is  the  income  for  the  period  i,  and  V1  and  Vi.,  are 
capital  values,  or  wealth,  at  the  end  and  beginning  of  period  i  respectively.  From  this 
perspective,  income  measurement  is  simply  a  derivative  of  the  measurement  of  well- 
offness  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  period.  Hicks  suggests  that  well-offness  should  be 
measured  in  terms  of  the  present  value  of  future  cash  flows,  and  he  frames  his  influential 
income  concept  number  1  in  those  terms.  Accordingly,  income  becomes  "the  maximum 
amount  which  can  be  spent  during  a  period  if  there  is  to  be  an  expectation  of  maintaining 
intact  the  capital  value  of  prospective  receipts  (in  money  terms)"  (Hicks,  1946,  p.  173). 
The  calculation  of  V1.,  and  Vi  would  then  represent  the  collapse,  into  present  values,  of  all 
future  cash  flows  of  the  entity  as  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  period  i  respectively.  The 
meaningfulness  of  the  collapse  of  the  vector  of  a  company's  cash-flows  into  a  single 
present  value  number  depends  upon  the  assumption  that  wealth  is  fungible.  Given  that 
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many  assets  and  claims  are  not  in  fact  represented  in  perfect  markets,  in  which  case  the 
failure  of  the  equation  of  exchange-value  and  use-values  is  rather  difficult  to  ignore,  full 
practical  application  of  the  economic  income  model  to  financial  accounting  is  impossibly 
problematic  (see  Bromwich,  1992,  chapter  4).  The  economic  income  approach  may,  in 
consequence,  have  lost  something  of  its  dominant  hold  on  financial  accounting  theory 
(see  Beaver,  1981,  p.  13).  However,  it  remains  highly  influential  -  it  has  motivated  many 
of  the  proposals  for  market  value  and  current  cost  accounting  found  in  the  accounting 
literature  over  the  years,  including  classics  such  as  Edwards  &  Bell  (1961),  Chambers 
(1966),  and  Sterling  (1970),  and  the  view  that  accounting  income  measures  should  ideally 
be  based  on  the  present  value  of  earning  power  now  can  claim  "virtually  universal 
acceptance  in  the  academic  literature"  (Edwards  et  al,  1987,  p.  2).  Most  significantly,  the 
economic  income  ideal  has  had  deep  and  continuing  influence  on  accounting  policy 
makers  (see  Bromwich,  1992,  p.  33)  -  the  ASB's  "Statement  of  Principles"  proposals 
being  a  recent  instance. 
The  closeness  of  the  fit  we  find  between  mental  accounting  and  traditional 
financial  accounting  practice  suggests  that  they  have  developed  in  dialectical  relation  to 
one  another.  It  suggests  that  the  conceptual  structures  and  knowledge  pertaining  to  mental 
accounts  as  a  source  domain  have  partly  constructed  the  structures  and  knowledge  of 
financial  accounting  as  a  target  domain,  and  vice  versa.  We  recognise  the  structures  of 
mental  accounting  as  culturally  and  historically  contingent,  and,  furthermore,  we  do  not 
regard  the  heuristics  underlying  prospect  theory  as  in  some  way  innate  or  "hard-wired". 
However,  we  do  consider  that  ultimately  such  constructs  have  a  grounded  relationship 
with  quite  fundamental  aspects  of  human  experience  and  need.  In  particular,  we  have 
identified  above  the  need  for  mechanisms  of  self-control  as  instrumental  in  shaping 
mental  and  in  turn  traditional  financial  accounting  12.  The  ASB's  proposals,  discussed 
above,  threaten  to  wrench  financial  accounting  away  from  traditional,  yet  highly 
circumscribed,  relations  with  certain  human  concerns  and  further  towards  the  rational 
abstractions  of  marginalist  economics. 
Contradiction  and  crisis  and  the  statement  of  principles  project 
In  this  section  we  examine  the  origins  of  the  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles'  project  and 
the  controversy  surrounding  it  in  terms  of  the  crisis  tendencies  immanent  to  advanced 
capitalism.  We  build  our  analysis  around  the  framework  presented  by  Habermas'  neo- 
Marxist  exposition  of  those  tendencies.  Habermas  (1973,  p.  45)  argues  that,  other  things 
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being  equal,  "fundamental  contradictions  of  the  capitalist  system"  will  be  manifest  as 
either  economic  crises,  crises  of  rationality,  crises  of  legitimation,  or  as  motivational 
crises  (see  e.  g.,  Held,  1980  pp.  284-295;  Puxty,  1997). 
Economic  crisis;  Marx  contends  that  the  contradictions  of  class  interests  made 
immanent  in  capitalism  as  contradictions  of  system  imperatives  are  manifest  in  the 
system's  tendency  to  periodic  economic  crisis  according  to  the  logic  of  the  tendential  fall 
in  the  rate  of  profit  (see  e.  g.,  Marx  1867;  Habermas,  1973;  Wright,  1978;  O'Connor, 
1984).  In  liberal-capitalism,  the  primary  focus  of  Marx's  analysis,  the  task  of  social 
integration,  the  reconciling  of  the  fundamentally  incompatible  claims  and  intentions  of 
individuals,  groups  and  classes  is  taken  over  by  a  depoliticized  steering  mechanism  -  the 
market  -  which  draws  a  specious  legitimacy  from  the  apparent  justice  of  the  exchange  of 
equivalents,  that  is,  from  the  ideology  of  commodity  fetishism  (see,  Habermas,  1973, 
p.  24).  Whilst  arguing  that  economic  crisis  holds  the  key  to  development  of  class 
consciousness  and  the  revolutionary  recoupling  of  the  economic  and  the  political  (see 
Habermas,  1973,  p.  26),  Marx  recognises  that  even  in  economic  crises  the  contradictions 
embedded  in  capitalism  are  not  self  evident: 
"...  in  liberal  capitalism,  class  antagonism  is  shifted  from  the 
intersubjectivity  of  the  life-world  into  the  sub-stratum  of  this  world. 
Commodity  fetishism  is  both  a  secularized  residual  ideology  and  the 
actually  functioning  steering  principle  of  the  economic  system.  Economic 
crises  thus  lose  the  character  of  a  fate  accessible  to  self-reflection  and 
acquire  the  objectivity  of  inexplicable,  contingent,  natural  events.  The 
ideological  core  has  shifted  to  ground  level.  Before  it  can  be  destroyed  by 
reflection,  these  events  are  in  need  of  an  objective  examination  of  system 
processes.  This  is  reflected  in  the  Marxian  critique  of  political  economy.  " 
(Habermas,  1973,  p.  30) 
Financial  accounting  in  privileging  exchange-value  reflects  and  sustains  the  ideology  of 
commodity  fetishism  upon  which  the  legitimacy  of  the  market  as  a  steering  mechanism 
relies. 
Adorno's  (1966)  analysis  of  identity  thinking  suggests  that  as  reality  becomes 
more  volatile,  complex  and  threatening,  efforts  are  commonly  made,  by  those  with  an 
interest  in  sustaining  the  system,  to  insulate  it  from  critique,  by  enforcing  an  increased 
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coherence  at  the  level  of  concepts,  which  increases  the  separation  of  idea  and  reality.  The 
period  preceding  the  initiation  of  the  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles'  project  was  one  of 
"exceptional  innovation"  in  commercial,  financial  and  regulatory  practice,  and  of 
blatantly  creative  accounting  (see  Tweedie  &  Whittington,  1990).  The  ASB's  proposals 
press  financial  accounting,  as  a  system  of  identity  thinking,  towards  fuller  conceptual 
coherence  in  reflection  of  the  logic  of  the  commodity  form  to  the  exclusion  of  human 
need,  and  promote  its  unity  by  reducing  opportunities  for  accounting  creativity.  Whilst  we 
agree  with  the  many  authors  (e.  g.,  Hines  1991)  who  suggest  conceptual  frameworks  play 
a  role  in  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  social  realities,  we  would  contend  that  the 
"reality"  they  principally  support  is  that  of  commodity  fetishism. 
Habermas  extends  Marx's  analysis  to  take  account  of  the  realities  of  advanced 
capitalism  that  Marx  himself  was  unable  to  fully  anticipate.  Of  particular  relevance  here 
is  the  politicization  of  the  system  steering  mechanism  which  tends  to  occur  as  capitalism 
advances,  that  is,  the  tendency  for  states  to  take  an  increasing  role  in  supplementing  and 
modifying  market  operations.  Accounting  is  an  important  part  of  the  state  para-apparatus 
(see  e.  g.,  Clark  &  Dear,  1984;  Puxty  et  al,  1987;  Robson  &  Cooper,  1990)  of  advanced 
capitalist  society,  taking  both  technical-rational  and  ideological  roles  in  the  regulation  of 
market  operations.  Habermas  recognises  that  in  advanced  capitalism  economic  crisis 
might  be  indefinitely  avoided  by  state  intervention.  However,  he  argues  that  whilst  state 
intervention  can  both  modify  and  displace  economic  crises,  it  can  not  eradicate  the 
immanent  contradictions  -  ultimately  contradictions  of  class  interest  -  which  give  rise  to 
the  crisis  tendency  in  capitalism.  The  translation  of  the  fundamental  contradictions  of 
capitalism  from  the  economic  to  the  political  sphere  will,  naturally,  change  their  form  and 
the  terms  in  which  they  may  possibly  be  resolved  or  managed: 
"In  the  economic  system,  contradictions  are  expressed  directly  in  the  social 
consequences  of  capital  loss  (bankruptcy)  and  deprivation  of  the  means  of 
subsistence  (unemployment).  In  the  administrative  system,  contradictions 
are  expressed  in  irrational  decisions  and  in  the  social  consequences  of 
administrative  failure,  that  is,  in  disorganization  of  areas  of  life.  " 
(Habermas,  1973,  p.  63) 
Rationality  crisis;  Habermas  argues  that  rationality  crisis  occurs  where  "the 
administrative  system  does  not  succeed  in  reconciling  and  fulfilling  the  imperatives 
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received  from  the  economic  system"  (Habermas,  1973,  p.  46).  His  analysis  reveals  the 
origin  of  a  tendency  to  such  crisis  in  the  contradictory  nature  of  the  demands  made  on  the 
political-administrative  system  in  advanced  capitalism.  The  advanced  capitalist  state  must 
secure  general  compliance,  the  loyalty  or  acquiescence  of  all  classes,  whilst 
fundamentally  privileging  the  interests  of  capital  and  sustaining  the  processes  of  capitalist 
accumulation.  A  degree  of  compliance  can  be  obtained  by  coercion.  However  late- 
capitalist  states  generally  seek  to  find  fuller  compliance,  "mass  loyalty",  on  the  basis  of 
the  legitimacy  conferred  by  the  practice  and  ideology  of  bourgeois  democracy  (see 
Lehman  &  Tinker,  1987).  The  political  system  holds  legitimacy  on  the  claim  that  it  can 
provide  a  rational  steering  of  the  economic  system  compatible  with  the  legitimating  value 
system  -  bourgeois  ideology.  Failure  to  redeem  that  claim  -  failure  to  meet  "demands  that 
it  has  placed  on  itself'  -  manifest  in  either  economic  crisis  or  in  rationality  crisis,  will 
threaten  the  legitimacy  of  the  political  system  (see  Habermas,  1973,  p.  69). 
To  securely  hold  its  place  as  part  of  the  system  steering  mechanism  of  advanced 
capitalism,  accounting  must  deliver  consistent  inputs  for  rational  economic  management 
and  in  particular  promote  the  accumulation  of  capital  and  help  restrain  the  crises 
tendencies  in  the  economic  system.  In  the  late  1980's  accounting  was  seen  to  be  failing  to 
meet  this  challenge.  Tweedie  &  Whittington  (1990),  writing  shortly  before  David 
Tweedie  took  over  as  chairman  of  the  ASB,  presented  an  analysis  of  the  current  problems 
of  financial  reporting,  which  reading  as  an  agenda  for  the  ASB's  subsequent  work, 
identified  inconsistency  in  financial  reporting  -  "creative  accounting"  -  as  the  key  issue. 
Mitchell  et  al  similarly  identify  creative  accounting  as  at  the  heart  of  a  rationality  crisis 
facing  accounting: 
"Without  decent  and  credible  information,  the  economy  can  hardly  be 
managed  in  an  effective  way.  With  creative  accounting  and  off-balance 
sheet  financing  ruling  the  day,  no-one  knows  the  rate  of  profitability, 
liquidity  or  investment.  It  is  difficult  to  make  sense  of  any  published 
corporate  report.  The  police  force  of  capitalism  has  gone  into  cahoots  with 
the  people  it  was  meant  to  police.  Everything  and  anything  is  'true  and 
fair'.  Accountancy  has  become  a  process  of  mystification,  obfuscation  and 
downright  deceit.  " 
(Mitchell  et  al,  1991,  p.  9) 
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We  view  the  'Statement  of  Principles'  project  to  be  part  of  the  ASB's  response  to  the  crisis 
of  rationality  and  confidence  manifest  in  the  creative  accounting  abuses  of  the  late  1980's 
and  early  1990's13 
As  explained  above,  rationality  crises  tendencies  are  inevitably  present  in  the 
administrative  apparatus  of  the  advanced  capitalist  state  because  of  the  conflicting 
demands  put  upon  the  system.  Tweedie  &  Whittington  (1990)  recognise  that  conflicts  of 
interests  and  demands  as  the  root  of  financial  reporting's  failures  in  the  period 
immediately  prior  to  the  initiation  of  the  'Statement  of  Principles'  project: 
"The  central  issue  in  accounting  standard-setting  (the  'disease'  in  our 
metaphor)  is  the  market  failure  or  failures  which  make  accounting  standard 
setting  necessary.  One  of  these  failures  is  that  company  managements 
individually  have  incentives  to  represent  their  company's  performance  in 
the  best  possible  light  (e.  g.  by  creative  accounting),  although  collectively 
they  would  like  accounting  to  conform  to  high  standards  in  order  to  inspire 
confidence  in  the  markets  in  which  they  operate.  " 
(Tweedie  &  Whittington,  1990,  p.  97) 
In  their  identification  of  the  fundamental  and  ineradicable  conflict  between 
collective  and  individual  capital;  Tweedie  and  Whittington's  analysis  of  the  basis  of  the 
crisis  facing  accounting  in  the  early  1990's  directly  echoes  Habermas'  general  analysis  of 
the  rationality  crisis  tendency: 
"The  (rationality)  crisis  theorem  is  based  now  on  the  reflection  that 
growing  socialization  of  production  still  adjusted  to  private  ends  brings 
with  it  unfulfillable  -  because  paradoxical  -  demands  on  the  state 
apparatus.  On  the  one  hand,  the  state  is  supposed  to  act  as  a  collective 
capitalist.  On  the  other  hand,  competing  individual  capitals  can  not  form  or 
carry  through  a  collective  will  as  long  as  freedom  of  investment  is  not 
eliminated.  " 
(Habermas,  1973,  p.  62) 
Tweedie  and  Whittington  (1990)  correctly  find  the  immanent  contradiction  of  the 
interests  of  collective  and  individual  capitals,  at  the  root  of  accounting's  failures  to  meet 
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the  needs  of  collective  capital.  The  ASB's  'Statements  of  Principles'  project  clearly  aims 
to  help  rectify  this  failure  by  responding  to  the  need  of  collective  capital  for  accounting 
information  which  will  be  useful  for  decision  making,  and  in  particular  which  will 
promote  the  profitable  allocation  of  resources  and  accumulation  of  capital.  This  is  notably 
evident  in  the  "decision  usefulness"  orientation  of  the  objectives  of  financial  reporting 
proposed  by  the  ASB  and  in  their  call  for  greater  use  of  current  value  information. 
However,  the  conflict  of  interest  between  individual  and  collective  capitals,  which 
Tweedie  &  Whittington  (1990)  found  manifest  in  creative  accounting,  is  an  ineradicable 
feature  of  the  system.  It  now  threatens  the  progress  of  the  ASB's  proposals.  As  we  have 
shown  in  a  previous  section,  the  ASB's  proposals  designed  to  increase  the  usefulness  of 
financial  reporting,  have  encountered  considerable  opposition  from  the  representatives  of 
individual  units  of  capital,  especially  from  preparers  and  auditors  concerned  by  the  effect 
that  the  proposals  could  have  on  their  individual  exposures  to  risk,  costs,  and  competitive 
positions. 
Tweedie  and  Whittington's  analysis,  whilst  correct,  does  not  quite  convey  the  full 
variety  of  the  conflicting  demands  facing  accounting.  In  addition  to  the  conflict  between 
collective  capital  and  individual  capital  which  they  focus  upon,  we  can  identify  in  our 
analysis  of  the  debate  surrounding  the  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles'  project,  conflict 
between  the  generalizable  public  interests  and  the  interests  of  capital,  and  conflict 
between  various  elements  of  organised  individual  capital. 
As  part  of  a  politicized  steering  apparatus  financial  accounting  must,  if  it  is  to 
hold  political  legitimacy,  endeavour  to  sustain  the  claim  that  it  serves  the  generalised 
public  interest.  We  find  this  reflected  in  the  ASB's  advocacy  of  the  view  that  financial 
statements  should  provide  information  which  is  useful  to  a  wide  range  of  users  including 
"employees"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  1.7.  a)  and  "the  public"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  1.7.  f).  We 
have  seen  above  that  this  suggestion  is  strongly  resisted  by  auditors  and  preparers  who 
clearly  see  it  as  not  in  their  individual  interests  to  encourage  any  inflation  of  public 
expectations  of  financial  statements.  The  claims  of  generalizable  public  interest  on 
financial  accounting  have  been  relatively  marginalized,  and  the  public  effectively 
excluded  from  active  involvement  in  the  administration  of  financial  reporting  as  a  system 
and  from  accounting  policy  formation.  For  example,  the  respondents  to  the  ASB's 
'Statement  of  Principles'  exposure  draft  are  predominantly  representative  of  commercial 
interests.  The  public  interest  claim  is  suppressed  but  it  is  fundamental  -  there  is  an 
unavoidable  immanent  contradiction  between  public  and  private  interest,  which  may 
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move  towards  crisis  when  accounting  conspicuously  fails  to  meet  public  expectations  -  as 
we  suggest  was  the  case  in  the  late  1980's  and  early  1990's. 
As  finance  capital  has  grown  in  power  and  significance  an  increasing  division  has 
developed  between  the  interests  of  finance  capital  and  productive  capital  which  finds 
expression  in,  for  example,  the  demands  made  of  the  accounting  system  (see  Hilferding, 
1910;  Laughlin  &  Puxty,  1983).  The  conflict  between  financial  capital  and  productive 
capital  substantially  reflects  the  conflict  between  collective  and  individual  capital. 
Financial  capital,  represented,  for  example,  by  the  investment  analysts,  has  an  interest  in 
demanding  value-based  accounting  information,  which  will  have  predictive  value  and 
provide  valuable  input  to  buy,  sell,  or  hold  decisions  concerning  financial  investments. 
Productive  capital  as  represented  by  the  management  of  non-financial  enterprises  has  an 
interest  in  limiting  the  disclosure  of  information  with  predictive  value  which  may erode 
competitive  advantage,  or  set  up  expectations  which  may not  be  met.  Finance  capital  is 
more  completely  divorced  from  use-values  than  productive  capital,  it  is  essentially 
concerned  only  with  rates  of  return  and  risk.  The  distinction  between  realised  and 
unrealised  gains  can  be  of  comparatively  little  significance  to  finance  capital.  In  contrast, 
managers  of  units  of  productive  capital  have  residual  links  to  use-value;  they  are  more 
involved  with  real  operations  and  product,  and  will  be  more  concerned  about  the 
maintenance  of  operating  capacity.  For  the  productive  unit  manager  wealth  and  profit  are 
not  fungibles;  unrealised  holding  gains  are  not  consumable  without  undermining  the  real 
productive  potential  of  the  enterprise  -  that  is  its  usefulness  -  and  by  extension  its  use- 
value.  The  managers  of  productive  units  of  capital  will  be  concerned  by  the  consumption 
demands  that  financial  reports  may  provoke,  and  relatively  more  concerned,  than  finance 
capital,  that  the  prudence  concept  be  maintained.  In  the  debate  over  the  ASB's  proposals 
we  see  a  struggle  for  the  meaning  of  accounting  income  which  reflects  different  needs  for 
action-motivating  meaning  in  different  sections  of  capital.  The  conflict  is  reflected  in,  for 
example,  differential  reactions  to  the  proposal  that  the  traditional  rule  allowing  only 
realised  profit  to  appear  in  the  profit  and  loss  account  be  abandoned. 
Habermas  does  not  argue  that  the  full  development  of  rationality  crises  tendencies 
within  the  capitalist  political  system  is  inevitable.  Rather,  he  identifies  three  reasons  why 
rationality  defects  may  not  develop  to  the  extent  that  they  threaten  the  continued 
existence  of  the  system.  Firstly,  whilst  bankruptcy  and  unemployment  represent  clear 
failures  of  the  economic  system,  the  criteria  for  failure  in  the  administrative  sphere  are 
less  clear,  and  the  extent  to  which  contradictions  within  the  administrative  system 
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expressed  as  policy  failure  can  be  tolerated  is  difficult  to  predict.  Accounting's  policy 
failures  perhaps  become  most  obvious,  and  it  moves  most  clearly  towards  crisis,  when  its 
administrative  failure  is  linked  in  the  imagination  with  the  unambiguous  failures  in  the 
economic  system.  For  example,  calls  for  increased  use  of  current  value  information  in 
accounts  received  fresh  impetus  from  the  savings  and  loan  industry  crisis,  in  the  United 
States  (US)  in  the  late  1980's'  4.  Similarly,  in  the  UK  in  the  late  1980's  and  early  1990's 
the  occurrence  of  a  spate  of  company  bankruptcies,  in  circumstances  where  financial 
statements  provided  little  warning  of  impending  collapse,  fuelled  similar  calls  for  radical 
accounting  change: 
"The  usual  company  collapses  of  the  'stop'  phase  of  the  British  economic 
cycle,  into  which  we  are  now  firmly  locked  reveal  the  lax  practices, 
creative  manipulations  and  dubious  standards  accepted  by  accountants  and 
auditors  in  the  Lawson  go  phase.  Instead  of  being  a  secular  priesthood,  the 
profession  looks  more  and  more  like  accessories  to  casino  capitalism.  The 
air  of  sleeze  this  produces  is  generating  an  angry  demand  for  change  .... 
" 
(Mitchell  et  al,  1991,  p.  3) 
Elements  of  the  state  para-apparatus  are  liable  to  receive  state  support  in 
proportion  to  their  ability  to  contribute  to  the  state's  management  of  economic  crises 
tendencies  and  the  production  of  legitimacy.  Their  success  or  failure  will  be  affected  and 
in  part  judged  by  their  own  stability  and  ability  to  manage  internal  contradictions  and 
thereby  support  the  legitimacy  of  the  system  as  a  whole.  Conspicuous  failure  to  meet 
expectations  raises  the  threat  that  the  state  will  be  forced  to  take  a  more  direct 
involvement  with  the  functions  previously  effectively  delegated  to  the  para-apparatus: 
"Fear  of  governmental  intervention  has  long  been,  and  continues  to  be,  the 
major  reason  for  calls  for  action  in  the  profession.  " 
(Dopuch  &  Sunder,  1980,  p.  17) 
More  direct  state  intervention  may  be  perceived  as  a  threat  to  the  privileges 
enjoyed  by  the  profession.  In  such  situations  we  should  expect  and  find  the  introduction 
of  initiatives,  like  the  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles'  project,  which  promise  to  rectify 
past  weaknesses.  A  second  reason  why  rationality  defects  may  not  develop  into  full 
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crisis  is  that  an  administrative  system  may  allow  for  provisional  compromises  to  be 
fashioned.  The  anarchic  market  is  dominated  by  the  rule  of  wealth  maximisation.  That 
rule  is  non-negotiable  and  therefore  the  medium  of  market  exchange  allows  little  scope 
for  conflict  resolution  or  compromise.  In  contrast,  the  administrative  system: 
"...  enters  into  compromise-orientated  negotiations  with  the  sectors  of 
society  on  which  it  depends.  "Bargaining"  is  applied  under  pressure  to  the 
reciprocal  adaptation  of  structures  of  expectation  and  value  systems.... 
The  state  can  make  visible  to  its  negotiating  partners  how  generalizable 
interests  of  the  population  differ  from  organized  individual  interests  as 
well  as  from  the  collective-capitalist  interest  in  the  continued  existence  of 
the  system.  " 
(Habermas,  1973,  pp.  63-64) 
The  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles'  project  serves  to  make  the  policy  alternatives 
for  accounting  visible  and  to  stimulate  a  debate  through  which  compromise  may  be 
found.  The  active  debate  surrounding  the  ASB's  proposals  opens  the  possibility  of 
bargaining  and  compromise.  The  ASB's  project  can  be  seen  as  a  compromise-seeking 
crisis-management  strategy. 
Third  and  finally,  rationality  crises  may  be  contained  because  "crisis  tendencies 
cannot  assert  themselves  through  collective  administrative  action  unconsciously  in  the 
same  way  as  they  can  through  the  particularized  behaviour  of  individual  market 
participants.  ... 
Instead,  crisis  avoidance  is  thematized  as  a  goal  of  action"  (Habermas, 
1973,  p.  64).  Tweedie  &  Whittington  (1990)  makes  it  clear  that  the  chairman  of  the  ASB 
was  well  aware  of  the  developing  rationality  crises  tendencies  engulfing  accounting  and 
intellectually  engaged  in  an  attempt  to  understand  and  propose  a  strategy  for  their 
containment.  The  ASB  could  have  been  in  no  doubt  that  their  ideas  would  be  highly 
controversial.  Systematic  conflicts  of  interests  were  clearly  recognised  (Tweedie  and 
Whittington,  1990),  and  previously  exposed  discussion  papers  containing  ideas  similar  to 
those  eventually  included  in  the  exposure  draft  had  provoked  hostile  reactions  from  some 
quarters.  The  ASB  did  not  stumble  blindly  into  controversy,  rather,  its  'Statement  of 
Principles'  project  appears  to  be  a  conscious  attempt  to  manage  a  rationality  crisis  by 
provoking  a  debate  in  which  compromise  might  eventually  be  found. 
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An  anarchic  market  dominated  by  the  rule  of  private  wealth  maximisation  is  not 
capable  of  finding  or  imposing  the  compromises  or  solutions,  which  are  necessary  if  crisis 
is  to  be  avoided  (see  Habermas,  1973,  pp.  63-64).  The  management  of  crises  tendencies 
in  advanced  capitalism  typically  entails  intervention  by  the  state,  often  effected  via  state 
para-apparatus  such  as  the  ASB  -  it  is  market  failure  which  make  accounting  standard 
setting  necessary  (see  Tweedie  &  Whittington,  1990,  p.  97).  However  the  very  the 
strategies  employed  to  manage  rationality  crises  may  raise  other  crises  tendencies. 
Legitimation  crisis;  Habermas  identifies  a  tendency  to  legitimation  crises  in  the 
repoliticization  of  the  late-capitalist  system  steering  mechanism.  The  politicization,  by 
state  intervention,  of  spheres  of  life  previously  considered  private  threatens  to  uncover  the 
element  of  social  choice  underlying  the  planning  and  control  of  social  arrangement.  Such 
a  demystification  of  social  processes  could  jeopardise  mass  loyalty  to  the  system  by 
bringing  "to  consciousness  the  contradiction  between  administratively  socialized 
production  and  the  continued  private  appropriation  and  use  of  surplus  value"  (Habermas, 
1973,  p.  36),  and  thereby  stimulate  political  demands  which  the  system  would  be  unable  to 
reconcile.  Conscious  thematization  of  this  contradiction  would  be  encouraged  by  real 
participative  democracy  that  gave  citizens  genuine  substantive  involvement  in  the 
administration.  The  late-capitalist  state  must  obtain  mass  political  loyalty,  yet  prevent 
substantive  democracy.  Typically  diffuse  mass  loyalty  and  the  legitimating  formation  of 
generalised  motives  is  elicited  through  formal  democratic  processes  which  are  kept,  so  far 
as  possible,  separate  from  technocratic  administrative  systems  charged  with  delivering 
social  planning  and  control  with  a  semblance  of  apolitical  naturalness  and  rational 
inevitability  -  "the  separation  of  instrumental  functions  of  the  administration  from 
expressive  symbols  that  release  an  unspecified  readiness  to  follow"  (Habermas,  1973, 
p.  70).  The  separation  is  sustained  by  the  ideology  of  civic  privatism  and  by  rhetorics  of 
rationality  and  efficiency.  Habermas  argues  that  with  the  advance  of  capitalism  traditions 
such  as  that  of  financial  accounting,  are  increasingly  "flushed  out  of  their  nature-like 
course(s)  of  development"  (Habermas,  1973,  p.  72)  and  drawn  within  the  public 
problematic  where  ultimately  the  contingency  of  both  their  contents  and  techniques  may 
be  revealed  and  their  once  unquestionable  character  undermined. 
Accounting  and  accounting  policy-making  has  indeed  become  increasingly 
politicized,  especially  in  the  latter  half  of  this  century: 
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"...  the  public  accounting  profession  has  acquired  a  unique  quasi- 
legislative  power.  ...  Furthermore,  its  accounting  "legislation"  affects  the 
economic  well-being  of  thousands  of  business  enterprises  and  millions  of 
individuals,  few  of  whom  had  anything  to  do  with  giving  the  profession  its 
power  or  have  a  significant  say  in  its  use.  " 
(Gerboth,  1973,  p.  481) 
The  politicization  of  accounting  policy-making  draws  attention  to  the  social 
choice  aspect  of  financial  accounting  -  it  may  no  longer  be  conceived  of  as  the  naturally 
legitimate  product  of  the  "invisible  hand"  of  the  market.  Furthermore,  recognition  of  the 
political  contingency  of  accounting  makes  it  difficult  to  conceive  of  accounting  or 
accounting  regulation  in  terms  of  a  search  for  truth  (see  Gerboth,  1973,  pp.  478). 
Politicization  threatens  the  foundations  of  accounting's  traditional  taken-for-granted 
legitimacy.  However,  a  new  political  legitimacy  may  be  conferred  by  the  political  process 
itself.  Accounting  policy-makers  typically  adopt  the  trappings  of  bourgeois  democracy  - 
due  processes  and  formal  procedures,  including  the  exposure  of  draft  proposals,  designed 
to  secure  a  generalised  authority  for  their  accounting  policy  making.  However,  a 
substantive  public  participation  in  accounting  policy-making  would  threaten  to  bring  to 
consciousness  the  contradiction  between  the  socialized  production  of  accounting  policy, 
and  its  systematic  privileging  of  the  information  needs  of  private  capital  accumulation.  If 
the  systematic  privileging,  of  capital  accumulation  is  to  be  sustained,  real  democratic 
involvement  in  the  accounting  administration  and  policy  making  must  be  avoided  (see 
Arrington  &  Puxty,  1991). 
We  interpret  the  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles'  project  and  the  debate 
surrounding  it  as  reflecting  a  legitimation  crisis  in  accounting  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  we  see 
the'Statement  of  Principles'  project  as  part  of  an  ongoing  defense  against  demands  which 
might  follow  real  public  involvement  in  accounting  policy  formation.  The  defence  is  one 
of  rationalism  -  the  fostering  of  the  illusion  that  accounting  practice  and  policy  making 
are  technical  matters,  affairs  of  reason  and  expertise  rather  than  of  value  judgements  and 
social  choice,  and  as  such,  appropriately  left  to  professionals  -  the  technocrats.  A 
conceptual  framework  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  increase  the  apparent  rationality 
and  consistency  of  accounting  standard  setting  and  financial  reporting,  and  by  supporting 
the  illusion  that  accounting  practice  and  policy  has  emerged  with  rational  inevitability 
from  a  scientific  body  of  economic  theory  help  insulate  accounting  from  the  incompatible 
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demands  which  politicization  might  otherwise  encourage.  Solomons  recommends  a 
conceptual  framework  for  financial  reporting  as  a  "defense  against  politicization": 
"If  the  FASB  could  show  that  its  standards  were  derived  from  a  coherent 
and  plausible  body  of  concepts,  it  would  greatly  enhance  the  credibility  of 
financial  reporting.  I  know  of  no  better  way  to  reduce  accounting's 
vulnerability  to  political  pressure.  How  else  can  the  board  demonstrate  the 
superiority  of  a  proposed  standard  over  a  counterproposal  from  some 
sectional  interest  that  is  self-serving  and  not  in  the  public  interest?  " 
(Solomons,  1986,  p.  116) 
We  substantially  agree  with  Solomons'  analysis  -  conceptual  frameworks  are 
indeed  constructed  as  a  defense  against  politicization.  However,  accounting's  mystique  of 
rationality  -  its  scientism  -  seems  to  be  rather  more  successful  in  stifling  the  articulation 
of  generalized  interests  than  in  moderating  the  self-serving  demands  of  sectional  interests 
(see  Tinker,  1991).  The  mystique  remains  powerful  and  difficult  to  penetrate: 
"Accountants  like  to  see  their  art  as  a  technical  one,  best  excluded  from  the 
unworthy  gaze  of  politicians,  even  the  wider  public,  ...  Politicians, 
particularly  Labour  ones,  are  far  too  inclined  to  accept  this  mystification 
out  of  awe  or  ignorance.  " 
(Mitchell  et  al,  1991,  p.  3) 
The  ASB's  proposals  press  accounting  rationality  towards  an  extreme  in  the 
measurement  of  economic  income.  Paradoxically,  however,  in  doing  so  they  threaten  to 
undercut  vestiges  of  the  legitimating  force  of  financial  accounting  tradition.  We  interpret 
the  practitioners'  bitter  reaction  to  the  ASB  proposals  as  forlorn  resistance  to  the  progress 
of  rationalization  and  politicization,  and  as  reflecting  an  intuitive  awareness  of  the  need 
for  financial  accounting,  on  the  edge  of  crisis,  to  hang  on  to  the  threads  of  traditional 
legitimacy,  which  we  suggest  are  reinforced  by  the  correspondence  which  is  found 
between  the  categorisations  of  the  traditional  financial  accounting  model  and  mental 
accounting  -  the  traces  of  a  relationship  between  financial  accounting  and  human 
concerns. 
36 Chapter  1:  Financial  Accounting,  Crisis  and  the  Commodity  Fetish 
Secondly,  we  interpret  the  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles'  project  and  the 
controversy  surrounding  it  as  reflecting  a  legitimation  crisis  arising  from  politicization's 
stimulation  of  ever  greater  and  incompatible  demands  of  the  system.  The  early 
development  of  financial  accounting  theory  and  practice  was  dominated  by  the 
assumption  that  the  purpose  of  financial  statements  was  the  provision  to  owners  of  a 
transactions-based  report  of  management's  stewardship  (See  Beaver,  1981,  ch.  1). 
Growing  awareness,  throughout  the  1960's  and  1970's,  of  the  economic  consequences  of 
financial  reporting  (Rappaport,  1977;  Zeff,  1978),  and  "the  social  choice  nature  of 
selection  among  financial  reporting  systems"  (Beaver,  1981,  p.  17)  opened  the  way  for  the 
acknowledgement  of  the  information  needs  of  a  range  of  users  in  influential  authoritative 
statements  concerning  the  objectives  of  financial  statements  (see  AICPA,  1973;  ASC, 
1975a;  FASB,  1978). 
Growth  in  expectations  increases  the  risk  that  accounting  will  fail  to  meet 
aspirations  and  suffer  consequent  loss  of  legitimacy.  As  we  have  seen,  the  promotion  of 
the  informational  perspective  by  the  ASB's  Statement  of  Principles  has  provoked 
significant  opposition's.  Much  of  that  opposition  is  expressed  in  terms  of  warnings  of  the 
dangers  of  encouraging  "unfulfillable  expectations".  It  is  clear  that  many  preparers  and 
auditors  of  accounts  would  like  to  see  a  deflation  of  expectations  and  a  retreat  to  a  less 
exposed  stewardship  position.  They  are  no  doubt  in  part  motivated  by  the  growth  of 
litigation  involving  accounts  and  accountants  (Economist,  1994,1995)  -  (a  litigation 
crisis). 
Advanced  capitalism  has  arguably  been  able  to  stay  a  step  ahead  of  legitimation 
crisis  by  providing  rising  living  standards  and  distributing  rewards  in  such  a  way  that 
growth  has  been  sustained  without  economic  crises.  However,  development  has  taken  the 
shape  dictated  by  the  private  pursuit  of  capital  accumulation  rather  than  the  generalised 
interest  of  society;  The  contradiction  of  class  interest  is  unresolved  and  "in  the  final 
analysis  this  class  structure  is  the  source  of  the  legitimation  deficit"  (Habermas,  1973, 
p.  73).  Habermas'  analysis  suggests  that  the  legitimation  defect  will  ultimately  overtake 
advanced  capitalism  through  a  breakdown  of  motivation. 
Motivation  crisis;  Habermas  argues  that  the  development  of  advanced  capitalism 
systematically  undermines  the  motivational  base  upon  which  it  relies  -  the  ideological 
complexes  of  civil  and  familial-vocational  privatism  -  so  that  eventually  its  socio-cultural 
sub-systems  will  fail  to  generate  "the  requisite  quantity  of  action-motivating  meaning" 
(Habermas,  1973,  p.  45).  Civil  privatism  generates  interest  in  the  performance  of  the 
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political  system  whilst  engendering  little  demand  for  substantive  public  involvement  in 
the  administration.  Familial-vocational  privatism  engenders  family  oriented  interest  in 
consumption,  and  career-oriented  interests  in  competition,  achievement  and  status.  These 
privatistic  motivations  of  advanced  capitalism  originate  in  both  bourgeois  and  in  pre- 
capitalist  elements  of  tradition. 
Habermas  identifies  the  ideology  of  achievement  and  competition,  possessive 
individualism,  and  the  orientation  to  exchange-value  as  among  those  vital  bourgeois 
elements  of  the  motivating  traditions  of  capitalism  which  are  undermined  by  the  social 
changes  brought  about  by  capitalism's  own  advance.  Financial  accounting  through  its 
articulation  of  the  profit  motive  has  played  a  part  in  providing  action-motivating  meaning 
for  capitalism.  It  has  promoted  and  legitimised  the  pursuit  of  profit  as  good  for  the 
managers  -  indicative  of  their  operational  success  -  as  good  for  the  firm  -  congruent  with 
the  accumulation  of  capital,  and  as  good  for  society  -  marking  the  responsiveness  of  the 
firm  to  social  demands.  The  legitimacy  and  power  of  accounting  profit  as  a  motive  is 
eroded  by  recognition  of  its  contingency  and  the  inconsistency  of  its  measurement.  We 
interpret  the  ASB  'Statement  of  Principles'  proposals  as  in  part  an  effort  to  restore  the 
action-motivating  meaning  of  accounting  performance  measurement  by  reinforcing  its 
congruence  with  economic  income. 
Habermas  suggests  that  the  pre-capitalist  elements  of  the  traditions  which 
motivate  capitalism  are  eroded  by  progressive  rationalization  of  areas  of  life  once 
regulated  by  tradition:  "the  scientization  of  professional  practice",  and  the  "administrative 
regulation  and  legalization  of  areas  of  political  and  social  intercourse  previously  regulated 
informally"  (Habermas,  1973,  p.  79).  Among  the  effects  of  this  erosion  he  identifies  a 
dissipation  of  the  disposition  to  "take-for-true"  and  a  recognition  of  competing  positions 
that  are  "undecided  as  to  truth"  (Habermas,  1973,  p.  80).  Erosion  of  the  disposition  to 
take-for-true,  and  in  particular  to  take-accounting-for-true  presents  an  opportunity  for  the 
encouragement  of  substantive  public  political  involvement  in  accounting  policy 
formation,  which  would  challenge  the  system  by  revealing  the  contradiction  of  its  claim 
to  mass  loyalty  whilst  systematically  privileging  private  capital  accumulation.  The 
imperative  for  those  who  seek  an  accounting  which  is  more  responsive  to  human  need, 
must  be  to  provoke  ever  increasing  awareness  in  the  public,  and  their  political 
representatives,  of  the  political  nature  of  accounting,  and  to  stimulate  their  involvement 
in  the  accounting  policy-formation  process.  Ernst  &  Young's  vociferous  mobilisation  of 
the  resistance  of  certain  elements  of  capital  to  the  ASB's  proposals  may  have  done  more 
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to  provoke  awareness  of  the  political  contingency  of  accounting  than  all  the  scribblings  of 
critical  theorists. 
Accounting  -  the  negative  dialectic 
We  have  seen  that  the  contradictions  immanent  to  the  commodity  fetish  find  expression 
not  only  in  the  economic  system,  but  also  in  the  administrative  and  socio-cultural  systems 
as  tendencies  to  rationality,  legitimacy  and  motivational  crises.  In  this  final  section  of  the 
chapter  we  return  directly  to  the  commodity  fetish  to  consider  its  implications  for  critical 
accounting. 
Capitalism  makes  a  commodity  of  humanity  and  personifies  commodities  as 
capital.  Financial  accounting  reflects  and  reproduces  this  inversion  and  addresses  itself  to 
the  information  requirements  of  the  personified  thing,  capital,  driven  by  the  imperatives 
of  appropriation  and  accumulation.  Accounting  as  presently  constructed  in  advanced 
capitalism  is  clearly  part  of  the  system's  ideological  infrastructure  (see  Dillard,  1991). 
Operating  through  the  commodity  fetish  it  suppresses  use-values  and  helps  stifle 
awareness  of  the  exploitative  inequality  of  exchange  in  capitalism,  it  reinforces 
humanity's  alienation,  in  capitalism,  from  the  form,  content,  and  fruits  of  its  labour,  and 
by  supporting  an  orientation  to  exchange  value  it  inhibits  fuller  recognition  of  the 
richness  of  human  nature  and  wants. 
Financial  accounting  may  be  made  less  effective  as  a  repressive  ideological 
system  if  it  is  challenged  and  its  inadequacies  exposed.  The  time  is  ripe  for  such 
exposure;  Habermas  identifies  the  orientation  to  exchange  value  as  one  of  the  motivating 
elements  of  bourgeois  ideology  that  is  weakened  in  advanced  capitalism.  The  socialising 
power  of  an  orientation  to  exchange  value  is  undermined  by,  for  example,  the  growth  of 
those  segments  of  the  population  which  do  not  reproduce  the  conditions  of  their  lives 
through  labour,  and  by  the  reduced  significance  of  labour  which  follows  reductions  in 
working  hours  and  the  development  of  leisure  pursuits  which  raise  the  significance  and 
recognition  of  needs  which  may  not  be  satisfied  monetarily.  The  poverty  of  exchange 
value  therefore  tends  to  begin  to  become  spontaneously  apparent  in  late  capitalism. 
Adorno,  (1966)  argues,  however,  that  ideology  can  be  ultimately  penetrated  and  its 
spurious  equations  undone  only  by  "nonidentical  thinking",  that  is,  by  immanent  critique 
focused  on  the  relations  and  contradictions  between  concept  and  object  -  through  a 
"negative  dialectic".  In  this  chapter  we  have  opened  an  immanent  critique  of  the 
commodity  fetish  in  accounting,  revealing  the  concept  of  wealth  to  be  less  than  its  object: 
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In  concept,  wealth  is  fungible  and  a  matter  of  relations  between  things.  In  object  it  is  non- 
fungible  and  a  matter  of  living  relationship  between  person  and  thing. 
An  emancipatory  accounting  must  break  with  the  ideology  of  the  fetishised 
commodity  which  holds  accounting  in  the  grip  of  its  inadequate  unitary  conceptual 
system.  It  must  discover  new  ways  to  identify  and  measure  the  things  of  value  and 
concern  to  humanity,  it  must  confront  the  concept  of  exchange-value  with  its  inadequacy 
to  encompass  the  nonidentical,  multifarious  nature  of  use-value  and  human  need  and 
desire.  Tinker  reminds  us  that  accounting  academics  bear  moral  responsibility  to  help 
prepare  accountants  (including  writers  of  conceptual  frameworks  and  accounting  standard 
setters)  to  meet  this  challenge;  the  intellectual  base  of  the  subject  must  be  broadened  and 
accounting  students  encouraged  to  recognise  value  beyond  exchange-value;  they  must  be 
brought  to  see  the  "rich  configurations  of  meaning"  associated  with  concepts  of  value  in 
other  disciplines  (Tinker,  1985,  p.  207). 
Advocates  of  emancipatory  accounting  must  carefully  avoid  the  temptation  to  slip 
into  alternative  modes  of  identity  thinking.  Tinker  (1985)  has  called  for  the  development 
of  an  "emancipatory  accounting"  based  upon  a  labour  theory  of  value.  Such  an 
accounting  would  indeed  draw  a  key  dimension  of  capitalist  alienation  into  the  light,  that 
is  the  "exchange  among  social  classes  of  commodities  containing  unequal  amounts  of 
social  labour"  (Tinker,  1985,  p.  171).  However,  under  capitalism,  the  abstraction  of 
socially  necessary  labour-value  is  no  more  capable  than  exchange-value  of  expressing  the 
rich  diversity  of  human  concerns  and  values,  needs  and  wants.  Indeed  an  accounting  built 
upon  labour-value  would  constitute  an  alternative  unitary  system  of  false  equivalences;  an 
alternative  form  of  identity  thinking  equally  able  to  suppress  the  diversity  of  human  need 
and  use-values.  In  a  fully  developed  socialist  society,  labour  would  be  allocated  to 
various  branches  of  production  and  social  activity,  on  the  basis  of  a  democratic 
prioritisation  of  human  needs;  and  so,  in  broad  terms,  there  would  be  a  clear  connection 
between  labour  inputs  and  human  need  and  utility.  In  a  capitalist  society  labour  is 
allocated  not  by  the  social  recognition  of  need  but  by  the  "law  of  value"  (Marx,  1868, 
p.  524)  and  effective  demand.  And  the  social  recognition  of  labour,  as  valuable  socially 
necessary  labour,  is independent  of  the  social  usefulness  of  the  given  commodity.  Labour 
only  counts"  (see  Marx.  1867,  p.  180)  as  its  value  is  proven  by  expressed  market  demand 
-  on  commodity  exchange: 
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"The  labour  theory  of  value  has  nothing  to  do  with  judgements  on  the 
usefulness  of  things  from  the  point  of  view  of  human  happiness  or  social 
progress.  It  has  even  less  to  do  with  establishing  'conditions  of  justice  in 
exchange'.  It  simply  recognises  the  deeper  meaning  of  the  actual  act  of 
exchange  and  of  the  output  of  commodities  under  capitalism,  and  what 
governs  the  distribution  of  income  between  social  classes  which  results 
from  these  acts,  independently  of  any  moral  aesthetic  or  political 
judgements,  Indeed  if  one  were  to  look  for  such  'judgements',  one  would 
have  to  say  that  Marx,  while  understanding  why  the  law  of  value  has  to 
operate  as  it  does  under  commodity  production,  did  not  at  all  strive  to 
'defend'  that  law,  but  on  the  contrary  to  build  a  society  in  which  its 
operations  would  be  totally  abolished.  " 
(Mandel,  1976,  p.  44) 
We  believe  that  environmental  accounting  holds  special  promise  as  a  site  for  the 
development  of  emancipatory  forms  of  accounting  and  that  it  should  be  made  a  central 
part  of  the  critical  accounting  project.  Environmental  accounting  throws  into  relief  the 
inadequacy  of  exchange-values.  In  this  area,  perhaps  more  than  in  any  other,  accounting 
researchers  and  pressure  groups  have  worked  to  find  ways  of  identifying,  quantifying  and 
reporting  corporate  impacts,  which  push  accounting  to  work  beyond  exchange-values 
and  to  more  adequately  engage  with  the  human  needs  and  the  diversity  of  use-values. 
Almost  inevitably,  capitalism  and  those  concerned  to  preserve  the  natural 
environment  are  in  conflict  (Gorz,  1991).  There  is  an  imperative  of  growth  at  the  heart  of 
capitalism,  and  incessant  growth  in  consumption  can  not  be  sustained  without 
environmental  damage  and  erosion  of  the  eco-system.  Indeed  the  "environment"  has  in 
recent  times  become  a  dramatic  site  of  resistance  to  capital,  rivalling,  in  prominence,  the 
equally  inevitable  conflict  between  labour  and  capital.  To  maximise  impact,  an 
emancipatory  accounting  must  put  its  weight  on  the  points  of  resistance.  It  must  work  for, 
and  with,  those  groups  that  find  themselves  in  opposition  to  capital.  The  points  of 
resistance  should  be  used  as  a  "catalyst  so  as  to  bring  to  light  power  relations,  locate  their 
position,  find  out  their  point  of  application  and  the  methods  used"  (Foucault,  1982, 
p.  211). 
We  acknowledge  that  environmental  accounting  in  corporate  financial  reporting 
can  be,  and  has  been,  subverted.  It  has  been  used  to  help  preserve  the  legitimacy  of  the 
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institutions  of  capitalism,  and  financial  accounting  itself,  by  lending  them  a  semblance  of 
relevance  to  human  needs,  concerns  and  values  (Puxty,  1986;  Tinker  et  al.,  1991). 
However  it  is  possible  for  accounting  to  make  itself  part  of  a  counter  hegemony,  in 
resistance  to  capital  (see  e.  g.,  Hopper  et  al,  1986;  Arnold  &  Hammond,  1994).  And  we 
believe  that  alternative  accounts  focused  on  capital's  conflict  with  the  environment  have 
the  potential  to  reveal,  in  dramatic  ways,  both  capital's  need  to  fuel  growth  at  the  expense 
of  the  environment  and  in  utter  disregard  of  human  need,  and  the  inadequacy  of  the 
concept  of  exchange-value  to  grasp  the  variety  of  human  use-value.  Ultimately,  in  the 
production  of  alternative  accounts  which  privilege  human  need  and  use-values  over 
exchange-values,  accounting  may  open  a  negative  dialectic  of  the  nonidentical,  help 
bring  to  light  the  alienating  relations  of  power  in  capitalism,  and  thereby  help  empower 
men  and  women  to  change  the  oppressive  circumstances  of  their  lives. 
The  possibility  of  crisis  is  immanent  in  financial  accounting's  embrace  of  the 
commodity  fetish.  And  it  may  be  that  in  time  the  system  will  collapse  under  pressure  of 
its  internal  contradictions.  However  considerable  effort  is  expended  in  sustaining  the 
system  and  staving  off  possible  crisis.  We  interpreted  the  ASB's  'Statement  of  Principles' 
project  as  a,  somewhat  misguided,  effort  to  re-position  financial  accounting's  conceptual 
base  on  firmer  ground  designed  to  sustain  control,  at  least,  at  the  conceptual  level.  It 
would  be  naive,  and  morally  irresponsible,  to  behave  as  if  by  force  of  its  internal 
contradictions  alone  the  systems  of  capitalism  might  spontaneously  collapse.  Ultimately, 
only  an  active  refusal  of  identity  thinking  and  the  application  of  a  vigorous  negative 
dialectic  will  allow  the  heterogeneous  to  invade  thought,  "release  the  nonidentical" 
(Adorno,  1966,  p.  6),  and  burst  the  straight  jacket  of  unitary  systems  of  concepts  and 
thought,  such  as  financial  accounting,  which  presently  govern  our  lives.  To  serve  an 
emancipatory  purpose,  accounting  must,  above  all,  help  men  to  penetrate  the 
"hieroglyphic"  of  exchange-value: 
"Value,  therefore,  does  not  have  its  description  branded  on  its  forehead;  it 
rather  transforms  every  product  of  labour  into  a  social  hieroglyphic.  Later 
on,  men  try  to  decipher  the  hieroglyphic,  to  get  behind  the  secret  of  their 
own  social  product:  for  the  characteristic  which  objects  of  utility  have  of 
being  values  is  as  much  men's  social  product  as  is  their  language.  " 
(Marx,  1867,  p.  167) 
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In  the  previous  chapter  we  argued  that  financial  reporting  in  advanced  capitalism  faces  crises 
of  rationality  and  legitimacy  and  we  read  ASB  'Statement  of  Principles'  project  as  part  of  the 
profession's  efforts  to  manufacture  and  impose  a  measure  of  ostensive  rationality  and 
specious  legitimacy  for  financial  accounting.  We  argued  that  as  capitalism  advances,  and  in 
order  to  forestall  the  full  expression  of  the  tendencies  to  economic  crisis  immanent  to  that 
system,  the  state,  often  acting  through  quasi-independent  institutions  such  as  accounting, 
tends  to  take  an  important  role  in  modifying  and  regulating  market  operations:  Accounting 
is  thus  politicized.  We  found  however  that  accounting  has  been  unable  to  satisfactorily 
reconcile  the  conflicting  demands  placed  upon  it  under  capitalism,  and  has  consequently  and 
conspicuously  failed  to  provide  consistent  inputs  for  rational  economic  management: 
"Accountancy  has  become  a  process  of  mystification,  obfuscation  and  downright  deceit" 
(Mitchell  et.  al.,  1991,  p.  9).  Accounting  faces  a  rationality  crisis  -  manifest  in  its  failure  to 
deliver  "decent  and  credible  information";  without  which  "the  economy  can  hardly  be 
managed  in  an  effective  way"  (Mitchell  et.  al.,  1991,  p.  9). 
The  legitimacy  of  an  effectively  politicized  financial  accounting,  within  a  modem 
liberal  democracy,  must  ultimately  rely  on  the  credibility  of  its  claim  to  serve  the  generalised 
public  interest.  The  systematic  privileging,  within  capitalism,  of  the  imperatives  of  private 
capital  accumulation  is  essentially  incompatible  with  that  claim.  We  found  that  the  tendency 
to  legitimacy  crisis  that  originates  in  this  conflict  of  private  and  public  interest  was  managed 
in  various  ways,  most  notably  through  the  denial  or  occlusion  of  the  political  nature  of 
accounting  choice.  Through  the  cultivation  of  the  view  that  accounting  practice  and  policy 
making  are  primarily  matters  of  instrumental  reason  and  expertise,  the  wider  public  has 
effectively  been  excluded  from  the  accounting  debate  and  the  demands  that  could  be  expected 
to  follow  their  real  involvement  suppressed. 
We  ended  chapter  1  by  looking  beyond  the  crises  that  financial  accounting  presently 
faces  towards  the  possibility  of  an  emancipatory  accounting.  Such  an  accounting  must 
overcome  the  "mystification,  obfuscation  and  downright  deceit"  that  characterizes  financial 
accounting  as  dominated  by  the  ideology  of  the  commodity  fetish.  It  must  confront  the 
concept  of  exchange-value  with  its  inadequacy  to  the  multifarious  reality  of  use-value  and 
human  need  and  desire.  Above  all  an  emancipatory  accounting  must  be  able  to  provide  us 
with  knowledge  of  the  objective  world  that  we  share.  It  is  only  on  the  basis  of  knowledge  of 
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the  objective  realities  of  our  existence  that  we  can  hope  to  rationally  modify  social  conditions 
and  progress  towards  a  fuller  realization  of  human  potential. 
In  this  chapter  we  will  draw  on  the  account  given  by  the  philosopher  Donald 
Davidson  of  the  very  possibility  of  knowledge  to  support  the  view  that  in  accounting  we  can 
have  knowledge  of  an  objective  reality  of  objects  and  events  in  the  world  we  share.  We  will, 
in  effect,  defend  a  variety  of  realism;  one  that  recognizes  intersubjectivity  as  all  the 
foundation  we  have  and  need  for  objectivity.  We  begin  the  chapter  by  considering  and 
rejecting  two  alternative  realist  views  that  have  been  influential  in  accounting  thought; 
metaphysical  realism  and  internal  realism.  We  find  metaphysical  realism  unsatisfactory 
because  of  its  reliance  on  the  ultimately  unintelligible  notion  of  truth  as  correspondence  of 
representation  and  representation-independent  reality.  And  we  reject  internal  realism  because 
it  tends  make  truth,  in  so  far  as  it  has  any  use  for  the  concept,  some  sort  of  mere  coherence 
of  beliefs.  In  the  Davidsonian  world-view  we  find  a  habitable  middle  ground  between  the 
unsatisfactory  poles  of  correspondence  or  coherence. 
An  important  motive  for  this  chapter  is  our  desire  to  defend  the  view  that  we  can  have 
accounting  knowledge  of  "an  objective,  shared  and  intersubjectively  accessible  world" 
against  those  theorists  would  reject  such  a  "mundane"  (Hines,  1991,  p.  317)  notion  and  prefer 
to  imagine  that  somehow  our  conceptual  schemes  constitute  the  very  objects  they  describe 
(see  Hines  1988).  We  therefore  go  on  to  contrast  our  Davidsonian  view  with  three  dualist 
conceptions  of  accounting,  each  of  which  encourages  us  to  either  abandon  or  relativize  the 
concepts  of  truth  and  reality. 
In  this  chapter  we  begin  to  develop  a  case  for  the  emancipatory  capacity  of  financial 
reporting.  We  confine  ourselves  here  to  discussion  of  accounting  as  a  descriptive  enterprise. 
We  recognise,  however,  that  accounting  has  a  normative  dimension.  We  take  up  the 
implications  of  prescriptive  dimension  of  accounting  in  subsequent  chapters,  where  we  deal 
with  questions  of  the  legitimacy  or  normative  objectivity  of  financial  accounting  regulation. 
In  this  chapter  we  point  to  the  possibility  of  a  way  beyond  the  rationality  crisis  that 
accounting  faces;  we  can  have  accounts  of  objective  reality.  Not  withstanding  the  fact  that 
financial  accounting  in  late  capitalism  is  deeply  mired  in  the  ideology  of  commodity 
fetishism,  accounting  is  not  in  principle  inevitably  ideological;  we  can  have  true  accounts  of 
the  objective  world  we  share.  In  later  chapters  we  take  up  the  question  of  how  accounting 
might  find  a  way  beyond  the  legitimacy  crisis  it  presently  faces. 
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"If  I  did  not  know  what  others  think  I  would  have  no  thoughts  of  my  own  and 
so  would  not  know  what  I  think.  If  I  did  not  know  what  I  think,  I  would  lack 
the  ability  to  gauge  the  thoughts  of  others.  Gauging  the  thoughts  of  others 
requires  that  I  live  in  the  same  world  as  them,  sharing  many  reactions  to  its 
major  features,  including  its  values.  " 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  166) 
Introduction 
The  basic  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  justify  the  view  that  in  accounting  we  can  have  knowledge 
of  an  objective  reality  of  objects  and  events  in  the  world.  We  want  to  defend  accounting 
against  those  theorists,  of  various  hues,  who  would  encourage  us  to  either  relativize,  or  give 
up  altogether,  the  concepts  of  truth  and  reality  in  accounting.  We  begin  the  chapter  with  an 
examination  of  the  issue  of  truth  in  accounting:  We  consider,  and  quickly  reject  as  ultimately 
unintelligible,  metaphysical  realism  and  the  notion  of  truth  as  correspondence  of 
representation  and  representation-independent  reality.  We  also  find  unsatisfactory  those 
dualist  views,  like  internal  realism,  which  assume  that  our  conceptual  schemes  constitute 
their  objects  and  which  tend  to  make  truth,  in  so  far  as  they  find  the  concept  viable,  some  sort 
of  mere  coherence  of  beliefs.  The  philosopher  Donald  Davidson's  work  offers  a  way  beyond 
the  correspondence  or  coherence  dichotomy.  In  the  central  part  of  the  chapter  we  outline 
Davidson  justification  of  the  possibility  of  objective  knowledge.  We  then  attempt  to  show 
the  significance  of  Davidson's  analysis  for  accounting,  by  explaining  how  it  stands  against 
three  dualist  conceptions  of  accounting.  The  ideas  introduced  in  this  chapter  are  carried  into 
the  succeeding  chapter  where  we  develop  a  fuller  exploration  of  the  possibility  of  objectivity 
in  accounting. 
Truth  in  financial  reporting;  the  mirror  of  reality 
External  financial  reporting  is  generally  recognized  as  resting  upon  realist  pre-suppositions 
(Shapiro,  1997,1998).  The  philosopher  Hilary  Putnam  argues  that  two  varieties  of  realism 
can  be  distinguished:  'metaphysical  realism'  and  'internal  realism'.  Metaphysical  realism 
consist  in  the  conjunction  of  the  relatively  unobjectionable  ontological  thesis  that  reality 
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exists  independently  of  our  representations  of  it,  and  the  epistemological  thesis'  that  there  is 
one  correct  scheme  for  describing  reality:  "  the  world  consists  of  some  fixed  totality  of  mind- 
independent  objects.  There  is  exactly  one  true  and  complete  description  of'the  way  the  world 
is'.  Truth  involves  some  sort  of  correspondence  relation  between  words  or  thought-signs  and 
external  things  and  sets  of  things"  (Putnam,  1981,  p.  49). 
The  notion  of  truth  as  correspondence  seems  to  have  a  central  place  in  the 
conceptions  of  the  possibilities  of  financial  reporting  held  by  accounting  regulators.  Typically 
it  is  expressed  in  terms  of  the  ideal  of  faithful  representation2:  the  "correspondence  or 
agreement  between  a  measure  or  description  and  the  phenomena  it  purports  to  represent" 
(FASB,  1980a,  para.  63).  The  dominant  metaphor  of  metaphysical  realism,  the  mind  or 
language  as  mirror  of  reality  (see  Rorty,  1980),  is  even  occasionally  pressed  into  service  by 
accounting  theorists: 
"Just  as  a  distorting  mirror  reflects  a  warped  image  of  the  person  standing  in 
front  of  it,  or  just  as  an  inexpensive  loudspeaker  fails  to  reproduce  faithfully 
the  sounds  that  went  into  the  microphone  ...  so  a  bad  model  gives  a  distorted 
representation  of  the  system  that  it  models.  The  question  accountants  must 
face  continually  is  how  much  distortion  is  acceptable.  The  cost  of  a  perfect 
sound  reproduction  system  puts  it  out  of  the  reach  of  most  people,  and  perfect 
reliability  of  accounting  information  is  equally  unattainable.  " 
(FASB,  1980,  para.  76) 
From  the  perspective  of  metaphysical  realism  the  pursuit  of  objectivity  becomes  a  matter  of 
eliminating  the  subjective  distortions  of  the  mirror  in  which  reality  is  reflected,  so  that  the 
objects  of  our  perceptions  and  thoughts  come  clearly  into  view  and  our  statements,  theories, 
and  the  accounts  we  give,  accord  with  the  independent  reality3.  Metaphysical  realism 
suggests  that  we  might  somehow  conceive  of  the  world  wholly  independently  of  our 
representations  and  theories  of  the  world,  and  it  relies  on  the  unintelligible  notion  that  our 
representations  might  fit  or  correspond  to  the  world as  it  "really  is",  prior  to  our  descriptions 
of  it: 
"It  suggests  that  we  can,  so  to  speak,  get  round  behind  our  descriptions  and 
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see  how  they  fit  the  world,  and  this  makes  no  sense  at  all:  any  conception  of 
the  world  we  can  use  at  all  is  one  that  is  already  expressed  in  terms  that  we 
understand,  our  terms.  The  world  cannot  describe  itself  for  us.  " 
(Williams,  1991,  p.  12) 
We  agree  with  Putnam  that:  "to  say  that  truth  is  'correspondence  to  reality'  is  not  false  but 
empty,  as  long  as  nothing  is  said  about  what  the  'correspondence'  is"  (Putnam,  1992b,  p.  10). 
And  it  seems  to  be  quite  clear  that  nothing  meaningful  can  be  said  about  what  sort  of  "thing" 
it  is  that  can  make  a  sentence  true  by  corresponding  with  it4.  Correspondence  and  the  realism 
associated  with  it  would  become  interesting:  "...  if  anyone  could  come  up  with  an  intelligible 
and  illuminating  way  of  individuating  the  entities  to  which  true  utterances  or  beliefs 
correspond,  along  with  an  acceptable  semantics  for  talk  about  such  entities  (Davidson,  1999a, 
p.  17).  Until  then,  the  notion  of  correspondence  is  essentially  vacuous  and  it  is  rather  pointless 
to  describe  oneself  as  a  realist.  If  we  stop  believing  that  there  is  anything  for  our  sentences 
to  correspond  to,  we  must  give  up  the  notion  that  truth  can  consist  in  the  accurate  mirroring 
of  facts.  And,  we  must  relinquish  the  representationalist  view  of  language  and  accounting: 
"...  if  there  is  nothing  for  true  sentences  to  correspond  to,  neither  is  there  anything  for  them 
to  represent'  (Davidson,  1999a,  p.  17).  Metaphysical  realism  is  clearly  not  the  form  of  realism 
we  seem  to  share  in  our  daily  lives,  and  despite  the  rhetoric  of  correspondence  which  seems 
to  permeate  financial  reporting,  it  cannot  actually  be  the  form  of  realism  which  underpins 
external  financial  reporting. 
Truth  in  financial  reporting;  Scheme  and  Content 
As  an  alternative  to  the  untenable  delusions  of  metaphysical  realism,  Putnam  offers  the 
perspective  of  'internal  realism'.  On  that  view  there  can  be  no  God's  eye  view  of  the  world; 
We  can  have  no  way  of  knowing  or  usefully  imagining  what  objects  the  world  consists  of 
except  from  within  our  descriptive  schemes.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  the  world  in  itself  is 
assumed  to  be  undifferentiated  before  we  cut  it  into  objects  by  the  introduction  of  a  scheme 
of  description:  "'Objects'  do  not  exist  independently  of  conceptual  schemes.  We  cut  up  the 
world  into  objects  when  we  introduce  one  or  another  scheme  of  description"  (Putnam,  1981, 
p.  52).  Putnam's  internal  realism,  then,  allows  the  world  only  limited  space  to  impose  itself 
upon  our  conceptual  schemes.  It  can  provide  "no  general  philosophical  understanding  of  how 
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our  thoughts  and  words  latch  on  to  the  world"  (Williams,  1991,  p.  12),  and,  because  both 
objects  and  words  are  regarded  as  internal  to  schemes  of  description,  questions  of  reference 
become  "trivial":  "What  does  'rabbit'  refer  to?  Why,  to  rabbits  of  course!  "  (Putnam,  1981, 
p.  52).  Most,  even  very  modest,  realists  will  find  this  vision  of  a  world  with  no  structure  in 
itself,  prior  to  our  schemes  unacceptable.  Realists  will,  generally,  want  to  hold  on  to  a 
stronger  sense  of  the  world-guidedness  of  our  descriptions,  at  least  in  the  scientific  sphere, 
than  Putnam's  internal  realism  allows.  They  will  argue  that  the  world  "...  must,  on  its  own, 
make  some  boundaries  more  salient  than  others,  ...  even  if  it  does  not  single  out  a  unique  way 
of  marking  off  individuals  and  sorts"  (Farrell,  1996,  p.  167)'.  On  Putnam's  view  of  things  it 
would  seem  that  "there  would  be  no  more,  and  no  less,  reason  to  be  puzzled  if  extraterrestrial 
physics  were  quite  different  from  ours  than  if  extraterrestrial  fashions  or  food  are"  (Williams, 
1991,  p.  13). 
Clearly  truth  as  'correspondence'  can  have  no  substantial  role  within  any  version  of 
the  internal  realism,  where  the  idea  of  representation-independent  reality  is  empty.  However, 
for  Putnam's  internal  realist,  once  a  particular  conceptual  scheme  is  in  place,  truth  can  be 
established  in  terms  of  the  objects  it  constitutes.  Putnam's  internal  realism  then 
accommodates  a  pressure  of  reality  upon  our  conceptual  schemes,  but  only  from  within.  The 
impact  of  the  world  on  the  conceptual  scheme  is  conceived  of  as  being  constrained  by  the 
conceptual  scheme  itself.  On  this  view,  beliefs  can  be  tested  against  evidence  as  that  evidence 
appears  in  terms  of  the  conceptual  scheme,  and,  by  submitting  beliefs  to  communal  criticism, 
we  may  hope  to  move  towards  truth  defined  as  idealized  rational  acceptability  (Putnam, 
1981,  p.  55).  In  defining  truth  as  "idealized  rational  acceptability",  Putnam  certainly  does  not 
mean  to  imply  that  we  should  think  of  truth  as  the  final  results  that  rational  inquiry  and 
reality  itself  somehow  presses  us  towards.  He  rejects  the  suggestion,  he  finds  in  the  early 
pragmatist  writings  of  James  and  Pierce,  that  truth  should  be  identified  with  "...  the  'final 
opinion',  that  is,  not  with  what  is  presently  confirmed,  but  with  what  is  'fated'  to  be 
confirmed,  if  inquiry  is  continued  long  enough,  and  in  a  responsible  and  fallibilistic  spirit" 
(Putnam,  1992b,  p.  10).  And  he  rejects  Bernard  Williams'  view  that,  in  science,  we  might 
reasonably  hope  for  world-guided  convergence  of  knowledge  (see  Putnam,  1990,  p.  173).  The 
difficulty  for  Putnam,  then,  is  to  make  sense  of  his  notion  of  truth  as  "idealized  rational 
acceptability"  whilst  maintaining  an  anti-convergence  position.  Rorty  suggests  that  we  must 
understand  Putnam's  "idealized  rational  acceptability"  as  "rational  acceptability  to  an  ideal 
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community.  "  And  given  that  we  can  have  no  vantage  point  outside  of  our  community,  the 
ideal  community  must  be  us,  that  is,  "us  as  we  should  like  to  be"  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  52).  In  this 
context,  Rorty  suggest,  with  approval,  truth  is  "just  the  reification  of  an  approbative 
adjective"  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  53).  Putnam  himself  clearly  thinks  that  truth  is  something  more 
than  an  honorific  adjective  -a  "mysterious  something  more"  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  61)  -  but  what 
more?  -  is  not  made  intelligible.  Rorty  too,  in  fact,  knows  that  there  is  more  to  truth  than 
commendation:  There  is  a  tension  in  Rorty's  own  views  on  truth.  On  the  one  hand  he  seems 
to  want  to  "reduce  truth  to  justification"  (Rorty,  1995,  p.  282);  In  describing  an  utterance  as 
true  we  commend  it  as  justified,  and  "once  you  understand  all  about  justification 
...  you 
understand  all  there  is  to  understand  about  ...  truth"  (1995,  p.  282).  On  the  other  hand  he 
knows  that  there  is  "something  more"  to  truth  than  this  approbative  or  commending  use,  he 
identifies  what  he  calls  its  cautionary  use,  that  is  "its  use  in  such  expressions  as  'fully 
justified,  but  perhaps  not  true"`  (1995,  p.  283).  The  force  of  this  cautionary  usage  is  to 
emphasize  the  relativity  of  justification  -  it  is  always  justification  to  an  audience,  justification 
to  us.  Rorty  recognizes  that  truth  is  not  relative  in  this  way;  "we  can  never  exclude  the 
possibility  that  some  better  audience  might  exist,  or  come  to  exist,  to  which  a  belief  that  is 
justifiable  to  us  would  not  be  justifiable"  (1995,  p.  283).  The  point  of  the  cautionary  use  of 
truth  is  to  remind  us  that  our  justified  beliefs  may  not  be  true.  Ultimately  Rorty  "knows  truth 
isn't  identical  with  justification"  (Davidson.  1999a,  p.  18):  Truth  is  not  relative  in  the  way  that 
justification  is.  Davidson  rejects  Putnam's  internal  realism  because  it  "makes  truth  relative 
to  a  scheme",  and  that  is  an  idea  he  does  "not  think  intelligible"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  309). 
The  underlying  problem,  as  Davidson  sees  it,  with  Putnam's  internal  realism  is  the 
"unintelligibility  of  the  dualism  of  a  conceptual  scheme  and  a  'world'  waiting  to  be  coped 
with"  to  which  it  is  committedb.  Following  sustained  critique  of  the  "straw  man"  of 
metaphysical  realism,  the  contemporary  critical  accounting  theory  literature  is  overflowing 
with  dualist,  scheme  and  content,  formulations  of  the  role  of  financial  reporting.  In  the 
following  section  of  this  chapter  we  will  use  Donald  Davidson's  persuasive  critique  of 
dualism,  as  a  basis  for  resistance  to  such  views.  However,  before  we  turn  to  a  close 
examination  of  Davidson's  views,  we  pause  to  briefly  illustrate  kind  of  dualist  accounting 
theory  we  want  to  oppose. 
Among  the  more  influential  strands  of  dualist  thinking  in  the  accounting  literature  are 
those  papers  which  bluntly  advance  the  view  that  "in  communicating  reality,  we  construct 
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reality"  (Hines,  1988).  In  perhaps  the  best  known  paper  in  this  genre,  Hines  suggests  that 
scientists,  and  accountants,  have  "not  so  much  grasped  reality,  as  created  it,  by  thinking  of 
it  in  a  certain  way,  and  treating  it  in  that  way!  "  (Hines,  1988,  p.  254).  She  thinks  that  there 
is  an  abundance  of  "evidence"  against  the  "mundane"  "assumption  of  an  objective,  shared 
and  intersubjectively  accessible  world"  (Hines,  1991,  p.  317).  Prior  to  our  conceptual 
schemes,  there  is "Just  a  jumble"  (Hines,  1988,  p.  255);  Our  various  and  arbitrary  conceptual 
schemes  somehow  impose  a  structure  on  our  reality,  they  constitute  the  very  objects  they 
describe.  In  Hines'  view  of  things,  our  freedom  to  modify  our  conceptual  schemes  "our 
picture  of  reality",  and  therefore  our  reality  itself,  seems  to  be  quite  unconstrained  by  any 
objective  reality': 
"Remember,  we  are  creating  reality.  ... 
As  ordinary  people,  we  arbitrarily 
combine,  and  define,  and  add,  and  subtract  things  from  our  picture  of  reality. 
As  professional  people,  we  arbitrarily  combine,  and  define,  and  add,  and 
subtract  things,  in  a  different  way:  that  is  what  differentiates  us.  " 
(Hines,  1988,  p.  254) 
The  main  check  Hines  identifies  on  the  development  of  our  conceptual  schemes,  is  the  state 
of  our  existing  conceptual  commitments:  The  main  constraint  on  a  conceptual  domain,  such 
as  accounting,  is  that  it  cohere  with  the  dominant  social  conceptions  of  reality:  "...  if  people 
have  a  certain  conception  of  reality,  then  naturally,  we  must  reflect  that.  Otherwise  people 
would  lose  faith  in  us"  (Hines,  1988,  p.  255).  Hines'  views,  then,  clearly  reflect  Putnam's 
internal  realism,  and  in  particular  his  notion  that  "we  cut  up  the  world  into  objects  when  we 
introduce  one  or another  scheme  of  description"  (Putnam,  1981,  p.  52).  She  also  conceives 
of  truth  in  a  way  that  makes  it  essentially  relative  to  a  scheme9. 
On  Hines's  view  the  conceptual  systems  maintained  by  institutions  like  accounting, 
play  an  significant  part  in  creating  and  sustaining  our  reality  -  where  otherwise  there  would 
be  chaos:  "Everything  would  be  a  mess  without  us.  Just  a  jumble.  No-one  would  know  where 
they  were"  (Hines,  1988,  p.  255);  She  sees  these  institutions  as  owing  much  of  their  power 
to  the  fact  that  people  are  reluctant  to  accept  "that  their  world  is  so  ...  tenuous"  (Hines,  1988, 
p.  255).  We  will  argue  in  the  following  section  of  this  chapter  that,  contrary  to  Hines'  view, 
Davidson  has  convincingly  shown  that  we  can  have  good  reason  for  thinking  that  we  are 
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securely  in  touch  with  an  objective  world10,  and  that  our  world,  and  the  relations  between  our 
beliefs  and  that  world  are  far  from  being  "tenuous". 
Truth  and  Knowledge  in  Accounting;  Beyond  Scheme  and  Content 
Davidson  rejects  Putnam's  internal  realism  as  unintelligibly  relativist.  However,  metaphysical 
realism  is  equally  unacceptable  to  Davidson,  for  it  allows  the  possibility  that  our  whole 
system  of  beliefs  may  be  out  of  touch  with  reality;  "all  our  best  researched  and  established 
thoughts  and  theories  may  be  false"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  309).  On  this  view,  the  truth  of  a 
sentence  depends  upon  its  correspondence  with  something  in  the  world,  yet  it  seems  that  our 
assessment  of  correspondence  can  only  consist  in  the  acquisition  of  further  beliefs  -  and  how 
are  we  to  know  that  those  beliefs  themselves  are  true?  -  but  by  the  acquisition  of  yet  further 
beliefs.  We  may  try  to  overcome  skepticism  by  identifying  bases  for  belief  which  transcend 
belief  itself.  Sensations,  for  example,  may  be  thought  to  provide  conclusive  justification  for 
certain  beliefs.  Davidson  strongly  opposes  any  such  foundationalism.  He  argues  that  while 
sensations  may  cause  belief,  they  can  never  be  'reasons'  for  belief: 
"The  relation  between  a  sensation  and  a  belief  cannot  be  logical,  since 
sensations  are  not  beliefs  or other  propositional  attitudes.  What  then  is  the 
relation?  The  answer  is,  I  think,  obvious:  the  relation  is  causal.  Sensations 
cause  some  beliefs  and  in  this  sense  are  the  basis  or  ground  of  those  beliefs. 
But  a  causal  explanation  of  a  belief  does  not  show  how  or  why  the  belief  is 
justified.  " 
(Davidson,  1983,  p.  310) 
Alternatively,  we  may  hope  to  avoid  the  problem  of  skepticism  by  redefining  our  concept 
truth.  The  coherence  theory  of  truth  starts  out  by  rejecting,  as  unintelligible,  the  search  for 
any  foundation  for  our  beliefs  in  grounds  beyond  our  beliefs:  "What  distinguishes  a 
coherence  theory  is  simply  the  claim  that  nothing  can  count  as  a  reason  for  holding  a  belief 
except  another  belief'  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  310).  On  this  view  a  belief  is  true,  not  if  it 
corresponds  to  something  in  the  world,  but  if  it  coheres  with  other  beliefs.  Truth  becomes 
purely  a  matter  of  the  internal  relations  within  networks  of  beliefs  or  sentences.  The  loss  of 
truth's  connection  with  the  world  raises  an  obvious  difficulty:  It  is  clearly  possible  to 
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construct  competing  sets  of  sentences,  each  of  which  is  internally  coherent,  yet  inconsistent 
with  the  other  sets.  If  truth  is  taken  to  consist  merely  in  coherency  we  would  then,  apparently, 
find  ourselves  in  the  position  of  accepting  inconsistent  sets  of  statements  as  'true'.  Whilst 
Davidson  firmly  rejects  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth,  "it  would  appear  to  require  a 
confrontation  between  what  we  believe  and  reality;  and  the  idea  of  such  a  confrontation  is 
absurd"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  307),  he  is  not  prepared  to  see  truth  as  mere  coherence".  He  is 
unwilling  to  accept  the  loss  of  truth's  connection  with  the  world.  He  argues  that  despite  the 
fact  that  we  cannot  "get  outside  our  beliefs  and  our  language  so  as  to  find  some  test  other 
than  coherence",  we  nevertheless  can  "insist  that  knowledge  is  of  an  objective  world 
independent  of  our  thought  or  language"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  307).  He  wants  to  persuade  us 
that  someone  with  more  or  less  coherent  beliefs  has  good  reason  for  thinking  that  most  of 
those  beliefs  are  true  and  in  touch  with  objective  reality.  In  the  following  paragraphs  we 
explain  how  Davidson  justifies  this  view. 
Davidson  gives  an  account  of  how  it  is  possible  for  us  to  have  three  irreducibly 
different,  but  deeply  interrelated,  varieties  of  knowledge;  (i)  knowledge  of  the  world,  (ii) 
knowledge  of  other  minds,  and  (iii)  knowledge  of  one's  own  mind.  The  three  types  of 
knowledge  are  essentially  interdependent:  "The  three  sorts  of  knowledge  form  a  tripod:  if  any 
leg  were  lost,  no  part  would  stand"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  166).  For  Davidson  the  basis  of  our 
propositional  knowledge  is  interpersonal  communication:  The  communicative  link  between 
knowledge  of  other  minds  and  knowledge  of  one's  own  mind,  forms  the  "base  line" 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  160)  of  the  triangular  relationship  between  the  three  types  of  knowledge. 
Davidson  shows  how  this  base  line  of  communication  can  be  established  and  how  it  both 
yields  and  depends  on  the  three  varieties  of  knowledge: 
Knowledge 
of  the  world 
Knowledge  of  Knowledge  of 
one's  own  mind  other  minds 
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Knowledge  and  hence  communication,  the  connection  between  knowledge  of  one's  own  mind 
and  knowledge  of  other  minds,  clearly  pre-supposes  belief.  Davidson  argues  that  to  hold 
beliefs  requires  that  one  have  a  concept  of  truth  and  therefore  the  capacity  to  appreciate  the 
contrast  between  true  and  false.  He  follows  Wittgenstein  in  arguing  that  only  source  of  the 
concept  of  truth  is  communication  itself  2: 
"Someone  who  has  a  belief  about  the  world  -  or  anything  else  -  must  grasp 
the  concept  of  objective  truth,  of  what  is  the  case  independently  of  what  he 
or  she  thinks....  -The  source  of  the  concept  of  objective  truth  is  interpersonal 
communication.  Thought  depends  on  communication.  This  follows  if  we 
suppose  that  language  is  essential  to  thought,  and  we  agree  with  Wittgenstein 
that  there  can  not  be  a  private  language.  " 
(Davidson,  1991,  pp.  156-157) 
Communication  requires  shared  understanding,  one  person  must  obtain  an  understanding  of 
the  meaning  of  the  behaviour  (usually  the  linguistic  utterances)  of  an  other;  Communication 
in  effect  entails  interpretation,  The  object  of  interpretation  is  the  assignment  of  propositional 
content  to  a  speaker's  utterances.  Davidson  sees  interpretation  as  proceeding  through  the 
interpreter's  matching  of  sentences  of  her  own  to  those  of  a  speaker;  In  so  far  as  the 
interpreter  "gets  things  right"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  157),  her  own  sentences  will  yield  the  truth 
conditions  of  the  speaker's  sentences,  and  give  a  basis  for  interpretation.  Davidson  wants  to 
show  how  such  a  theory  of  truth  for  a  speaker's  utterances,  that  is  "an  empirical  theory  about 
the  truth  conditions  of  every  sentence  in  some  corpus  of  sentences"  (1990a,  p.  309),  can  be 
constructed  and  verified  and  serve  as  a  theory  of  meaning. 
The  evidential  foundation  for  the  theory  must  not  "beg  the  question"  by  assuming 
knowledge  of  meanings  at  the  outset,  it  must  be  plausibly  accessible  to  the  radical  interpreter, 
that  is  someone  with  no  prior  knowledge  of  the  language  and  no  capacity  to  directly  observe 
the  detailed  content  of  the  speakers  propositional  attitudes;  desires,  beliefs,  intentions'3. 
Davidson  argues  that  it  is  possible  for  an  interpreter  to  directly  observe  that  a  speaker  holds 
a  sentence  to  be  true,  in  particular  circumstances,  without  knowing  the  meaning  of  the 
sentence.  Therefore  the  speaker's  prompted  assent  or  dissent  can  be  taken,  without  circularity, 
as  basic  evidence  in  the  development  of  interpretive  theory:  "This  is  a  fair  place  to  start 
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identifying  beliefs  and  meanings,  since  a  speaker's  assent  to  a  sentence  depends  both  on  what 
he  means  by  the  sentence  and  on  what  he  believes  about  the  world.  Yet  it  is  possible  to  know 
that  a  speaker  assents  to  a  sentence  without  knowing  either  what  the  sentence,  as  spoken  by 
him,  means,  or  what  belief  is  expressed  by  it"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  314-315). 
The  fact  that  the  notion  of  truth  is  central  to  all  of  our  interpretive  schemes  does  not 
lead  Davidson  to  think  we  need  a  definition  of  truth".  He  does,  however,  -identify  one 
"intuitive  truth  about  truth  "the  simple  notion  that  the  truth  of  any  sentence  depends  upon  its 
meaning  and  the  world.  He  finds  this  intuition  reflected  in  Tarski's  test  (Tarski,  1944)  of  the 
material  adequacy  of  theories  of  truth,  Convention  T'5: 
"What  Convention  T,  and  the  trite  sentences  it  declares  true,  like  "`Grass  is 
green"  spoken  by  an  English  speaker  is  true  if  and  only  if  grass  is  green', 
reveal  is  that  the  truth  of  an  utterance  depends  on  just  two  things:  what  the 
words  as  spoken  mean,  and  how  the  world  is  arranged.  " 
(Davidson,  1983,  pp.  308-309) 
Davidson  suggests  that  an  adequate  theory  of  truth  for  the  purpose  of  radical  interpretation 
can  be  developed  in  terms  of  a  modified  version  of  convention  T:  An  adequate  theory  will 
entail  for  every  sentence  s  of  a  language  a  testable  T-sentence,  expressed  in  the  language  of 
the  interpreter,  of  the  form  -  "s  is  true  if  and  only  if  p,  "  where  's'  is  the  name  of  an  object 
language  sentence  and  pis  any  sentence  that  is  true  if  and  only  if  's'  is16. 
The  interdependence  of  belief  and  meaning  is  a  potentially  fatal  impediment  to  the 
construction  of  a  theory  of  truth  and  meaning:  "If  all  we  have  to  go  on  is  the  fact  of  honest 
utterance,  we  cannot  infer  the  belief  without  the  meaning  and  we  have  no  chance  of  inferring 
the  meaning  without  the  belief'  (Davidson,  1974b,  p.  142).  Davidson  thinks  that  the  only  way 
an  interpreter  can  break  into  the  circle  of  belief  and  meaning  is  by  the  adoption,  "across  the 
board",  of  a  principle  of  charity.  The  principle  of  charity  itself  has  two  key  components  a 
principle  of  correspondence  and  a  principle  of  coherence.  The  principle  of  correspondence 
directs  the  interpreter  to  proceed  on  the  basis  that  the  speaker's  utterances  express  beliefs  with 
which  she  is  largely  in  agreement.  It  "prompts  the  interpreter  to  take  the  speaker  to  be 
responding  to  the  same  features  of  the  world  that  (s)he  (the  interpreter)  would  be  responding 
to  under  similar  circumstances"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  158).  The  empirical  constraint  thus 
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imposed  on  the  attribution  of  belief  makes  the  derivation  of  meanings  possible.  The  approach 
deals  with  the  problem  of  the  interdependence  of  belief  and  meaning  by  "holding  belief 
constant  as  far  as  possible  while  solving  for  meaning"  (Davidson,  1973a,  p.  137).  This  is  done 
by  assigning  truth  conditions  to  the  speaker's  sentences  that  make  her  right,  according  to  the 
interpreter's  view  of  the  circumstances,  whenever  plausibly  possible". 
The  principle  of  coherence  directs  the  interpreter  to  assume  that  the  speaker  shares 
her  standards  of  rationality;  it  prompts  the  interpreter  to  find  "a  degree  of  logical  consistency 
in  the  thought  of  the  speaker"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  158).  An  interpreter  cannot  build  an 
interpretive  theory  of  truth  and  meaning  by  taking  each  sentence  of  an  object  language  in 
isolation  and  deciding  upon  an  appropriate  T-sentences  for  it.  Rather  she  must  build  a  pattern 
that  fits  the  evidence  and  respects  the  interlocking  relations  of  rational  entailment  between 
sentences".  Davidson  thinks  that  the  meaning  of  words  and  sentences  can  be  drawn  only 
indirectly  from  the  whole  structure  of  interrelated  T-sentences  entailed  by  the  truth  theory  for 
the  speaker's  language.  For  Davidson  a  theory  of  truth  and  meaning  for  a  language  is  an 
account  of  how  the  speakers'  utterances  hold  together  in  a  coherent  pattern  that,  as  a  whole, 
fits  and  makes  sense  of  the  interaction  of  the  speakers  and  their  environment  as  understood 
by  the  interpreter19.  Davidson's  approach  to  meaning  is  thoroughly  holistic20. 
Davidson's  approach  to  interpretation  does  not  make  the  ridiculous  demand  that  the 
speaker  is  always  right  about  the  world,  always  rational  and  consistent.  However  it  allows 
no  room  for  the  possibility  that  the  interpreter  might  discover  that  the  speaker  is  largely 
wrong  about  the  world.  If  the  interpreter  cannot  find  a  way  to  read  into  a  creature's  utterances 
a  pattern  of  beliefs  which,  by  the  interpreter's  own  standards,  is  largely  consistent  and  true 
she  has  "no  reason  to  count  that  creature  as  rational,  as  having  beliefs,  or  as  saying  anything" 
(Davidson,  1973a,  p.  136-137).  The  principle  of  charity  requires  that  the  interpreter  maximize 
the  truth,  by  her  own  standards,  of  the  speakers'  utterances,  that  is,  she  must  interpret  so  as 
to  maximize  the  consistency  and  coherence  of  her  own  beliefs  with  those  of  the  speakers. 
It  seems  to  be  clear  that  interpretation  necessarily21  entails  the  application  of 
interpersonal  standards  of  coherence  and  correspondence  to  the  beliefs  and  utterances  of 
speaker  and  interpreter.  But  why  should  an  interpersonal  standard  be  objective,  what  is  there 
to  prevent  interpreter  and  speaker  being  in  agreement  yet  thoroughly  mistaken  in  their 
beliefs?  If  nothing,  then  we  should  agree  with  Rorty  that  when  Davidson  argues  that  most  of 
anybody's  beliefs  must  be  true,  what  he  means  boils  down  to  just  that  "most  of  anybody's 
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beliefs  must  coincide  with  most  of  our  beliefs"  (Rorty,  1995,  p.  286).  Truth  then  would  just 
be  truth  according  to  the  interpreter.  An  other,  very  much  related,  question  also  occurs  at  this 
stage;  why  should  we  accept  that  it  is  only  through  communication  that  an  objective  standard 
of  truth  can  be  established?  Why  not  think  that  the  world  itself  provides  an  objective  standard 
that  makes  our  sentences  true  or  false?  To  clarify  Davidson's  view  on  these  questions,  we 
must  go  back  and  say  a  little  more  about  the  triangular  relations  between  knowledge  of  the 
world,  knowledge  of  other  minds  and  knowledge  of  one's  own  mind. 
Davidson  does  indeed  think  that  the  ultimate  source  of  "objectivity  is 
intersubjectivity":  Without  communication  we  have  no  basis  for  the  concept  of  truth,  no 
foundation  for  the  idea  that  our  thoughts,  or  the  things  we  say,  might  be  right  or  wrong.  And 
without  a  concept  of  objective  truth  we  can  have  no  thought  or  communication.  Davidson 
stresses  that  the  notion  of  objective  truth  can  arise  and  have  application  only  in  the  context 
of  the  relations  between  communicating  parties  responding  jointly  to  each  other  and  stimuli 
from  a  shared  world.  His  reasoning  is  as  follows:  All  creatures  tend  to  classify  objects  and 
events  in  the  world  in  terms  of  patterns  of  similarity  and  difference  in  the  stimuli  those 
objects  and  events  generate.  The  basis  for  claiming  that  this  is  happening  is  the 
similarity/regularity  of  the  creature's  response  to  the  stimuli.  But  on  what  grounds  can  it  be 
said  that  the  creature's  responses  to  the  stimuli  are  similar?  The  only  answer  we  can  have  to 
this  question  is  that  another  creature  finds  similarity  in  both  the  stimuli  and  in  the  response 
of  the  first.  Only  when  the  observer  or  interpreter  completes  the  triangle,  by  correlating  the 
first  party's  responses,  with  the  objects  and  events  in  the  world,  as  the  observer  sees  it,  are 
there  grounds  for  thinking  that  the  parties  are  responding  to  an  objective  reality  of  objects  and 
events  in  the  world  rather  than  some  proximal  stimuli  or  imaginings.  It  is  through  this 
process  of  triangulation,  this  sharing  of  stimuli,  that  thought  is  given  content:  "It  takes  two 
points  of  view  to  give  a  location  to  the  cause  of  a  thought,  and  thus  to  define  its  content" 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  159)22. 
It  now  becomes  clear  why  it  is  that  Davidson,  contra  Rorty23,  thinks  that  while  a 
speaker  and  interpreter  may  often  understand  one  another  on  the  basis  of  erroneous  beliefs, 
such  cases  "cannot  be  the  rule"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  317)24;  The  interpersonal  standard  is  an 
objective  standard.  He  thinks  most  of  our  beliefs  must  be  true  because  of  the  causal  linkage 
of  the  most  fundamental  of  those  beliefs  with  the  world: 
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"...  what  ultimately  ties  language  to  the  world  is  that  the  conditions  that 
typically  cause  us  to  hold  sentences  true  constitute  the  truth  conditions,  and 
hence  the  meanings,  of  our  sentences.  " 
(Davidson,  1996,  p.  275) 
While  the  truth  of  an  utterance  may  depend  "on  just  two  things:  what  the  words  as  spoken 
mean,  and  how  the  world  is  arranged",  it  is  the  conditions  in  the  world  which  typically  cause 
sentences  to  be  held  true  which  give  content  to  utterances.  The  interpreter  must  attribute 
beliefs  and  interpret  sentences  held  true  in  terms  of  the  events  and  objects  in  the  world  that 
cause  the  sentences  to  be  held  true;  Radical  interpretation  does  not  allow  the  possibility  that 
belief  can  somehow  be  out  of  phase  with  the  environment  which  determines  its  content.  It 
has  no  room  for  the  notion  of  an  epistemological  gap  between  the  content  of  thought  and 
language  and  the  world  upon  which  the  skeptic  relies25: 
"What  stands  in  the  way  of  global  skepticism  of  the  senses  is,  in  my  view,  the 
fact  that  we  must,  in  the  plainest  and  methodologically  most  basic  cases,  take 
the  objects  of  belief  to  be  the  causes  of  that  belief.  And  what  we,  as 
interpreters,  must  take  them  to  be  is  what  they  in  fact  are.  Communication 
begins  where  causes  converge26:  your  utterance  means  what  mine  does  if 
belief  in  its  truth  is  systematically  caused  by  the  same  events  and  objects.  " 
(Davidson,  1983,  p.  317-318) 
Davidson  urges  us  to  learn  to  conceive  of  our  relation  to  the  world  in  causal  rather  than 
representationalist  terms.  He  takes  us  to  be  firmly  'in  touch'  with  reality,  not  in  the  sense  that 
our  beliefs  can  be  more  or  less  adequate  representations  of  reality,  but  rather  in  the  sense  that 
our  beliefs  are  causally  related  to  our  environment,  ultimately  via  our  senses.  Davidson's  is 
a  purely  extensional  theory  of  meaning;  content  is  an  effect  of  radical  interpretation:  "The 
semantic  features  of  language  are  public  features.  What  no  one  can,  in  the  nature  of  the  case, 
figure  out  from  the  totality  of  the  relevant  evidence  cannot  be  part  of  meaning"  (Davidson, 
1979,  p.  235).  There  can  be  no  sense  in  the  notion  that  even  an  adequate  interpretation  of  a 
speaker's  utterances  might  somehow  miss  the  mark  by  failing  to  grasp  the  speaker's  intention 
-  "what  she'really  meant".  As  a  matter  of  principle,  meaning  and  belief  are  open  to  public 
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determination  and  scientific  investigation27:  "What  a  fully  informed  interpreter  could  learn 
about  what  a  speaker  means  is  all  there  is  to  learn;  the  same  goes  for  what  the  speaker 
believes"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  315). 
Davidson's  analysis  shows  that  the  possibility  of  knowledge  requires  that  many  of  our 
plainest  beliefs  are  true,  and  publicly  accessible.  Radical  interpretation  obviously  does  not 
guarantee  all  of  our  beliefs  are  true.  Some  of  our  beliefs  are  no  doubt  caused  by  misleading 
sensations,  and  many  of  our  sophisticated  beliefs  are  given  content  only  by  their  relation  to 
further  beliefs  and  therefore  bear  only  indirect  and  perhaps  tenuous  relation  to  the  causal 
stimuli  provided  by  the  world28:  Any  individual  belief  or  set  of  beliefs  may  be  false.  What 
radical  interpretation  does  not  allow  is  that  our  basic  framework  of  belief  can  somehow  be 
out  of  phase  with  the  world.  And,  it  insists  that  it  is  only  in  the  context  of  this 
framework/fabric  of  basic  true  belief  that  more  sophisticated  beliefs  can  have  content  and  a 
theory  of  error  be  developed. 
We  have  stressed  in  the  in  the  last  few  paragraphs  that  the  world  does  indeed 
constrain  our  knowledge.  Yet,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
world  is  always  based  upon  our  knowledge  of  other  minds29;  Knowledge  is  grounded  in 
intersubjectivity: 
"A  community  of  minds  is  the  basis  of  knowledge;  it  provides  the  measure 
of  all  things.  It  makes  no  sense  to  question  the  adequacy  of  this  measure,  or 
to  seek  a  more  ultimate  standard,  " 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  164) 
One  way  of  thinking  of  Davidson's  analysis  of  the  basic  methodology  of  interpretation  is  to 
see  it  as  part  of  a  fundamental  critique  of  scheme  and  content  dualism.  And  one  way  to 
understand  his  suggestion  that  we  should  learn  to  conceive  of  the  relation  of  language  and 
the  world  in  purely  causal  terms,  is  to  see  it  as  a  call  for  us  "to  stop  thinking  that  there  is 
something  called  'language'  which  is  a'scheme'  which  can  organize,  or  fit,  or  stand  in  some 
other  non-causal  relation  to,  a'content'  called'the  world"`  (Rorty,  1991,  pp.  59-60).  According 
to  the  dualist  vision  at  the  core  of  the  empiricist  tradition,  we  have  on  the  one  hand  'content'; 
the  given  of  sensory  experience,  and  on  the  other  the  'scheme',  a  mechanism  of  mind  or 
language,  that  provides  some  system  of  categories  which  gives  form  to  sensation  and 
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organizes  experience  to  produce  meaning,  belief,  and  other  mental  states.  As  we  have  seen 
Davidson's  analysis  of  radical  interpretation  allows  no  epistemological  intermediary  between 
language  and  the  world:  Experience,  how  things  seem  to  the  subject,  is  allowed  a  causal,  but 
absolutely  no  evidential  role.  The  world's  determination  of  the  meaning  of  sentences  is  direct: 
Mental  states,  the  contents  of  belief  and  the  meaning  of  sentences,  are  fixed  directly  through 
radical  interpretation,  by  the  things  and  events  in  the  world  which  cause  /  prompt  assent  and 
dissent  to  sentences.  The  causation  is  distal  rather  than  proximal;  the  senses  do  not  act  as 
epistemological  intermediaries.  When  experience  is  denied  an  evidential  role  in  the  theory 
of  meaning  there  can  be  no  place  for  its  counterpart  -a  scheme  which  somehow  fits30  or 
organizes  experience. 
Scheme  and  content  dualism  seems  to  make  the  thoughts  we  are  capable  of  thinking 
depend  upon  the  scheme  we  apply,  and  certain  thoughts  generated  on  the  basis  of  one  scheme 
may,  then,  be  quite  inaccessible  to  persons  employing  a  different  scheme.  It  tempts  us  to  see 
reality  and  truth  as  scheme  relative: 
"Conceptual  schemes,  we  are  told  are  ways  of  organizing  experience;  they  are 
systems  of  categories  that  give  form  to  the  data  of  sensation;  they  are  points 
of  view  from  which  individuals,  cultures,  or  periods  survey  the  passing  scene. 
There  may  be  no  translating  from  one  scheme  to  another,  in  which  case  the 
beliefs,  desires,  hopes,  and  bits  of  knowledge  that  characterize  one  person 
have  no  true  counterpart  for  the  subscriber  to  another  scheme.  Reality  itself 
is  relative  to  a  scheme:  what  counts  as  real  in  one  system  may  not  in  another.  " 
(Davidson,  1974a,  p.  183) 
For  Kant  the  mind,  the  'transcendental  unity  of  the  self  consciousness'  (1781,  B  131),  is  the 
crucial  intermediary  between  experience  and  knowledge.  He  argues  that  knowledge  is 
produced  through  the  active  synthesis  of  phenomenal  experience  by  the  transcendental 
structures  of  the  mind.  The  minds  'intuitions'  of  time  and  space  allow  the  spacio-temporal 
ordering  of  phenomena  in  experience  and  the  mind's  categories  of  understanding  such  as 
'substance'  and  'causality'  allow  us  to  experience,  refer  to  and  describe  objects  and  their 
relations,  and  in  that  sense  know  things.  The  Kantian  model  "was  soon  replaced  by  a  more 
reasonable  candidate,  society.  Instead  of  a  mythical  Mind  giving  shape  to  reality,  carving  it, 
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cutting  it,  ordering  it,  it  was  now  prejudices,  categories,  and  paradigms  of  a  group  of  people 
living  together"  (Latour,  1999,  p.  6).  It  became  common  to  conceive  of  the  intermediation  of 
world  and  meaning,  not  in  terms  of  universal  conceptual  categories  of  mind,  but  rather  in 
terms  of  terms  of  the  plurality  of  language:  We  might  then  perhaps  say  that  two  groups  of 
people  have  different  conceptual  schemes  if  they  speak  languages  which  it  is  impossible  to 
translate  satisfactorily  one  into  the  other.  Davidson  cites  the  'Sapir-Whorf  hypothesis'  as  a 
leading  example  of  this  claim31: 
"...  language  produces  an  organization  of  experience.  We  are  inclined  to  think 
of  language  simply  as  a  technique  of  expression,  and  not  realize  that  language 
first  of  all  is  a  classification  and  arrangement  of  the  stream  of  sensory 
experience  which  results  in  a  certain  world-order.  ... 
In  other  words,  language 
does  in  a  cruder  but  also  in  a  broader  and  more  versatile  way  the  same  thing 
that  science  does. 
... 
We  are  thus  introduced  to  a  new  principle  of  relativity, 
which  holds  that  all  observers  are  not  led  by  the  same  physical  evidence  to  the 
same  picture  of  the  universe,  unless  their  linguistic  backgrounds  are  similar, 
or  can  in  some  way  be  calibrated.  " 
(Whorf,  1956,  p.  55) 
Davidson  finds  all  the  necessary  elements  of  scheme  content  relativism  in  the  Sapir-Whorf 
formulation:  (i)  Language  as  the  organizing  scheme.  (ii)  The  content  to  be  organized,  "the 
physical  evidence"  or  "the  stream  of  sensory  experience",  supplied  by  nature.  And  (iii)  the 
failure  of  translation,  or  "calibration"  as  a  condition  for  different  conceptual  schemes. 
Davidson's  approach  is  to  question  the  sense  that  can  be  made  of  the  notion  of  failure  of 
translation.  Given  the  methodology  of  radical  interpretation  which  we  must  employ,  nothing, 
he  argues  "could  count  as  evidence  that  some  form  of  activity  could  not  be  interpreted  in  our 
language  that  was  not  at  the  same  time  evidence  that  that  form  of  activity  was  not  speech 
behaviour"  (Davidson,  1974a,  p.  185).  The  method  of  radical  interpretation  demands  that 
starting  out  the  interpreter  must  assume  a  great  deal  about  a  speaker's  beliefs.  She  must  begin 
by  applying  the  principle  of  charity:  "We  get  a  first  approximation  to  a  finished  theory  by 
assigning  to  sentences  of  a  speaker  conditions  of  truth  that  actually  obtain  (in  our  opinion) 
just  when  the  speaker  holds  those  sentences  true"  (Davidson,  1974a,  p.  196).  The 
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methodology  requires  the  interpreter  to  go  directly  to  the  conditions,  objects  and  events,  in 
the  world  in  order  to  determine  the  content  of  the  speaker's  utterances.  And  if  an  interpreter 
can't  make  a  coherent  pattern  of  the  activity  she  is  faced  with  -  in  context  of  the  evidence  - 
she  has  no  basis  for  thinking  that  activity  is  speech.  Content  is  an  effect  of  radical 
interpretation,  if  some  activity  is  uninterpretable  we  can  have  no  basis  for  thinking  it 
meaningful  -  meaning  is  extensional  not  intensional.  No  sense  can  be  made  of  complete 
failure  of  translation. 
Davidson  thinks  that  no  more  sense  can  be  made  of  the  notion  of  conceptual 
relativism,  and  hence  the  notion  of  a  conceptual  scheme,  in  terms  of  partial  failure  of 
translation.  We  make  most  sense  of  a  speaker's  utterances  when  we  optimize  agreement.  The 
method  of  radical  interpretation  can  not  eradicate  all  error  and  disagreement:  "its  purpose  is 
to  make  meaningful  disagreement  possible,  and  this  depends  entirely  on  a  foundation  -  some 
foundation  in  agreement"  (Davidson,  1974a,  p.  196).  We  improve  the  clarity  of  our 
disagreements  by  enlarging  the  basis  of  our  agreement,  and  if  the  level  of  agreement  is  low, 
the  process  of  interpretation  will  be  undermined.  Whether  we  consider  the  possibility  of  total 
or  partial  failure,  the  key  issue  for  Davidson  is  that  given  the  necessary  methodology  of 
radical  interpretation,  we  as  interpreters,  "could  not  be  in  a  position  to  judge  that  others  had 
concepts  or  beliefs  radically  different  from  our  own"  (Davidson  1974a,  p.  197). 
In  relinquishing  the  scheme  and  content-formulation,  we  give  up  the  idea  of  an 
uninterpreted  reality,  the  notion  of  something  neutral  and  common  lying  outside  our  schemes, 
which  our  conceptual  schemes  might  fit,  organize,  or  correspond  to.  As  we  have  previously 
emphasized,  this  does  not  mean  that  Davidson  is  asking  us  to  accept,  as  Rorty  would  urge, 
that  the  world  is  "well  lost".  On  the  contrary  it  enables  him  to  insist  that  we  have  good  reason 
to  think  that  we  can  have  objective  knowledge  of  a  public  world  which  is  not  of  our  making: 
"In  giving  up  dependence  on  the  concept  of  an  uninterpreted  reality, 
something  outside  all  schemes  and  science,  we  do  not  relinquish  the  notion 
of  objective  truth  -  quite  the  contrary.  Given  the  dogma  of  dualism  of  scheme 
and  reality,  we  get  conceptual  relativity  and  truth  relative  to  a  scheme. 
Without  the  dogma,  this  kind  of  relativity  goes  by  the  board.  Of  course  truth 
of  sentences  remains  relative  to  language,  but  that  is  as  objective  as  can  be. 
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In  giving  up  the  dualism  of  scheme  and  world,  we  do  not  give  up  the  world, 
but  re-establish  unmediated  touch  with  the  familiar  objects  whose  antics  make 
our  sentences  and  opinions  true  or  false. 
(Davidson,  1974a,  p.  198) 
Davidson's  critique  of  scheme  content  dualism  poses  a  significant  challenge  to 
important  trends  in  accounting  thought,  which  seem  to  encourage  us  to  understand  'the  real' 
as  a  construct  of  signifying  practices  and  structures.  In  our  view  dualist  thinking  has  come 
to  dominate  the  critical  accounting  literature.  There  are  a  number  of  obvious  variants  on  the 
dualist  theme  in  accounting  thought.  We  deal  only  with  three:  Most  obvious,  and  discussed 
above  (exemplified  by  Hines,  1988),  is  writing  in  the  phenomenological  tradition  which  takes 
a  social  constructionist  view  of  accounting;  Other  equally  influential,  and  essentially  dualist, 
perspectives  on  accounting  have  drawn  on  both  the  stucturalist  and  hermeneutic  traditions. 
We  will  now  briefly  discuss  examples  of  such  literature;  We  will  not  pretend  to  address  the 
complexities  of  the  arguments  advanced  in  the  papers  which  we  use  as  illustrative  examples, 
and  we  will  not  systematically  reiterate  Davidson's  challenge  to  dualism  which  we  hope  we 
have  adequately  outlined  above. 
The  thesis  of  linguistic  relativity  advanced  by  Sapir  and  Whorf  has  its  origins  in  the 
structuralist  theory  of  language  developed  by  Saussure.  Whilst  the  Sapir-Whorf  hypothesis 
has  had  relatively  little  direct  impact  on  accounting  thought  (Belkaoui  1978,  being  an 
exception),  the  'linguistic  turn'32  taken  by  much  of  twentieth  century  thought,  following 
Saussure,  has  had  a  profound  effects  on  the  conception  accounting  advanced  in  the  critical 
accounting  literature.  Saussure  reacts  against  an  atomistic  theory  of  language  in  which  words 
are  thought  to  have  meaning  by  virtue  of  their  direct  relation  to  objects.  In  place  of  atomism 
he  offers  a  holistic  theory  of  language  in  which  words  have  meaning  by  virtue  of  their 
relation  to  other  words,  that  is,  by  virtue  of  their  relations  to  the  whole  system  of  language. 
He  conceives  of  language  as  a  system  of  differences  "without  positive  terms"  (Saussure, 
1931,  p.  120).  Saussure  turned  away  from  questions  of  reference,  relations  between  words  and 
objects  and  events,  and  instead  focused  on  language  as  a  system  of  signs.  He  regarded  each 
sign  as  composed  of  two  arbitrarily  related  parts  a  signifier  (word)  and  signified  (concept), 
and  he  thought  of  language  as  a  closed  structure  capable  of  producing  stable  meanings. 
Derrida  radicalizes  the  Saussurian  project  by  insisting  that  meaning  is  produced  in  open  and 
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endless  play  of  signifiers  -  there  are  no  stable  meanings.  In  both  structuralist  and  Derridean 
/  poststructuralist  forms,  the  Saussurian  tradition  presents  a  linguistic  variation  on  classic 
scheme  and  content  dualism,  there  is  no  denial  of  the  existence  of  extra-discursive  objects 
and  events,  however,  our  access  to  that  reality  is  seen  as  always  mediated  by  language33.  It 
is  fundamental  to  structuralist  and  poststructuralist  thinking  that  language  is  essentially 
conventional  -a  system  of  culturally  sustained  arbitrary  relations.  Questions  of  truth  and 
reference  can  be  intelligible  then,  if  at  all,  only  in  relation  to  particular  systems  of 
signification  or  conceptual  schemes. 
This  Saussurian  dualist  view  of  the  relation  between  language  and  reality  is  taken  up 
in  the  accounting  literature  by  Tinker  (1991)  who  draws  explicitly  on  Saussure  as  authority: 
"There  is  an  authoritative  semiotic  case  for  recognising  the  quasi-independent 
(discretionary)  status  of  accounting  "signs":  Saussure's  principle  of  the  "the 
arbitrariness  of  signs"  ...  Saussure's  principle  highlights  the  independence 
(autonomy)  of  signification  from  economic  reality;  " 
(Tinker,  1991,  pp.  302-303) 
Tinker  also  seems  to  accept  the  dualist  analyses  of  the  history  of  science  which  suggest  the 
incommensurability  of  different  scientific  paradigms  (see  e.  g.,  Kuhn  1962;  Davidson  1974a), 
from  which  he  draws  the  implication  we  must  accept  the  scheme  relativity  of  truth  / 
epistemological  criteria: 
"This  socially  relative  character  of  epistemological  criteria  is  evident  in  the 
turmoil  of  scientific  revolutions  at  times  of  social  upheaval  and  crises.  " 
(Tinker,  1991,  p.  304) 
Certain  other  theorists  in  accounting  and  finance  (see  e.  g.,  McGoun,  1997;  Macintosh  et.  al., 
2000)  seem  prepared  to  go  further  still.  They  appear  to  be  ready  to  follow  Baudrillard's 
radical  working  through  of  the  structuralist  problematic  to  its  bitter  extreme,  and  seem  to  toy 
with  his  diagnosis  of  the  collapse  of  any  distinctions  between  true  and  false,  real  and 
imaginary: 
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"We  conclude  that  much  of  today's  accounting  information  circulates  in  a 
Baudrillardian  "hyperreality"  where  time  and  space  implode  and  accounting 
signs  no  longer  reflect  the  material,  economic  realm  but  rather  precede  it  or 
bear  no  relationship  to  it.  " 
(Macintosh  et.  al.,  2000,  p.  14) 
The  Saussurian  tradition  and  Davidson's  thinking  are  equally  and  unreservedly  anti-atomistic, 
they  share  commitment  to  thoroughly  holistic  theories  of  meaning.  Indeed  we  might  classify 
Davidson  as  a  structuralist,  he  provides  a  structural  explanation  of  meaning,  in  terms  of  the 
truth  conditions  of  sentences,  which  accounts  for  the  infinite  capacity  of  words  to  be 
combined  in  meaningful  utterances.  The  Saussurian  tradition  goes  wrong  when  it  brackets 
off  reality  and  conceives  of  meaning  as  simply  a  product  of  signifying  structure,  a  matter  of 
convention.  Truth  and  reference  are  then  relativized  to  particular  languages  or  conceptual 
schemes,  so  that,  for  (post)  structuralist  theorists  like  Foucault,  they  become  merely  local 
effects  of  power34: 
"Each  society  has  its  regime  of  truth,  its  "general  politics"  of  truth:  that  is,  the 
types  of  discourse  which  it  accepts  and  makes  function  as  true;  ... 
"Truth"  is 
linked  in  a  circular  relation  with  systems  of  power  which  produce  and  sustain 
it,  and  to  effects  of  power  which  it  induces  and  which  extend  it.  " 
(Foucault,  Power/Knowledge,  1980,  pp131-133) 
The  Saussurian  tradition  fails  to  recognize  the  concept  of  truth  as  a  logical  primitive,  and  as 
the  pre-requisite  for  any  interpretation  or  communication,  which  Davidson's  work  reveals  it 
to  be. 
The  other  great  reorientation  of  twentieth  century  philosophy,  the  shift  of  emphasis 
from  "epistemology  to  hermeneutics"  (see  Rorty,  1980,  Ch.  vii),  originating  in  Heidegger's 
hermeneutic  analysis  of  ontological  issues  (1927),  has  also  had  considerable  impact  on 
critical  accounting  thought.  The  implications  of  this  "interpretive  turn"  for  the  social  sciences 
are  developed  in  the  work  of  hermeuticians  such  as  Gadamer's  (1960)  and  Ricoeur  (1974). 
We  will  consider  the  influence  of  this  interpretive  turn  on  critical  accounting  thought 
primarily  through  reference  to  an  influential  paper,  by  Lavoie  (1989),  that  introduces 
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Gadamer's  hermeneutics  to  an  accounting  audience. 
Gadamerian  hermeneutics  presents  a  variation  on  the  theme  of  scheme  and  content 
dualism,  in  which  the  organizing  scheme  is  conceived  of  as  a  historically  developing 
framework  of  prejudices  -a  tradition.  On  this  view,  all  interpretations  are  historically  and 
linguistically  mediated,  and  all  our  understandings  of  the  world  grounded  in  our  pre- 
understandings,  the  enabling  prejudices  which  set  the  horizons  or  limits  to  our  thought35.  The 
world  has  meaning,  only  through  the  pre-structured  framework  of  our  tradition,  the 
conceptual  scheme  that  constitutes  our  openness  to  the  world: 
"Prejudices  are  not  necessarily  unjustified  and  erroneous,  so  that  they 
inevitably  distort  the  truth.  In  fact  the  historicity  of  our  existence  entails  that 
prejudices,  in  the  literal  sense  of  the  word,  constitute  the  initial  directedness 
of  our  whole  ability  to  experience.  Prejudices  are  biases  of  our  openness  to 
the  world.  They  are  simply  conditions  whereby  we  experience  something  - 
whereby  what  we  encounter  says  something  to  us.  " 
(Gadamer,  1967,  p.  9) 
For  Gadamer,  a  tradition36  is  not  a  possession,  something  controlled  or  used  by  human  being 
in  order  to  deal  with  the  world,  rather  it  is  something  to  which  they  are  subject.  Our  tradition 
is  not  something  we  can  bring  into  full  view  it  is  the  very  ground  of  our  being,  it  is  the  pre- 
requisites  of  any37  understanding: 
"In  fact  history  does  not  belong  to  us;  we  belong  to  it.  Long  before  we 
understand  ourselves  through  the  process  of  self-examination,  we  understand 
ourselves  in  a  self-evident  way  in  the  family,  society,  and  state  in  which  we 
live.  The  focus  of  subjectivity  is  a  distorting  mirror.  The  self-awareness  of  the 
individual  is  only  a  flickering  in  the  closed  circuits  of  historical  life.  That  is 
why  the  prejudices  of  the  individual,  far  more  than  his  judgments,  constitute 
the  historical  reality  of  his  being.  " 
(Gadamer,  1960/1989,  p.  276-277) 
On  the  Gadamerian  view  of  things  we  are  always  already  part  of  an  ongoing  tradition, 
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making  almost  automatic  sense  of  the  world;  Knowledge  is  never  objective,  it  is  always  pre- 
structured  by  prejudice,  and  questions  of  truth  or  falsity  are  always  internal  to  a  tradition's 
Lavoie,  (1989),  advocates  an  hermeneutic  view  of  the  problem  of  accounting  theory 
choice.  He  suggests  that  theories  are  "like  spectacles  through  which  we  see  the  world";  they 
are  not  hypothesis  to  be  tested  against  the  facts,  rather  they  are  the  way  we  see  the  facts 
(Lavoie.  1989,  p.  590).  He  then  goes  on  to  suggest  that  we  can  solve  the  problem  of  theory 
choice  only:  "by  trying  to  look  at  the  world  through  alternative  pairs  of  spectacles  until  one 
is  convinced,  for  now,  that  one  is  seeing  clearly"  (Lavoie,  p.  590).  This  view  of  things  is 
clearly  dualist;  our  ways  of  seeing,  our  theories,  provide  the  scheme  which  somehow  fits,  or 
bring  the  world  into  focus. 
Some  schemes  or  theories,  it  seems,  will  fit  reality  more  satisfyingly  than  others  will. 
Lavoie  argues  that  while  "the  history  of  science  teaches  that  all  efforts  to  set  down  objective 
criteria  for  theory-choice  fail"  (Lavoie,  1989,  p.  583),  we  can  in  a  hermeneutic  spirit 
discriminate  between  competing  theories  if  we  "just  talk  to  each  other  about  alternative 
interpretations  and  see  which  one  appears  more  persuasive"  (Lavoie,  p.  583).  The  'more 
persuasive'  theories  will  be  those  which  are  able  to  win  the  support  of  open-minded  and 
critical  members  of  the  community;  they  will  be  the  product  of  good  conversation  and  will 
be  supported  by  good  reasons39: 
We  can  point  to  no  objective  technique,  which  would  tell  us  how  we  can 
select  better  accounting  theories  from  the  multitude  of  candidates.  Instead  the 
problem  has  to  be  solved,  as  it  is  in  science,  anonymously  and  continuously, 
by  the  critical  process  of  controversy  that  can  occur  among  persons  who 
commit  themselves  to  the  pursuit  of  knowledge. 
(Lavoie,  1989,  p.  590) 
The  meaning  of'good'  in  such  contexts  "is  itself  the  product  of  conversations"  (Lavoie,  1989, 
p.  586),  and  therefore  shaped  by  tradition  itself.  Compelling  theories,  it  seems,  will  turn  out 
to  be  those  which  are  most  consistent  with  our  pre-understandings:  "those  which  most 
comfortably  fit  into  individual  scientist's  presuppositions,  themselves  the  product  of  a  long 
evolution  of  scientific  dialogue"  (Lavoie,  1989,  p.  585). 
Davidson's  analysis  of  the  methodology  of  radical  interpretation  is  itself  an  important 
66 Chapter  2:  Accounting  Knowledge 
contribution  to  hermeneutic  /  interpretive  thought.  However,  from  a  Davidsonian  perspective, 
the  dominant  (Gadamerian)  line  of  the  hermeneutic  tradition,  goes  seriously  wrong  in  the 
priority  it  accords  to  tradition  as  the  mediator  of  understanding.  For  Lavoie,  acceptance  of 
the  authority  of  tradition  is  the  necessary  foundation  for  communication  and  mutual 
understanding  of  the  world: 
"Thus  "enabling  prejudices,  "  elements  of  shared  understandings  which  are 
"passed  down"  to  us  as  traditions,  are  what  make  the  mutual  communication 
among  scientists  possible.  We  only  understand  our  world  because  we 
understand  one  another.  We  only  understand  each  other,  in  turn,  because  we 
all  spent  some  substantial  part  of  our  lives  being  enculturated  into  the  life 
world  ... 
" 
(Lavoie,  1989,  p.  585) 
On  a  Davidsonian  view,  however,  our  understanding  of  one  another's  utterances  and  actions 
depends  upon  our  common  relation  to  an  objective  world;  we  understand  one  another  because 
we  share  a  world,  and  not  primarily  because  we  have  been  subject  to  similar  traditions  or 
processes  of  enculturation,  or  because  we  share  particular  conceptual  schemes  or  languages. 
The  hermeneutic  tradition  pays  insufficient  attention  to  the  real  structural  forces  and  interests 
in  the  world  which  underlie  the  development  of  tradition,  and  allows  too  little  space  to 
possibility  that  our  "enabling  prejudices"  may  be  systematically  distorted". 
Conclusion 
The  Davidsonian  analysis  we  have  discussed  in  this  chapter  shows  that  we  have  good  reason 
for  thinking  that  our  knowledge  has  secure  foundations41:  Intersubjectivity  provides  all  the 
objectivity  we  need,  or  could  have.  In  the  following  chapter,  we  will  extend  our  exploration 
of  the  possibility  of  objectivity  in  accounting,  and  in  the  process  give  further  consideration 
to  the  implications  of  the  Davidsonian  view  for  accounting. 
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In  chapter  1  we  argued  that  in  advanced  modernity  financial  accounting  as  a  way  of  knowing 
tends  towards  crises  -  epistemological  crises.  We  ended  chapter  1  with  a  discussion  in  very 
broad  terms  of  the  possibility  of  an  emancipatory  accounting;  an  accounting  that  might 
overcome  the  obfuscation  of  the  ideology  of  the  commodity  fetish.  In  chapter  2  we  began  to 
develop  a  reasoned  defense  of  the  view  that  financial  accounting  might  overcome  its 
tendency  to  rationality  and  legitimacy  crises  and  become  emancipatory.  We  associated 
accounting's  emancipatory  potential  with  what  we  see  as  its  latent  capacity  to  provide  us  with 
true  accounts  of  the  objective  world  we  share  and  we  used  Davidson's  account  of  the 
possibility  of  knowledge  to  justify  our  faith  in  accounting's  potential  to  give  knowledge  of 
an  objective  reality. 
We  recognize  that  accounting  faces  joint  crises  of  rationality  and  legitimacy.  In 
chapter  2  we  primarily  addressed  the  issue  of  accounting's  rationality  -  its  potential  to 
provide  us  with  true  accounts  of  the  objective  realities  of  our  lives  and  thereby  facilitate 
informed  decision-making.  In  chapter  2  we  implicitly  bracket  questions  of  financial 
accounting's  legitimacy  and  treated  it  as  an  essentially  descriptive  activity.  In  this  chapter  we 
deepen  our  exploration  of  the  possibility  of  objectivity  in  accounting,  we  engage  with  issues 
of  legitimacy,  and  we  argue  that  financial  accounting  may  obtain  a  normative  objectivity  and 
legitimacy  through  the  application  of  communicative  reason  in  democratic  processes. 
We  begin  chapter  three  by  reviewing  and  restating  our  commitment  to  a  Davidsonian 
view  of  descriptive  objectivity  in  accounting.  The  application  of  Davidson's 
antirepresentationalist  conception  of  objectivity  as  intersubjectivity  to  accounting  is  analysed 
here  in  terms  of  the  contrast,  drawn  by  Bernard  Williams,  between  the  prospects  for 
objectivity  in  science  and  ethics.  The  analysis  tends  to  confirm  the  deep  and  inextricable 
entanglement  of  the  descriptive  and  normative  in  accounting.  We  accept  that  ethical 
questions,  those  evaluative  questions  that  concern  competing  self-understandings  and 
conceptions  of  `the  good  life',  can  not  be  settled  objectively.  We  recognise  that  if  we  were 
to  accept  that  the  normative  dimension  of  accounting  consists  in  evaluations  that  can  not  be 
objectively  validated  then  we  face  the  disturbing  possibility  that  reflection,  which  tends  to 
secure  scientific  knowledge,  may  destroy  accounting  knowledge  by  revealing  its  lack  of 
secure  foundation.  We  do  not  accept,  however,  that  the  normative  dimension  of  financial 
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accounting  inevitably  lies  beyond  rational  and  objective  determination  /  validation.  We  turn 
to  Habermas'  theory  of  discourse  ethics  to  justify  the  view  that  normative  objectivity  and 
validity  might  be  secured  for  financial  accounting  regulation  through  communicative 
rationality.  Again  we  contend  that  intersubjectivity  is  all  the  foundation  we  need  or  can  have 
for  objectivity  in  accounting. 
In  terms  of  the  Habermasian  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  society,  accounting's  crisis 
of  legitimacy  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  loss  of  moral  force  characteristic  of  institutions 
in  transition  to  modernity.  In  traditional  societies,  the  self-understandings  characteristic  of 
dominant  groups  and  the  value  preferences  that  emerge  from  their  traditions  and  conceptions 
of  the  good  life,  have  the  power  to  anchor  and  motivate  norms  of  action.  However,  in 
transition  to  modern  pluralist  society,  participants  must  come  to  terms  with  a  plurality  of 
traditions  and  self-understandings.  The  power  that  a  behavioural  expectation  might  have 
obtained  by  association  with  a  particular  tradition  and  associated  self-understandings,  is 
relativized  in  modern  pluralist  society  by  the  recognition  that  other  groups  within  society  do 
not  share  those  understanding  and  value-preferences.  In  modernity  acceptable  norms  of 
action,  guiding  necessary  integration  and  cooperation  across  the  whole  of  society,  can  no 
longer  be  powerfully  motivated  by  appeal  to  the  value  preferences  associated  with  particular 
conceptions  of  the  "good  life".  Normative  claims  derived  from  local  identities  can  not  have 
the  same  quality  of  motivating  force  as  those,  which  can  command  universal  agreement. 
The  advance  of  reason  in  modernity,  and  in  particular  the  development  of  the 
potential  for  communicative  rationality,  promises  the  possibility  of  a  restoration  of  moral 
force  to  social  norms  in  pluralism.  Habermas  does  not  suggest  that  communicative  rationality 
can  be  appropriately  applied  to  all  ethical  /  evaluative  questions.  He  argues,  rather,  that  in 
modernity  a  set  of  moral  questions  that  do  admit  of  objective  determination  /  validation  in 
terms  of  the  generalizability  of  interests  through  communicative  reason  can  be  broken  away 
from  the  ethical.  In  traditional  society,  ethics  (dealing  with  conceptions  of  the  good  life)  and 
morality  (dealing  with  norms  of  action  binding  on  everyone  across  society)  are  tied  tightly 
together,  and  the  latter  obtains  much  of  its  normative  force  from  the  former.  In  the  transition 
to  modern  society,  processes  of  differentiation,  associated  with  the  development  of  expert 
subcultures  in  all  spheres  of  society,  are  set  in  train.  Through  those  processes  an  analytic 
distance  is  produced  and  reflective  perspectives  emerge;  "perspectives  from  which  the 
lifeworld  appears  as  practice  with  which  theory  is  to  be  mediated,  as  life  with  which  art  is  to 
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be  reconciled,  or  ethical  life  to  which  morality  must  be  related"  (Habermas,  1983,  pp.  106- 
109).  The  moral  perspective,  which  emerges  in  modernity,  then  sets  the  lifeworld  at  a 
reflective  distance,  and  differentiates  the  ethical  sphere  from  the  whole.  The  apparent  totality, 
of  the  ethical  sphere,  which  required  that  "questions  of  justice  are  posed  only  within  the 
horizon  of  questions  concerning  the  good  life,  questions  which  have  always  already  been 
answered"  (Habermas,  1983,  pp.  106-109),  loses  its  self-evident  quality,  and  breaks  into  two 
components;  the  moral  and  the  evaluative.  Moral  question  being  those  that  can  be  approached 
rationally  in  terms  of  the  generalizability  of  interests,  and  evaluative  questions  being  those 
which  are  accessible  to  rational  analysis  only  from  within  the  horizons  of  a  particular 
historical  form  of  life. 
We  conclude  chapter  3  with  a  discussion  of  the  implications  of  Habermas'  discourse 
ethics  for  accounting  policy  making,  and  in  particular  the  implications  for  the  appropriate 
role  for  conceptual  framework  projects  such  as  the  ASB's  "Statement  of  Principles  for 
Financial  Reporting"  project.  We  take  the  view  that  accounting  regulations  might,  in 
principle,  be  thought  of  as  moral  norms  and  as  open  to  objective  validation  through 
communicative  reasoning  in  terms  of  the  generalizability  of  interests.  Thereby  the  moral 
force  of  financial  accounting  might  be  restored  and  a  financial  accounting  developed  that 
allows  the  lifeworld  some  normative  grip  on  the  system. 
70 Chapter  3:  Objectivity  in  Accounting  -  The  Case  of  Deferred  Tax 
Chapter  3:  Objectivity  in  Accounting  -  The  Case  of  Deferred  Tax 
Introduction 
This  chapter  sets  out  to  defend  and  explore  the  emancipatory  potential  of  accounting.  We 
associate  that  potential  with  accounting's  capacity  to  be  objective,  and  therefore  seek  to 
defend  the  notion  of  objectivity  in  accounting.  It  seems  to  be  widely  accepted  that  it  is 
meaningful  to  attempt  to  evaluate  alternative  accounting  methods  and  standards  of  external 
financial  reporting  in  terms  of  their  objectivity.  This  criterion,  in  various  guises,  has  featured 
prominently,  and  continues  to  appear,  in  conceptual  studies  and  professional  publications  (see 
for  example,  ASSC,  1975;  FASB,  1980;  ICAS,  1988;  ASB,  1999).  However,  the  term 
"objectivity"  obviously  does  not  possess  a  fixed  unitary  meaning  (see  Megill,  1994),  and  it 
clearly  presents  accountants  with  "considerable  semantic  problems"  (Stamp,  1981).  We  hope, 
in  this  chapter,  to  contribute  towards  a  clarification  of  the  meaning  of  objectivity  in  the 
context  of  its  application  to  accounting.  In  this  introduction  we  sketch  the  broad  outline  of 
the  chapter. 
We  begin  by  adopting  Donald  Davidson's  view  that  intersubjectivity  is  all  the 
foundation  we  need,  or can  have,  for  objectivity,  and  use  that  Davidsonian  perspective  to 
justify  the  view  that  accounting  can,  in  principle,  provide  us  with  knowledge  of  an  objective 
publicly  accessible  world.  We  recognize,  however,  that  accounting  is  more  than  a  purely 
descriptive  enterprise;  it  is  a  moral  practice.  It  performs  regulative  and  integrative  functions 
within  society  and  has  a  normative/ethical  dimension.  Therefore,  without  losing  sight  of  the 
notion  that  "the  ultimate  source  of  objectivity  is 
... 
intersubjectivity"  (Davidson,  1997, 
p.  121),  we  move  on  to  develop  our  discussion  of  objectivity  in  accounting  in  terms  of  the 
distinction,  drawn  by  Bernard  Williams  (1978,1985),  between  the  viable  aims  of  scientific 
and  ethical  inquiry.  Williams  argues  that  in  science  we  may  reasonably  hope  to  transcended 
the  limits  of  perspective  and  converge  upon  an  "absolute  conception  of  reality":  "...  a 
conception  consisting  of  nonperspectival  materials  available  to  any  adequate  investigator" 
(Williams,  1985,  p.  140).  That  is,  in  science  we  can  realistically  hope  for  world-guided 
convergence  on  the  ideal  an  "absolutely"  objective  conception  of  reality;  a  conception  open 
to  maximal  intersubjective  agreement.  Williams  argues  that  we  can  not  expect  no  such 
convergence  in  the  ethical  domain,  and  in  fact  he  suggests  that  reflection,  so  vital  to  the 
justification  of  scientific  knowledge,  may  destroy  ethical  knowledge. 
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We  take  the  issue  of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK  as  a  focus  for  our  effort 
to  locate  accounting  in  the  context  of  the  science  -  ethics  dichotomy  outlined  by  Williams. 
We  examine  both  the  history  of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  and  the  recent  debate  on  the  topic 
that  has  taken  place  in  the  context  of  a  developing  conceptual  framework  for  financial 
reporting  in  the  UK.  Two  conclusion  of  our  consideration  of  the  deferred  tax  debate  are 
perhaps  particularly  notable:  Firstly,  we  suggest  that  descriptive  objectivity  may  be  low  in 
respect  of  many  accounting  issues,  because  the  accounting  concepts  and  theory  employed 
often  lack  a  clear  relation  to  causal  stimuli  in  the  publicly  accessible  world.  Considerable 
scope  is  thereby  allowed  for  failure  of  intersubjective  descriptive  consensus,  that  is,  in  our 
terms,  failure  of  objectivity.  We  note  that  this  issue  has  been  identified  by  other  observers 
of  accounting,  including  Sterling  and  Chambers,  who  have  called  for  accounting  to  become 
more  rational,  less  bound  by  myth  and  tradition,  and  more  like  science;  that  is,  more  closely 
tied  to  an  objective  public  reality.  Secondly,  our  analysis  suggests  that  the  descriptive  and 
normative  are  deeply  entangled  in  accounting.  We  conclude  that  the  normative  element  is 
entirely  integral  to  accounting;  it  can  not  become  a  purely  descriptive  enterprise.  We  suggest 
that  accounting  concepts  resemble  thick  ethical  concepts,  and  that  we  should  therefore  not 
expect  to  find  in  accounting  theory  the  kind  world-guided  convergence  that  we  can 
reasonably  expect  in  science;  It  seems  that  Williams'  suggestion  that  reflection  may  destroy 
ethical  knowledge  might  need  to  be  extended  to  accounting. 
In  the  final  part  of  this  chapter,  accepting  that  we  can  not  expect  world  guided 
convergence  and  objectivity  in  accounting  theory,  we  look  for  an  alternative  foundation  for 
accounting  objectivity  in  rationally  motivated  consensus;  convergence  guided  by 
communicative  reason.  We  turn  to  Habermas'  work  to  sustain  the  view  that,  at  least 
potentially,  we  can  have  normative  objectivity/validity  in  accounting  recognized  as  a 
normative/regulative  enterprise.  Williams  and  Habermas  would  agree  that  there  can  be  no 
objective  adjudication  between  value-preferences  or  between  competing  conceptions  of  the 
"good  life":  Such  evaluative  questions  can  only  be  addressed  from  within  particular  forms 
of  life.  Habermas  argues,  however,  that  whilst  in  traditional  society  the  ethical  sphere  appears 
as  a  totality  in  which  the  norms  of  action  and  "question  of  justice"  are  determined  by  answers 
given  to  the  evaluative  questions,  in  the  transition  from  traditional  society  to  modernity,  the 
ethical  sphere  breaks  into  two  components  -  the  evaluative  and  the  moral.  That  is,  in  modern 
pluralist  society  a  set  of  moral  questions  becomes  detached  from  the  evaluative.  The  moral 
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questions  are  defined  as  those  very  questions  that  admit  of  a  generalizability  of  interests  and 
are  therefore  open  to  the  possibility  of  objective  validation  through  rational  argument.  These 
moral  questions  have  a  priority,  over  the  evaluative/ethical  questions,  because  their  resolution 
allows  the  integration  and  coordination  of  society  and  thus  sets  the  social  conditions  within 
which  particular  forms  of  life  may  flourish  and  the  ethical  questions  they  raise  be  addressed. 
Habermas  shows  how  moral  norms  of  action  can  be  objectively  validated  through 
communicative  reason,  that  is,  through  the  institutionalization  of  what  he  calls  "discourse 
ethics".  We  argue  that  accounting  regulation  falls  within  this  moral  sphere  and  is  open  to 
objective  validation  through  rational  argument  and  in  particular  the  application  of  discourse 
ethics.  It  is  in  this  application  of  communicative  reason  that  we  see  the  fuller/second 
dimension  of  accounting's  emancipatory  potential.  Accounting  regulation  established 
through  the  institutionalization  of  discourse  ethics  may  truly  contribute  to  communicative 
integration  of  society  and  help  to  put  a  normative  check  on  the  colonizing  depredations  of 
the  capitalist  system  upon  the  lifeworld.  The  chapter  closes  with  a  brief  discussion  of  some 
of  the  implications  of  the  analysis  presented  for  conceptual  frameworks  for  financial 
reporting  projects. 
Objectivity  as  intersubjectivity 
Throughout  the  discussion  of  objectivity  in  accounting  which  follows  we  adopt  the  view  that 
ultimately  objectivity  needs,  and  can  have,  no  other  foundation  than  intersubjectivity.  In  this 
section  of  the  chapter  we  sketch  a  justification  of  this  view  in  terms  of  the  work  of  the 
philosopher  Donald  Davidson.  The  reader  will  find  that  this  section  repeats,  with 
different  emphasis,  much  of  the  discussion  of  Davidson's  views  contained  in  chapter  2 
of  this  thesis.  It  is  not  our  intention  to  offer  any  comprehensive  discussion  of  competing 
conceptions  of  objectivity.  However  it  may  help  clarify  our  position  if  it  is  understood  from 
the  start  that  we  find  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth,  and  any  conceptions  of  objectivity 
built  upon  it,  unintelligible.  We  agree  with  Davidson  that  correspondence  is  "an  idea  without 
content"  (1990,  p.  305),  and  therefore  we  can  make  no  sense  of  those  views  that  somehow 
make  objectivity  coextensive  with  the  faithful  representation  of  a  representation  independent 
reality.  For  a  full  critique  of  the  notion  "objectivity  as  correspondence",  often  referred  to  as 
"absolute  objectivity",  see  Rorty  (1980). 
Davidson  finds  a  foundation  for  objectivity  in  intersubjectivity,  that  is,  in  the  network 
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of  relations  between  creatures  reacting  to  one  and  other  and  their  shared  environment: 
"The  only  ultimate  source  of  objectivity  is,  in  my  opinion,  intersubjectivity. 
If  we  were  not  in  communication  with  others,  there  would  be  nothing  on 
which  to  base  the  idea  of  being  wrong  or,  therefore,  of  being  right,  either  in 
what  we  say  or  in  what  we  think.  The  possibility  of  thought  as  well  as  of 
communication  depends,  in  my  view,  on  the  fact  that  two  or  more  creatures 
are  responding,  more  or  less  simultaneously,  to  input  from  a  shared  world, 
and  from  each  other.  "  i 
(Davidson,  1997,  pp.  121) 
Justification  of  the  notion  of  objectivity  as  intersubjectivity  is  found  most  plainly  in  the 
account  Davidson  offers  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  and  communication,  which  he  insists 
"forces  us  to  the  idea  of  an  objective,  public  truth"  (Davidson,  1975,  p.  170).  We  sketch  that 
account  in  the  following  paragraphs. 
Knowledge  clearly  always  pre-supposes  belief,  and  holding  a  belief  requires  that  one 
understands  the  possibility  of  being  mistaken;  it  requires  that  one  grasp  "the  contrast  between 
truth  and  error  -  true  belief  and  false  belief'  (Davidson,  1975,  p.  170).  Appreciation  of  the 
contrast  between  true  and  false  belief,  the  concept  of  objective  truth,  emerges  only  in  the 
context  of  communication:  "Without  a  second  person  there  is,  as  Wittgenstein  powerfully 
suggests,  no  basis  for  a  judgment  that  a  reaction  is  wrong"  (Davidson,  1997,  pp.  122).  At  the 
core  of  communication  is  interpretation;  if  communication  is  to  take  place  at  all  interpreters 
must  be  able  to  attribute  meaning  to  speakers'  utterances.  If  we  are  to  account  for  knowledge 
we  need  an  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  interpretation.  Davidson  proposes  a  truth 
conditional  theory  of  meaning;  he  argues  that  interpretation  must  proceed  through  the 
interpreter's  matching  of  sentences  of  her  own  to  each  of  the  speaker's  utterances  /  sentences. 
The  interpreter's  own  sentences  will  constitute  a  theory  of  truth  and  meaning  for  the 
speaker's  sentences,  and  insofar  as  the  interpretation  is  correct,  yield  the  meaning  / 
propositional  content  of  those  utterances.  Davidson  gives  us  an  explanation  of  how  such  an 
empirical  theory  of  truth  for  a  speaker's  utterances  can  be  constructed  and  verified  and  can 
serve  as  a  theory  of  meaning.  We  shall  see  that  that  explanation  forces  us  to  the  notion  of  a 
publicly  accessible  objective  reality. 
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Davidson  argues  that  we  must  consider  the  problem  of  interpretation  from  the 
position  of  the  "radical  interpreter",  that  is,  someone  with  no  prior  knowledge  of  the 
speaker's  language  and  no  direct  access  to  the  detailed  propositional  intentions  or  beliefs  of 
the  speaker.  Otherwise,  we  simply  beg  the  question  of  interpretation  by  assuming  knowledge 
of  meanings  at  the  outset.  We  must  explain  how  it  is  that  interpretation  is  possible  on  the 
basis  of  the  evidence  available  to  the  radical  interpreter.  That  evidence  will  obviously  include 
the  speaker's  utterances,  and  Davidson  argues  that  we  can  also  reasonably  presume  that  the 
radical  interpreter  can  directly  observe  that  a  speaker  holds  an  utterance  /  sentence  to  be  true 
in  particular  circumstances,  without  knowing  what  the  speaker  means  by  it:  We  can 
reasonably  assume  that  "it  is  possible  to  know  that  a  speaker  assents  to  a  sentence  without 
knowing  either  what  the  sentence,  as  spoken  by  him,  means,  or  what  belief  is  expressed  by 
it"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  315).  There  is,  however,  an  obvious  difficulty  associated  with  using 
the  speaker's  prompted  assent  of  dissent  as  a  foundation  for  the  construction  of  and 
verification  of  a  theory  of  truth  and  meaning  for  the  speaker's  utterances.  The  problem  is  that 
a  speaker  will  hold  an  utterance  to  be  true,  or  false,  in  part  because  of  what  it  means,  and  in 
part  because  of  what  he  believes  to  be  the  case.  Belief  and  meaning  are  thoroughly  entangled 
in  the  evidence  available  to  the  radical  interpreter;  "a  speaker's  assent  to  a  sentence  depends 
both  on  what  he  means  by  the  sentence  and  on  what  he  believes  about  the  world"  (Davidson, 
1983,  p.  314). 
Davidson  argues  that  the  interpreter  can  break  the  deadlock  of  belief  and  meaning  by 
applying  the  principle  of  charity.  That  principle  requires  the  interpreter  to  proceed  on  the 
basis  that  the  speaker  is  reacting  to  the  same  features  of  the  world  as  she  would  herself  react 
to  in  similar  circumstances,  and  that  the  speaker's  utterances  express  beliefs  with  which  she 
would  for  the  most  part  agree.  By  thus  assigning  truth  conditions  to  the  speaker's  utterances 
that,  whenever  plausibly  possible,  make  him  right  according  to  the  interpreter's  view  of  the 
circumstances,  sufficient  constraint  may  placed  on  the  attribution  of  beliefs  to  allow  the 
derivation  of  meanings.  The  impasse  of  belief  and  meaning  is  broken  by  "holding  belief 
constant  as  far  as  possible  while  solving  for  meaning"  (Davidson,  1973a,  p.  137).  The 
principle  of  charity  also  directs  the  interpreter  to  credit  the  speaker  with  her  own  standards 
of  rationality  and  consistency.  An  interpreter  cannot  construct  a  theory  of  truth  and  meaning 
for  a  speaker's  language  by  dealing  with  each  of  the  speaker's  utterances  in  isolation,  rather 
she  must  build  a  pattern  that  fits  the  evidence  and  maintains  the  rationality  of  relations 
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between  sentences.  The  method  of  radical  interpretation  is  thoroughly  holistic;  the  meaning 
of  words  and  sentences  can  be  drawn  only  indirectly  from  the  whole  pattern  of  interrelated 
sentences  that  constitute  the  truth  theory  for  the  speaker's  language.  An  interpretive  theory, 
once  established,  will  generally  not  be  obvious  in  use,  especially  where  the  speaker  and 
interpreter  share  the  same  language.  "Once  we  have  the  theory,  though,  we  can  explain  the 
truth  of  sentences  on  the  basis  of  their  structure  and  the  semantic  properties  of  the  parts" 
(Davidson,  1990a,  p.  300).  The  structure  and  semantic  properties  of  the  parts,  the  meaning  of 
words,  can  not  be  a  starting  point,  for  the  development  of  an  interpretive  theory  of  truth  for 
a  speaker's  language,  they  are  products  of  such  theory.  Davidson  insists  then  that  "all 
understanding  of  speech  involves  radical  interpretation"  (Davidson,  1973  a,  p.  125). 
The  method  of  radical  interpretation,  sketched  above,  allows  no  room  for  the 
possibility  that  the  interpreter  might  discover  the  speaker  to  be  largely  mistaken  in  his  beliefs 
about  the  world.  If  the  interpreter  cannot  find  in  the  speaker's  utterances  a  pattern  of  beliefs 
that,  by  her  own  standards,  is  largely  consistent  and  true  she  has  "no  reason  to  count  that 
creature  as  rational,  as  having  beliefs,  or  as  saying  anything"  (Davidson,  1973a,  p.  136-137). 
The  method  directs  the  interpreter  to  maximize  the  truth,  by  her  own  standards,  of  the 
speaker's  utterances;  correct  interpretation  must  proceed  so  as  to  optimize  the 
correspondence  /  agreement  and  coherence  of  the  interpreter's,  and  speaker's,  beliefs. 
Interpretation  clearly  relies  on  "an  interpersonal  standard  of  consistency  and  correspondence" 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  158).  At  this  point,  the  critic  may  agree  with  all  of  the  above  yet  ask; 
what  assurance  do  we  have  that  the  interpersonal  standard  is  objective?  What,  if  anything, 
prevents  the  interpreter  and  speaker  from  being  agreed  upon  largely  wrong  beliefs?  If  we  are 
to  have  convincing  justification  of  the  view  that  ultimately  objectivity  needs,  and  can  have, 
no  other  foundation  than  intersubjectivity,  we  need  to  understand  why  Davidson  thinks  that 
the  "interpersonal"  standard  of  coherence  and  correspondence,  that  is  so  vital  to 
communication,  is  an  "objective"  standard.  We  need  to  see,  that  is,  why  he  believes  that 
whilst  an  interpreter  and  speaker  may  occasionally  understand  one  another  on  the  basis  of 
mistaken  beliefs  such  cases  "cannot  be  the  rule"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  317).  Furthermore,  we 
need  to  be  convinced  that  the  interpersonal  standard,  achieved  through  communication,  is  the 
only  objective  standard  we  can  have;  we  need  to  see  why  we  should  accept  that  the  world 
itself  can  not  provide  an  objective  standard  that  makes  our  sentences  true  or  false. 
The  Davidsonian  line  of  argument  traced  out  above  proceeds  on  the  basis  that  all 
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thought  and  knowledge  presupposes  beliefs  and  that  having  beliefs  requires  a  grasp  of  the 
concept  of  objective  truth.  The  notion  of  objective  truth  itself,  Davidson  argues,  can  emerge 
and  have  application  only  in  the  context  of  the  communicative  relations  between  parties 
responding  jointly  to  each  other  and  stimuli  from  a  shared  world.  Communication  relies  upon 
the  interpreter's  ability  to  find  regularities  in  the  behavior  /  utterances  of  the  speaker  that  can 
be  correlated  with  events  and  objects  in  the  world  as  the  interpreter  sees  it.  It  is  this  process 
of  triangulation,  this  sharing  of  stimuli,  that  gives  content  /  meaning  to  speech  and  thought, 
and  provides  us  with  grounds  for  thinking  that  the  communicating  parties  are  responding  to 
an  objective  publicly  accessible  reality  of  objects  and  events  in  the  world  -  rather  than  to 
some  proximal  stimuli,  or  imaginings: 
"For  until  the  triangle  is  completed  connecting  two  creatures,  and  each 
creature  with  common  features  of  the  world,  there  can  be  no  answer  to  the 
question  whether  a  creature,  in  discriminating  between  stimuli,  is 
discriminating  between  stimuli  at  the  sensory  surfaces  or  somewhere  further 
out,  or  further  in.  Without  this  sharing  of  reactions  to  common  stimuli, 
thought  and  speech  would  have  no  particular  content  -  that  is,  no  content  at 
all.  It  takes  two  points  of  view  to  give  a  location  to  the  cause  of  a  thought,  and 
thus  to  define  its  content.  " 
(Davidson,  1991,  pp.  159-160) 
It  should  now  be  clear  why  Davidson  thinks  that  the  interpersonal  standard  of  the  community 
of  minds  is  an  objective  standard,  and  why  we  can  be  sure  that  our  view  of  the  world  is,  in 
its  most  basic  features,  largely  correct.  On  Davidson's  view  of  things  most  of  our  plainest 
beliefs  must  be  true  because  they  are  given  content  by  the  objects  and  events  in  the  world  that 
cause  them;  "...  what  ultimately  ties  language  to  the  world  is  that  the  conditions  that 
typically  cause  us  to  hold  sentences  true  constitute  the  truth  conditions,  and  hence  the 
meanings,  of  our  sentences"  (Davidson,  1996,  p.  275).  Radical  interpretation  allows  no  gap 
between  the  content  of  thought  and  language  and  the  world;  the  general  framework  of  our 
plain  beliefs  can  not  be  out  of  phase  with  the  reality  that  determines  its  content.  We  can  be 
confident  that  our  beliefs  are  securely  in  touch  with  reality,  not  in  the  sense  that  they 
somehow  correspond  with,  or  faithfully  represent,  reality,  but  rather  in  the  sense  that  they  are 
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necessarily  causally  related  to  our  environment  and  true.  We  can  be  sure  that  most  of 
anyone's  utterances  /  statements  are  true  because  their  truth  depends  "on  just  two  things: 
what  the  words  as  spoken  mean,  and  how  the  world  is  arranged"  (Davidson,  1983,  pp.  308- 
309),  and  those  two  things  are  not  independent  entities,  whose  correspondence  might  be 
tested,  rather  one  is  causally  dependent  on  the  other. 
The  process  of  radical  interpretation,  and  the  causal  relations  between  our  beliefs  and 
the  world  it  relies  upon,  obviously  can  not  guarantee  that  all  of  our  beliefs  are  true. 
Misleading  sensations  will  sometimes  produce  mistaken  beliefs  and  many  of  our  beliefs  have 
only  indirect  relations  with  objects  and  events  in  the  world.  What  the  process  does  provide 
is  a  backdrop  of  agreement  and  true  belief  against  which  error  can  be  distinguished  and 
particular  intelligible  beliefs  formulated.  The  process  of  radical  interpretation  allows  that  any 
particular  belief  or  set  of  beliefs  may  be  false,  what  it  does  not  allow  is  that  "our  general 
picture  of  the  world  and  our  place  in  it  is  mistaken,  for  it  is  this  picture  which  informs  the  rest 
of  our  beliefs,  whether  they  be  true  or  false,  and  makes  them  intelligible"  (Davidson,  1991, 
p.  160). 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  objective  world  constrains  our  knowledge,  without  a  common 
cause  we  can  have  no  communication  and  no  knowledge:  "Communication  begins  where 
causes  converge"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  317-318).  Equally,  it  is  clear  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
world  is,  always  dependent  on,  and  conditioned  by,  our  knowledge  of  other  minds.  Without 
communication  we  can  have  no  sense  of  objectivity,  no  basis  for  discrimination  between  true 
and  false  belief:  "A  community  of  minds  is  the  basis  of  knowledge;  it  provides  the  measure 
of  all  things"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  164):  Davidson  claims  that  creatures  tend  to  classify  objects 
and  events  in  the  world  in  terms  of  patterns  of  similarity  and  difference  in  the  stimuli  they 
generate.  The  only  grounds  we  can  have  for  such  a  claim  is  the  similarity/regularity  of  the 
creature's  response  to  the  stimuli.  But  the  only  grounds  we  can  have  for  claiming  that  the 
creatures  responses  to  the  stimuli  are  similar  /  regular  is  that  another  creature  finds  similarity 
in  both  the  stimuli  and  in  the  response  of  the  first  creature.  Ultimately  the  interpersonal 
standard  of  the  community  of  minds  is  the  only  standard  of  the  real  we  have  or  need  and  the 
objectivity  of  particular  knowledge  must  be  conceived  of  in  terms  of  the  degree  and  quality 
of  the  intersubjective  agreement  supporting  it.  On  this  view,  perspectival  knowledge  can  be 
objective  in  cases  where  it  is  supported  by  reflective  explanation  of  its  possibility,  the 
validity  of  which  is  itself  open  to  broadly  based  intersubjective  consensus. 
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Objectivity  and  knowledge  is  essentially  founded  on  agreement,  yet  does  not  require 
total  agreement.  Nevertheless,  too  many  disagreements  or  mistakes,  will  tend  to  undermine 
the  possibility  of  interpretation  and  the  communicative  foundations  of  knowledge.  Some 
disagreements  will  be  more  destructive  than  others;  disagreement  about  beliefs  that  derive 
their  content  from  relations  to  other  beliefs  rather  than  directly  from  the  environment  may 
pose  relatively  little  difficulty,  more  damaging  will  be  those  disagreements  that  concern 
matters  where  the  causal  influence  of  the  environment  is  apparently  direct: 
"Disagreement  about  theoretical  matters  may  (in  some  cases)  be  more 
tolerable  than  disagreement  about  what  is  more  evident;  disagreement  about 
how  things  look  or  appear  is  less  tolerable  than  disagreement  about  how  they 
are;  disagreement  about  the  truth  of  attributions  of  certain  attitudes  to  a 
speaker  by  that  same  speaker  may  not  be  tolerable  at  all,  or  barely.  " 
(Davidson,  1975,  p.  169) 
Persistent  disagreement  on  theoretical  matters  bearing  little  direct  relation  to  causal  stimuli 
provided  by  a  shared  world  may  be  easily  accommodated.  Intelligible  disagreement  on 
matters  more  directly  related  to  the  world,  perhaps  explainable  in  terms  of  differences  in  the 
positions  and  faculties  of  the  speaker  and  interpreter,  may  also  be  readily  accommodated. 
Most  disruptive  will  be  those  unintelligible  disagreements  in  matters  closely  related  to  the 
stimuli  provided  by  the  world  where  objective  agreement  is  reasonably  expected. 
Bernard  Williams  (1985)  offers  a  similar  analysis  of  the  possibility  of  objectivity  in 
the  domains  of  science  and  ethics.  His  analysis  turns  upon  the  nature  of  agreement  and 
disagreement  in  those  spheres,  and  on  "our  reflective  understanding  of  the  best  hopes  we 
could  coherently  entertain  for  eliminating  disagreement  in  the  two  areas"  (Williams,  1985, 
P.  135).  He  contrasts  (1985,  p.  133)  two  types  of  disagreement;  On  the  one  hand, 
disagreements,  such  as  that  between  two  children  wanting  one  bun,  which  need  not  suggest 
that  there  has  been  any  failure  of  recognition  or  understanding  or  any  language  problem'. 
And  on  the  other  hand  disagreements,  such  as  those  involving  the  recognition  of  "middle- 
Sized  dry  goods",  which  do  suggest  such  failures  or  problems.  He  argues  that  the  difference 
between  such  cases  of  disagreement  underlies  the  epistemological  contrast  between  science 
and  ethics. 
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For  Williams,  like  Davidson,  the  objectivity  of  a  particular  belief  must  be  assessed 
in  terms  of  the  degree  and  quality  of  intersubjective  support  it  enjoys.  The  more  objective 
views  are  those  which  are  open  to  fullest  intersubjective  agreement;  those  views  which  rely 
least  "on  the  specifics  of  the  individual's  makeup  and  position  in  the  world,  or  on  the 
character  of  the  particular  type  of  creature  he  is"  (Nagel,  1986,  p.  5).  On  such  a  view,  the 
distinction  between  subjective  and  objective  judgement  is  obviously  always  a  matter  of 
degree.  Williams  contends  that  in  science  we  can  coherently  expect  to  achieve  a  much  higher 
degree  of  objectivity,  through  reflection,  than  we  can  ever  reasonably  expect  to  obtain  in  the 
ethical  sphere.  He  argues  that  in  science  perspectival  knowledge  may  attain  objectivity  when 
it  is  justified  by  reflective  explanation  of  its  possibility,  that  is  itself  guided  by  objects  and 
events  in  the  world  that  any  competent  observers  may  triangulate  upon. 
Williams  recognizes  that  any  description  of  the  world  must  incorporate  a  point  of 
view  -a  subjective  element.  This,  he  argues,  need  not  prevent  our  perspectival 
representations  from  being  objective  and  providing  knowledge'  of  how  things  are  in  the 
world.  He  fully  appreciates  the  difficulties  associated  with  any  attempt  to  maintain  the  notion 
that  human  inquiry  can  provide  a  systematic  account  of  the  way  the  world  really  is.  He  agrees 
that  notions  such  as  "how  things  are"  or  "the  world"  are,  prior  to  our  descriptions,  empty  and 
unspecifiable  (see  Rorty,  1991,  p.  55).  He  characterizes  the  problem  in  terms  of  a  dilemma: 
either  we  conceive  of  the  world  in  terms  of  our  current  beliefs,  in  which  case  the  world  can 
do  no  more  "than  repeat  the  beliefs  we  take  to  represent  it",  or  we  try  to  conceive  of  the 
world  prior  to  any  description  of  it  -  and  this  is  simply  "an  empty  notion"  (Williams,  1985, 
p.  138).  Indeed,  it  is  with  the  hope  of  taking  us  beyond  this  dilemma  that  Williams  suggests 
that  we  should  strive  to  form  an  absolute  conception  of  the  world  that  is  "already  there"  in 
terms  only  of  those  of  our  beliefs  and  theories  "that  we  can  reasonably  claim  to  represent  the 
world  in  a  way  to  the  maximum  degree  independent  of  our  perspective  and  its  peculiarities" 
(Williams,  1985,  pp.  138-139).  He  suggests  that  in  science  we  may  step  back  from  our 
competing  perceptions,  and  beliefs  and  work  to  develop  a  more  inclusive  conception  of  the 
world  that  is  capable  of  explaining  the  relations  of  competing  and  more  perspectival 
representations  to  the  world.  In  science  perspectival  knowledge  can  be  justified  through  the 
process  of  reflection  which  allows  a  particular  perspective  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of 
a  more  inclusive  view.  The  more  inclusive  conception  produced  may  itself  face  competition 
from  other  representations,  in  which  case  a  yet  more  inclusive  conception  of  the  world  must 
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be  sought.  Williams  argues  that  we  can  coherently  hope  that  ideally  science  will  eventually 
converge  on  a  conception  of  the  world  that  meets  no  competition  and  which  can  claim  to  be 
'the  absolute  conception'  of  reality.  The  absolute  conception  will  be  maximally  independent 
of  perspective,  it  will  be  a  maximally  inclusive  and  objective  conception  of  the  reality  that 
is  'there  anyway'. 
The  idea  of  scientific  convergence  -  as  convergence  on  how  things  anyway  are  -  relies 
heavily  on  notions  of  explanation:  "The  substance  of  the  absolute  conception  ... 
lies  in  the 
idea  that  it  could  non-vacuously  explain  how  it  itself,  and  various  perspectival  views  of  the 
world,  are  possible"  (Williams,  1985,  p.  139).  Science  can  provide  some  degree  of  second- 
order  explanation  of  how  creatures  with  our  history  and  faculties  can  perceive  and  understand 
the  world  with  properties  that  this  same  science  ascribes  to  it.  We  can  explain  our 
perspectival  view;  we  can  explain  why  it  is  that  "grass"  seems  to  be  "green"  to  creatures  like 
us,  and  we  can  explain  why  the  concept  of  green  is  not  available  from  certain  other 
perspectives.  We  can  make  some  disagreement  intelligible  and  thereby,  in  a  sense,  resolve 
them.  The  realisation  that  the  concept  "green"  is  perspectival  certainly  does  not  undermine 
our  use  of  the  concept  or  our  colour  classification  systems;  in  fact,  the  knowledge  that  "grass 
is  green"  is  supported  by  explanation.  In  science  second  order  explanation  of  perspectives 
also  justifies,  because  it  explains  how  perceptions  are  related  to  one  another  and  to  the 
physical  reality  which  they  give  knowledge  of  -  it  explains  how  scientific  understandings 
help  us  "find  our  way  around  the  physical  world"  (Williams,  1985,  p.  151).  Crucially,  in 
science,  world-guidance  does  not  breakdown  on  reflection:  both  perspectival  knowledge  and 
the  second  order,  absolute,  conception  of  reality  can  be  world-guided.  In  science,  at  least,  we 
may  hope  and  expect  to  converge'  on  an  account  of  the  world  that,  whilst  inevitably  an 
account  of  how  things  seem  to  beings  like  us,  is  to  a  maximum  degree  independent  of  local 
perspectives;  an  account  that  is  objective,  and  that  might  reasonably,  if  not  literally,  be 
thought  of  as  an  expression  of  "how  things  are". 
Williams  clearly  accepts  that  we  can  not  shed  our  descriptive  perspective  and  move 
to  a'God's  eye  view'  of  reality  from  which  we  can  develop  a  conception  of  the  world  as  it  is 
in  itself  independent  of  all  representation.  He  rejects  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth:  "It 
suggests  that  we  can,  so  to  speak,  get  round  behind  our  descriptions  and  see  how  they  fit  the 
world,  and  this  makes  no  sense  at  all:  any  conception  of  the  world  we  can  use  at  all  is  one 
that  is  already  expressed  in  terms  that  we  understand,  our  terms.  The  world  cannot  describe 
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itself  for  us"  (Williams,  1991,  p.  12).  For  Williams,  the'world  as  it  is  in  itself  "...  is  not  the 
object  of  a  representation  that  tries  to  transcend  all  representation,  but  only  the  object  of  a 
representation  that  is  relatively  inclusive  and  unrivalled"  (Sorrell,  1990,  p.  13).  We  should 
think  of  the  absolute  conception  of  reality  as  literally  unattainable  ideal  towards  which  we 
can  reasonably  expect  scientific  knowledge  to  converge:  "Of  course,  we  may  never  actually 
arrive  at  such  a  view,  but  as  rational  human  beings  we  can  be  expected  to  converge  toward 
an  approximation  of  it.  Absolute  objectivity,  then,  presents  itself  as  absolute  not  in  its 
certitude  or  infallibility,  but  rather  in  the  hold  that  it  ought  to  have  on  us  as  rational  beings" 
(Megill,  1994,  p.  3). 
An  argument  might  be  made  that  convergence  on  how  things  are  is  also  possible  in 
ethics.  Clearly,  our  thick  ethical  concepts  like  cowardice,  cruelty,  brutality,  or  gratitude,  are 
action-guiding  but  they  are  also  typically  world-guided;  their  proper  application  depends  on 
the  state  of  world,  or  the  users'  perception  of  the  world.  Those,  non-cognitivist,  moral 
philosophers  who  take  the  view  that  the  descriptive  and  prescriptive  aspects  of  thick  ethical 
concepts  can  be  separated  out,  will  argue  that  ethical  sentences  are  not  capable  of  truth 
because  their  value  element  is  not  open  to  truth.  On  such  a  view  we  can  not  have  knowledge 
under  ethical  concepts  and  a  fortiori  we  can  not  have  world-guided  convergence  in  ethics. 
Williams  opposes  the  non-cognitivist  view,  he  recognises  "the  way  in  which  fact  and  value 
are  entangled  in  our  concepts"  (Putnam,  1990,  p.  168)  and  insists  that  the  descriptive  and 
Prescriptive  elements  can  not  in  fact  be  disentangled.  The  distinction  Williams  wants  to  draw 
between  science  and  ethics  is  clearly  not  a  crude  distinction  of  fact  versus  value.  He  argues 
that  practices  and  values  within  a  culture  may  clearly  set  the  appropriate  use  of  a  thick  ethical 
concept  such  as  chastity,  so  that  it  is  possible  within  the  local  community  to  obtain  agreement 
on  the  chastity  of  a  person's  behavior,  and  it  may  simply  true  that,  within  the  culture,  certain 
behaviour  is  chaste.  Statements  made  using  thick  ethical  concepts  can  be  "locally  true",  and 
"users  of  such  concepts,  in  correctly  applying  them,  could  properly  be  said  to  have 
knowledge"  (Williams,  1995,  p  206).  In  order  for  speakers  to  a  correctly  apply  thick  ethical 
concepts  to  novel  situations  Williams  believes  that  they  must  be  aware  of  the  evaluative 
interests  with  which  the  concept  is  connected  and  be  capable  of  imaginatively  identifying 
With  them. 
In  Williams'  view,  an  insightful  observer  may  understand  and  anticipate  the  use  of 
a  thick  ethical  concept  without  sharing  the  values  connected  with  it,  provided  she  can  grasp 
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its  evaluative  point.  She  could  not,  however,  stand  entirely  outside  the  evaluative  interests 
of  the  local  community  being  observed  and  somehow  "pick  up  the  concept  simply  as  a  device 
for  dividing  up  in  a  rather  strange  way  certain  neutral  features  of  the  world"  (Williams,  1985, 
p.  142).  An  observer  may  be  able  to  recognize  the  locals'  correct  application  of  thick  concepts, 
but,  because  she  does  not  share  the  associated  values,  be  effectively  unable  to  use  the  concept 
herself;  she  may  essentially  be  "barred  from  saying  just  what  the  locals  say"  (Williams,  1985, 
p.  145).  For  example,  an  observer  who  does  not  share  the  evaluative  interests  connected  with 
the  local  use  of  the  term  "chastity"  can  know  that  within  the  terms  of  the  culture  it  is  true  to 
describe  a  particular  person  as  chaste  but  she  could  not  herself  properly  say  that  the  person 
is  "chaste".  Knowledge  of  the  person's  chastity  is  possible  for  the  locals  but  not  for  the 
observer: 
"There  seem  to  be  perfectly  good  grounds  for  saying  that  some  of  them 
(statements  made  using  thick  ethical  concepts)  are  what,  in  local  terms,  they 
are  taken  to  be,  namely  true;  and,  since  the  people  who  use  them  satisfy  other 
relevant  conditions,  we  can  say  that  those  people  have  some  knowledge  under 
these  concepts.  But  this  is  not  knowledge  that  we  share,  since  we  do  not  share 
those  concepts. 
(Williams,  1995,  p  206) 
In  their  use  of  particular  thick  ethical  concepts  members  of  a  society  may  express  knowledge 
of  the  world  to  which  they  apply  their  concepts:  in  this  sense  they  may  have  local  / 
perspectival  ethical  knowledge.  This  kind  of  local  knowledge  entails  no  display  of  second 
order  knowledge  concerning  the  use  of  those  particular  thick  concepts  as  opposed  to  some 
others;  such  knowledge  would  entail  a  stepping  back  from  the  initial  position  and  values  - 
ethical  reflection.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  that  we  can  have  perspectival  knowledge  in  ethics, 
"X  is  chaste",  just  as  we  do  in  science,  "grass  is  green".  Indeed  we  can  have  local 
convergence  in  our  conceptions  of  what  it  means  to  be  "chaste"  or  what  it  means  for 
something  to  be  "green".  In  science  reflection  can  reinforce  local  knowledge;  can  this  effect 
be  extended  to  the  ethical  domain  -  what  impact  will  reflection  have  on  our  local  ethical 
knowledge? 
As  explained  above,  Williams  argues  that  in  the  scientific  context  the  world- 
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guidedness  of  our  knowledge  extends  to  the  reflective  level.  In  science  reflective  explanation 
of  our  perspectival  knowledge  does  not  unsettle  our  knowledge,  it  justifies  it  by  identifying 
its  coherence  with  other  knowledge  on  both  the  perspectival  and  absolute  level.  If  we  want 
to  extend  this  process  of  reflective  justification  to  the  ethical  domain  we  need  to  be  able  to 
identify  a  basis  for  second-order  reflection  on  ethical  perspectives,  which  is  capable  of 
somehow  validating  our  local  ethical  knowledge.  We  might  hope  to  apply  the  analogy  with 
science  directly  by  obtaining  explanatory  accounts  of  our  ethical  perspectives,  which  justify 
by  explaining  how  our  perspectival  view  relates  to  the  world.  In  science  explanation  justifies 
by  showing  how  perceptions  relate  to  and  give  knowledge  of  the  one  physical  reality.  For 
second-order  explanations  of  ethical  perspectives  we  need  to  look,  not  just  to  the  physical 
world,  but,  to  the  social  world,  and  this  means  "some  social  world  or  other"  (Williams,  1985, 
pp.  151).  Clearly  there  are  many  social  worlds,  both  actual  and  possible,  and  explanations, 
which  are  relative  to  some  particular  social  world,  can  provide  no  answer  to  the  essential 
question  raised  by  ethical  reflection:  "is  this  the  best  kind  of  social  world?  "  (Williams,  1985, 
p.  151). 
At  the  reflective  level  in  ethics,  we  need  accounts/theory  that  can  deal  with  the 
question  "is  this  a  good  way  living  in  comparison  with  other  ways?  "  We  need  a  theory  that 
is  able  to  justify  local  ethical  concepts,  and  perhaps  explain  why  one  local  concept  or  ethical 
perspective  is  appropriate  in  particular  circumstances  and  not  in  others.  Given  that  an 
Cxplanatory  theory  can  not  address  such  issues,  Williams  argues  that  if  we  want  to  move  to 
A  reflective  level  in  ethics  we  are  forced  to  use  "thin"  concepts  such  as  "right".  Those  most 
general  and  abstract  of  ethical  concepts  are  capable  of  very  wide  application,  but  they  "do  not 
display  world-guidedness"  (Williams,  1985,  p.  152).  For  reflective  ethical  theory  to  be 
Capable  of  justifying  local  ethical  knowledge  it  would  need  to  have  some  objectivity  of  its 
awn.  Williams  argues  that  because  ethical  beliefs  at  this  reflective  level  are  not  world guided, 
we  can  not  reasonably  expect  that  they  will  track  the  truth,  and  we  can  not  realistically 
anticipate  their  rational  convergence  on  one  determinate  set  of  ideas.  At  the  root  of  the 
distinction  Williams  draws  between  science  and  ethics  is  the  contrast,  as  he  sees  it,  between 
the  relative  universality  of  science  and  the  fact  that  "the  interests  that  thick  ethical  concepts 
gubserve  are  the  interests  of  one  human  community  (one  `social  world')  or  another"  (Putnam, 
1990,  p.  169).  Williams  recognises  that  in  theory  we  might  obtain  some  measure  of 
objectivity  at  the  reflective  level  in  ethics  through  a  convergence  of  ideas  about  human  nature 
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-  about  our  needs  and  motivations,  which  might  yield  the  schema  of  an  ethical  life  that  would 
be  the  most  satisfactory  for  humans  in  general.  Indeed,  he  sees  the  project  of  giving  ethics 
an  objective  grounding  in  knowledge  of  human  nature  as  the  "only  intelligible  form  of  ethical 
objectivity  at  the  reflective  level"  (Williams,  1985,  p.  153).  However,  he  does  not  think  that 
such  a  project  is  likely  to  ever  succeed,  and  he  believes  that  any  such  approach  would  always 
"radically  underdetermine  the  ethical  options"  (Williams,  1985,  p.  153)  in  any  given  situation. 
Because  the  world-guidedness  of  ethical  beliefs  breaks  down  at  the  reflective  level 
we  can  not  coherently  expect  ethical  reflection  to  lead  to  convergence  in  thinking.  And 
because,  in  ethics,  we  have  nothing  corresponding  to  science's  ability  to  provide  explanations 
of  our  perceptions  which  relate  how  the  world  seems  from  a  particular  perspective  to  how  it 
is  in  itself,  that  is,  how  it  is  when  viewed  objectively  or  in  other  words  when  viewed  in  a  way 
that  is,  so  far  as  possible,  independent  of  local/idiosyncratic  perspectives,  we  have  no  basis 
for  an  objective  theory  of  error  in  ethics: 
"An  ethical  theory  ...  might  explain  why  it  was  reasonable  for  people  to  have 
these  various  ethical  beliefs,  it  would  not  be  the  sort  of  theory  that  could 
explain  why  they  did  or  did  not  have  them.  It  could  not  do  something  that 
explanations  of  perception  can  do,  which  is  to  generate  an  adequate  theory  of 
error  and  to  account  generally  for  the  tendency  of  people  to  have  what, 
according  to  its  principles,  are  wrong  beliefs.  " 
(Williams,  1985,  p,  151) 
We  can  not  have  ethical  knowledge  at  the  reflective  level,  and  therefore  ethical  reflection  will 
not  justify  local  ethical  knowledge.  Indeed,  Williams  suggests  that  ethical  reflection  may 
destroy  knowledge  held  under  thick  ethical  concepts  by  effectively  placing  the  users  of  the 
Concept  in  the  position  of  the  observer  unable,  after  reflection,  to  fully  identify  with  the 
evaluative  interests  connected  with  a  thick  ethical  concept. 
The  objective  public  world  plays  a  crucial  role  in  Williams'  model.  It  provides  the 
independent  stimuli  to  which  the  community  of  scientists  reacts  and  about  which  they  form 
Communicative  relations.  Williams  thinks  that  in  science,  if  not  in  ethics,  it  is  reasonable  to 
expect  that  the  world's  causal  impact  on  the  content  of  meaning  and  belief  can  guide 
Convergence  "that  could  meaningfully  be  said  to  be  a  convergence  on  how  things  anyway 
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are"  (Williams,  1985,  p.  139).  The  world  does  not  provide  equal  guidance  in  all  domains,  and 
clearly the  strongest  guidance  is  in  respect  of  "our  perceptual  beliefs,  the  beliefs  that  are 
directly  caused  by  what  we  see  and  hear  and  otherwise  sense"  that  is  those  beliefs  that  must 
be  "in  the  main  true  because  their  content  is,  in  effect,  determined  by  what  typically  causes 
them"  (Davidson,  1999a,  p.  19). 
We  tentatively  suggest  that  Williams'  notion  of  "an  absolute  conception  of  reality" 
may  be  extended  to  the  domains  of  economics  and  accounting,  at  least  in  so  far  as  it  is 
reasonable  to  conceive  of  those  domains  as  world-guided  and  analogous  to  science.  We 
might  develop  an  absolute  conception  of  the  economic  world  that  is  "already  there"  in  terms 
of  those  of  our  beliefs  and  theories  that  are,  so  far  as  possible,  independent  of  local 
perspectives.  No  matter  what  our  perspective,  we  may,  for  example,  agree  that  in  the 
economic  domain  certain  factors  or  forces  of  production  operate  in  relation  and  produce 
certain  flows  -  of  cash,  other  resources  and  products.  These  conceptions  may  command  a 
high  degree  of  agreement  from  participants  and  observers  of  the  economic  domain, 
irrespective  of  their  interpretive  perspective  -  how  they  represent  the  meaning  of  these  factors 
and  flows.  Other  beliefs  and  concepts  will  clearly  not  be  part  of  the  absolute  conception  of 
economic  reality:  We  suggest  that  concepts  like;  profit,  the  appropriation  of  surplus  value, 
and  efficiency,  are  very  much  more  local/perspectival.  Accounting  theorists  have  generally 
recognized  that  many  of  the  objects  with  which  accounting  deals  are  highly  perspectival  and 
consist  of  beliefs  and  theories  built  upon  other  beliefs  rather  than  on  direct  causal  relations 
with  the  environment.  Furthermore,  they  have  appreciated  the  difficulties  associated  with  the 
justification  of  such  perspectival  "knowledge".  Solomons  for  example  contends  that 
accountants  are  on  "safe  ground"  only  when  describing  "external  phenomena  that  have  an 
independent  existence  of  their  own  ...  phenomena  such  as  cash  flows,  contractual  rights, 
market  values,  etc"  (Solomons,  1978,  p.  72).  Those  beliefs  and  theories  about  the  economic 
realm  that  are  open  to  maximal  intersubjective  agreement  guided  by  "phenomena"  (objects 
and  events)  in  the  world  may  be  thought  of  as  an  approximation  of  the  absolute  conception 
of  economic  reality. 
If  Williams'  notion  of  an  "absolute  conception"  does  extend  to  the  domain  of 
economics,  the  elements  included  in  the  absolute  conception  of  economic  reality  will 
underpin  and  moderate  the  development  of  those  more  perspectival  economic  concepts, 
which  could  be  explained,  and  thereby  justified,  in  its  terms.  And  if  it  is  valid  to  view 
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economics  and  financial  reporting  as  scientific,  we  might  ideally  expect  to  find  convergence 
in  accounting  inquiry  -  convergence  that  is  best  explained  as  convergence  guided  by  how 
things  are.  In  the  following  section  of  the  chapter  we  look  for  convergence  in  the 
development  of  financial  accounting,  focusing  particularly  on  the  history  of  accounting  for 
deferred  tax  in  the  UK. 
The  kind  of  convergence  that  would  suggest  that  it  is  valid  to  conceive  of  accounting 
as  science,  will  not  be  sort  that  might  best  be  explained  by  the  accounting  /  economic 
historian.  Such  explanations  of  the  socio-historical  development  of  perspectival  views  will 
essentially  stay  on  local,  or  perspectival,  level.  The  ideal  convergence  will  be  best  explained 
in  terms  that  show  how  "convergence  has  been  guided  by  the  way  things  actually  are" 
(Williams,  1985,  p.  136).  To  support  an  extension  of  Williams  notion  of  the  absolute 
conception  of  reality  to  accounting  we  should  look  for  convergence  explainable  in  terms  of 
how  things  are  when  viewed  from  more  inclusive  perspectives,  rather  than  convergence 
driven  by  regulatory  fiat. 
The  history  of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK 
In  the  UK,  companies  are  not  taxed  on  their  profit  as  reported  in  the  annual  report.  Instead, 
a  separate  calculation  is  made  of  taxable  profit.  This  starts  with  the  accounting  profit  and 
makes  adjustments  for  items  that  are  not  allowable  or  assessable  for  tax  purposes.  Some  of 
these  adjustments  create  permanent  differences  between  the  accounting  and  taxable  profit 
figures.  Other  adjustments  create  temporary,  `timing',  differences,  where  gains  or  losses  are 
recognized  in  the  financial  accounts  and  the  calculation  of  taxable  profits  in  different  periods. 
Timing  differences  give  rise  to  the  issue  of  deferred  tax. 
Whilst  there  are  many  sources  of  timing  differences,  two  have  been  particularly 
important  under  UK  tax  regimes:  Firstly,  the  costs  of  fixed  assets  have  generally  been 
allowed,  via  capital  allowances,  in  the  calculation  of  taxable  profit  ahead  of  their  recognition 
As  depreciation  expense  in  financial  accounts.  For  any  particular  fixed  asset,  the  timing 
differences  originated  in  this  way  will  reverse  in  later  years  when  depreciation  charges  will 
tend  to  exceed  capital  allowances  given  for  the  year.  Secondly,  the  costs  of  pensions  and 
Other  post  retirement  benefits  have  been  required  to  be  recognized  in  accounts  on  an  accruals 
Oasis,  yet  have  been  allowed  in  the  calculation  of  taxable  profit  only  on  the  basis  of  amounts 
paid.  Companies  which  have  unfunded  schemes  are  required  to  accrue  pension  costs  in  their 
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accounts  over  the  working  lives  of  their  employees,  yet  do  not  receive  tax  allowance  in 
respect  of  these  charges  until  the  related  payments  are  actually  made.  The  timing  difference 
originating  in  this  way  will  reverse  when  pension  contributions  are  paid  and  tax  relief 
received. 
At  issue  is  the  question  of  how,  if  at  all,  the  tax  effects  of  timing  differences,  'deferred 
tax',  should  be  reflected  in  financial  statements?  There  are  three  main  alternatives:  Firstly, 
the  'flow-through'  method,  which  makes  no  provision  for  deferred  tax.  This  method  is 
Sometimes  described  as  the  'nil  provision'  method,  it  recognizes  no  assets  or  liabilities  in 
respect  of  the  future  tax  effects  of  the  reversal  of  timing  differences  and  bases  the  tax  charge 
in  the  accounts  on  the  taxable  profit  arising  in  the  period.  Secondly,  there  is  the  'full 
provision'  method,  which  makes  provision  for  the  tax  effects  of  all  gains  and  losses  which 
are  recognized  in  the  accounts  and  are  expected  to  enter  the  calculation  of  taxable  profits  at 
Some  point  in  the  future.  The  third  possibility  is  the'partial  provision'  method,  under  which 
deferred  tax  is  provided  for  only  in  respect  of  the  net  amount  by  which  it  is  probable  that  tax 
temporarily  deferred  or  accelerated  by  timing  differences  will  reverse  in  the  foreseeable 
future  without  replacement.  The  partial  provision  method  recognizes  that  for  companies 
which  are  not  expected  to  reduce  the  scale  of  their  operations  significantly,  for  the 
foreseeable  future,  the  reversal  of  timing  differences  will  be  compensated  for  by  the 
origination  of  new  timing  difference  so  that  a  certain  element  of  tax  -a  hard  core  -  will  be 
deferred  indefinitely.  Under  the  partial  provision  method  no  provision  would  be  made  in  the 
accounts  for  the  hard  core  timing  differences.  Arguments  for  and  against  the  flow-through, 
full  provision  and  partial  provision  alternative  treatments  of  deferred  taxation  have  been  put 
forward  by  many  authors.  For  example,  Rosenfield  &  Dent  (1983)  argue  for  the  flow-through 
1nethod,  Defliese  (1983)  and  Schwarz  (1983)  defend  full  provision,  and  Chaney  &  Jeter 
1989)  make  a  case  for  partial  provision. 
The  historical  development  of  accounting  standards  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK  is 
. Outlined  Table  1,  below: 
r 
fable  1.  The  development  of  accounting  policy  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK 
Document  Accounting  treatment 
SSAP  11  (ASC,  1975b)  Full  provision  basis. 
'§-SAP  15  (ASC,  1978  revised  1982)  Partial  provision  basis. 
UITF  6  (1992)  &  SSAP  15  revision  Partial  provision  with  the  exception  that  full 
Accounting  treatment 
Full  provision  basis. 
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(ASB,  1992)  provision  allowed  in  respect  of  post-retirement 
costs  such  as  pensions. 
ASB  Discussion  paper  (1995a),  Full  provision  basis,  with  provision  made  for 
FRED  19  (ASB,  1999)  &  FRS  19  all  timing  differences,  except  for  those 
(ASB,  2001)  resulting  from  the  revaluation  of  fixed  assets, 
and  allowing  but  not  requiring  discounting. 
Statement  of  standard  accounting  practice,  SSAP  11  (1975)  was  developed,  following 
exposure  draft  ED  11  (1973),  in  a  period  of  growing  inflation  when  tax  law  contained  a 
number  of  provisions  designed  to  offset  the  punitive  effect  of  taxing  inflated  historical  cost 
profits.  Those  provisions  included  100%  capital  allowance  on  fixed  assets  acquisitions  in  the 
year  of  purchase  and  a  stock  appreciation  relief,  both  of  which  gave  rise  to  timing 
differences.  The  application  of  the  full  provision  method  advocated  by  SSAP  11  would  have 
led  to  the  recognition  of  large  and  growing  deferred  tax  liabilities  in  many  companies' 
accounts,  which  could  not  reasonably  be  expected  to  reverse,  in  aggregate  terms,  in  the 
foreseeable  future.  Resistance  by  the  preparers  of  financial  statements  to  the  implementation 
of  SSAP  11  forced  the  Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC)  to  suspend  the  standard's 
implementation  date  before  it  became  effective  (see  Hope  &  Briggs,  1982).  After 
reconsideration  of  the  issue,  through  ED  19  (1977),  the  ASC  replaced  SSAP  11  with  SSAP 
15  (1978),  which  required  the  use  of  the  partial  provision  method,  with  the  conservative 
caveat  that  deferred  tax  assets  could  only  be  recognized  where  their  reversal  without 
replacement  was  assured  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  The  main  impact  of  SSAP  15  was  that 
the  amounts  of  deferred  tax  liabilities  recognized  in  companies  tended  to  be  very  much 
smaller  than  they  would  have  been  under  SSAP  11. 
Tax  law  and  business  practices  significantly  changed  in  the  period  following  the 
introduction  of  SSAP  15.  The  decline  of  inflation  led  to  the  phasing  out  of  stock  appreciation 
relief,  and  the  rates  used  in  the  calculation  of  tax  allowances  on  fixed  asset  acquisitions  were 
brought  more  into  line  with  depreciation  charges.  Timing  differences  from  these  sources, 
which  normally  gave  rise  to  deferred  tax  liabilities,  were  therefore  very  much  reduced.  In  the 
same  period  there  was  a  trend  towards  increased  use  of  unfunded  pension  schemes.  The 
timing  differences  arising  in  respect  of  unfunded  pension  schemes  reverse  when  payment  is 
made,  However,  unless  the  scale  of  the  scheme  is  reduced,  the  reversing  differences  will  tend 
to  be  replaced  by  new  originating  differences.  The  partial  provision  basis,  proscribed  by 
SSAP  15,  allowed  deferred  tax  provision  to  be  made  for  the  tax  effects  of  timing  differences 
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only  to  the  extent  that  the  difference  could  be  expected  to  reverse  without  replacement  in  the 
foreseeable  future.  On  that  basis,  the  deferred  tax  asset  in  respect  of  pension  costs  could 
generally  not  be  recognized:  In  effect,  tax  relief  in  respect  of  accrued  pension  cost  was  not 
recognized  in  accounts.  The  Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB)  came  under  pressure  to 
review  this  aspect  of  SSAP  15.  The  'problem'  was  addressed  by  the  Urgent  Issues  Task  Force 
(UITF)  who  proposed  in  UITF  6  (ASB,  1992d)  that  the  recognition  under  full  provision 
method  of  deferred  tax  assets  in  respect  of  pension  cost  and  other  post  retirement  benefits 
should  be  permitted;  SSAP  15  was  correspondingly  amended  in  December  1992. 
The  amended  SSAP  15  permits  the  tax  effects  of  different  types  of  timing  differences 
to  be  dealt  with  in  different  ways.  Full  provision  is  allowed  in  respect  of  pension  cost  timing 
differences  which  predominantly  give  rise  to  deferred  tax  assets,  while  partial  provision  is 
required  for  other  timing  differences  which  mainly  entail  deferred  tax  liabilities.  The  ASB 
themselves  seem  positively  embarrassed  by  the  glaring  inconsistency  introduced  by  the 
SSAP  15  amendment:  "its  practical  effect  is  that  what  for  most  entities  is  their  biggest 
deferred  tax  asset  is  recognised  in  full  while  deferred  tax  liabilities  are  only  partially 
recognised.  To  a  jaundiced  observer  this  could  well  appear  a  somewhat  cynical  approach" 
(ASB,  1995a,  para.  5.8.3).  In  search  of  a  more  satisfactory  position,  the  ASB  reopened  the 
deferred  tax  debate  by  issuing  a  discussion  paper  (ASB,  1995a)  which,  on  balance,  favoured 
return  to  the  full  provision  method  for  all  timing  differences.  Most  respondents  to  the 
discussion  paper  supported  the  retention  of  the  partial  provision  method  (ASB,  1999c, 
Appendix  V,  para.  19).  Partial  provision  has,  however,  lost  ground  with  standard  setters 
internationally:  The  US  Financial  Accounting  Standard  SFAS  No.  109  "Accounting  for 
Income  Taxes"  (FASB,  1992),  which  requires  full  provision  for  deferred  tax  has  become 
well  established  and  influential.  In  1996  the  International  Accounting  Standards  Committee 
(IASC)  adopted  a  new  standard  on  accounting  for  Income  Taxes  IAS  No.  12  (IASC,  1996), 
that  requires  companies  applying  International  Accounting  Standards  to  make  full  provision 
for  deferred  tax.  By  1999,  the  UK  and  the  Republic  of  Ireland  were  the  only  countries  still 
requiring  the  partial  provision  method  (ASB,  1999c,  appendix.  v,  para.  20),  and  in  view  the 
international  trend  the  ASB  has  maintained  its  advocacy  of  full  provision.  Exposure  draft 
FRED  19  (ASB,  1999c)  indicated  the  Board's  intention  to  proceed  with  the  implementation 
of  many  of  the  proposals  included  in  the  1995  discussion  paper,  including  the  requirement 
of  full  provision  for  deferred  tax.  One  novel  feature  of  the  exposure  draft  was  the  support  it 
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gave  to  the  discounting  of  deferred  tax  provisions. 
Early  in  2001  a  new  Financial  Reporting  Standard  for  deferred  tax  FRS  19  was 
issued.  The  new  standard  implemented  the  Boards  previously  expressed  intentions:  it 
required  that  a  liability  should  be  recognized  whenever  an  obligation  to  pay  tax  arises 
because  of  past  events.  Effectively,  this  means  that  provision  should  be  made  in  respect  of 
all  timing  differences  with  the  exception  of  those  arising  on  the  revaluation  of  fixed  assets, 
where  no  obligation  to  pay  tax  exists  until  such  time  as  the  company  decides  to  sell  the  asset 
and  realize  the  gain.  The  full  provision  method  will  also  apply  to  deferred  tax  assets, 
including  those  arising  on  pension  costs.  The  new  standard  allows  but  does  not  require 
discounting  of  deferred  tax  balances.  Timing  differences  on  pension  costs  are  effectively 
based  on  net  present  values  therefore  no  discounting  will  be  applicable  in  respect  of  the 
associated  deferred  tax  assets.  Thus,  one  implication  of  the  new  standard  is  that  the  increase 
in  liabilities  due  to  the  switch  to  full  provision  will  be  offset  by  the  recognition  of  the 
resulting  balances  at  their  net  present  values,  while  there  will  be  no  corresponding  impact  on 
existing  deferred  tax  assets  recognized  under  UITF  6. 
The  development  of  accounting  regulation  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK  has  followed 
a  cyclical  pattern  that  has  been  highly  responsive  to  socio-economic  changes.  There  is  no 
pattern  of  convergence  obvious  in  the  movement  from  full  provision  through  various  options 
and  eventually  back  to  full  provision.  This,  of  course,  is  not  sufficient  grounds  for  us  to 
conclude  that  accounting  are  essentially  unscientific:  The  course  of  science  may  be  perverted 
by  social  and  political  pressures.  It  may  simply  be  the  case  that  in  the  past,  the  development 
of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK  has  been  so  biased  by  successive  political  pressures 
that  a  convergence  guided  by  "how  things  are"  has  been  thwarted.  Conceptual  framework 
projects  for  financial  reporting  may  be  understood  as  attempts  to  raise  accounting  thought 
beyond  the  local  idiosyncratic  perspectives  and  pressures  and  onto  a  more  reflective  and 
inclusive  level,  that  is,  as  an  effort  to  move  accounting  thought  in  the  direction  of  an  absolute 
conception  of  "how  things  are"  in  economic  terms.  Solomons  (1983,1986)  argues  that  a 
conceptual  framework  for  financial  reporting  would  help  defend  accounting  against 
politicization  and  thereby  facilitate  the  development  of  a  bias-free  financial  reporting  which 
would  "tell  it  like  it  really  is".  We  now  turn  to  examine  the  possibility  that  a  conceptual 
framework  might  facilitate  the  development  of  a  convergence  in  financial  reporting  guided 
by  "how  things  are".  We  will  continue  to  use  the  issue  of  accounting  deferred  tax  a  vehicle 
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for  our  analysis. 
Deferred  tax  -a  test  of  the  ASB's  'conceptual  framework' 
The  development  of  a  conceptual  framework  to  guide  accounting  policy-making  can  be  seen 
as  an  attempt  to  identify  and  set  out  certain  "absolute  conceptions"  of  the  commercial  and 
accounting  world,  or  at  least  approximations  thereof.  Ideally  the  framework  will  be  produced 
in  a  context  that  is  abstracted  from  the  political  pressures  and  economic  interests  that  are 
bound  to  surround  particular  reporting  issue.  The  concepts  derived  in  the  relative  calm  of  a 
careful  and  measured  development  of  a  conceptual  framework  may  then  serve  to  discipline 
consideration  of  particular  issues.  It  may  promote  objectivity  and  convergence,  explainable 
in  terms  of  the  way  things  are,  by  providing  a  shield  against  the  political  pressure  and 
Personal  bias  (see  Solomons,  1978). 
We  evaluate  this  view  by  examining  the  ASB's  discussion  paper  "Accounting  for  tax" 
(ASB,  1995a)  and  the  responses  made  to  it  by  the  Big  Six  accounting  firms,  in  the  context 
of  certain  elements  of  the  ASB's'  then  developing  conceptual  framework  project;  the  draft 
"Statement  of  Principles  for  financial  reporting"  (ASB,  1995b).  The  aim  of  the  project  was 
to  clarify  the  `conceptual  underpinnings'  of  the  Boards  work  and  to  establish  a  `coherent 
frame  of  reference'  for  standard  setting  (ASB,  1999a,  paras.  l-4).  Some  aspects  of  the  Board's 
draft  Statement  of  Principles  excited  considerable  opposition.  However,  we  intend  to  draw 
mainly  upon  a  relatively  uncontroversial  aspect  of  the  draft  -  its  definitions  of  assets  and 
liabilities.  The  definitions  proposed  by  the  ASB  in  1992  at  the  initial  discussion  paper  stage 
of  the  project  were  in  fact  carried  through  the  consultation  process  without  any  change  to  the 
recently  issued  final  version  of  the  Statement  of  Principles  (ASB,  1999d).  Those  definitions 
are  as  follows;  (i)  "Assets  are  rights  or  other  access  to  future  economic  benefits  controlled 
by  an  entity  as  a  result  of  past  transactions  or  events.  "  (ASB,  July  1992a,  para.  7),  and  (ii) 
"Liabilities  are  an  entity's  obligations  to  transfer  economic  benefits  as  a  result  of  past 
transactions  or  events"  (ASB,  July  1992a,  para.  24).  These  definition  were  then  available,  to 
guide  thinking  about  particular  accounting  issues,  three  years  prior  to  the  publication  of  the 
"Accounting  for  Tax"  discussion  paper  (ASB,  1995a). 
Our  primary  focus  is  on  how  the  crucial  question  -  "do  timing  differences  constitute 
assets  and  liabilities?  "  -  was  addressed  by  the  ASB  in  its  discussion  paper  (ASB,  1995a),  and 
by  respondents  to  the  paper.  We  concentrate  on  this  issue  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  definitions 
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of  assets  and  liabilities  are  central  to  debates  concerning  alternative  accounting  treatments 
of  deferred  tax.  For  example,  those  who  favour  the  "flow-through"  method  tend  to  take  view 
-that  tax  liabilities  arise  only  on  taxable  profits,  deferred  tax  does  not,  on  this  view,  represent 
3  liability,  and  therefore  no  provision  should  be  made.  Secondly,  the  ASB's  draft  Statement 
of  Principles  project,  from  the  outset,  gave  a  pivotal  role  to  definitions  of  assets  and  liabilities 
by  advocating  that  the  determination  of  entity  performance  should  essentially  be  made 
derivative  of  the  measurement  of  assets  and  liabilities  in  the  balance  sheet'.  Thus,  the 
definition  of  assets  and  liabilities  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  the  ASB's  attempt  to  provide 
gtandard  setters  with  a  "coherent  frame  of  reference".  This  "balance  sheet"  approach  has  been 
retained  in  the  final  version  of  the  Statement  of  Principles  (see  ASB,  1999d,  para.  10). 
Furthermore,  the  provision  of  robust  definitions  -  answers  to  some  basic  questions  -  has 
generally  been  considered  to  be  one  of  the  main  purposes  of  any  conceptual  framework  of 
financial  reporting:  "What  is  an  asset?  What  is  a  liability?  What  belongs  on  the  financial 
Statements  and  what  in  the  footnotes?  Just  what  is  accounting  trying  to  do,  anyway?  A 
Conceptual  framework,  so  the  idea  went,  would  answer  those  questions  up  front,  get  them  out 
of  the  way  once  and  for  all"  (Gerboth,  1987,  p.  2). 
If  conceptual  frameworks  can  be  effective  as  a  defence  against  politicization  then 
purely  we  should  find  that  the  ASB's  evolving  Statement  of  Principles,  and  in  particular  its 
definitions  of  assets  and  liabilities,  informed  thinking  on  accounting  for  deferred  tax  and 
thereby  reduced  the  scope  for  political  leverage  on  the  issue.  If  the  definitions  are  not  capable 
of  providing  a  clear  and  robust  answer  to  the  question  of  whether  the  tax  effects  of  timing 
differences  should  be  regarded  as  an  asset  or  liability  in  the  financial  statements,  then  one 
Might  doubt  whether  they  will  provide  useful  guidance  in  any  difficult  case.  Our  aim,  then, 
in  this  section  of  the  chapter  is  to  look  for  the  development  of  agreement  -  convergence  - 
within  the  recent  debate  in  the  UK  on  the  issue  of  accounting  for  deferred  tax;  possibly 
Convergence  facilitated  by  the  ASB's  Statement  of  Principles. 
The  "Accounting  for  Tax"  discussion  paper  (ASB,  1995a),  explores  accounting  for 
tax  "from  first  principles".  It  examines,  in  turn,  the  flow-through,  full  provision  and  partial 
provision  bases.  It  discusses  each  of  the  three  methods  in  terms  of  their  relationship  with  the 
draft  Statement  of  Principles,  and  explicitly  considers  whether  the  balance  sheet  amounts 
recorded  by  each  method  meet  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles  definitions  of  assets  and 
liabilities.  The  Board  favours  the  adoption  of  the  full  provision  method,  but  is  unable  to 
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provide  unequivocal  guidance  on  how  the  balance  sheet  amounts  arising  should  be 
understood:  "Some  (Board  members)  take  the  view  ...  that  deferred  tax  represents  a  known 
increment  or  decrement  of  a  future  tax  liability.  Others  take  the  view  ...  that  it  represents  a 
'valuation  adjustment'  to  other  assets  and  liabilities  at  the  balance  sheet  date"  (ASB,  1995a, 
para.  4.7.8).  The  discussion  paper  devotes  considerable  space  to  comparing  these  alternative 
views. 
The  Board  explains  that  those  who  view  deferred  tax  as  an  increment  to  future  assets 
or  liabilities  do  so  on  basis  that:  "as  a  result  of  the  cumulative  timing  differences  at  the 
balance  sheet  date,  future  tax  assessments  (whatever  their  amount  in  absolute  terms)  will  be 
higher  or  lower  than  they  would  have  been  if  those  timing  differences  had  not  arisen"  (ASB 
1995a,  para.  4.4.12).  But  at  no  point  does  the  Board  make  it  clear  how  immediate  recognition 
of  increments  or  decrements  to  future  tax  assessments  can  be  reconciled  with  the  draft 
Statement  of  Principles.  In  particular,  it  is  never  made  clear  on  what  basis  it  is  thought  that 
recognition  can  be  given  to  increases  or  decreases  in  future  assets  or  liabilities  which  do  not 
themselves  meet  the  criteria  for  recognition.  The  ASB  is  clearly  aware  that  the  fact  that  "the 
actual  tax  assessments  of  a  future  period  are  not  liabilities  at  the  balance  sheet  date"  (ASB 
1995a,  para.  4.4.12),  presents  a  problem  for  this  approach.  Yet  no  recognizable  attempt  is 
made  to  directly  test  it  against  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles,  and  it  is  not  rejected  outright. 
Furthermore,  it  is  not  strictly  correct  to  say  that  whatever  the  amount  of  tax  assessments  in 
future  periods  they  will  be  higher  or  lower  in  absolute  terms  than  they  would  have  been  if  the 
timing  differences  had  not  occurred.  A  company  which  does  not  earn  taxable  profits  in  future 
periods  will  generally  not  incur  future  obligations  to  pay  tax,  and  the  timing  differences 
brought  forward  would  tend  to  have  no  impact  upon  that  state  of  affairs. 
The  appeal  of  the  view  of  deferred  tax  as  increment  to  future  asset  or  liability,  is 
perhaps  associated  with  a  residual  attachment  to  the  matching  concept:  "It  is  possible,  and 
appropriate,  to  attribute  tax  effects  to  individual  transactions,  even  though  tax  is  not  legally 
assessed  on  this  basis.  "  (ASB,  1995a,  para.  3.7.3).  The  Board's  balance  sheet  driven  Statement 
of  Principles  precludes  any  very  frank  or  open  admission  of  reliance  on  the  matching 
principle: 
"Notwithstanding  its  origins  as  a  means  of  matching  income  and  expenditure 
with  their  effects,  deferred  tax  is  equally  valid  conceptually  ...  under  models 
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of  accounting,  such  as  that  in  the  Board's  draft  Statement  of  Principles,  that 
start  by  identifying  assets  and  liabilities.  " 
(ASB,  1995a,  para.  4.2.2) 
The  Board  has  elsewhere  made  it  clear  that  it  recognises  that  `matching'  can  have  only  an 
epiphenomenal  place  within  the  balance  sheet  driven  approach  to  accounting  it  favours: 
"Matching  would  continue  to  apply,  but  balances  that  were  being  carried  forward  in  the 
balance  sheet  as  assets  and  liabilities  would  be  subject  to  a  test  as  to  their  authenticity"  (ASB, 
1996,  p.  5).  Despite  the  rhetoric,  the  Board,  in  the  case  of  deferred  tax,  gives  no  real  primacy 
to  assets  and  liabilities:  No  clear  direct  test  is  made,  against  definitions,  of  the  'authenticity' 
of  the  balance  sheet  amounts  resulting  from  the  application  of  the  matching  principle. 
Instead,  the  matching  principle,  a  mere  supplement  seems  to  play  a  significant  part  in 
sustaining  the  Board's  preference  for  full  provision. 
Some  members  of  the  Board  favoured  an  alternative  view  of  the  nature  of  deferred 
tax,  seeing  it  as  a  'valuation  adjustment'  to  the  carrying  value  of  the  asset  or  liability  in 
respect  of  which  the  timing  difference  has  arisen.  For  example,  an  asset  which  is  partially 
tax-exhausted  by  the  receipt  of  accelerated  capital  allowances  would  be  regarded  as  "worth" 
less  to  the  enterprise  than  an  otherwise  identical  asset  with  greater  tax  deductibility  (ASB, 
1995a,  para.  4.4.13).  The  'valuation  adjustments'  might,  in  principle,  be  best  reflected  by  the 
net-of-tax  method  whereby  assets,  liabilities,  gains  and  losses  are  reported  net  of  their  tax 
effects.  On  consideration,  the  Board  reject  the  net-of-tax  alternative  and  suggest  that  it  would 
be  preferable  to  pool  the  tax-related  'valuation  adjustments'  to  all  assets  and  liabilities  in  the 
balance  sheet  under  the  single  heading  'deferred  tax'.  Thus  by  a  circuitous  route  we  have  a 
rationalization  of  a  'deferred  tax'  balance  in  the  balance  sheet  -  which  presumably  must  be 
an  asset  or  liability:  Again,  no  direct  test  against  definitions  of  the  "authenticity"  of  the 
balance  sheet  amounts  is  offered.  The  'valuation  adjustment'  approach  relies  upon  the  concept 
of  'worth'  -  where  'worth'  is  in  effect  the  asset's  book  value  less  the  amount  of  deferred  tax 
arising  in  respect  of  it.  This  measure  of  'worth'  is  not  independent  of  deferred  tax  and  bears 
no  necessary  relation  to  the  valuation  of  the  asset  concerned  in  terms  of  the  measurement 
bases  discussed  in  chapter  5  of  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles.  It  is  not;  'value  in  use',  'net 
realisable  value',  or  'value  to  the  business'.  The  concept  of  a  net-of-tax  measurement  base 
('worth')  is  novel  and  as  the  Board  itself  notes  it  is  effectively  prohibited  by  United  Kingdom 
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company  law  which  requires  assets  to  be  recorded  at  cost  or,  in  some  cases,  valuation.  The 
lines  of  argument  discussed  by  the  ASB  in  support  of  full  provision  for  deferred  tax  rely  on 
bases  not  found  in  the  Statement  of  Principles. 
The  ASB  is  aware  that  provisions  for  deferred  tax  do  not  sit  easily  with  its  Statement 
of  Principles  and  in  particular  its  definitions  of  assets  and  liabilities.  They  confine  explicit 
recognition  of  this  problem  to  their  discussion  of  the  partial  provision  method.  They  note  that 
"the  arguments  as  to  whether  the  balances  recorded  under  the  partial  provision  method 
represent  assets  or  liabilities  are  essentially  the  same  as  those  in  respect  of  the  full  provision 
method"  (ASB,  1995a,  para.  5.4.2).  They  then  go  on  to  say  that  they  find  it  difficult  to 
reconcile  the  partial  provision  method  to  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles  "which  defines 
'assets'  and  'liabilities'  as  respectively  benefits  and  obligations  arising  from  past  events" 
(ASB,  1995a,  para.  5.4.10).  The  problem  they  see  with  partial  provision  is  that  "it  recognises 
the  tax  effect  of  future  transactions  before  they  have  occurred  and  in  many  cases  before  the 
reporting  entity  is  even  committed  to  undertaking  them"  (ASB,  1995a,  para.  5.8.2).  The  Board 
seem  to  be  saying  that  amounts  calculated  under  the  partial  provision  method  do  not  meet  the 
definitions  of  assets  and  liabilities  -  which  is  curious  given  that  such  amounts  are  essentially 
part  of  the  full  provision  amounts  which  they  want  to  see  recognized  as  assets  or  liabilities. 
Inconsistency  and  division  within  the  Board  concerning  the  relation  of  deferred  tax  and  the 
Statement  of  Principles  is  reflected  in  a  number  of  places  in  the  discussion  paper.  Different 
Board  members  conclude  that;  "the  definition  of  a  liability  supports  the  flow-through  method 
(section  3.7.6),  the  partial  provision  method  (section  1.4.2)  and  the  full  provision  method 
(section  4.4.7)",  (Touche  Ross,  1995,  p.  535).  In  sum,  the  Statement  of  Principles  seems  to 
have  been  of  little  help  to  the  ASB  in  forging  unforced  agreement  /  convergence  within  the 
Board  itself  concerning  the  appropriate  treatment  of  deferred  tax. 
The  'Accounting  for  Tax'  discussion  paper  attracted  144  responses,  running  to  604 
pages  of  comment.  In  the  remainder  of  this  section  of  the  chapter  we  will  examine  the 
responses  made  by  the  UK  National  offices  of  the  'Big  Six'  accounting  firms,  which  ran  to 
77  pages.  Our  aim  is  to  evaluate  the  degree  of  convergence  /  agreement  within  the  views  of 
this  well  informed  group,  and  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  ASB's  developing  Statement 
of  Principles  project  seems  to  have  informed  their  views  and  promoted  consensus.  We 
concentrate  on  the  responses  of  the  Big  Six  firms  because,  in  our  view,  they  may  be  expected 
to  be  particularly  aware  of  the  role  the  Statement  of  Principles  might  play  in  guiding  thinking 
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on  an  issue  such  as  accounting  for  deferred  tax.  In  addition  their  economic  interests  are  not 
obviously  radically  disparate  or  potentially  compromised  by  the  accounting  for  deferred  tax 
issue:  They  appear  to  be  relatively  well  positioned  to  take  a  knowledgeable  and  dispassionate 
view  of  the  issues. 
Even  the  most  cursory  examination  of  the  positions  taken  by  the  'Big  Six'  firms, 
summarized  in  table  2  shown  below,  indicates  the  lack  of  consensus  in  their  thinking.  Each 
of  the  three  basic  approaches  to  accounting  for  deferred  tax  is  advocated,  by  one  firm  or 
another.  And  a  wide  spectrum  of  rationales  is  applied  to  justify  preferences. 
Table  2.  Summary  of'Big  Six'  comment  on  the  AS  B's  'Accounting  For  Tax'  paper 
Firm  Preferred  method  View  on  whether  or  not  timing 
differences  give  rise  to  assets  and 
liabilities. 
Arthur  Full  provision.  Support  hybrid  view  which  regards  timing 
Andersen  differences  originating  in  the  financial 
statements  as  giving  rise  to  assets  and 
liabilities  and  timing  differences  arising  in 
the  tax  computation  as  not  giving  rise  to 
assets  or  liabilities  but  to  'valuation 
adjustments'. 
Coopers  Partial  provision  as  in  Argue  that  partial  provision  can  be 
&  SSAP  15  as  amended  by  reconciled  with  the  ASB  Statement  of 
Lybrand  UITF  6.  Principles  -  if  amounts  provided  are 
understood  in  terms  of  a  contingent  liability. 
Ernst  &  Partial  provision  with  Argue  that  the  only  method  that  gives  rise  to 
Young  withdrawal  of  the  UITF  6  assets  and  liabilities  fully  consistent  with 
amendment  to  SSAP  15,  and  the  Statement  of  Principles  is  the  flow- 
temporary  suspension  of  through  method. 
consideration  of  the  issue. 
KPMG  Partial  provision  with  See  the  nature  of  deferred  tax  as  a  liability 
withdrawal  of  the  UITF  6  rather  than  a  valuation  adjustment,  and 
amendment  to  SSAP  15.  argue  that  the  partial  provision  basis  can  be 
reconciled  with  the  draft  Statement  of 
Principles  if  recognition  and  measurement 
issues  are  clearly  separated. 
Price  Flow-through  modified  to  Argue  that  deferred  tax  is  of  the  nature  of  a 
Water-  provide  for  deferred  tax  as  a  contingent  asset  or  liability. 
house  contingent  liability. 
Touche  Full  provision.  Follow  the  ASB's  line  and  argue  that 
Ross  &  deferred  tax  constitutes  an  asset  or  liability 
Co  on  the  grounds  that  it  effects  an  increment 
or  decrement  to  future  tax  liabilities. 
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Arthur  Andersen  argue  that  neither  of  the  two  views  of  the  nature  of  deferred  tax  in 
terms  of  which  issues  are  principally  analysed  in  the  Discussion  Paper  (i.  e.,  the  increment  or 
decrement  of  a  future  tax  liability  or a  valuation  adjustment  to  other  assets  and  liabilities, 
perspectives),  are  fully  appropriate  in  all  cases.  They  contend  that  the  particular 
characteristics  of  each  timing  difference  should  determine  which  view  is  appropriate.  Arthur 
Andersen  urge  the  ASB  to  have  regard  to  the  conceptual  force  of  a  hybrid  approach  under 
which  certain  timing  differences  would  be  accounted  for  as  assets  and  liabilities  and  others 
as  valuation  adjustments.  Arthur  Andersen  suggest  that  some  of  the  difficulties  encountered 
in  resolving  the  accounting  for  deferred  tax  puzzle  originate  in  constraints  imposed  by  the 
Statement  of  Principles'  three-category  balance  sheet,  made  up  of  only  assets,  liabilities  and 
equity.  Arthur  Andersen  imply  that  there  is  difficulty  in  fitting  "provisions"  made  for 
deferred  tax  into  this  scheme: 
"More  guidance  would  be  helpful  on  how  provisions,  including  deferred 
taxation,  fit  into  the  framework  as  a  sub-set  of  liabilities  and  emphasising  the 
difference  between  the  nature  of  the  deferred  tax  number  created  as  part  of  the 
accounting  allocation  exercise  and  say  a  creditor.  " 
(Arthur  Andersen,  1995,  p.  19) 
Arthur  Andersen  seem  effectively  to  invite  the  ASB  to  rethink  the  essential  logic  of  the 
Statement  of  Principles:  The  ASB's  balance  sheet  orientation  quite  deliberately  allows  no 
place  in  financial  statements  for  those  residuals  of  matching  and  allocation  exercises  which 
do  not  meet  the  definition  of  liabilities  in  the  way  that,  say,  creditors  do. 
Coopers  &  Lybrand  prefer  the  partial  provision  method,  which  they  argue  can  be 
reconciled  with  the  ASB's  draft  Statement  of  Principles  project,  if  the  amounts  of  deferred 
tax  are  "regarded  as  contingent  liabilities  rather  than  actual  ones"  (Coopers  &  Lybrand,  1995, 
p.  138).  A  contingency,  of  course,  is  generally  understood  as  a  condition  existing  at  the 
balance  sheet  date,  where  the  outcome  will  be  confirmed  by  uncertain  future  events  (ASC, 
1980b,  para.  1).  Coopers  &  Lybrand  offer  no  explanation  of  how  deferred  tax  can  be  properly 
understood,  in  these  terms,  as  a  contingency.  The  ASB  themselves  hint,  somewhat  obliquely, 
that  it  may  be  appropriate  to  regard  deferred  tax  as  a  contingent  liability.  The  Board  explains 
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that  those  who  advocate  the  flow-through  method  take  the  view  that:  "it  is  incorrect  to  report 
a  liability  to  tax  that  is  contingent  on  certain  future  events  (e.  g.  earning  taxable  profit),  as  is 
the  case  when  deferred  tax  is  provided  for"  (ASB,  1995a,  para.  3.7.2).  In  fact,  advocates  of 
the  flow-through  method  would  argue  that  timing  differences  do  not  constitute  liabilities 
(contingent  or  otherwise)  at  the  balance  sheet  date  because  any  future  liability  is  dependent 
upon  future  events  not  merely  confirmed  by  them  -  the  future  tax  liability  will  not  exist  until 
future  profits  are  earned:  "earning  future  revenue  wouldn't  be  merely  ancillary  to  the 
obligation"  (Rosenfield  &  Dent,  1983,  p.  50). 
Ernst  &  Young,  with  a  suggestion  of  irony,  put  forward  the  view  that  only  the  flow- 
through  method  produces  balance  sheet  amounts  that  represent  assets  and  liabilities  as 
defined,  "on  any  reasonable  construction  of  the  words",  by  the  Statement  of  Principles.  They 
argue  that  the  "true  conceptual  basis"  for  the  full  provision  basis  is  the  matching  principle 
(Ernst  &  Young,  1995,  p.  194),  and  they  describe  the  ASB's  attempts  to  justify  the  full 
provision  method  in  terms  of  the  Statement  of  Principles  assets  and  liabilities  definitions  as 
"unconvincing  rationalisations".  They  attack  both  the  'increment  and  decrement  to  future 
liabilities'  and  the  'valuation  adjustment'  routes  the  ASB  use  to  rationalise  advocacy  of  the 
full  provision  method.  They  express  their  difficulty  in  comprehending  how  the  "how  the 
Boards'  draft  Statement  of  Principles  allows  the  recognition  of  an  increment  or  decrement  in 
a  future  asset  or  liability  that  does  not  yet  meet  the  criteria  for  recognition  itself'  (Ernst  & 
Young,  1995,  p.  194).  And,  in  response  to  the  'valuation  adjustment'  line  of  reasoning  they 
argue  that  while  it  may  be  true  that  a  partially  tax-exhausted  asset  must  be  worth  less  than 
one  whose  book  amount  is  still  fully  tax  deductible,  a'valuation  adjustment'  made  on  that 
basis  does  not  "represent  an  asset  or  liability  as  defined  in  the  Board's  draft  Statement  of 
Principles"  (Ernst  &  Young,  1995,  p.  195). 
KPMG  favour  the  partial  provision  approach  and  argue  that  it  can  be  more  readily 
reconciled  with  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles  than  the  ASB  suggest.  The  Board  maintain 
that  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  partial  provision  with  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles 
definitions  of  assets  and  liabilities  because  it  recognises  the  tax  effects  of  future  transactions 
before  they  have  occurred  (ASB,  1995a,  para.  5.8.2  and  para.  1.3.6).  KPMG  argue  that  partial 
provision  can  be  justified  if  it  is  interpreted  in  terms  of  separate  recognition  and  measurement 
processes;  "first,  the  liability  definition  is  met  and  thus  existence  of  the  liability  is 
acknowledged,  or  recognised;  and  secondly,  that  liability  is  measured  at  the  amount  that  will 
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probably  be  paid"  (KPMG,  1995,  p.  317).  KPMG  suggest  that  future  events  will  need  to  be 
taken  into  consideration  only  at  the  second  stage,  that  of  measurement,  and  thus  the  ASB's 
principal  objection  to  partial  provision  is  misconceived.  However,  KPMG  offer  no 
explanation  of  how  deferred  tax  can  properly  be  understood  as  meeting  asset  and  liability 
definitions.  This  omission  is  understandable  in  context  of  their  view  of  accounting  for 
deferred  tax  as  "primarily  a  matter  of  expense  allocation  and  only  secondarily  a  matter  of 
ensuring  that  the  resulting  liability  fits  into  the  balance  sheet  focused  framework"  (KPMG, 
1995,  p.  315). 
Price  Waterhouse  prefer  the  flow-through  method  arguing  that  it  "match(es)  tax 
charges  to  related  past  transactions  and  events  which  have  a  tax  consequence"  and  produces 
balance  sheet  amounts  which  "can  be  explained  and  understood"  (Price  Waterhouse,  1995, 
p.  401).  They  advocate,  however,  a  modification  of  the  pure  flow  through  in  which  provision 
would  be  made  for  timing  differences  arising  on  "one-off'  transactions  and  other  timing 
differences  likely  to  crystallise  in  the  foreseeable  future.  They  state  that  such  an  approach 
"quite  clearly  accounts  for  all  liabilities  existing  at  the  balance  sheet  date  and  those  which 
are  likely  to  arise  within  a  short  space  of  time  thereafter"  (Price  Waterhouse,  1995,  p.  404). 
However  they  do  not  make  it  clear  why  they  consider  it  appropriate  to  account  at  the  balance 
sheet  date  for  liabilities  which  may  arise  some  time  after  the  year  end  -  and  which  by 
implication  do  not  exist  at  the  balance  sheet  date. 
Touche  Ross  view  deferred  tax  as  an  increment  or  decrement  to  tax  payable  on  future 
profits,  and  support  the  ASB  in  advocacy  of  the  full  provision  method.  They  recognize  that 
until  future  profits  have  been  earned  "the  principal  liability  to  tax  on  those  profits  does  not 
yet  exist"  nevertheless  they  insist  that  "a  measurable  increase  or  decrease  in  that  future  tax 
liability  does  exist,  and  is  the  result  of  past  transactions.  The  method  thus  meets  the 
requirement  of  the  definition  of  assets  and  liability"  (Touche  Ross,  1995,  p.  540).  Touch  Ross 
seem  to  be  no  more  prepared  than  the  ASB  to  provide  a  convincing  explanation  of  how  the 
recognition  of  possible  increments  or  decrements  to  a  future  assets  or  liabilities,  that  do  not 
themselves  meet  the  criteria  for  recognition,  can  be  reconciled  with  the  draft  Statement  of 
Principles. 
Just  as  we  found  no  evidence  of  convergence  in  the  history  of  accounting  for  deferred 
tax  in  the  UK,  we  find  no  evidence  of  convergence  in  the  recent  debate.  Despite  the  draft 
Statement  of  Principles,  the  Big  Six  firms  do  not  agree  on  the  most  appropriate  treatment  of 
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deferred  tax.  Indeed  there  is  a  remarkable  lack  of  consistency  in  their  application  of  the 
ASB's  definitions  to  this  topic  and  extensive  disagreement  on  basic  issues.  In  general  our 
findings  reflect  Gerboth's  analysis  of  the  use  of  definitions  developed  by  the  FASB  in  debate 
on  accounting  for  pension  costs.  He  found,  much  as  we  have,  that,  whilst  the  definition  of 
liabilities  affected  the  vocabulary  of  the  debate  and  the  terms  in  which  decisions  were 
justified,  "from  all  external  indications,  the  substantive  contribution  of  the  definition  was 
slight.  All  of  the  arguments  raised,  however  they  were  expressed  were  those  that  a 
knowledgeable  observer  would  have  expected  to  be  raised  with  or without  the  definition" 
(Gerboth,  1987,  p.  2-3).  In  the  following  section  we  will  consider  the  implications  that  might 
be  drawn  from  the  apparent  failure  of  convergence  in  accounting  thought  and  regulation  in 
the  UK  concerning  accounting  for  deferred  tax. 
Explaining  disagreement  (and  agreement)  -  science,  ethics  and  accounting 
The  distinction,  Williams  draws,  between  ethics  and  science  does  not  depend  on  whether  or 
not  agreement,  or  convergence,  is  actually  obtained.  The  distinction  hinges  on  how  we  might 
best  explain  agreement  or  disagreement:  "It  is  not  that  disagreement  needs  explanation  and 
agreement  does  not,  but  that  in  different  contexts  disagreement  requires  different  sorts  of 
explanation,  and  so  does  agreement"  (Williams,  1985,  p.  133).  In  science  we  can  coherently 
expect  that  agreement  might  be  best  explained  as  convergence  guided  by  how  things  are, 
whilst  any  agreement  that  may  occur  in  ethical  thought  is  likely  to  be  best  explained  in  socio- 
cultural  terms. 
There  is,  in  fact,  a  considerable  degree  of  international  convergence  in  accounting 
standards  for  deferred  tax:  a  convergence  on  the  method  of  full  provision  with  discounting. 
This  is,  in  a  sense,  convergence  for  the  sake  of  convergence,  driven  by  the  perceived  value 
of  international  accounting  consistency  itself.  The  international  dominance  of  full  provision 
method,  following  the  lead  given  on  the  issue  by  the  FASB,  in  the  US,  through  SFAS 
No.  109,  is  crucial  to  the  ASB's  rationale  for  proceeding  towards  full  provision  in  the  UK.  The 
ASB's  move  certainly  does  not  seem  to  reflect  any  strong  view  that  the  full  provision  method 
captures  how  things  are  any  better  than  does  the  partial  provision  method.  The  Board  can 
"see  the  logic  for  all  three  of  the  methods  of  accounting  for  tax  under  consideration"  (ASB, 
1999c,  appendix.  V,  para.  22),  but  they  "do  not  believe  that  a  good  case  can  be  made  for 
standing  up  against  the  direction  of  international  opinion"  (ASB,  1999c,  appendix.  V, 
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para.  23).  Essentially,  the  ASB  believe  that  failure  to  conform  would  damage  the  credibility 
of  UK  financial  reporting  because,  as  the  dominance  of  the  full  provision  method  is 
increasingly  established,  a  marginalized  partial  provision  alternative  will  become  "less  well 
understood  and  accepted"  (ASB,  1999c,  appendix.  V,  para.  24).  The  responses  to  the  1995 
'Accounting  for  tax'  discussion  paper  indicate  that,  there  is  no  ground-swell  of  opinion  in  the 
UK  against  SSAP  15  and  partial  provision,  and  certainly  no  natural  consensus  in  favour  of 
full  provision.  The  ASB  held  a  number  of  meetings  with  representatives  of  the  preparer,  user, 
and  auditor  groups  and  apparently  succeeded  in  reconciling  them  to  the  need  for  international 
conformity:  "each  of  these  groups,  whilst  disappointed  that  there  has  not  been  international 
acceptance  of  the  partial  provision  method,  now  accepts  the  rationale  for  change"  (ASB, 
1999c,  appendix.  V,  para.  25). 
A  cynical  view  of  the  development  of  accounting  standards  for  deferred  taxation  in 
the  UK  might  be  that  they  have  blown  in  the  wind  of  economic  and  fiscal  change  in  response 
to  sectional  interest  and  political  pressure.  The  full  provision  method  was  abandoned  at  a 
time  when  its  use  would  have  forced  recognition  of  substantial  liabilities  -  with  consequent 
impact  on  profits  after  tax.  The  rehabilitation  of  the  full  provision  method  has  coincided  with 
changes  in  the  UK  tax  regime  and  business  practices,  particularly  concerning  the  use  of 
unfunded  pension  schemes,  that  tend  to  give  rise  to  substantial  deferred  tax  "assets"  which 
could  not  be  reflected  in  the  balance  sheet  under  partial  provision  method.  There  is  little  to 
suggest  that  the  evolution  of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK  can  reasonably  be 
described,  or  best  explained,  as  convergence  on  how  things  are.  Accounting,  at  least  in  the 
instance  of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK,  does  not  seem  to  exhibit  the  kind  of 
convergence  that  we  might  hope  to  find  in  science.  Furthermore,  the  development  of 
accounting  for  deferred  tax  in  the  UK  is  not  an  atypical  case.  Accounting  for  tax  in  the  US 
has  also  been  shown  to  have  been  shaped  by  political  and  economic  pressure  (see  Moonitz, 
1966;  Zeff,  1978),  as  has  financial  accounting  in  respect  of  many  other  issues,  including  for 
example;  accounting  for  stock  option  compensation  (Zeff,  1997),  accounting  for  goodwill 
(Nobes,  1992),  accounting  for  Research  and  Development  (Hope  &  Gray,  1982),  and 
accounting  for  troubled  debt  restructuring  (Pushkin  &  Pariser  1991). 
Robert  Sterling  (1979)  suggests  that  there  is  little  convergence  or  objectivity  in 
accounting  because  it  has  taken  law  as  its  model,  and  has  therefore  become  drawn  into 
politics  and  matters  of  social  choice.  He  argues  that  there  is  nothing  essential  to  the  subject 
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matter  of  accounting  preventing  it  from  being  reformulated  as  science.  As  Sterling  sees 
things,  accounting  may  keep  law  as  its  model  and  thus  become  increasingly  mired  in  politics 
or  it  can  take  the  scientific  path:  "the  law  rather  naturally  shades  off  into  consideration  of 
politics.  Thus  we  can  also  expect  those  interest  groups  to  appeal  to  higher  legislative 
authorities  when  they  don't  get  their  way  with  the  FASB. 
...  The  alternative  is  to  adopt  the 
method  of  science"  (Sterling,  1976,  p.  87).  Sterling's  call  for  a  scientific  accounting  is 
motivated,  above  all,  by  his  observation  of  the  lack  of  convergence  in  accounting  thought: 
"When  we  confront  a  problem,  we  almost  invariably  disagree  about  its  proper  solution" 
(Sterling,  1979,  p.  3).  He  suggests  that,  if  accounting  is  to  move  towards  scientific  status,  it 
must  abandon  the  "fantasy"  of  historic  costs  and  arbitrary  allocation  processes  and  ground 
itself  in  the  observable  objects  and  events  in  the  shared  and  accessible  public  world.  "What 
I  mean  when  I  suggest  that  accounting  move  toward  a  science  is  simply  that  it  take  the  first 
step  by  switching  from  calculating  numerals  to  measuring  (observing)  and  reporting  some 
kind  of  verifiable  magnitude,  such  as  prices"  (Sterling,  1993,  p.  153,  note.  25).  For  Sterling 
a  scientific  accounting,  by  being  securely  based  in  an  observable  public  commercial  reality, 
will  obtain  objectivity  through  intersubjectivity.  He  thinks  that,  for  the  most  part,  we  can 
easily  recognise  the  broad  contours  of  our  shared  economic  world,  and  that  prices  are  part 
of  that  shared  experience  (whilst  historic  cost  residuals  of  allocation  processes  are  not).  He 
recognizes,  however,  that  measurement  issues  are  much  more  problematic  than  those  of 
recognition: 
"Although  at  the  boundaries  there  are  problems  in  deciding  exactly  which 
objects  qualify  as  economic  resources  and  obligations,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the 
subject  matter  of  accounting  practice  includes  such  things  as  cash,  claims  to 
cash,  stock-in-trade,  machines,  buildings,  land,  and  the  like.  Unfortunately, 
that  is  the  end  of  clarity:  as  soon  as  we  move  to  a  consideration  of  the  amount 
of  those  things  or  events,  we  face  a  maze  of  murky  ideas.  " 
(Sterling,  1993,  p.  125) 
He  suggests  that  a  move  to  exit  value  accounting  would  go  a  long  way  towards  resolving  the 
"murk"  around  accounting  measurement  by  giving  accounting  a  clear  verifiable  empirical 
base  in  prices  which  are  part  of  the  "phenomena  of  common  experience"  (Sterling,  1993, 
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p.  153,  note.  24). 
Raymond  Chambers  has  similarly  advocated  a  more  scientific  approach  to 
accounting.  Like  Sterling,  he  regards  accounting  practice  as  having  lost  its  direct  connection 
with  commercial  realities:  "Much  of  the  corpus  of  traditional  accounting  doctrine  and 
practice  rests  on  myths,  propositions  that  are  treated  as  not  corrigible  by  recourse  to 
observation  and  experiment"  (Chambers,  1980,  p.  167).  He  too  recommends  a  move  towards 
a  more  empirically  grounded  accounting.  Chambers  has  argued  that  the  weakness  of  the 
FASB  conceptual  framework  project'  lies  in  its  failure  to  adequately  conceptualise  how 
things  are  in  the  commercial  world:  "the  contents  of  the  'concepts  statements'  deal 
substantially  with  what  lies  within  the  lore  of  accountants,  not  with  'relationships  in  the  world 
out  there'  which  it  is  the  business  of  accounting  to  depict"  (Chambers,  1996,  p.  127).  As 
Chambers  sees  it,  the  confusion  of  prescription  and  description  he  finds  in  the  FASB 
conceptual  framework,  is  not  inevitable;  he  thinks  that  in  accounting  we  can  and  should  have 
"reliable  knowledge 
... 
before  prescription".  Sterling  and  Chambers  seem  to  believe  that 
accounting  can  be  ideally  conceptualized  as  a  primarily  descriptive  project;  others  would 
disagree. 
Stamp  rejects  Sterling's  suggestion  that  accounting  can  become  like  science.  He 
argues  that  accounting  is  fundamentally  a  normative  enterprise.  He  likens  accounting  to  law, 
arguing  that  both  disciplines  are  essentially  concerned  with  "resolving  conflicts  among 
people  and  organisations"  (Stamp,  1981a,  p.  216).  Stamp  sees  science  as  dealing  with  the 
world  as  it  any  way  is,  "a  world  which  would  still  exist  without  any  scientist"  (Stamp,  1981  b, 
p  20),  whilst  accounting,  on  the  other  hand  is  involved,  in  human  effort  to  construct  or 
modify  a  social  world:  "accounting  standards  are  man-made  efforts  to  control  a  man-made 
environment"  (Stamp,  1981a,  p  218).  Stamp's  conviction  that  accounting  is  an  essentially 
normative,  value  laden,  conflict  resolution  mechanism  is  shared  by  many  critical  accounting 
theorists  (see  e.  g.  Tinker,  1980).  On  such  a  view,  all  of  our  efforts  to  control,  modify  or 
maintain  a  social  world,  including  accounting,  inevitably  involve  choices,  implicit  or  explicit, 
concerning  the  "values  that  are  to  be  "maximized"  (Williams,  1992,  p.  103).  Financial 
reporting  then  comes  to  be  seen  as  "fundamentally  an  ethical  problem"  (Williams,  1992, 
p.  103),  and  accounting  as  an  essentially  a  moral  practice:  "It  is  precisely  because  value 
choices  underlie  accounting  practices  (though  often  invisibly  so)  that  accounting  is  a  political 
as  well  as  moral  practice"  (Francis,  1990,  p.  7).  From  this  perspective,  the  primary  danger  of 
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the  scientific  view  of  accounting  is  that  it  may  foster  "the  illusion  that  accounting  can  be 
thought  of  in  strictly  technical  terms"  (Williams,  1992,  p.  103),  and  lead  us  to  overlook  the 
implicit  ethical  choices  involved  in  accounting  practice.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  see  the 
Sterling  -  Stamp  debate  as  a  contest  between  two  philosophical  extremes  (see  Power,  1986). 
They  share  a  preoccupation  with  "stability  and  consensus  in  accounting  practice"  (Power, 
1994,  p.  5).  Sterling  hopes  that  accounting  knowledge  might  be  founded  upon  intersubjective 
consensus  guided  by  triangulation  on  the  objective  contours  of  commercial  reality.  Stamp, 
on  the  other  hand,  sees  the  jurisprudential  model,  of  ongoing  free  debate  within  a  developing 
tradition,  as  the  only  legitimate  foundation  for  accounting  consensus. 
The  tension  between  the  descriptive  and  normative  aspects  of  accounting  that 
underlies  the  accounting  as  science  versus  accounting  as  ethics  debate  may  be  illuminated 
in  terms  of  the  distinctions  Williams  draws  between  science  and  ethics.  In  table  3,  shown 
below,  we  try  to  locate  accounting  in  terms  of  the  science  /  ethics  dichotomy: 
Table  3:  A  comparison  of  science  ethics  and  accounting. 
Science  Ethics  Accounting 
Aims  to  help  us  find  our  Aims  to  help  us  answer  the  Aims  to  help  us  find  our 
way  around  a  world  in  Socratic  question  "how  way  through  the 
which  we  occupy  no  special  should  one  live?  social/cultural  world  in 
position.  which  we  find  ourselves. 
Aims  to  help  us  construct 
and  find  our  way  through  Aims  to  help  us  reproduce 
the  best  type  of  social  world  and  develop  our  world. 
for  us. 
Concepts  are  not  primarily  Concepts  are  action  Concepts  are  action 
action  guiding.  guiding;  they  are  guiding;  they  are 
prescriptive.  prescriptive. 
Concepts  are  world  guided  Concepts  are  world  guided  Concepts  are  world  guided 
at  local  level;  they  are  at  local  level;  they  are  at  local  level;  they  are 
descriptive.  descriptive.  The  proper  descriptive.  The  proper 
application  of  the  concept  of  application  of  the  concept  of 
chastity  depends  upon  the  profitability  depends  upon 
state  of  the  world.  the  state  of  the  world. 
We  can  have  local  We  can  have  local  We  can  have  local 
knowledge  under  concepts;  knowledge  under  concepts.  knowledge  under  concepts; 
"grass  is  green".  "X  is  chaste".  "Company  X  is  profitable". 
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Table  3  continued:  A  comparison  of  science  ethics  and  accounting. 
Science 
We  can  coherently  expect 
that  the  one  physical  world 
may  guide  the  convergence 
of  scientific  understanding. 
-  Convergence  that  can  be 
best  explained  as 
convergence  guided  by  the 
way  things  are. 
Ethics 
There  are  many  actual  and 
possible  social/cultural 
worlds.  Therefore  notion  of 
the  convergence  of  ethical 
theory  on  an  absolute 
conception  of  reality  is  not 
coherent. 
Accounting 
There  are  many  actual  and 
possible  social/cultural 
worlds;  therefore  the  notion 
of  a  convergence  on  an 
absolute  conception  of 
reality  is  not  coherent. 
We  can  coherently  hope  that 
the  world  might  guide  us 
towards  a  view  of  the 
world-  the  absolute 
conception  of  reality  - 
which  is  so  far  as  possible 
free  of  local  idiosyncrasies 
and  thus  maximally 
inclusive,  and  objective. 
Theory  is  world  guided  at  a 
reflective  level. 
Reflective  /  second-order 
theory  can  be  an 
explanatory  theory  of  local 
perspectives/knowledge;  It 
can  explain  how  a 
perspectival  view  relates  to 
the  world;  It  can  explain 
why  grass  seems  to  be  green 
to  creatures  like  us. 
Scientific  theory  can 
incorporate  a  theory  of 
error. 
Reflection  can  explain  and 
thereby  justify  local 
knowledge. 
It  is  reasonable  to  expect 
some  degree  of  local 
convergence  -  on  the  ethical 
concepts  we  need  to  help  us 
find  our  way  around  the 
world  we  find  ourselves  in. 
Theory  is  not  world  guided 
at  a  reflective  level. 
At  a  reflective  level  theory 
can  not  be  explanatory;  it 
can  not  explain  the  use  of 
the  concept  chastity  rather 
than  some  other  concept. 
Theory  can  not  incorporate 
a  theory  of  error. 
Reflection  can  not  explain 
and  may  destroy  local 
knowledge. 
Some  degree  of  local 
convergence  on  the 
accounting  concepts  we 
need  to  help  us  find  our  way 
around  the  particular 
economic  world  we  find 
ourselves  in  might 
reasonably  be  anticipated. 
Theory  is  not  world  guided 
at  a  reflective  level. 
At  a  reflective  level  theory 
can  not  be  explanatory;  it 
can  not  explain  the  use  of 
the  concept  of  profit  rather 
than  some  other  concept. 
Theory  can  not  incorporate 
a  theory  of  error. 
Reflection  can  not  explain 
and  may  destroy  local 
knowledge. 
The  differences  between  science  and  ethics  arise,  in  part,  because  both  enterprises  have  very 
different  aims.  Science  aims  to  provide  explanation  of  experience,  including  some 
explanation  of  why  the  physical  world  presents  itself  as  it  does  to  creatures  like  us.  Science 
thus  helps  us  find  our  way  around  a  world  in  which  we  occupy  no  special  position  -a  world 
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which  "anyway  is".  Ethics  does  not  generally  aim  to  explain  experience  at  all,  and  certainly 
there  is  no  world  such  that  it  could  be  the  aim  of  ethical  thought  to  explain  why  it  presents 
as  it  does  to  creatures  like  us.  Ethical  thought  aims  to  help  us  answer  the  Socratic  question 
"how  should  one  live?  "  and  ethical  theory  aims  to  help  us  to  "construct  a  world  that  will  be 
our  world,  one  in  which  we  have  a  social,  cultural,  and  personal  life"  (Williams,  1985, 
p.  111).  Accounting  embodies  a  tension  between  descriptive  and  normative  objectives.  It  has 
the  aim  of  describing  or  explaining  (economic)  experience,  and  in  this  respect  has  something 
in  common  with  science.  However  where  science  describes  or  explains  a  world  to  which  we 
stand  in  no  special  relation,  accounting  describes  aspects  of  our  social  world  -a  world  which 
we  construct.  Accounts  help  us  find  our  way  in  the  social  world,  but  they  do  more;  they  act 
on  it:  they  help  us  to  construct,  reproduce  and  modify  our  world.  Accounting  deeply  affects 
how  we  live  with  one  another,  and  is  imbued  with  both  explicit  and  implicit  values.  The 
value  choices  that  run  through  accounting  are  absolutely  integral  to  it.  We  can  not  reasonably 
expect  or  aspire  to  an  accounting  that  avoids  value  choices  and  simply  describes  the 
economic  world.  The  fundamental  accounting  acts  of  aggregation  and  classification 
inevitably  acknowledge,  use,  and  thereby  tend  to  legitimise,  certain  meaningful  and  value 
laden  social  categories.  For  example,  notions  of  property  rights  underpin  the  category  of 
assets,  and  the  category  of  liabilities  is  underpinned  by  notions  of  obligation.  We  can  imagine 
different  social  worlds  and  different  meaningful  categories,  but  whatever  categories  we  use 
we  will  inevitably  privilege  some  value  system  or  other.  We  suggest  that  certain  key 
accounting  concepts  such  as  'profit'  are  in  essence  thick  ethical  concepts,  in  which  the 
descriptive  and  normative,  fact  and  value  are  inextricably  entangled. 
For  science  there  is  one  physical  world  which  may  guide  the  convergence  of  scientific 
understanding,  whilst  for  ethics  there  are  many  possible  social  worlds,  (social  worlds  to 
which  we  stand  in  special  relation  as  constructor  or  imaginer).  Convergence  in  ethical 
thought  guided  by  the  way  the  world  "anyway  is"  is  therefore  not  possible.  Accounting  helps 
us  to  find  our  way  about  the  social  world  -  which  means  one  particular  social  world  -  one  of 
many,  real  or  imagined,  worlds.  Ultimately,  the  ethical  dimension  to  accounting  thought 
ensures  that  there  is  no  one  world  to  guide  convergence  in  accounting;  politically  driven 
views  and  choices  about  the  "values  to  be  maximised"  will  always  tend  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  full  agreement  and  allow  the  possibility  of  reversal  in  accounting  thought.  The  history  of 
policy  reversal  in  accounting  for  deferred  tax  might  be  explained  in  these  terms.  Nonetheless 
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we  do  live  in  a  particular  social  world,  and  our  shared  "reactions  to  its  major  features, 
including  its  values"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  166),  provide  all  the  basis  we  need  for  objective 
knowledge  of  that  world. 
Given  that  accounting  apparently  aims  to  describe  certain  of  the  most  significant 
phenomena  of  our  shared  experience:  "Producing  and  consuming  goods,  buying  and  selling, 
and  receiving  income  and  spending  it 
...  activities  engaging  everyone's  attention  practically 
all  the  time"  (Leontief,  1982,  quoted  by  Sterling,  1993,  p.  153,  note.  24),  one  might  anticipate 
easy  agreement  on  accounting  issues  -  local  convergence.  Yet,  despite  this  background  of 
shared  experience,  there  is  persistent  disagreement  in  accounting  debate.  Our  analysis  of  the 
recent  UK  accounting  for  deferred  tax  debate  suggests  that  one  reason  why  disagreement 
persists  is  that  accounting  theory  in  respect  of  such  matters  is  so  far  removed  from  any  direct 
relation  with  any  causal  stimuli  provided  by  objects  and  events  in  the  world.  The  commercial 
world  we  share  gives  the  participants  no  strong  lead  on  the  issue,  no  clear  stimuli  to 
triangulate  upon.  Our  examination  of  the  competing  views  on  the  deferred  tax  issue  indicates 
that  a  logic  of  matching  and  allocation  is  not  far  below  the  surface  of  the  debate;  and,  as 
Sterling  and  Chambers  suggest,  such  processes  bear  little  relation  to  any  publicly  observable 
commercial  realities. 
The  ASB  clearly  intended  that  its  Statement  of  Principles  project  would  help  move 
UK  financial  reporting  away  from  those  accounting  ideas  and  practices  that  most  obviously 
rest  on'myths'  and  towards  a  clearer  empirical  basis  in  observable  commercial  realities.  The 
balance  sheet  approach  favoured  by  the  ASB  is  specifically  intended  to  prevent  the  inclusion, 
in  balance  sheet  of  'fantasy'  items,  such  as  the  residuals  or  products  of  allocation  and 
matching  processes,  which  bear  no  clear  relation  to  observable  objects  and  events  in  the 
world.  The  failure  of  the  ASB's  statement  of  Principles  project  to  promote  convergence  in 
the  accounting  for  deferred  tax  debate  is  in  a  sense  a  failure  to  carry  through  good  intentions. 
We,  perhaps,  should  not  be  surprised  that  the  ASB's  Statement  of  Principles  project  failed 
to  bring  any  significant  measure  of  consensus  to  the  deferred  tax  debate.  The  definitions  at 
the  heart  of  the  project  have  previously  proven  "notably  unhelpful"  in  the  context  of  real 
accounting  argument  (Gerboth,  1987,  p.  2).  Experience  seems  to  bear  out  Dopuch  and 
Sunder's  view  that  accounting  definitions  "no  matter  how  carefully  worded,  cannot  bear  the 
burden  of  the  struggle  for  economic  advantage  between  various  interest  groups"  (Dopuch  & 
Sunder,  1980,  p.  16).  They  specifically  predict  that  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards 
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Board's  definition  of  liabilities,  upon  which  the  ASB's  definition  is  based,  "will  not  help 
resolve  the  issue"  of  accounting  for  deferred  tax  (1980,  p.  7).  Our  own  analysis  of  the  deferred 
tax  debate  suggests  the  failure  of  the  definitions  to  help  resolve  fundamental  questions  in 
accounting  can,  in  part,  be  accounted  for  by  the  indeterminacy  of  meaning,  that  is,  by  the 
impossibility  of  making  meaning,  as  a  product  of  difference,  fully  present  in  language. 
Meaning  depends  upon  context  but  context  is  boundless  therefore  meaning  is  ultimately 
indeterminate:  "no  context  permits  saturation"  (Derrida,  1979,  p.  81,  quoted  by  Culler,  1983, 
p.  123).  We  found  that  the  definition  of  liabilities  understood  in  relation  to  many  other  texts 
-  notably  the  texts  of  'matching',  'contingent  liabilities',  and  'provisions'.  Definitions,  far  from 
resolving  ambiguity,  may  be  drawn  on  by  competing  interests  as  powerful  but  indeterminate 
rhetorical  elements  in  accounting  debate;  their  meaning  is  always  contestable.  The 
unconvincing  contortions  performed  by  the  ASB  in  their  efforts  to  make  full  provision  'fit' 
with  their  Statement  of  Principles  definition  of  liabilities,  seems  to  support  the  view  that  we 
should  not  expect  accounting  definitions  to  bear  the  burden  of  economic  and  political 
interests.  In  this  case  definitions  seemed  to  be  used  to  help  legitimize  an  accounting  policy 
choice  that  was  in  fact  determined  by  other  factors,  including  the  perceived  need  for 
international  consistency. 
In  science,  ethics,  and  accounting  our  concepts  can  be  world-guided  at  the  local  level; 
the  right  application  of  concepts  such  as  green,  chastity,  or  profit  depends  upon  the  state  of 
the  world,  and  we  can  have  local  knowledge  under  such  concepts.  In  each  domain  we  may 
reasonably  anticipate  a  degree  of  local  convergence  in  knowledge.  In  science  world-guidance 
can  extend  to  the  reflective  level;  we  can  properly  strive  to  transcend  our  local  perspectives 
on  the  world  to  gain  an  "absolute  conception"  of  it  which  can  explain  and  justify  local 
knowledge.  Progression  towards  an  ideal  conception  of  reality  relies  upon  the  possibility  of 
second-order  explanation.  It  requires  that  we  might  step  back  from  (or  transcend)  our 
competing  local  perspectives  to  produce  a  more  inclusive  conception  of  the  world  which  is 
capable  of  explaining  the  relations  of  itself  and  the  more  local  perspectival  representations 
it  encompasses  to  the  one  world  which  produced  them.  Explanation,  for  example,  of  how  it 
is  that  creatures  like  us  can  have  the  concept  of  "greenness",  also  justifies  because  it  can 
show  how  our  perception  relates  to  the  physical  world  and  how  it  can  provide  knowledge  and 
help  us  find  our  way  around  that  world. 
The  essence  of  the  idea  of  the  absolute  conception  of  reality  is  that  the  world  might 
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guide  us  towards  a  view  of  the  world  which  is  so  far  as  possible  free  of  local  idiosyncrasies 
and  thus  maximally  inclusive  and  thus  objective.  If  the  notion  of  the  absolute  conception  is 
to  be  extended  to  accounting  we  need  to  be  able  to  step  back  from  our  local  accounting 
knowledge.  We  need  to  be  able  to  explain  our  accounting  concepts  from  some  more  inclusive 
position  and  show  how  they  relate  to  the  world  and  how  they  can  give  knowledge  of  that 
world,  and  thus  help  us  find  our  way  in  it.  Any  explanation  of  accounting  concepts  like 
"profit",  "assets"  and  the  like  will  need  to  draw  not  only  on  the  physical  world  but  on  a 
particular  social  world.  Such  explanation  therefore  will  not  be  quite  comparable  with 
explanation  in  science,  and  in  particular  the  degree  of  inclusiveness  that  might  be  coherently 
aspired  to  will  be  constrained  by  the  social  world.  As  a  first  step  back  from  the  local 
perspective  of  accounting,  a  first  step  in  the  direction  of  a  more  inclusive  (if  not  absolute) 
conception,  we  might  consider  economic  conceptions  of  the  world.  Some  accounting 
concepts  may  be  explained  on  the  basis  of  economic  conceptions  of  reality  and  thus  to  some 
extent  be  justified,  whilst  others  may  find  no  explanation  in  economic  conceptions  of  reality 
and  thus  not  be  justified  by  reflection.  For  example,  accounting  matching  and  allocation 
concepts,  and  the  balance  sheet  and  income  statement  amounts  they  give  rise  to,  may  not  be 
explainable  or  justifiable  in  terms  of  more  inclusive  economic  conceptions  of  reality.  Those 
local  concepts  that  can  not  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  developing  absolute  conception  of 
reality,  or  be  made  to  cohere  with  it,  will  tend  to  be  undercut  and  forced  from  use  by 
reflection.  Some  other  accounting  concepts,  for  example,  sales,  purchases,  assets  and 
liabilities,  may  be  either  directly  related  to  or  explainable  in  terms  of  the  inclusive  common 
conceptions  of  economic  reality,  and  therefore  justified  by  reflection.  The  import  of 
Chambers'  criticism  of  the  FASB  conceptual  framework,  is  effectively  that  it  has  failed  as 
a  reflective  enterprise;  that  it  has  failed  to  justify  the  accounting  conceptions  it  prescribes  in 
terms  of  inclusive  (widely  accessible)  conceptions  of  the  economic  reality. 
The  extension  of  the  idea  of  the  pursuit  of  an  ideal  absolute  conception  of  reality  to 
the  realm  of  accounting  makes  some  sense  if  we  can  maintain  a  view  of  accounting  as  a 
neutral  descriptive  enterprise;  if  we  can  take  the  social  world  we  find  ourselves  in  as  given. 
On  this  view,  perspectival  accounting  knowledge  may  be  justified  by  more  inclusive 
conceptions  of  reality  attained  through  reflection.  Those  theorists  who  suggest  that 
accounting  might  appropriately  be  conceived  of  in  terms  of  science,  will  of  course  tend  to 
argue  that  accounting  must  carefully  protect  its  neutrality.  Solomons  (1991)  argues  that  if 
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accounting  becomes  a  partisan  advocate  of  any  particular  vision  of  the  "social  world  that 
would  be  best  for  us",  it  will  compromise  its  capacity  to  help  us  find  our  way  around  the 
world  that  we  presently  find  ourselves  in.  However,  the  idea  that  reflection  from  more 
inclusive  (if  not  actually  absolute)  positions  might  justify  local  accounting  knowledge  will 
make  little  sense  if  we  see  accounting  as  an  essentially  a  normative  enterprise  that  aims  of 
help  us  answer  the  fundamental  ethical  question:  "is  this  the  best  kind  of  social  world?  " 
Explanation  of  local  ethical  perspectives,  based  for  example,  on  analysis  of  their  origins  in 
particular  social  worlds  can  not  address  such  a  question.  In  ethics  world-guidance  does  not 
extend  to  the  reflective  level.  Ethical  reflection,  therefore,  can  not  be  based  on  explanation, 
instead  it  must  rely  on  thin  concepts,  such  as  "good",  "right",  "obligation",  and  the  like, 
which  are  not  world  guided.  Reflection  can  not  justify  local  ethical  knowledge  in  the  way  that 
it  can  justify  local  scientific  knowledge.  We  will  find  no  basis  in  ethical  reflection  for 
thinking  that  our  local  concepts  are  grounded  in  any  absolute  sense.  Indeed,  the  process  of 
reflection  may  encourage  recognition  of  the  absence  of  any  'absolute'  basis  for  ethical 
knowledge,  and  thereby  weaken  identification  with  the  evaluative  interests  involved  in  local 
ethical  concepts.  Reflection  may  thus  destroy  ethical  knowledge.  There  are,  as  we  have  seen, 
good  reasons  why  we  might  view  accounting  as  an  ethical  practice.  Certain  of  its  key 
concepts  clearly  contain  a  prescriptive  element;  they  embody  notions  of  "the  good  way  of 
living"  and  might  reasonably  be  described  as  thick  ethical  concepts.  If  we  accept  that  in  a 
pre-reflective  state  users  of  such  concepts  might  have  knowledge  under  them,  in  so  far  as 
they  correctly  apply  and  make  judgements  using  those  concepts,  then  reflection  may  destroy 
accounting  knowledge.  Reflection  may,  for  example,  undermine  one's  capacity  to  take  the 
category  of  profit,  as  an  ethical  prescription,  for  granted  as  part  of  our  way  of  life. 
Reflection  and  the  destruction  of  accounting  knowledge: 
The  drive  towards  reflective  understanding  of  our  culture  and  our  practices  seems  more 
urgent  than  ever  before  and  to  reach  into  virtually  every  aspect  of  modem  society:  "There  is 
no  way  back  from  reflectiveness"  (Williams,  1985,  p  163).  Reflection  tends  to  put  traditional 
concepts,  including  accounting  concepts,  under  pressure.  Two  distinct  impacts  of  reflection 
on  accounting  may  be  anticipated;  Firstly  we  might  expect  reflection  to  promote  an  increased 
rationalisation  of  accounting  practice  -  associated  with  a  diminution  of  the  significance  of  the 
role  of  accounting  myth  and  symbol.  Secondly,  we  might  anticipate  that  reflection  will  lead 
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to  increasing  recognition  of  the  ethical  dimension  of  accounting  ethical  practice;  Reflection 
may,  therefore,  have  the  potential  to  destroy  accounting  knowledge  by  driving  from  use 
certain  thick  ethical  concepts  under  which  knowledge  was  previously  held. 
Reflection  can  lead  us  to  recognize  just  how  far  certain  accounting  descriptions  miss 
describing  the  world  in  any  absolute  sense.  Reflection  may  show  that  many  traditional 
accounting  concepts  are  not  explained  or  justified  by  any  economic,  or  deeper,  conceptions 
of  the  world.  In  such  cases  unjustified  concepts  may  need  to  be  abandoned  or  modified  if  the 
credibility  and  action  guiding  force  of  the  discipline  is  to  be  maintained,  in  a  society  that 
increasingly  prizes  the  rational  guidance  of  action.  To  some  extent  the  ASB's  Statement  of 
Principles  project  can  be  understood  as  part  of  a  project  of  accounting  rationalisation. 
Through  reflection  the  ASB  has  recognized,  for  example,  that  the  traditional  notion  of  profit 
as  an  outcome  of  a  matching  and  allocation  process  based  on  historic  costs  is  not  well  related 
to  economic  conceptions  of  income.  The  ASB  has  responded  by  advocating  a  balance  sheet 
approach  to  accounting  in  which  income  and  profit  would  be  conceived  in  more  clearly 
economic  terms  -  based  on  a  Hicksian  view  of  income.  The  recognition,  belated  though  it 
may  be,  that  many  of  our  traditional  accounting  concepts  can  not  be  justified,  in  any  absolute 
terms,  and  that  in  fact  they  can  not  even  be  justified  in  terms  of  economic  conceptions  of  the 
world,  opens  the  question  of  how  they  can  be  best  explained.  The  appreciation  that 
accounting  concepts  and  standards  are  often  essentially  an  arbitrary  expression  of  the 
preferences  of  significant  interest  groups,  and  engagement  with  the  ethical  dimension  of 
accounting  is  then  but  a  short  step  away.  Reflection  on  the  nature  of  accounting  as  a 
"descriptive"  enterprise  potentially  begins  to  reveal  its  ethical  dimension. 
In  practice,  however,  the  rationalisation  accounting  practice  has  tended  to  inhibit  the 
acknowledgement  of  the  ethical  nature  of  accounting  and  ethical  component  of  thick 
accounting  concepts  such  as  profit.  The  suppression  of  the  ethical  in  accounting  has 
paralleled  the  wider  denial  of  the  ethical  component  of  management  in  modern  society. 
Accounting  has  been  understood  to  take  ends  as  given  and  to  be  concerned  only  with  the 
rational,  effective  and  efficient,  matching  of  means  to  ends.  Accountants  and  more  generally 
managers  and  bureaucrats  have  been  widely  assumed  to  be  morally  neutral  characters: 
"They  are  seen  by  themselves,  and  by  those  who  see  them  with  the  same  eyes 
as  their  own,  as  uncontested  figures,  who  purport  to  restrict  themselves  to  the 
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realms  in  which  rational  agreement  is  possible  -  that  is,  of  course  from  their 
point  of  view  to  the  realm  of  fact,  the  realm  of  means,  the  realm  of 
measurable  effectiveness.  " 
(MacIntyre,  1985,  p.  30) 
Maclntyre  suggests  that  this  Weberian  stance  reflects  the  dominance  in  our  culture  of  an 
'emotivist'  doctrine,  that  holds  that  all  judgments  insofar  as  they  are  moral  or  evaluative  in 
character,  are  no  more  than  expressions  of  preference,  attitude  or  feeling.  Emotivism  itself 
can  be  seen  as  a  response  to  the  apparent  failure  of  the  enlightenment  project  and  its 
successors  to  find  rational  foundations  for  an  objective  morality;  On  an  emotivist  view  reason 
must  be  silent  on  questions  of  value.  The  selection  of  appropriate  ends  in  accounting  and 
other  realms  is  a  matter  of  values,  and  the  "conflict  between  rival  values  cannot  be  rationally 
settled.  Instead  one  must  simply  choose  -  between  parties,  classes,  nations,  causes,  ideals" 
(Maclntyre,  1985,  p.  25-26). 
The  value  choices  associated  with  the  ends  of  accounting  have  traditionally  been 
subject  to  relatively  little  reflection.  The  measurement  of  profit  has  simply  been  part  of  the 
commercial  life,  which  accountants,  preparers  and  users  of  accounting  information,  inhabited 
rather  than  consciously  constructed,  chose,  or  reflected  upon  in  ethical  terms.  However,  in 
more  recent,  and  increasingly  reflective,  times,  blindness  to  the  ethical  aspect  of  accounting 
-  the  fact  that  it  privileges  certain  values  and  interests  over  others,  the  fact  that  it  helps  sustain 
certain  ways  of  life  and  curtails  other  alternatives  -  has  become  increasingly  difficult  to 
sustain.  The  interminable  nature  of  accounting  debates,  and  the  way  that  arguments  shift  in 
response  to  changing  economic  circumstances  as  they  affect  the  interest  of  powerful  groups, 
makes  the  contested  and  ethical  nature  of  accounting  quite  plain.  The  increasingly  open  and 
widespread  recognition  of  the  apparently  emotivist  nature  of  accounting  argument  has 
fostered  the  rise  of  an  unapologetic  economic  consequences  style  of  accounting  argument  and 
lobbying  behaviour  (see  Zeff,  1978,1997).  Many  accounting  researchers  have  come  to  regard 
any  appeal  to  accounting  theory  as  an  excuse  or  foil  for  the  disguised  expression  of  personal 
preference  and  interests  (see  for  example  Watts  &  Zimmerman,  1979).  Positive  accounting 
researchers,  in  particular,  have  taken  the  view  that  in  accounting  debate  as  "in  moral 
argument  the  apparent  assertion  of  principles  functions  as  a  mask  for  expressions  of  personal 
preference"  (Maclntyre,  1985,  p.  19).  The  flight  to  positive  accounting  research  can  be 
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interpreted  as  a  response  to  the  uncomfortable  recognition  of  the  political  /  ethical  dimension 
of  accounting,  by  researchers  committed  to  the  notion  that  normative/ethical  issues  can  not 
be  settled  rationally  (see  Mattessich,  1993,  pp.  262-263)8.  From  time  to  time,  particularly 
contentious  issues,  such  as  accounting  for  stock  option  compensation  (Zeff,  1997),  bring  the 
attention  of  a  wider  public  to  the  contested  and  highly  politicized  nature  of  accounting 
choice.  Nevertheless  accountants  themselves  have  been  most  intensely  and  regularly  forced 
to  recognize  and  reflect  on  the  ethical  nature  of  accounting  than  have  accounting  user  groups 
or  the  public  in  general. 
Williams  does  not  suggest  that  reflection  necessarily  obliterates  'thick'  ethical 
concepts  from  memory,  rather,  he  thinks  that  it  can  make  it  difficult  for  people  to  go  on  using 
them.  Reflection  can  place  us  in  the  position  of  observer  with  regard  to  our  pre-reflective 
beliefs,  so  that  we  see  them,  after  reflection,  as  knowledge  we  can  no  longer  share  or  use.  Our 
suggestion  is  that  the  effect  of  the  pressures  of  reflection  on  accounting  have  been  such  that 
accountants  have  been  put  into  the  position  of  observers  with  respect  to  accounting  as 
knowledge  -  it  is  now  knowledge  that  they  can  no  longer  share.  Concepts  such  as  'profit', 
once  taken  for  granted  and  embedded  in  a  commercial  way  of  life  that  implied  no  level  of 
ethical  reflection  whatsoever,  no  search  for  the  best  way  of  life,  but  simply  participation  in 
our  way  of  life,  have  been  problematized  by  reflection.  For  the  accountant  forced  to 
reflection  by  events,  and  potentially  for  a  reflective  wider  public,  judgements  made  in  terms 
of  thick  accounting  concepts  may  no  longer  constitute  knowledge,  because  the  ethical 
dimension  of  those  judgements  will  cease  to  be  seen  as  being  open  to  truth  or  falsity'.  Our 
suggestion  that  accountants  no  longer  fully  share  in  accounting  as  knowledge  is  in  no  way 
meant  to  imply  that  accountants  have  entirely  lost  any  faith  in  accounting  as  a  valuable 
systems  steering  mechanism.  Rather,  we  mean  to  suggest  that  their  faith  in  the  usefulness  of 
accounting  is  no  longer  underpinned  by  the  belief  that  accounting  gives  us  knowledge  of  the 
world. 
Not  only  will  reflection  not  justify  thick  accounting  concepts,  it  may  positively 
discredit  them  by  revealing  them  as  expressions  of  arbitrary  of  will  and  preference. 
Reflection  clearly  has  liberative  potential;  it  may  undermine  oppressive  traditions.  Equally 
clear,  however,  are  the  dangers  that  the  destruction  of  knowledge  held  under  thick  concepts 
may  present  to  societies  and  institutions  that  have  come  to  rely  on  that  knowledge.  The 
potential  for  social  disruption  if  people  become  unwilling  or  unable  use  certain  thick 
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concepts,  say  "profit",  is  obvious.  A  certain  kind  of  action-guiding  knowledge  which  people 
have  used  to  find  their  way  around  their  social  world  and  to  help  shape  it  will  no  longer  be 
available  to  them.  In  a  modern  society,  increasingly  reliant  on  thin  ethical  concepts  that  can 
not  give  us  knowledge,  it  is  not  clear,  where  will  we  find  the  conviction  to  go  on.  Williams' 
argues  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  ethical  conviction  needs  to  be  founded  on  knowledge 
-  "a  mode  of  certainty"  (Williams,  1985,  p  169).  And  he  suggests  that  `confidence'  can  be 
a  viable  basis  for  ethical  conviction.  Given  society's  drift  away  from  thick  ethical  concepts, 
an  increasing  number  of  ethical  challenges  may  need  to  be  dealt  with  using  thin  ethical 
concepts  alone.  As  we  can  not  have  knowledge  under  such  concepts,  we  may  need  to  rely  on 
confidence  to  support  their  use.  In  addition,  it  seems  likely  that  some  thick  ethical  concepts 
will  survive  reflection10,  and  that  new  ones  may  emerge.  While  we  can  have  knowledge  under 
such  concepts,  they  will  inevitably  come  under  pressure  in  a  reflective  society.  Williams 
thinks  that  confidence  can  sustain  our  faith  in  thick  evaluative  concepts  which  we  may  retain 
but  must  now  see  are  not  simply  given: 
"While  we  shall  have  the  knowledge  that  comes  with  the  deployment  of  our 
surviving  thick  concepts,  we  shall  still  not  have  any  knowledge  to  the  effect 
that  we  have  a  definitively  desirable  set  of  such  concepts.  ...  So  we  are 
aware,  when  we  think  of  it,  of  something  that  less  reflective  people  were  not 
aware  of,  that  these  concepts  are  not  simply  given,  and  this  leaves  space 
where  confidence,  again,  is  indeed,  confidence  in  seeing  the  world  in  these 
evaluative  terms.  The  thick  concepts  under  which  we  can  have  some  pieces 
of  ethical  knowledge  are  not  themselves  sustained  by  knowledge,  but  by 
confidence.  " 
(Williams,  1995,  p  208) 
The  conceptual  framework  projects  and  standard  setting  work  undertaken  by  the  accounting 
profession  since  the  late  1960's  can  be  interpreted  as  an  effort  to  generate  the  confidence  and 
the  moral  conviction  needed  to  maintain  the  utility  of  certain  thick  accounting  concepts.  In 
a  context  where  accountants  themselves  have  increasingly  come  to  hold  attitudes  of  private 
irony  towards  the  accounting  knowledge  that  they  can  not  share  in,  the  profession's  public 
efforts  seem  to  have  helped  to  sustain  the  confidence  of  users  and  the  wider  public.  Many 
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thick  accounting  concepts  do  seem  to  survive  in  society  at  large,  and  users  of  accounts  do 
seem  to  be  able  to  confidently  hold  and  apply  the  knowledge  available  under  those  concepts. 
Nevertheless,  in  our  increasingly  plural  and  reflective  society,  there  is  bound  to  be  growing 
appreciation  of  the  contested  value  element  of  thick  ethical  concepts,  of  all  sorts.  The  action 
guiding  force  of  thick  accounting  concepts  is  thus  liable  to  come  under  mounting  and 
ultimately  destructive  pressure,  unless  our  confidence  in  those  concepts  can  be  justified. 
Reflection  reveals  the  ethical  dimension  to  thick  accounting  concepts  like  'profit':  A 
dimension  that  our  emotivist  culture  encourages  us  to  see  as  beyond  rational  justification.  In 
the  following  section  of  the  chapter  we  draw  on  Habermas'  discourse  ethics  to  suggest  how 
the  moral  or  normative  aspects  of  accounting  might  be  objectively  validated  -  and  its 
normative  force  sustained. 
Restoring  normative  validity  and  force  to  accounting 
Williams  has  little  to  say  about  what  might  underpin  the  confidence  that  he  sees  as  having 
such  an  important  role  to  play  in  sustaining  the  action  guiding  force  of  norms  in  our  modem 
pluralist  society.  In  this  section  of  the  chapter  we  turn  to  Habermas  for  an  account  of  how 
confidence  in  our  normative  claims  might  be  redeemed,  that  is,  how  through  discourse  ethics 
we  might  recover  moral  objectivity  in  a  posttraditional  world.  Like  Davidson  and  Williams, 
Habermas  associates  objectivity  with  intersubjectivity,  that  is,  with  uncoerced 
consensus/convergence.  He  argues  that  we  can  have  rational  consensus/convergence  in 
moral/normative  matters.  In  this  part  of  the  chapter  we  introduce  Habermas'  discourse  ethics 
and  in  broad  terms  explain  its  relevance  for  accounting  and  accounting  standard  setting.  In 
doing  so  we  will  stress  the  affinities  between  Habermas'  discourse  ethics  and  the 
Davidsonian  truth  conditional  semantics  that  we  drew  on  in  previous  sections  of  this  chapter. 
In  the  following  parts  of  the  chapter  we  discuss  the  application  of  discourse  ethics  to 
accounting  standard  setting  and  consider  some  of  the  implications  of  Habermas' 
reconstruction  of  discourse  ethics  for  the  role  of  conceptual  frameworks  in  accounting". 
The  essential  claim  at  the  core  of  the  discourse  ethics  project  is  that  moral  objectivity 
needs  no  foundation  other  than  discourse  itself.  Discourse  ethics  is  an  essentially  procedural, 
rather  than  substantive,  moral  theory.  It  aims  to  reconstruct  the  moral  point  of  view  from 
which  the  validity  of  competing  normative  claims  can  be  rationally  and  objectively  judged. 
That  reconstruction  locates  the  decision  procedure  for  the  validation  of  norms  in  practical 
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discourse  striving  for  consensus  and  it  identifies  a  rule  of  argument  that  makes  rational 
consensus  on  norms  and  the  impartial  testing  of  norms,  possible.  According  to  that  rule,  the 
principle  of  universalization  (U),  a  norm  is  valid  if: 
(U)  All  affected  can  accept  the  consequences  and  the  side  effects  its  general 
observance  can  be  anticipated  to  have  for  the  satisfaction  of  everyone's 
interests  (and  these  consequences  are  preferred  to  those  of  known  alternative 
possibilities  for  regulation).  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  65) 
Habermas  recognizes  the  contemporary  plurality  of  conceptions  of  the  good  life;  he  does  not 
think  that  philosophy,  anymore  than  religion,  can  provide  an  objective  or  generally 
acceptable  answer  to  the  ethical  question  "how  should  I  (we)  live?  "  He  does,  however,  want 
to  show  that  we  can  have  a  narrower  moral  theory,  a  theory  of  justice,  that  will  allow  us  to 
objectively  (impartially  and  fairly)  test  the  validity  of  competing  normative  claims.  For 
Habermas,  ethical  questions  can  only  be  addressed  from  within  the  context  of  a  particular  life 
form  and  history.  They  involve  deep  issues  of  identity  and  self-realisation,  and  are  often 
expressed  in  terms  of  goods  and  value  preferences.  In  contrast,  moral  claims  refer  to 
behavioural  expectations,  the  obligations  and  prohibitions  that  we  expect  to  apply  across 
society  and  be  binding  on  everyone.  They  raise  questions  like;  "which  norms  of  action  are 
justified?  "  A  moral  perspective  will  require  participants  to  be  aware  and  take  notice  of  the 
value  preferences  and  self-understandings  of  those  affected  by  the  norm,  but  the  moral  point 
of  view  will  not  allow  any  preferred  identities  to  be  prescribed,  imposed,  or  set  up  as  the  ideal 
or  goal.  Habermas'  deontological  ethics  then  applies  only  to  "practical  questions  that  can  be 
debated  rationally,  i.  e.,  those  that  hold  out  the  prospect  of  consensus.  It  deals  not  with  value 
preferences  but  with  the  normative  validity  of  norms  of  action"  (Habermas,  1983,  p.  105).  On 
Habermas'  analysis,  the  moral  breaks  away  from  the  ethical  as  society  evolves  to  become 
more  plural,  rational  and  reflective,  that  is,  as  the  traditional  anchorage  of  normative  claims 
in  particular  forms  of  life  and  given  ethical/lifeworld  contexts  is  put  under  increasing  stress. 
As  the  complexity  and  plurality  of  society  grows  in  modernity,  the  level  of 
interdependence  among  groups  with  very  different  self-understandings  and  life  goals 
increases.  In  such  conditions,  the  development  by  particular  individuals  and  groups  of  the 
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forms  of  life  that  they  value  increasingly  depends  upon  the  existence  of  social  co-operation 
and  freedoms  that  can  only  be  secured  at  the  moral  level.  Secured,  that  is,  at  the  generalizable 
level  where  broad  rational,  and  therefore  intersubjectively  binding,  social  consensus  is 
possible.  Habermas'  discourse  ethics  is  an  attempt  to  recover  the  motivating  power  of  the 
normative  in  a  post-traditional  society  where  the  social  norms  that  we  rely  on  to  integrate  and 
coordinate  social  life  can  no  longer  easily  draw  motivating  force  from  shared  self- 
understandings.  Discourse  ethics  addresses  modern  society's  need  to  find  ways  of  generating 
and  maintaining  consensual  social  integration  that  can  operate  across  different  conceptions 
of  the  good  life. 
Discourse  ethics  justifies  a  mode  of  social  co-operation  based  on  norms  that  are 
powerful  because  they  are  seen  to  be  objective  and  fair;  it  privileges  a  consensual  mode  of 
conflict  resolution  and  `social  integration'.  The  prime  alternative  to  such  `social 
integration'  is  `systems  integration',  that  is,  integration  as  a  consequence  of  action,  as 
exemplified  by  the  integration  achieved  through  market  operations.  In  late  capitalist  society 
financial  reporting  has  tended  to  become  little  more  than  an  element  of  the  `system'  through 
which  the  material  world  is  reproduced  and  integrated  via  the  steering  media  of  money, 
mark  ets  and  power.  It  has  become  colonized  by  the  system,  and  in  the  process  its  moral 
/  normative  dimension  has  become  suppressed.  The  primary  role  for  financial  reports  has 
come  to  be  seen  as  the  provision  of  information  to  markets  to  allow  the  efficient  pricing 
and  allocation  of  resources,  and  to  facilitate  the  disciplining  of  management  through  the 
market  for  corporate  control  and  the  managerial  labour  market.  Financial  reporting  then 
appears  as  an  adjunct  to  a  market  based  `systems  integration'  of  society  that  has  thus  drifted 
beyond  substantive  normative  control.  Through  discourse  ethics,  accounting  might  be 
reclaimed  as  a  normative  practice  with  real  moral  force,  and  thus  be  empowered  to  exercise 
some  control,  or  at  least  moderating  influence,  on  the  system.  At  present  the  system  seems 
to  have  substantially  broken  free  and  is  turning  back  to  colonise  those  aspects  of  our  social 
lives  that  rely  upon  social  integration  -  the  lifeworld.  Standards  /  norms  of  action  in  the 
domain  of  accounting  and  financial  reporting  involve  issues  of  justice  or  fairness  and  appear, 
prima  facie,  to  be  open  to  the  possibility  of  rational  and  consensual  determination,  at  a 
generalizable  level,  through  discourse.  Through  discourse  ethics  accounting  may  be  drawn 
into  the  realm  of  normed  co-operation  underwritten  by  rational  consent,  and  come  to 
operate  as  a  media  through  which  the  lifeworld  might  achieve  some  normative  control  of 
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the  system. 
Habermas'  reconstruction  of  what  is  implicit  in  everyday  moral  thinking  ties  the 
motivating  force  of  moral  claims  to  confidence  that  they  can  be  redeemed  with  convincing 
reasons.  And,  his  reconstruction  of  convincing,  or  rationally  motivating,  reason  giving,  based 
on  the  communicative  practices  intuitively  adopted  by  competent  participants  in  argument, 
yields  the  conclusion  that  any  rationally  motivating  exchange  of  reasons  concerning  norms 
of  action,  must  conform  to  the  principle  of  universalization  (U).  That  principle  demands  that 
the  validity  of  a  norm  be  tested  `dialogically'  through  a  process  of  real  public  argument  in 
which  all  those  affected  are  prepared  to  try  and  reciprocally  share  one  and  others' 
perspectives  in  an  uncoerced  effort  to  assess  the  fairness,  for  all,  of  the  proposed  norm.  Under 
(U),  the  validity  of  a  norm  depends  upon  its  acceptability  to  all  in  view  of  its  consequences 
for  each.  Empathy  is  thus  built  into  the  rule,  it  "is  intended  to  compel  the  universal  exchange 
of  roles  that  G.  H.  Mead  called  `ideal  role  taking"'  (Habermas,  1983,  p.  65). 
Habermas'  discourse  ethics  moves  beyond  the  philosophy  of  the  subject  and 
establishes  and  explicates  the  intersubjective  basis  of  moral  objectivity  and  knowledge. 
Discourse  ethics  clearly  takes  its  "bearings  from  the  basic  intuition  contained  in  Kant's 
categorical  imperative"  (Habermas,  1983,  p.  63);  It  insists  that  valid  norms  have  a  universal 
quality,  so  that  everyone  could  rationally  will  that  they  be  binding  on  all.  Habermas, 
however,  significantly  breaks  with  Kant  by  shifting  the  locus  of  moral  cognition  away  from 
the  solitary  individual  to  the  community  in  real  practical  discourse.  The  formulation  of  (U) 
"preclude(s)  the  monological  application  of  the  principle"  (Habermas,  1983,  p.  66),  and 
clearly  points  to  the  necessity  of  some  supra-individual  foundation  for  the  kind  of  empathy 
and  intersubjective  moral  insight  that  might  rationally  validate  a  norm.  The  necessary  insight 
can  not  be  generated  on  the  basis  of  individual  perspectives,  even  if  they  are  aggregated  in 
some  way: 
"I  can  be  rationally  convinced  of  the  rightness  of  a  norm  only  if  I  have 
grounds  for  considering  you  (and  each  affected  person)  to  be  just  as  rationally 
convinced.  But  you  can  be  rationally  convinced  only  if  you  likewise  have 
grounds  for  considering  my  conviction  a  rational  one.  " 
(Rehg,  1997,  pp.  214-215) 
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The  obvious  impasse  here  is  resolved  only  if  we  locate  the  necessary  insight  and  rational 
conviction,  not  in  the  individual  subject,  but  rather  in  a  jointly  accessible  public  sphere.  The 
rational  validation  of  norms  is  then  seen  to  take  place  not  within  the  mind,  but  instead 
communicatively  in  the  objectively  accessible  public  world  of  discourse;  that  is,  in  language. 
On  Habermas'  view  of  things  (U)  effectively  underlies  all  our  moral  claims;  it  is  a 
universal  moral  principle  (not  merely  a  local  product  of  late  modernity).  He  offers  a 
transcendental  justification  of  discourse  ethics12,  designed  to  show  that  it  is  implicit  in  certain 
presuppositions  of  argument,  which  anyone  who  engages  in  argument  must  be  committed  to, 
insofar  as  their  denial  would  entail  performative  contradiction: 
Every  person  who  accepts  the  universal  and  necessary  communicative 
presuppositions  of  argumentative  speech  and  who  knows  what  it  means  to 
justify  a  norm  of  action  implicitly  presupposes  as  valid  the  principle  of 
universalization,  whether  in  the  form  I  gave  it  above  or  in  an  equivalent 
form.  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  86) 
Habermas'  transcendental-pragmatic  justification  of  (U)  does  not  constitute  proof  or  ultimate 
justification  of  discourse  ethics.  Rather,  it  locates  discourse  ethics  "among  the  reconstructive 
sciences  concerned  with  the  rational  bases  of  knowing,  speaking,  and  acting"  (Habermas, 
1983,  p.  98).  It'provides  a  transcendental  justification  of  the  intersubjective  basis  of  moral 
objectivity  and  knowledge,  that  reflects  Davidson's  transcendental  justification  of  the 
intersubjective  basis  of  all  knowledge  and  objectivity  in  general.  Habermas'  discourse  ethics 
extends  a  Davidsonian  truth  conditional  semantics  to  the  moral  domain.  For  Habermas, 
understanding  any  utterance,  including  a  moral  claim,  means  understanding  how  the 
utterance's  claim  to  validity  could  be  redeemed  with  reasons:  We  understand  the  meaning 
of  any  speech  act  "when  we  know  the  conditions  under  which  it  can  be  accepted  as  valid" 
(Habermas,  1985a,  p.  313).  He  treats  normative  claims  to  validity  as  "analogous  to  truth 
claims"  (1983,  p.  56),  and  associates  understanding  and  meaning  with  intersubjective 
agreement: 
"We  understand  a  speech  act  when  we  know  what  makes  it  acceptable.  ...  A 
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speech  act  may  be  called  "acceptable"  if  it  satisfies  the  conditions  that  are 
necessary  in  order  that  the  hearer  be  allowed  to  take  a  "yes"  position  on  the 
claim  raised  by  the  speaker.  These  conditions  can  not  be  satisfied  one-sidedly, 
either  relative  to  the  speaker  or  to  the  hearer.  They  are  rather  conditions  for 
the  intersubjective  recognition  of  a  linguistic  claim,  which,  in  a  way  typical 
of  a  given  class  of  speech  acts  grounds  a  specified  agreement  concerning 
obligations  relevant  to  the  sequel  of  interaction.  " 
(Habermas,  1981a,  pp.  297-298) 
This  truth/validity  conditional  approach  to  meaning  "gives  center  stage  to  the  relation 
between  sentence  and  state  of  affairs,  between  language  and  the  world"  (labermas,  1981  a, 
p.  276);  for  both  Davidson  and  Habermas  meaning  can  not  be  separated  from  context;  context 
determines  content: 
"Thus  the  interpreter  cannot  become  clear  about  the  semantic  content  of  an 
expression  independently  of  the  action  contexts  in  which  participants  react  to 
the  expression  in  question  with  a  "yes"  or  a  "no"  or  an  abstention.  And  he 
does  not  understand  these  yes/no  positions  if  he  cannot  make  clear  to  himself 
the  implicit  reasons  that  move  the  participants  to  take  the  positions  they  do.  " 
(Habermas,  1981a,  pp.  115-116) 
For  Habermas,  understanding  any  utterance,  including  a  moral  claim,  thus  requires  that  the 
interpreter  grasp  the  reasons  that  the  speaker  would  use  to  defend  its  validity.  Recognising 
reasons  is  not  something  that  can  be  done  in  the  attitude  of  the  third  person,  it  requires  that 
the  interpreter  take  a  performative  attitude;  Understanding  reasons,  inevitably  draws  the 
interpreter  into  the  process  of  assessing  their  validity.  In  taking  such  an  evaluative  stance,  the 
interpreter  can  not  avoid  applying  her  own  standards  of  judgement  (Habermas,  1981  a,  p.  116): 
"From  the  perspective  of  a  participant,  however  one's  own  rationality 
standards  must  always  claim  general  validity;  this  claim  to  general  validity 
can  be  restricted  only  subsequently,  from  the  perspective  of  a  third  person.  In 
short,  the  interpretive  reconstruction  of  reasons  makes  it  necessary  for  us  to 
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place  "their"  standards  in  relation  to  "ours,  "  so  that  in  the  case  of  a 
contradiction  we  either  revise  our  preconceptions  or  relativize  "their" 
standards  or  rationality  against  "ours.  " 
(Habermas,  1985b,  p.  204) 
The  interpretive  principle  of  charity  then  clearly  underpins  the  Habermasian  approach  to 
meaning  and  understanding.  The  Habermasian  model  of  rational  interpretation  can  be  viewed 
as  essentially  a  "modification"  of  the  rationalist  analysis  of  meaning  and  interpretation 
offered  by  Davidson.  Like  Davidson,  he  argues  that  participants  engaged  in  the  process  of 
reaching  for  understanding  must  operate  on  the  assumption  that  that  they  share  certain 
standards  of  communicative  rationality  and  many  basic  beliefs  and  common  convictions 
about  the  world,  including  their  shared  lifeworld.  It  is  only  against  this  background  of  shared 
belief  -  this  conservative  counterweight  -  that  disagreement  can  be  identified: 
"...  the  rational  potential  of  speech  is interwoven  with  the  resources  of  any 
particular  given  lifeworld.  To  the  extent  that  the  lifeworld  fulfils  the  resource 
function,  it  has  the  character  of  an  intuitive,  unshakeably  certain,  and  holistic 
knowledge,  which  cannot  be  made  problematic  at  will  -  and  in  this  respect  it 
does  not  represent  "knowledge"  in  any  strict  sense  of  the  word.  This  amalgam 
of  background  assumptions,  solidarities,  and  skills  bred  through  socialization 
constitutes  a  conservative  counterweight  against  the  risk  of  dissent  inherent 
in  processes  of  reaching  understanding  that  work  through  validity  claims.  " 
(Habermas,  1985a,  p.  326) 
The  principle  of  charity  constrains  the  participants,  entering  the  communicative  process  of 
trying  to  establish  what  is  true  or  morally  right,  to  interpret  the  contributions  of  other 
participants,  in  accordance  with  their  own  beliefs  and  standards  of  judgement  -  so  as  to 
optimise  agreement.  The  attribution  of  meaning  is  always  constrained  by  the  interpreter's 
appreciation  of  context  and  her  evaluations  of  truth  and  falsity. 
Habermas  recognises  that  the  evaluative  element  integral  to  his  model  of  interpretive 
understanding  "places  the  usual  type  of  objectivity  of  knowledge  in  question"  (Habermas, 
1981a,  p.  116).  Nevertheless  he  argues  that  "objectivity  of  understanding"  can  be  reconciled 
122 Chapter  3:  Objectivity  in  Accounting  -  The  Case  of  Deferred  Tax 
with  the  "performative  attitude  of  one  who  participates  in  a  process  of  reaching 
understanding"  (Habermas,  1981  a,  p.  112).  Like  Davidson,  Habermas  takes  the  view  that 
ultimately  objectivity  can  have  a  foundation  in  intersubjectivity.  He  argues  that  the 
conditions  for  objective  understanding  exist  within  the  "general  structures  of  the  processes 
of  reaching  understanding"  (Habermas,  1981a,  p.  123).  That  is,  he  sees  the  possibility  of 
objectivity  attained  through  reflection  and  critique  as  integral  to  the  universal  structures  of 
communicative  action.  The  adoption  of  the  interpretive  approach  does  not  force  the 
interpreter  to  abandon  all  "reflective  self-control"  -  on  the  contrary  the  criteria  for  reflective 
self-control  are  derived  from  the  rationality  implicit  in  communication: 
"(T)he  most  general  structures  of  communication  that  speaking  and  acting 
subjects  have  learned  to  master  not  only  open  up  access  to  specific  contexts 
which  draw  participants  passively  -  so  it  may  seem  at  first  -  under  the  spell 
of  the  merely  particular.  These  same  structures  also  simultaneously  provide 
the  critical  means  to  transcend  it;  the  means,  if  need  be,  to  push  beyond  a  de 
facto  established  consensus,  to  revise  errors,  correct  misunderstandings,  and 
the  like.  The  same  structures  that  make  it  possible  to  reach  an  understanding 
also  provide  for  the  possibility  of  reflective  self-control  of  this  process.  " 
(Habermas,  1981  a,  pp.  120-121) 
On  Habermas'  view,  the  general/universal  structures  of  communicative  action  are  procedural, 
rather  than  substantive.  They  are  the  procedural  principles  associated  with  the  ideal  of 
uncoerced  consensus,  which  itself  can  claim  a  necessity  and  universality,  because  it  is 
presupposed  by  any  "effort  to  formulate,  communicate,  and  vindicate  a  view"  (Hoy,  1994, 
p.  176).  As  we  have  seen,  for  Habermas  moral  rightness,  meaning,  and  validity  and  are  all  tied 
to  uncoerced  rational  consensus:  That  is,  to  communicatively  achieved,  rather  than 
instrumentally  or  strategically  imposed,  agreement  on  validity  claims  that  are  "in  principle 
criticizable"  (Habermas,  1981  a,  p.  287). 
Taken  together,  the  principle  of  charity,  the  ideal  of  uncoerced  consensus,  and  the 
notion  that  "the  possible  correctives  for  confused  communicative  experiences  are,  so  to 
speak,  built  into  communicative  action  itself'  (Habermas,  1981a,  p.  123),  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  we  can  enter  real  practical  discourse  with  a  reasonable  expectation  of  rational 
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convergence.  At  the  generalizable  /  moral  level,  but  not  ethical,  we  can  rationally  hope  for 
convergence  guided  by  the  critical  potential  of  communicative  action  and  by  the  way  our 
lifeworld  is:  We  can  reasonably  aspire  to  objectivity  in  moral  questions,  concerning  issues 
of  justice,  fairness  and  the  validity  of  normative  claims". 
The  application  of  discourse  ethics  to  accounting  standard  setting 
Discourse  ethics  makes  high  demands:  Ideally  the  disputants  seeking  to  validate  a  norm,  or 
decision,  must  engage  in  a  full  exchange  of  arguments  which  excludes  no  affected  parties  nor 
any  relevant  considerations.  External  and  internal  coercive  pressures  must  be  removed  so  that 
the  parties,  standing  back  from  the  pressures  of  action,  can  achieve  a  reflective  detachment 
and  participate  in  a  reciprocal  perspective  sharing.  The  ideal  is  clearly  essentially 
counterfactual:  It  will  almost  always  be  impossible  to  obtain  complete  participation  in  debate 
or  complete  rational  consensus  in  judgment.  In  moral  argument  there  will  always  be  a 
"tension  between  facticity  and  validity"  (Habermas,  1992,  p.  23):  We  must  recognize  that 
every  actual  discourse  is  fallible  yet  hold  onto  (U)  as  a  regulative  ideal.  In  the  case  of 
argument  concerning  accounting  standards  /  norms,  for  example,  it  will  never  be  possible  to 
identify,  and  include  in  debate,  all  the  parties  that  might  possibly  be  affected  by  an 
accounting  regulation  -  if  only  because  the  effects  of  regulation  are  likely  to  persist  into 
future  `generations'.  In  addition,  perfectly  reasonable  time  and  resource  constraints  will 
almost  always  place  limits  on  the  debate.  It  will,  for  example,  normally  be  necessary  to 
implement  procedures  designed  to  close  discussion  and  secure  a  clear  decision  prior  to  the 
attainment  of  full  consensus.  In  our  discussion  of  deferred  tax  we  saw  that  even  the  small 
group  of  experts  making  up  the  ASB  were  unable  to  reach  full  consensus  -  so  that  the  ASB's 
decision  on  the  issue  was  based  on  a  majority  vote.  Other  obvious  practical  problems 
associated  with  the  implementation  of  discourse  ethics  include  the  difficulties  associated  with 
the  interpretation  of  interests,  the  overcoming  of  power  differentials,  and  the  practicality  of 
reciprocal  perspective  taking. 
The  inevitable  tension  between  the  ideal  and  the  reality  of  practical  discourse  does 
not  destroy  the  validity  or  utility  of  the  principles  of  discourse  ethics:  "the  counterfactual  idea 
that  a  norm  deserves  universal  assent  is  by  no  means  absorbed  and  neutralized  by  the  facticity 
that  attends  the  legal  institutionalization  of  public  discourse"  (Habermas,  1994,  p.  459). 
Indeed,  our  confidence  in  the  rationality  of  a  consensus  must  in  large  part  be  based  on 
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assessment  of  the  quality  of  the  institutions  generating  the  consensus.  Confidence  in  the 
validity  of  a  norm  cannot  properly  be  primarily  based  on  its  substantive  supporting 
arguments  nor  on  the  fullness  of  the  consensus  backing  it.  Ultimately  confidence  in  the 
validity  of  a  norm  must  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  the  consensus  supporting  it  has  been 
generated  through  procedures  that  meet  the  demands  of  discourse  ethics.  Confidence  in  the 
rationality  of  a  consensus  must  rest  on  the  quality,  the  depth  and  breadth,  of  the  process  of 
reciprocal  perspective  taking  out  of  which  the  consensus  emerges,  which  in  turn  depends  on, 
and  can  only  be  assessed  in  terms  of,  the  procedures  adopted.  Given  the  high  demands  of  the 
principle  of  universalization  (U),  it  is  only  likely  to  be  approximated  in  certain  contexts, 
including  legal  and  political  settings,  where  something  like  it  is  deliberately  institutionalized. 
Accounting  standard  have,  in  effect,  a  quasi-legal  status,  and  may  obtain  legitimacy 
from  their  `legality'.  For  Habermas,  "the  legitimacy  of  legality  is  due  to  the  interlocking  of 
two  types  of  procedures,  namely,  of  legal  processes  with  processes  of  moral  argumentation" 
(1988,  p.  230).  Accounting  standards  may  thus  obtain  a  'legal'  legitimacy  when  produced  and 
applied  through  such  mutually  supporting  procedures.  That  is,  when  validated  through 
processes  of  moral  argumentation  that  are  supported  by  quasi-legal  processes  that  create  and 
protect  the  space  and  structures  within  which  the  processes  of  moral  argumentation  can 
operate.  Both  types  of  procedure  are  identifiable  in  existing  accounting  standard  setting 
regimes.  The  quasi-legal  component  is  institutionalized  in  those  procedures  for  public 
consultation,  including  the  publication  of  discussion  papers  and  exposure  drafts  that,  invite 
wide  participation  in  debate.  It  is  also  present  in  procedures,  such  as  majority  voting,  that 
may  be  used  to  bring  debate  to  a  conclusion  in  circumstances  where  full  rational  consensus 
can  not  be  attained.  The  component  of  moral  argumentation  is  found  in  the  debate  and 
analysis,  the  perspective  sharing,  and  the  generation  of  moral  insight  prior  to  the  finalization 
of  decisions/votes.  That  is;  in  the  analysis  of  the  content  of  comment  letters  received  on 
proposals,  in  the  public  hearings  and  open  debate  on  proposals,  and  in  the  process  of 
reciprocal  perspective  taking  achieved  (in  part)  through  the  impartial  consideration  of 
arguments  by  the  Board  (acting  as  judge).  In  accounting  standard  setting  we  find  some 
reflection  of  the  sophisticated  procedures  employed  by  the  courts  in  their  efforts  to  instantiate 
the  idealisations  of  impartiality  in  very  difficult  circumstances.  We  see,  in  particular,  a 
parallel  between  the  processes  of  accounting  standard  setting  and  the  adversarial  judge  and 
jury  system.  That  system  itself  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  break  down  the  requirements  of 
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rational  discourse  into  two  elements;  the  full  exchange  of  best  arguments  and  reciprocal 
perspective  taking  "artfully  approximated  by  a  division  of  labor  (between  disputants  and 
jury)"  (Rehg,  1997,  p.  226). 
Accounting  standard  setters  plainly  seek  to  obtain  for  their  output  the  legitimacy 
associated  with  legality  and  democracy  in  our  society.  They  are  concerned  that  accounting 
standards  are  seen  to  be  the  outcome  of  a  `due  process'  that  includes  the  wide  exposure  of 
proposals  and  active  debate.  Nevertheless,  our  examination  of  the  deferred  tax  `debate' 
suggest  that  the  actuality  of  standard  setting  procedures  in  the  UK  fails  even  to  broadly 
approximate  an  institutionalization  of  (U).  Indeed  the  actuality  of  UK  standard  setting  falls 
so  far  short  of  the  discourse  ethics  ideal  that,  in  effect,  the  standards  produced  have  no  moral 
validity  /  legitimacy.  Almost  all  of  the  respondents  to  exposure  drafts  are  drawn  from  very 
narrow  constituencies;  accountants,  preparers  of  accounts,  and  investors.  The  procedures  of 
UK  accounting  standard  setting  do  not  succeed  in  drawing  representatives  of  all  affected 
groups  into  debate.  External  pressures  and  forces,  other  than  the  force  of  the  better  argument, 
play  a  significant  role  in  the  determination  of  standards.  And  the  extent  to  which  member  of 
the  ASB  are  capable  of  overcoming  those  pressures  and  their  own  biases,  and  acting 
impartially  as  `judges'  in  a  effective  simulation  of  reciprocal  perspective  taking  is  clearly 
limited.  UK  accounting  standards  seem  to  be  determined  by  instrumental  and  strategic 
considerations  and  certainly  not  by  the  development  of  rational  consensus  /  convergence. 
We  have  concentrated,  in  this  section  of  the  paper,  on  the  moral  dimension  of 
accounting  regulations;  we  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  accounting  regulations  can  properly 
be  reduced  to  moral  norms  alone.  There  is  clearly  a  technical-pragmatic,  or  instrumental, 
dimension  to  financial  reporting  and  accounting  regulation.  The  legitimacy  of  accounting 
regulations,  as  quasi-legal  norms,  involves  more  than  the  approximation  of  standard  setting 
procedures  to  moral  idealizations:  "the  more  complex  validity  dimensions  of  legal  norms 
prohibits  one  from  assimilating  the  legitimacy  of  legal  decisions  to  the  validity  of  moral 
judgments"  (Habermas,  1992,  p.  233).  Technical-pragmatic,  and  ethical  (as  distinct  from 
moral)  issues  and  discourses  will  also  bear  on  the  validity  of  accounting  standards. 
Nevertheless,  the  moral  dimension  of  accounting  standards  /  norms  requires  that  their 
legitimation  be  based  on  principles  of  impartiality  and  democracy.  Ultimately  the 
legitimation  of  accounting  standards  must  be  primarily  secured  through  institutionalization 
of  the  broad  based  discourse  principle:  "that  the  only  regulations  and  ways  of  acting  that  can 
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claim  legitimacy  are  those  to  which  all  who  are  possibly  affected  could  assent  as  participants 
in  rational  discourse"  (Habermas,  1994,  p.  459). 
Conclusion;  objectivity  and  conceptual  frameworks 
The  Habermasian  view  of  objectivity  clearly  resonates  with  Davidson  and  Williams' 
association  of  objectivity  with  intersubjectivity  and  convergence.  Together,  these  views 
suggest  that  if  objectivity  is  to  be  retained  as  a  useful  ideal  in  accounting  it  must  be 
substantially  reconceived.  The  dominant,  but  ultimately  unintelligible,  representationalist 
view  that  makes  objectivity  synonymous  with  truth  as  correspondence,  must  give  way  to  a 
conception  of  objectivity  as  intersubjectivity  or  solidarity.  As  an  ideal  objectivity  becomes 
"simply  the  desire  for  as  much  intersubjective  agreement  as  possible,  the  desire  to  extend  the 
reference  of  "us"  as  far  as  we  can"  (Rorty,  1991,  p.  22-23).  On  this  antirepresentationalist 
view,  the  pursuit  of  objectivity  must  be  construed  in  terms  of  a  "de-parochialization"  of 
inquiry  and  a  disciplined  search  for  "rational  consensus"  or  "unforced  agreement",  that  is, 
as  an  ongoing  critical  process  involving  the  collision  of  rival  viewpoints.  Objectivity  can  not 
require  disinterestedness  or  emptiness;  we  are  necessarily  ethnocentric  and  "must  work  by 
our  own  lights"  (Rorty,  1991,  p.  38).  However,  it  does  require  that  we  exercise  sufficient 
detachment  from  our  own  commitments  to  motivate  critical  reflection  upon  them  and  to 
ensure  their  openness  to  the  test  of  alternative  perspectives.  The  possibility  of  progress, 
beyond  our  local  perspective,  to  more  objective  concepts  then  lies  not  in  the  uncovering  of 
predeterminate  truths  but  in  openness  to  the  Other  in  debate.  It  requires  that  we  maximise 
reciprocal  perspective  taking  and  empathy,  which  in  turn  demands  that  we  adopt  procedures 
that  bring  to  our  debate  knowledge  of  the  interests  and  values  of  all  the  parties  affected  by 
the  issue  being  considered. 
From  the,  thoroughly  intersubjective,  perspective  of  discourse  ethics,  the  demands 
of  justice  and  solidarity,  individual  interests  and  the  common  good,  appear  as  inextricably 
interrelated:  "solidarity  is  simply  the  reverse  side  of  justice"  (Habermas,  1996,  p.  29).  The 
framework  of  norms  developed  through  a  communicative  process  that  makes  the  interests  of 
each  individual  the  concern  of  all,  sustains  a  cooperative  lifeworid  which  provides 
indispensable  resources  and  space  for  individual  social  development  and  self-realisation.  The 
antirepresentationalist  perspective  forces  us  to  recognise  ourselves,  our  communities,  and  our 
institutions  including  financial  accounting  as  in  constant  process  of  re-invention,  through 
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discourse,  labour,  and  struggle:  "every  conjunctural  foundation,  all  vocabularies  and  all 
forms  of  practical  reasoning  become  open  to  question"  (Daly,  1994,  p.  180).  It  thus  forces  us 
towards  the  political;  ethics  and  politics  take  priority  over  epistemology. 
A  conceptual  framework  project  for  financial  accounting  could  help  make  accounting 
more  open  to  critical  reflection  and  intersubjective  critique,  and  thereby  more  objective.  Such 
a  project  might  serve  as  a  valuable  catalyst  for  self-critical  debate  and  reflection  by  helping 
to  make  the  basic  presuppositions  and  commitments  of  financial  reporting  clear  and  open  for 
debate.  A  conceptual  framework  project  might  also  provide  a  forum  where  voices  not 
normally  included  in  accounting  debate  might  be  welcomed  and  listened  to.  Only  through 
the  encouragement  of  open  dialogue  and  critique  can  accountants  hope  to  transcend  their 
acculturation  and  develop  more  objective  and  socially  useful  accounts.  Unfortunately,  the 
ASB's  Statement  of  Principles  project  does  not  seem  to  be  designed  to  stimulate  real 
intersubjective  critical  engagement.  At  least  four  factors  indicate  the  misguided  nature  of  the 
ASB's  conceptual  framework  project:  Firstly,  it  plainly  clings  onto  a  conception  of 
"objectivity  as  correspondence"  and  a  related  rhetoric  of  representational  faithfulness.  For 
the  ASB  a  transaction  is  faithfully  represented  in  financial  statements  when  "the  way  in 
which  it  is  recognised,  measured  and  presented  in  those  statements  corresponds  closely  to  the 
effect  of  that  transaction  or  event"  (ASB,  1999a,  para.  3.10).  By  hanging  onto  objectivity  as 
correspondence  the  ASB  is  able  to  avoid  facing  up  to  the  questions  that  would  follow  from 
clear  recognition  that  there  is  no  way  that  things  are  -  independent  of  the  community  of 
minds: 
"If  one  reinterprets  objectivity  as  intersubjectivity,  or  as  solidarity,  ...  then  one 
will  drop  the  question  of  how  to  get  in  touch  with  "mind-independent  and 
language-independent"  reality.  "  One  will  replace  it  with  questions  like  "what 
are  the  limits  of  our  community?  Are  our  encounters  sufficiently  free  and 
open?  Has  what  we  have  recently  gained  in  solidarity  cost  us  our  ability  to 
listen  to  outsiders  who  are  suffering?  To  outsiders  who  have  new  ideas?  " 
(Rorty,  1991,  p.  13) 
Secondly,  it  is  clear  that  the  ASB  primarily  conceive  of  their  conceptual  framework  project 
as  an  effort  to  set  down,  or  fix,  a  framework  which  will  guide  (in  a  deductive  fashion)  future 
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decision  making  (see,  ASB,  1999a,  introduction,  para.  1-4).  Rather  than  see  the  framework 
project  as  part  of  an  essentially  ongoing  process  of  self-reflection  and  intersubjective 
exchange,  the  ASB  hope  that  their  framework  will  enable  the  development  of  standards  on 
a  consistent  basis  "by  reducing  the  need  to  debate  fundamental  issues"  (ASB,  1999a, 
introduction,  para.  3).  Rather  than  see  the  framework  project  as  a  focus  and  provocation  for 
continuing  dialogue  and  debate,  the  Board  fall  into  the  mistake  of  presuming  that  a 
conceptual  framework  must  either  be  "deductive  or  defective".  The  Board  implicitly  assume 
that  to  be  operational  in  the  required  sense  a  conceptual  framework  must  "provide  a  set  of 
axioms  from  which  the  standard  setters  can  logically  derive  standards  without  appeal  to 
processes  of  debate"  (Power,  1993,  p.  47-48).  By  conceiving  of  their  conceptual  framework 
as  standing  "outside  practice,  i.  e.  as  a  fixed  ahistorical  construct  from  which  accounting 
standards  can  be  derived  deductively"  (Power,  1994,  pp.  54-55),  the  Board  fundamentally 
misconstrue  the  possibilities  for  a  conceptual  framework.  We  agree,  with  Power,  that  a 
conceptual  framework  should  not  be  thought  of  as  an:  "ultimate  foundation  in  any  classical 
sense  but  a  point  of  reference  in  the  network  of  accounting  standards  and  practices  that  serves 
to  'organize'  thinking  about  them"  (Power,  1994,  p.  53).  The  ASB  fail  to  see  that  the  primary 
value  of  a  conceptual  framework  project  lies  in  the  contribution  it  may  make  to  ongoing 
dialogue  and  debate;  openness  rather  than  closure  on  a  set  of  axioms  should  be  the  goal  of 
a  conceptual  framework  project. 
The  third  problem  with  the  ASB's  conceptual  framework  project  is  that  it  failed  to 
incite  broadly  based  intersubjective  engagement.  It  has  not  made  itself  open  to  radically 
competing  viewpoints,  and  has  provoked  very  little  involvement  of  the  wider  public  in  the 
accounting  debate.  Analysis  of  comment  of  the  ASB's  draft  Statement  of  Principles  (see,  e.  g., 
McKeman  &  O'Donnell,  1998)  shows  that  participation  in  the  debate  instigated  by  the  ASB's 
project  was  essentially  confined  to  accountants,  auditors,  preparers  of  financial  statements 
and  representatives  of  investors.  Finally,  it  draws  its  inspiration  from  narrow  streams  of 
thought  -  it  is  highly  derivative  of  the  FASB's  conceptual  framework  project  of  the  1970's, 
and  does  little  to  expand  the  accounting  imagination  -  it  provides  us  with  no  "new  candidates 
for  belief  and  desire  phrased  in  new  vocabularies"  (Rorty,  1991,  p.  14).  The  ASB's  project 
perpetuates  an  unexamined  privileging  of  the  position  of  the  investor  as  user  of  financial 
statements.  It  allows  no  space  or  purchase  to  new  ideas  and  gives  no  encouragement  to  other 
voices.  Rather  than  enable  progress  in  financial  reporting  it  entrenches  the  status  quo: 
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"We  can  only  hope  to  transcend  our  acculturation  if  our  culture  contains  (or 
thanks  to  disruptions  from  outside  or  internal  revolt,  comes  to  contain)  splits 
which  supply  toeholds  for  new  initiatives.  Without  such  splits  -  without 
tensions  which  make  people  listen  to  unfamiliar  ideas  in  the  hope  of  finding 
means  of  overcoming  those  tensions  -  there  is  no  such  hope.  " 
(Rorty,  1991,  p.  13-14) 
The  ASB's  project  provides  UK  accounting  with  no  basis  for  growth,  through  transcendence 
of  our  acculturation.  It  can  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  to  repel  "disruption  from  the  outside", 
and  suppress  "internal  revolt"  -a  defense  at  the  level  of  concepts  against  disorder, 
contradiction,  and  most  of  all  against  competing  perspectives.  The  straightjacket  of  an  expert 
search  for  "correspondence"  continues  to  impede  the  expansion  of  the  accounting 
imagination  and  the  development  of  accounting  objectivity.  The  accounting  community  does 
not  yet  seem  to  have  found  a  way  of  "avoiding  the  disadvantages  of  ethnocentrism".  We  must 
find  ways  of  expanding  our  communality  if  we  are  to  expand  the  possibilities  of  accounting 
thought  and  knowledge:  "There  are  no  definite  limits  to  how  far  dialogue  can  or  will  take  us" 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  165). 
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In  chapter  2  we  used  Davidson's  work  to  justify  the  possibility  of  truth  and  objectivity  in 
accounting.  Our  intention  there  was  to  defend  the  possibility  of  a  rational  accounting  against 
those  "totalized  critiques"  of  reason  which  have  featured  prominently  in  the  critical 
accounting  literature  in  recent  decades.  In  that  chapter  we  defended  accounting's  potential 
for  descriptive  objectivity;  its  latent  capacity  to  provide  true  accounts  of  the  objective  reality 
we  share,  and  we  take  the  view  that  in  principle,  at  least,  the  rationality  crisis  facing 
accounting  can  be  over  come.  We  regard  the  possession  of  true  descriptions  /  accounts  of 
objects  and  events  in  the  world  as  a  necessary  component  of  rationality.  Only  on  the  basis 
of  knowledge  of  present  conditions  and  relationships  can  we  reasonably  expect  to  be  able  to 
orchestrate  action  so  as  to  achieve  desired  ends.  Clearly,  the  rationality  involved  here  is 
primarily  an  instrumental  or  purposive  rationality,  concerned  with  the  effective  and  efficient 
relations  between  means  and  ends. 
We  recognize,  however,  that  the  full  emancipatory  potential  of  financial  reporting 
cannot  properly  be  conceived  of  in  narrowly  instrumental  terms,  and  we  see  the  moral  and 
descriptive  dimensions  of  accounting  as  inextricably  entangled.  In  chapter  3  we  argued  that 
the  crisis  of  legitimacy  that  faces  financial  accounting  might,  in  principle,  be  overcome 
through  the  application  of  Habermasian  discourse  ethics.  We  take  the  view  that  it  is  only 
through  communicative  rationality  that  the  full  emancipatory  potential  of  financial  reporting 
can  be  realized.  Our  emphasis  in  chapter  4  is  on  defending  the  role  of  communicative  reason 
in  the  domain  of  financial  reporting.  The  defence  here  is  against  those  theorists,  including 
those  of  emotivist  and  scientistic  hue,  who  would  be  inclined  to  reduce  rationality  to 
instrumental  rationality  and  objectivity  to  descriptive  objectivity,  and  thereby  place  the 
normative  beyond  any  rational  determination  and  consequently  beyond  any  rationally  based 
objectivity. 
On  the  Habermasian  view  of  the  evolution  of  society,  introduced  in  chapter  1,  the 
transition  to  modernity  is  marked  by  a  struggle  between  reason  and  the  other  of  reason, 
represented  by  tradition.  Modernity  itself,  in  contrast,  is  characterized  by  a  tension  between 
the  instrumental  and  communicative  modes  of  reason.  That  tension  in  modernity  is  reflected 
in  the  contest  between  the  systemic  and  the  communicative  integration  /  coordination  of 
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society.  As  modernity  progresses  there  is  a  tendency  for  the  instrumental  rationality  of  the 
system  to  turn  back  upon  the  lifeworld  and  supplant  the  communicative  rationality  upon 
which  it  relies.  In  modernity  the  moral  dimension  of  accounting  can  no  longer  draw  powerful 
motivating  force  from  tradition,  but  in  principle,  as  we  argued  in  chapter  3,  it  can  have  a 
strong  and  objective  basis  in  communicative  rationality.  Yet  as  modernity  develops  there  is 
a  tendency  for  institutions  like  financial  accounting  to  be  increasingly  dominated  by  expertise 
and  instrumental  reason  and  for  the  moral  issues  and  communicative  reason  to  be 
progressively  marginalized.  If  accounting  is  to  fulfil  its  emancipatory  promise  and  serve  as 
a  means  by  which  the  lifeworld  may come  to  exercise  some  normative  control  over  the 
colonizing  depredations  of  the  system,  in  capitalist  modernity,  it  must  itself  secure  its  moral 
foundations  in  the  lifeworld  through  communicative  reason. 
The  colonization  of  the  lifeworld  meets  little  resistance  primarily  because  the 
rationalization  of  the  lifeworld  is  associated  with  its  "differentiation";  it  is  accompanied  by 
the  rise  of  expert  cultures  and  the  segmentation  of  the  lifeworld  into  fields  of  knowledge  and 
expertise  -  science  and  production,  art  and  aesthetics,  morality  and  law.  Because  the  expertise 
and  knowledge  accumulated  in  the  separate  spheres  is  not  integrated,  and  because  the 
separate  spheres  develop  their  own  technical  vocabularies,  there  is  no  common 
consciousness,  no  synthesised  position,  from  which  colonisation  can  be  effectively  resisted. 
In  this  chapter  we  use  Habermas'  reconstruction  of  the  moral  point  of  view  in  communicative 
rationality  to  resist  the  collapse  of  reason  in  accounting  to  instrumental  reason  and  of 
objectivity  in  accounting  to  descriptive  objectivity.  We  defend  the  possibility  of  normative 
objectivity  in  accounting  against  those  accounting  theorists,  exemplified  for  us  by  Shapiro 
(1997  &  1998),  who  seem  to  conceive  of  the  moral  dimension  of  financial  reporting,  in  so 
far  as  they  recognize  it  at  all,  as  standing  beyond  any  rational  validation.  We  object  to  the 
view  that  somehow  the  moral  and  descriptive  dimensions  of  accounting  can  be  neatly 
separated  and  that  the  accountants'  role  can  properly  be  understood  in  terms  of  an  application 
of  a  neutral  expertise  and  instrumental  rationality;  means  in  the  service  of  ends  that  lie 
beyond  rational  adjudication. 
An  important  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  consolidate  the  analysis  of  objectivity  as 
intersubjectivity  in  accounting  that  we  have  outlined  in  previous  chapters.  This  chapter  is 
therefore  entirely  underwritten  by  our  conviction  that  objectivity  can  have  no  other 
foundation  than  intersubjectivity  and  it  contains  a  restatement  of  our  commitment  to  a 
132 Preamble  to  chapter  4:  Validity  in  Accounting  Standard  Setting  and  the  Presuppositions  of  External  Financial 
Reporting 
Davidsonian  view  of  the  possibility  of  descriptive  objectivity  and  to  a  Habermasian  view  of 
the  possibility  of  normative  objectivity.  The  main  body  of  the  chapter  consists  in  the 
development  of  a  critique  of  scientistic  analysis  of  the  presuppositions  of  external  financial 
reporting  and  maxims  of  rational  argument  in  accounting  debate  advanced  by  Shapiro  (1997 
&  1998).  We  use  Shapiro's  instrumentalist  conception  of  the  limits  of  rationality  in  financial 
reporting  as  a  counterpoint  to  our  own  view  of  the  foundations  of  financial  reporting  and  the 
possibility  of  validity  in  accounting  standard  setting.  We  thereby  hope  to  contribute  to  a 
clarification  of  what  is  at  stake  in  debates  concerning  truth,  objectivity  and  validity  in 
accounting  and  accounting  standard  setting. 
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Introduction 
This  chapter  defends  the  possibility  of  objectivity  and  rationality  in  accounting  and 
accounting  standard  setting.  The  philosopher  Donald  Davidson's  analysis  of  radical 
interpretation  is  used  to  defend  the  view  that  in  accounting  we  can  have  cognitive  objectivity, 
that  is,  knowledge  of  an  objective  publicly  accessible  world.  And  Jürgen  Habermas'  work 
on  communicative  rationality,  and  in  particular  his  analysis  of  discourse  ethics,  is  used  to 
resist  the  collapse  of  reason  in  accounting  to  instrumental  reason,  and  to  defend  the  view  that 
the  normative  component  of  accounting  could,  in  the  right  conditions,  attain  an  objective 
validity.  For  both  Davidson  and  Habermas  intersubjectivity  and  the  power  of  reason  is  all  the 
foundation  we  need,  or  can  have,  to  ground  claims  to  descriptive  and  normative  objectivity. 
In  two  recent  papers  Shapiro  (1997,1998)  has  set  out  his  views  on  the 
presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting  and  on  the  principles  of  rational  argument  in 
accounting  debate.  This  chapter  responds  to  Shapiro's  recognition  of  the  need  for  further 
debate  on  these  issues  and  to  his  suggestion  that  those  who  disagree  with  the  views  he 
presents,  ought  to  articulate  and  defend  their  own  thinking  on  these  matters  (Shapiro,  1997, 
p.  183).  We  disagree  with  much  of  Shapiro's  analysis,  and  find  in  the  framework  of 
presuppositions  and  maxims  that  he  provides  a  natural  counterpoint  to  our  own  views. 
Whilst  we  share  Shapiro's  interest  in  promoting  a  clarification  of  the  philosophical 
bases  of  financial  reporting,  we  have  reservations  concerning  his  view  that  the  identification 
of  our  "common  assumptions  and  definitions"  will  facilitate  sensible  debate.  In  our  view,  the 
search  for  definitions  often  leads  in  essentially  fruitless  circles.  We  should  not  expect  always 
to  be  able  to  define  our  useful  concepts  in  terms  of  other  concepts.  Davidson  treats  the 
concept  of  truth  as  a  primitive,  "beautifully  transparent"  in  comparison  with  the  much  more 
problematic  concepts  such  as  meaning  and  interpretation  which  he  wants  to  illuminate  using 
a  theory  of  truth,  and  he  regards  humanity's  persistent  efforts  to  define  and  analyse  truth  as 
"folly": 
"Let  me  suggest  a  diagnosis  of  our  aporia  about  truth.  We  are  still  under  the 
spell  of  the  Socratic  idea  that  we  must  keep  asking  for  the  essence  of  an  idea, 
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a  significant  analysis  in  other  terms,  an  answer  to  the  question  what  makes 
this  an  act  of  piety,  what  makes  this,  or  any,  utterance,  sentence,  belief,  or 
proposition  true.  We  still  fall  for  the  freshman  fallacy  that  demands  that  we 
define  our  terms  as  a  prelude  to  saying  anything  further  with  or  about  them.  " 
(Davidson,  1996,  p.  275) 
Following  Davidson's  lead,  in  the  analysis  that  follows  we  take  the  concept  of  truth  to  be 
vital  to  the  possibility  of  objective  knowledge  but  refuse  to  engage  in  any  search  for  the 
meaning  of  "truth"  in  accounting'.  Nor  do  we  attempt  to  assemble  any  alternative  synopsis 
of  presuppositions  and  maxims  to  compete  with  Shapiro's. 
The  chapter  consists  of  four  basic  elements:  In  the  first  section  we  offer  an 
antirepresentationalist  view  of  the  possibility  of  objective  accounting  knowledge.  Secondly, 
Shapiro's  essentially  representationalist  analysis  of  the  presuppositions  of  external  financial 
reporting  is  critically  reviewed.  In  the  third  section  of  the  chapter  we  critically  comment  on 
Shapiro's  analysis  of  the  role  of  argument  in  accounting  debate.  We  object  primarily  to  his 
preclusion  of  norms  as  the  subject  of  rational  argument.  In  the  final  part  of  the  chapter  we 
outline  a  Habermasian  view  of  the  ideal  role  of  argument  in  accounting  debate,  and  we  argue 
that,  ideally,  objective  accounting  norms  and  standards  can  be  established  and  validated 
through  rational  argument  and  debate. 
The  intersubjective  foundations  of  epistemological  objectivity 
In  this  part  of  the  chapter  we  outline  our  view  of  the  foundations  of  accounting  knowledge 
and  objectivity.  We  see  no  reason  to  think  that  accounting  knowledge  constitutes,  in  any 
fundamental  way,  a  special  kind  of  knowledge.  Therefore,  we  begin  this  section  by  sketching 
Davidson's  persuasive  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  possibility  of  knowledge  -  of  any  kind. 
We  then  go  on  to  comment,  briefly,  on  the  implications  of  Davidson's  analysis  and  its 
application  to  accounting  knowledge.  The  reader  will  find  that  this  section  repeats,  with 
different  emphasis,  much  of  the  discussion  of  Davidson's  views  contained  in  chapter  2 
of  this  thesis.  Davidson  argues  that  any  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  must 
account  for  the  three  distinct,  but  mutually  interdependent,  kinds  of  knowledge:  knowledge 
of  the  world,  knowledge  of  other  minds,  and  knowledge  of  one's  own  mind.  He  suggests  that 
we  might  think  of  these  three  varieties  of  knowledge  in  terms  of  a  triangle,  resting  on  a  base 
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of  communication  -  the  relation  between  knowledge  of  one's  own  mind  and  knowledge  of 
other  minds.  Davidson  argues  that;  knowledge  clearly  pre-supposes  belief;  that  having  a 
belief  requires  that  we  can  discriminate  between  true  and  false;  and  following  Wittgenstein, 
he  holds  that  the  "source  of  the  concept  of  objective  truth  is  interpersonal  communication" 
(Davidson,  1991,  pp.  156-157).  Davidson  refuses  to  define  truth,  but  he  does  recognize  one 
"intuitive  truth  about  truth",  that  is;  "the  truth  of  an  utterance  depends  on  just  two  things: 
what  the  words  as  spoken  mean,  and  how  the  world  is  arranged"  (Davidson,  1983,  pp.  308- 
309). 
It  seems  that  we  cannot  have  knowledge  without  communication.  But  what  makes 
communication  itself  possible?  How  is  it  possible  for  a  speaker  and  interpreter  to  share  an 
understanding  of  the  meaning  of  the  speaker's  utterances?  It  seems  that  we  need  an  account 
of  the  possibility  of  interpretation.  The  interpreter's  task  is  clear;  she  must  assign  a 
propositional  content  to  each  of  the  speaker's  utterances.  Essentially,  she  must  match  a 
sentence  of  her  own  with  each  of  the  speaker's  sentences.  If  she  "gets  things  right",  her  own 
sentences  will  "provide  the  truth  conditions  of  the  speaker's  sentences"  (Davidson,  1991, 
p.  157)  and  yield  the  meaning  of  the  speaker's  utterances.  But  how  can  the  interpreter 
construct  and  verify  such  a  framework  of  truth  conditions  -a  theory  of  truth  and  meaning  - 
for  the  speaker's  utterances?  What  evidence  is  available?  The  interpreter  clearly  has  no  direct 
access  to  the  detailed  propositional  intentions  or  beliefs  of  the  speaker  -  and  to  assume  that 
she  did  would  be  to  beg  the  question  of  interpretation.  The  interpreter  does,  however,  have 
access  to  the  speaker's  utterances,  and,  Davidson  suggests  that  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that 
she  can  detect  which  utterances  the  speaker  holds  to  be  true  in  particular  circumstances.  A 
speaker  will  hold  an  utterance  to  be  true,  or  false,  in  part  because  of  what  it  means,  and  in 
part  because  of  what  he  believes  to  be  the  case.  If  the  interpreter  aims  to  establish  meanings 
on  the  evidence  of  prompted  assent  or  dissent  (holding  true  or  false)  to  utterances,  she  must 
deal  with  the  problem  of  the  entanglement  of  meaning  and  belief. 
The  separation  of  meaning  and  belief  in  interpretation  is  made  possible  by  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  charity.  The  principle  of  charity  has  two  components  a 
principle  of  correspondence  and  a  principle  of  coherence.  The  principle  of  correspondence 
directs  the  interpreter  to  proceed,  so  far  as  possible,  on  the  basis  that  the  speaker's  utterances 
are  a  response  to  the  same  aspects  of  the  world  that  she  herself  would  respond  to  in  similar 
circumstances.  The  intention  is  to  constrain  belief  so  as  to  allow  a  solution  for  meaning. 
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Whenever  plausibly  possible,  the  interpreter  must  assign  sentences  of  her  own  (truth 
conditions)  to  the  speaker's  sentences  that  make  him  right  -  credit  him  with  true  beliefs  - 
according  to  her  own  view  of  things.  An  interpreter  cannot  build  an  adequate  interpretive 
theory  of  truth  and  meaning  for  the  speaker's  language  by  taking  each  sentence  in  isolation 
and  deciding  upon  an  appropriate  matching  sentence  from  her  own  language  for  it.  Rather 
she  must  build  a  pattern  that  fits  the  evidence  and  respects  the  interlocking  relations  of 
rational  entailment  between  sentences.  The  principle  of  coherence  directs  the  interpreter  to 
assume  a  degree  of  logical  consistency  in  the  speakers  thinking,  that  is,  to  assume  that  the 
speaker  shares  her  standards  of  rationality.  An  adequate  interpretative  theory  of  truth  and 
meaning  for  a  language  is  an  account  of  how  the  speakers'  utterances  hold  together  in  a 
coherent  pattern  which  as  a  whole  fits  and  makes  sense  of  the  speaker's  interaction  with  his 
environment,  as  understood  by  the  interpreter. 
It  is  clear  that  the  process  of  correct  interpretation,  we  have  just  sketched,  relies  on 
"an  interpersonal  standard  of  consistency  and  correspondence"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  158). 
Davidson  argues  that  this  "interpersonal"  standard  is  an  "objective"  standard:  An  interpreter 
and  speaker  will,  no  doubt,  on  occasion  understand  one  another  on  the  basis  of  mistaken 
beliefs,  but  such  cases  "cannot  be  the  rule"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  317).  We  can  be  sure  "that 
our  view  of  the  world  is,  in  its  plainest  features,  largely  correct"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  158).  To 
understand  why  we  should  see  the  interpersonal  standard  as  objective,  we  need  to  go  back 
to  the  triangular  relation  between  knowledge  of  the  world,  knowledge  of  other  minds,  and 
knowledge  of  one's  own  mind.  We  began  this  section  of  the  chapter  by  recognizing  that  all 
thought  and  all  knowledge,  including  knowledge  of  one's  own  mind,  presupposes  beliefs,  and 
that  having  beliefs  presupposes  a  grasp  of  the  concept  of  objective  truth,  which  in  turn 
depends  upon  interpersonal  communication.  We  then  considered  the  process  of 
communication,  construed  as  interpretation,  and  found  that  it  required  that  the  interpreter  be 
able  to  find  regularities  in  the  (verbal)  behaviour  of  the  speaker  that  she  could  correlate  with 
events  and  objects  in  her  own  world.  This  process  of  triangulation  on  shared  stimuli,  gives 
content  /  meaning  to  thought  and  speech,  and  provides  us  with  assurance  that  we  are  in 
contact  with  an  objective  publicly  accessible  reality  of  objects  and  events.  Only  when  the 
triangle  is  complete  can  we  tell  "whether  a  creature,  in  discriminating  between  stimuli,  is 
discriminating  between  stimuli  at  the  sensory  surfaces  or  somewhere  further  out,  or  further 
in"  (Davidson,  1991,  pp.  159).  We  can  now  see  why  Davidson  thinks  that  the  interpersonal 
137 Chapter  4:  Validity  in Accounting  Standard  Setting  and  the  Presuppositions  of  External  Financial  Reporting 
standard  of  the  community  of  minds  can  give  us  objective  assurance  that  our  view  of  the 
world  must,  in  its  most  basic  features,  be  largely  correct:  "The  reason  is  that  the  stimuli  that 
cause  our  most  basic  verbal  responses  also  determine  what  those  verbal  responses  mean,  and 
the  content  of  the  beliefs  that  accompany  them"(Davidson,  1991,  p.  160). 
Most  of  our  plainest  beliefs  must  be  true  and  their  nature  known  to  others  because 
their  truth  conditions,  and  therefore  their  meaning,  is  constituted  by  the  public  objects  and 
events  in  the  world  that  cause  them.  Acceptance  of  the  notion  that:  "the  truth  of  an  utterance 
depends  on  just  two  things:  what  the  words  as  spoken  mean,  and  how  the  world  is  arranged" 
(Davidson,  1983,  pp.  308-309)  does  not  commit  us  to  a  dualism  of  scheme  and  content, 
language  and  corresponding  world.  On  the  contrary  it  leads  us  to  a  closer  focus  on  how  the 
words  as  spoken  are  given  meaning,  and  the  realisation  that  our  most  basic  statements  and 
thoughts  are  given  content  by  virtue  of  their  causal  relation  with  the  world  we  share. 
Davidson's  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  possibility  of  the  three  varieties  of  knowledge,  which 
we  have  sketched  above,  allows  no  room  for  possibility  that  our  basic  framework  of  belief 
can  somehow  be  out  of  phase  with  the  environment  which  determines  its  content.  It  has  no 
room  for  the  notion  of  an  epistemological  gap  between  the  content  of  thought  and  the  world. 
Davidson  shows  that  the  nature  of  correct  interpretation  guarantees  that  we  are  firmly 
in  touch  with  reality.  In  touch,  that  is,  not  in  the  sense  that  our  beliefs  can  be  more  or  less 
adequate  representations  of  reality,  but  rather  in  the  sense  that  many  of  our  simplest  beliefs 
are  necessarily  causally  related  to  our  environment  and  true.  This  obviously  does  not  mean 
or  imply  that  all  of  our  beliefs  must  be  true;  mistaken  beliefs  may  sometimes  be  provoked 
by  misleading  sensations,  and  many  of  our  beliefs  derive  their  content  entirely  from  their 
relations  with  other  beliefs  and  have  no  direct  causal  relation  with  our  environment.  Any 
particular  beliefs  may  be  false,  but  the  basic  framework  of  plain  beliefs  we  hold  about  the 
world  and  our  place  in  it  can  not  be  mistaken  "for  it  is  this  picture  which  informs  the  rest  of 
our  beliefs,  whether  they  be  true  or  false,  and  makes  them  intelligible"  (Davidson,  1991, 
p.  160). 
Davidson  finds  a  basis  for  objectivity  in  intersubjectivity,  that  is,  in  the  relations 
between  creatures  reacting  simultaneously  to  each  other  and  stimuli  from  a  shared  world.  In 
effect  he  finds  a  middle  ground  between  subjectivity  and  absolute  objectivity,  between 
matters  of  taste  and  an  objectivity  based  on  the  ideal  of  correspondence:  That  middle  ground 
and  "our  only  usable  notion  of  `objectivity'  is  `agreement'  rather  than  mirroring"  (Rorty, 
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1980,  p.  337).  The  objectivity  of  a  particular  piece  of  knowledge  should  then  be  understood 
in  terms  of  the  breadth  and  quality  of  agreement  associated  with  it.  For  Davidson,  the  notion 
of  an  impersonal  objectivity  beyond  the  community  of  minds  is  delusional.  It  then  becomes 
clear  that  if  we  want  to  improve  our  standards  of  objectivity,  it  is  vital  that  we  take  steps  to 
deepen,  broaden,  and  secure  the  quality  of  interactions  within  community  of  minds. 
Davidson  is  not  an  antirealist;  he  clearly  accepts  the  world  as  "out  there"  and  does  not 
doubt  that  most  things  in  the  world  are  causally  independent  of  us.  What  he  denies  is  that 
they  are  representationally  independent  of  us;  He  insists  that  the  world  contains  no  'truths' 
or  'facts'  prior  to  language,  waiting  to  be  discovered.  For  an  object  to  be  representationally 
independent  of  us  it  would  need  to  have  certain  intrinsic  features,  so  that  it  would  be  more 
adequately  described  or  represented  by  certain  of  our  terms  or  conceptual  schemes  than  by 
others.  A  representationally  independent  object  would  have  a  way  that  it  is  in  itself  -  its  own 
point  of  view.  Many  philosophers  recognise  that  we  have  no  way  to  distinguish  the 
supposedly  intrinsic features  of  an  object  from  the  merely  extrinsic,  or  description  relative, 
features.  The  antirepresentationalists  respond  to  this  fact  by  discarding  "the  intrinsic-extrinsic 
distinction,  the  claim  that  beliefs  represent,  and  the  whole  question  of  representation 
independence  or  dependence"  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  86). 
Antirepresentationalists,  like  Rorty  and  Davidson,  will  certainly  agree  that,  within  the 
terms  of  a  particular  descriptive  framework,  the  world  may  justify  beliefs.  They  will, 
however,  urge  us  to  avoid  the  temptation  "to  confuse  the  platitude  that  the  world  may  cause 
us  to  be  justified  in  believing  a  sentence  true,  with  the  claim  that  the  world  splits  itself  up, 
on  its  own  initiative,  into  sentence  shaped  chunks  called'facts"'  (Rorty,  1989,  p.  5)  that  may 
make  our  beliefs  true  by  corresponding  to  them.  The  antirepresentationalist  will  therefore 
hesitate  to  accept  without  qualification  the  apparently  innocuous  suggestion  that  statements 
such  as  "There  are  no  chairs  in  this  room"  will  be  true  or  false  in  virtue  of  the  way  things  are. 
They  will  hesitate  because  they  see  two  ways  of  interpreting  "in  virtue  of  the  way  things  are": 
The  antirepresentationalist  will  not  accept  that  any  statement  can  be  true  "in  virtue  of  the  way 
things  are"  interpreted  as  "simply  in  virtue  of  the  way  things  are,  quite  apart  from  how  we 
describe  them"  (Rorty,  1998,  pp.  86-87).  But  she  will  think  any  true  statement,  whether  about 
the  presence  of  chairs,  the  amount  of  cash  in  my  pocket,  or  human  rights,  is  true  "in  virtue 
of  the  way  things  are"  understood  as:  "in  virtue  of  the  way  our  current  descriptions  of  things 
are  used  and  the  causal  interactions  we  have  with  those  things"  (Rorty,  1998,  pp.  86-87).  This 
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latter  interpretation  is  in  effect  a  variation  on  the  "intuitive  truth  about  truth"  recognised  by 
Davidson  that:  "the  truth  of  an  utterance  depends  on  just  two  things:  what  the  words  as 
spoken  mean,  and  how  the  world  is  arranged"  (Davidson,  1983,  pp.  308-309).  Anyone  who 
accepts  that  the  world  "divides  up  the  way  we  divide  it"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  160),  rather  than  "on 
its  own  initiative",  must  surely  agree  that  the  truth  of  a  statement  depends  on  both  "what  the 
words  as  spoken  mean,  and  how  the  world  is  arranged".  But  this  raises  an  obvious  question: 
can  we  distinguish  the  role  of  the  words  (scheme)  and  the  role  of  the  world  (content)  in 
determining  the  truth  of  our  statement?  Antirepresentationalist  do  not  think  that  there  is  any 
way  that  we  can  make  such  a  distinction,  and  they  will  urge  us  to  drop  the  scheme  and 
content  model,  and  with  it  any  "attempt  to  sort  out  propositions  by  whether  they  are  "made" 
true  by  "the  world"  or  by  "us"  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  87).  If  we  drop  the  distinction  we  will  not  be 
able  to  explain  correspondence  except  by  reintroducing  something  like  the  notion  of  the  way 
the  world  divides  itself  up  -  the  way  the  world  is  in  itself.  If  we  are  not  prepared  to  do  that 
correspondence  must  go  and  along  with  it  the  notion  of  representations  and  representational 
faithfulness.  An  antirepresentationalist  will  see  any  attempt  to  keep  correspondence  without 
the  notion  that  there  is  a  way  that  the  world  divides  itself  up,  as  bound  to  fail. 
We  will  complete  this  section  by  very  briefly  outlining  the  salient  implications  of  a 
Davidsonian  antirepresentationalist  view  of  things  for  accounting:  Davidson's  analysis  gives 
us  good  reason  for  thinking  that  most  of  our  plainest  beliefs  must  be  true,  in  touch  with 
objective  reality,  and  shared  with  others.  This  core  of  simple  true  belief,  that  is  given  content 
by  its  causal  relation  to  the  environment,  provides  the  context  that  informs  and  makes 
intelligible  our  other  beliefs.  Financial  accounting  therefore  is  at  its  most  intelligible  when 
it  strongly  coheres  with  beliefs  that  have  direct  causal  relation  with  the  environment.  And 
accounting  is  on  strong  ground  when,  for  example,  it  deals  with  market  values  and 
transactions,  and  with  assets  and  liabilities  that  have  a  real  presence  in  the  environment  that 
is  corroborated  by  their  existence  in  other  belief  systems.  When  accounting  is  on  this  strong 
ground,  particular  accounting  statements  may  be  objectively  true  or  false.  Financial 
accounting  drifts  towards  unintelligibility  when  the  indirect  connections  it  can  have  with  the 
core  of  plain  true  beliefs  that  are  causally  related  to  the  environment  are  stretched  to  breaking 
by  certain  accounting  practices.  Cost  allocation  and  matching  exercises,  for  example,  produce 
accounting  values,  including  depreciated  historic  cost  carrying  values  for  fixed  assets,  that 
are  patently  out  of  touch  with  the  commercial  environment  and  indeed  seem  to  bear  little 
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relation,  if  any,  to  any  other  system  of  beliefs.  Davidson's  analysis  also  gives  us  grounds  for 
thinking  that  an  intelligible  account,  whether  about  the  amount  of  cash  in  my  pocket,  or  the 
trading  activity  of  a  commercial  organisation,  can  be  true  or  false  "in  virtue  of  the  way  things 
are".  In  antirepresentationalist  terms,  we  may  conceive  of  an  account  as  being  true  or  false 
in  virtue  of  the  meaning  of  the  account  and  how  the  world  is  arranged,  provided  that  we 
recognise  that  the  meaning  of  the  account  as  causally,  rather  than  representationally,  related 
to  things  in  the  world.  That  is,  our  accounts  may  be  true  or  false  "in  virtue  of  the  way  our 
current  descriptions  of  things  are  used  and  the  causal  interactions  we  have  with  those  things" 
(Rorty,  1998,  pp.  86-87). 
The  presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting 
In  this  part  of  the  chapter  we  critically  review  the  representationalist  analysis  of  the 
presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting  presented  by  Shapiro  (1997,1998).  Shapiro 
argues  that  every  "community  needs  some  common  assumptions  and  definitions  in  order  to 
conduct  a  constructive  and  intelligible  debate  about  issues  that  are  significant  to  its  members" 
(1997,  p.  167).  In  the  hope  of  clarifying  what  is  at  stake  in  disputes  over  "rationality, 
objectivity  and  `truth'  in  external  financial  reporting"  (1997,  p.  165),  and  of  facilitating 
rational  debate  in  accounting,  Shapiro  sets  out  what  he  believes  to  be  the  primary 
philosophical  presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting.  The  assumptions  identified  by 
Shapiro  are  clearly  inspired  by  the  thinking  of  the  philosopher  John  Searle,  and  in  particular 
they  closely  follow  Searle's  analysis  of  the  "presuppositions  of  our  contemporary  world 
view"  (Searle,  1995,  pp.  150-151).  Much  of  our  disagreement  with  Shapiro's  thinking  has  its 
roots  in  what  we  see  as  weaknesses  in  the  analysis  put  forward  by  Searle.  In  specifying  those 
weaknesses  we  have  drawn  on  Rorty's  criticism  of  the  representationalist  position  presented 
by  Searle.  We  hope  that  our  critique  of  Shapiro's  essentially  representationalist  view  of  the 
possibility  of  objectivity  and  truth  in  accounting  will  help  to  clarify  and  reinforce  our  own 
antirepresentationalist  view. 
The  five  presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting  identified  by  Shapiro  (1997, 
p.  167)  are  set  out  below  in  Table  1: 
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Table  1.  Five  presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting  offered  by  Shapiro 
P1  External  realism:  External  reality  exists  independently  of  financial  statements  that 
represent  it.  Social  phenomena  are  ontologically  subjective  but  just  as  real  as 
ontologically  objective  physical  phenomena. 
P2  Correspondence  theory  of  truth:  A  financial  representation  is  true  if  it  corresponds 
(at  least  approximately)  to  the  underlying  economic  reality  that  it  purports  to 
represent. 
P3  Conceptual  relativism  of  financial  reporting  schemes:  All  systems  of  representation, 
such  as  conceptual  frameworks,  are  human  creations  and  thus  socially  constructed. 
Different  systems  of  representations  can  be  used  to  represent  the  same  reality,  and 
one  system  may  or  may  not  be  better  than  another.  The  Objectives  of  financial 
reporting  are  based  on  normative  values  that  cannot  be  verified  or  empirically 
validated. 
P4  Subjective  judgement  (epistemological  subjectivity):  Accountants'  judgements  about 
what  constitutes  valid  descriptions  of  economic  reality  are  influenced  by  many 
factors  -  cultural,  economic,  political,  psychological,  and  so  on.  Absolute 
epistemological  objectivity  is  not  possible  because  all  accounting  judgements  are 
made  from  a  point  of  view,  subject  to  various  measurement  biases,  motivated  by 
personal  factors,  and  within  a  certain  historical  context. 
P5  Commitment  to  rationalism  (epistemological  objectivity):  Knowing  is 
epistemologically  objective  to  the  extent  that  a  community  can  agree  on  the  criteria 
for  evaluating  the  justification  or  evidence  for  assertions.  The  idea  that  knowledge 
consists  in  having  true  representations  for  which  we  can  give  certain  sorts  of 
justification  or  evidence  is  the  basis  of  Western  rational  science,  the  notion  of  due 
process  in  standard-setting,  and  the  demand  for  attestation  services.  Absolute 
epistemological  objectivity  is  rejected  in  favour  of  a  pragmatic,  intersubjective,  and 
consensus  view. 
Shapiro  claims  that  this  inventory  of  presuppositions  is,  at  least  implicitly,  "generally 
accepted"  (1997,  p.  167).  He  argues  that  it  underlies  many  of  the  beliefs  and  attitudes  we  have 
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concerning  financial  reporting,  is  embedded  in  various  conceptual  frameworks  for  financial 
reporting,  and  underpins  much  of  financial  accounting  and  auditing  practice.  We  will  argue 
that  Shapiro's  presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting  represent  an  incoherent 
amalgam  of  two,  essentially  incompatible,  philosophical  positions:  John  Searle's  "realism" 
and  Richard  Rorty's  pragmatism.  We  begin  our  critique  of  Shapiro's  analysis  by  examining 
each  of  these  supposed  presuppositions  of  external  financial  reporting  in  turn. 
P1:  External  realism  (ontological  objectivity) 
Shapiro  thinks  that  realism  in  financial  reporting  may  usefully  be  conceived  of  as  a  purely 
ontological  philosophical  thesis  lacking  any  semantic  or  epistemic  content.  Such  realism 
asserts  "that  some  reality  exists  'out  there'  independently  of  any  observer's  perceptions,  but 
it  does  not  make  any  epistemological  claim  about  how  or  how  well  an  observer  might  come 
to  know  or  perceive"  (Shapiro,  1997,  p.  168).  Shapiro  follows  Searle  in  referring  to  this 
ontological  realism  as  external  realism.  As  an  ontological  thesis,  realism  "says  that  there 
exists  a  reality  totally  independent  of  our  representations"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  155),  but  it  allows 
us  to  say  nothing  about  the  features  of  that  reality: 
"Realism  does  not  say  how  things  are  but  only  that  there  is  a  way  that  they 
are.  And  `things'  in  the  previous  ...  sentence(s)  does  not  mean  material 
objects  or  even  objects.  It  is,  like  the  `it'  in  `It  is  raining',  not  a  referring 
expression.  " 
(Searle,  1995,  p.  155) 
Both  Shapiro  and  Searle  emphasise  that,  in  itself,  realism  does  not  imply  that  it  makes  sense 
to  think  that  we  can  have  any  epistemic  access  to  reality,  nor  does  it  imply  a  correspondence 
theory  of  truth.  Realism  "is  not  a  theory  of  truth,  it  is  not  a  theory  of  knowledge,  and  it  is  not 
a  theory  of  language"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  155). 
As  a  purely  ontological  thesis  we  find  realism  uninteresting  but  unobjectionable;  it 
is  a  form  of  realism  that  Rorty  suggests  "no  one  has  ever  attacked"  (Rorty,  1997,  p.  160).  We 
are  however  suspicious  of  any  articulation  of  a  purely  ontological  realism  as  we  agree  with 
Davidson  (1990,  p.  305)  that  no  positive  sense  can  be  made  of  talk  of  the  real  as  independent 
of  our  representations  and  beliefs,  except  in  so  far  as  it  paves  the  way  for  epistemic  claims. 
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Indeed,  Rorty  is  able  to  identify  epistemic  claims  even  in  Searle's  carefully  described 
ontological  realism:  ý  Searle  insists  that  realism  does  not  imply  "that  there  is  one  best 
vocabulary  for  describing  reality"  or  "that  reality  itself  must  determine  how  it  should  be 
described"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  155).  Nevertheless,  he  is  not  always  quite  able  to  resist  the 
temptation  to  see  systems  of  representation  in  terms  of  their  adequacy  to  reality.  And  in  so 
far  as  he  suggests  that  "some  of  these  systems  (of  representation)  can  be  used  more  or  less 
adequately,  to  represent  (features  of  representation-independent  reality)"  (Searle,  1995, 
p.  167),  he  clearly  implies  that  some  representations  are  more  or  less  faithful  to  reality  than 
others.  Despite  Searle's  insistence  that  there  is  no  way  that  the  world  is  in  itself,  he 
occasionally  seems  to  suggest  that  we  might  somehow  find  "enough  of  a  representation- 
independent  way  the  world  is  to  make  some  systems  of  representation  less,  and  others  more, 
adequate  to  represent  reality"  (Rorty,  1997,  p.  162). 
Searle's  realism  arguably  allows  space  for  covert  epistemic  claims  to  creep  in. 
Shapiro's  external  realism,  on  the  other  hand,  allows  blatant  epistemic  claims;  it  simply  isn't 
a  purely  ontological  thesis.  Searle's  external  realism  consists  in  the  notion  "that  there  is  a  way 
that  things  are  that  is  logically  independent  of  all  human  representations"  (Searle,  1995, 
p.  155,  emphasis  added).  The  version  of  "external  realism"  which  Shapiro  suggests  we  should 
accept,  as  a  presupposition  of  external  financial  reporting,  significantly  modifies  Searle's 
formulation  of  the  thesis.  For  Shapiro's  external  realism  is  the  thesis  that  there  is  a  way  that 
things  are  that  is  independent  of  financial  representations:  "external  reality  exists 
independently  of  the  financial  statements  that  represent  it"  (Shapiro,  1997,  p.  167).  Searle 
defends  the  thesis  that  there  is  a  reality  independent  of  human  representations,  that  is,  an 
"ontologically  objective"  reality.  He  sees  this  "brute  reality"  as  the  base  upon  which  we 
impose  and  develop  our  ontologically  subjective  "social  reality": 
"The  ontological  subjectivity  of  the  socially  constructed  reality  requires  an 
ontologically  objective  reality  out  of  which  it  is  constructed....  Because  the 
logical  form  of  the  creation  of  socially  constructed  reality  consists  in  iterations 
of  the  structure  X  counts  as  Y  in  C,  the  iterations  must  bottom  out  in  an  X 
element  that  is  not  itself  an  institutional  construction.  Otherwise  you  would 
get  infinite  regress  or  circularity. 
(Searle,  1995,  p.  191) 
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For  Searle,  a  representation  dependent  social  construct  like  money  presupposes  the  existence 
of  a  representation  independent  reality  upon  which  the  social  is  constructed;  it  presupposes 
external  realism.  However,  whilst  the  "physical  realization"  of  money  -  "a  bit  of  paper  or  blip 
on  a  computer  disk"  -  is  for  Searle  part  of  an  external  reality,  money  as  a  social  construct  is 
ontologically  subjective  and  not  part  of  external  reality  (see  Searle,  1995,  p.  56).  Shapiro's 
external  reality  is  not  a  reality  external  to  all  human  representation,  but  merely  the  reality 
external  to  financial  representation.  It  therefore  includes  much  of  our  ontologically  subjective 
social  world  -  the  world  that  is  dependent  on  our  representations.  Shapiro's  external  reality 
can  contain  stock  option  compensation.  Searle's  external  reality  would  not  contain  any  such, 
ontologically  subjective,  social  constructs. 
Searle  tries  hard  to  maintain  the  notion  that  "realism  does  not  say  how  things  are  but 
only  that  there  is  a  way  that  they  are"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  155).  He  insists  that  external  realism 
does  not  imply  that  there  is  "privileged  vocabulary"  for  describing  external  reality).  Searle's 
external  reality  imposes  no  descriptive  scheme  on  us:  "ontologically  objective  reality  does 
not  have  a  point  of  view"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  176).  Such  claims  do  not  hold  for  Shapiro's 
external  reality,  which  includes  both  ontologically  objective  reality  and  ontologically 
subjective  reality.  Ontologically  subjective  reality  exists  under  representations;  it  has  "a  point 
of  view".  The  socially  constructed  economic  reality  of  "assets",  "liabilities",  "stock  options", 
and  the  like,  exists  only  relative  to  certain  conceptual  schemes.  If  we  want  to  describe  the 
features  of  the  economic  reality  we  are  constrained  to  recognise  the  privileged  descriptive 
schemes  that  are  built  into  that  reality.  The  ontology  and  epistemology  of  the  social  are 
deeply  entangled.  We  can  not  talk  about  money  or  marriage,  or  a  particular  debt  or  particular 
marriage  without  implicitly  drawing  on  the  conceptual  frameworks,  which  are  constitutive 
of  those  social  realities.  Shapiro's  external  realism  allows  representation-dependent  epistemic 
claims  to  be  made  about  the  content  of  reality  (how  things  are).  It  allows  the  claim  that  reality 
includes  certain  economic  features,  including  stock  option  compensation,  which  are  not 
represented  in  financial  statements. 
The  fact  that  Shapiro's  external  realism  is  not  a  purely  ontological  thesis  becomes 
obvious  when  we  examine  his  assertion  that  critics  who  reject  his  external  realism  will  have 
difficulty  explaining  the  existence  of  business  practices  which  are  not  reflected  in  accounts: 
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"Critics  who  reject  external  realism  will  find  it  difficult  to  explain  how 
certain  business  practices  -  such  as  the  granting  of  employee  stock  options  - 
can  exist  even  though  present-day  financial  reporting  practices  do  not 
formally  recognise  them.  " 
(Shapiro,  1997,  p.  168) 
The  genesis  of  this  assertion,  we  suggest,  may  be  found  in  Searle's  response  to  antirealism 
(see  Searle,  1995,  pp.  177-193).  Searle  sometimes  writes  as  if  antirealist  philosophers,  who 
"do  not  believe  in  `mind  independent  reality'  must  deny  that  there  were  mountains  before 
people  had  the  idea  of  `mountain'  in  their  minds  or  the  word  `mountain'  in  their  language" 
(Rorty,  1998,  p.  72).  The  "antirealist",  is  in  fact  unlikely  to  want  to  engage  with  Searle's 
challenge:  "it  is  pointless  to  ask  whether  there  really  are  mountains  or  whether  it  is  merely 
convenient  to  talk  about  them"  (Rorty,  1998,  p.  72).  Any  similarity,  however,  between 
Searle's  comments  on  mountains  and  Shapiro's  on  stock  option  compensation  is  superficial. 
Searle's  external  realism  does  not  in  itself  say  anything  about  how  things  are.  For  Searle 
reality  in  itself  does  not  have  a  privileged  vocabulary  that  includes  mountains.  The  notion  of 
mountains  can  only  arise  through  our  creation  of  descriptive  schemes  that  include  mountains. 
From  Searle's  perspective,  it  is  only  once  we  fit  the  descriptive  schemes  we  have  created  to 
reality  and  find  that  there  really  are  mountains  there  that  it  can  make  any  sense  to  challenge 
the  antirealist,  who  agrees  that  there  are  mountains,  to  explain  the  status  of  mountains  prior 
to  our  human  recognition  of  them.  If  our  descriptive  schemes  did  not  include  mountains  them 
the  challenge  to  the  antirealist  could  not  arise.  Accepting  that  stock  option  compensation  is 
not  part  of  the  descriptive  scheme  of  financial  reporting,  we  must  consider  how  it  is  possible 
for  Shapiro  to  consider  that  the  existence  of  stock  option  compensation  can  present  a 
challenge  to  the  critics  of  his  external  realism.  Clearly,  Shapiro's  urge  to  challenge  the  critic 
is  made  possible  by  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  stock  option  compensation  is  part  of  the 
privileged  conceptual  scheme  already  built  into  the  object  domain  of  external  reality  prior 
to  any  account  being  given.  Shapiro's  external  realism  imposes  a  conceptual  scheme  on 
reality,  a  scheme  that  includes  stock  option  compensation.  Shapiro's  external  realism  is  not 
a  purely  ontological  thesis. 
Any  critic  rejecting  Shapiro's  external  realism,  that  is  someone  who  does  not  believe 
in  financial  statement  independent  reality,  would  not  actually  be  troubled  by  the  challenge 
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that  Shapiro  seems  to  think  stock  option  compensation  represents.  Such  a  person  would 
simply  not  recognise  stock  option  compensation.  It  would  of  course  be  rather  difficult  to 
conceive  of  such  a  person  as  anything  other  than  mad.  A  challenge  would  arise  for  this  critic 
only  if  a  new  accounting  standard  was  introduced  giving  financial  statement  recognition  to 
stock  option  compensation.  The  challenge  then  for  such  a  mad  critic  would  be  to  explain  the 
status  to  stock  option  compensation  prior  to  its  recognition  in  accounts.  The  common-or- 
garden  antirealist,  someone  who  just  wants  to  deny  mind  independent  reality  and  confine 
reality  to  the  scope  of  human  knowledge,  might  have  difficulty  in  explaining  the  existence 
of  mountains  prior  to  any  human  representation  of  mountains  -  if  they  thought  that  an  issue 
worth  engaging  with.  However  they  would  not  have  any  problem  in  explaining  the  existence 
of  stock  option  compensation  and  other  features  of  economic  reality  that  are  not  recognised 
in  financial  statements.  Stock  option  compensation  is  clearly  a  mind  dependent  social 
construct,  with  a  clear  existence  within  human  knowledge  outside  accounts. 
In  any  case,  we  doubt  the  validity  of  Shapiro's  "external  realism"  thesis:  it  simply 
does  not  seem  to  us  that  it  is  correct  to  say  that  our  socially  constructed  economic  reality 
exists  independently  of  the  financial  representations  of  it.  On  the  contrary,  we  suggest  that 
accounting  and  economic  concepts  and  the  realities  they  constitute  are  inextricably 
intertwined.  In  one  sense  of  course  it  is  sensible  to  think  that  a  company's  financial  report 
does  indeed  give  an  account  of  an  economic  reality  that  is  external  to  the  account  given.  Just 
as  "Talk  of  money  and  marriages  is  talk  of  publicly  accessible  reality,  and  such  phenomena 
are  "representation  independent"  in  the  sense  that  this  twenty  dollar  bill  or  this  marriage 
between  Sam  and  Sally  exists  independently  of  your  or  my  representations  of  it"  (Searle, 
1995,  p.  190),  there  is  clearly  a  sense  in  which  an  individual  company's  commercial  activities 
are  independent  of  the  financial  account  given  of  those  activities.  "But  marriages  and  money, 
unlike  mountains  and  atoms,  do  not  exist  independently  of  all  representations"  (Searle,  1995, 
p.  190).  Money,  marriages  and  economic  reality  are  not  part  of  the  "external  reality"  which 
Searle  argues  exists  external  to  "our  systems  of  representation"  not  just  external  to  particular 
representations  of  it.  The  antirealist  critic  breaks  with  Searle  by  insisting  that  mountains  and 
atoms  are  also  representation  dependent.  However,  both  Searle  and  his  antirealist  critic,  could 
(and  surely  would)  agree  that  the  economic  reality  of  any  company's  commercial  activities 
exists  only  by  virtue  of  our  representations  and  that  accounting  concepts  play  some  part  in 
sustaining  the  representational  complex  which  supports  economic  reality. 
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We  do  not  want  to  claim  that  realism,  in  the  purely  ontological  form  proposed  by 
Searle,  and  apparently  intended  by  Shapiro,  is  false.  However,  we  can  see  no  way  in  which 
its  recognition  could  contribute  to  a  clarification  of  what  is  at  stake  in  debates  concerning 
financial  reporting.  Indeed,  we  regard  it  as  positively  unhelpful  because  it  seems,  above  all, 
to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  mistaken  idea  that  truth  can  be  intelligibly  conceived  in  terms  of 
the  correspondence  of  representation  and  reality: 
"it  is  futile  either  to  reject  or  accept  the  slogan  that  the  real  and  the  true  are 
`independent  of  our  beliefs.  '  The  only  positive  sense  we  can  make  of  this 
phrase,  the  only  use  that  derives  from  the  intentions  of  those  who  prize  it, 
derives  from  the  idea  of  correspondence,  and  this  is  an  idea  without  content.  " 
(Davidson,  1990,  p.  305) 
We  agree  with  Davidson  that  the  motive  for  realist  talk,  even  when  it  is  couched  carefully 
in  terms  of  ontological  realism,  is  generally  ultimately,  if  covertly,  epistemic.  We  are 
therefore  suspicious  of  any  talk  of  realism  in  the  context  of  financial  reporting,  even 
ontological  realism.  It  prepares  the  ground  for  the  vacuous  idea  of  truth  in  accounting  as 
correspondence  of  financial  representation  and  economic  reality.  Furthermore,  Shapiro's 
extension  of  the  notion  of  external  reality  to  refer  to  both  the  ontologically  objective  and  the 
ontologically  subjective  domains  is  particularly  dangerous  because  it  may  encourage  the 
reification  of  our  social  constructed  economic  reality.  By  supporting  the  "phantom 
objectivity"  (Lukäcs,  1923/1971,  p.  83)  of  the  ontologically  subjective  economic  reality,  it 
may  help  sustain  the  exploitative  social  relations  which  underpin  that  reality. 
P2:  Correspondence  theory  of  truth  (representational  faithfulness) 
Shapiro  suggests  that  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  is  a  presupposition  of  external 
financial  reporting:  "a  financial  representation  is  true  if  it  corresponds  (at  least 
approximately)  to  the  underlying  economic  reality  that  it  purports  to  represent"  (Shapiro, 
1997,  p.  167).  Again  it  seems  Shapiro's  position  is  supported  by  Searle's  analysis  of  the 
presuppositions  of  our  worldview.  Searle  defends  a  substantial  conception  of  the 
correspondence  theory  of  truth  according  to  which: 
148 Chapter  4:  Validity  in  Accounting  Standard  Setting  and  the  Presuppositions  of  External  Financial  Reporting 
"there  really  are  nonlinguistic  facts  in  the  world  and  statements  are  true 
because  they  really  do  stand  in  certain  relations  to  these  facts,  relations  that 
we  variously  describe  as  fitting,  matching,  stating,  or  corresponding  to  the 
facts.  " 
(Searle,  1995,  p.  209) 
For  Searle  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a  statement  is  fixed  by  how  the  world  is,  independently  of 
how  we  represent  it:  "Statements  are  made  true  by  how  things  are  in  the  world  that  is 
independent  of  the  statement"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  219).  Correspondence  theorists,  like  Searle, 
seek  then  to  explain  what  it  is  for  whole  statements  to  be  true  in  terms  of  their 
correspondence  with  something  else  -  usually  referred  to  as  facts.  To  give  content  to  the 
notion  of  correspondence,  they  need  to  give  some  explanation  of  how  we  can  specify  and  talk 
about  those  "things"  that  make  our  statements  true.  Many  philosophers,  from  Strawson 
(1950)  to  Davidson  (1990)  have  argued  that  no  satisfactory  account  of  facts,  as  nonlinguistic 
entities  existing  in  the  world,  can  be  given.  Critics  like  Strawson  point  out  that  the  only  way 
we  have  of  individuating  and  identifying  a  particular  fact  is  by  using  the  same  language  we 
use  to  individuate  and  identify  its  corresponding  sentence.  Facts  are  not  extralinguistic 
entities,  they  are  "what  statements  (when  true)  state"  (Strawson,  1950/1964,  p.  38).  Therefore 
true  statements  and  their  corresponding  facts  are  not  independent  entities:  Correspondence 
theories  of  truth  essentially  fail  to  provide  independent  entities  to  which  truth  vehicles 
(whether  statements,  sentences  or  utterances)  can  be  said  to  correspond  (see  Davidson,  1990, 
pp.  303-305).  Rorty  suggests  that  Searle's  realist-correspondentists  position  breaks-down  on 
precisely  this  point;  he  can  give  no  satisfactory  explanation  of  "in  what  sense  a  `way  the 
world  is'  can  be  `independent'  of  a  description  of  the  world?  "  (Rorty,  1997,  p.  161).  Rorty 
thinks  that  any  such  explanation  would  have  to  "find  a  use  for  `a  way  the  world  is'  that  is 
glossable  by  neither  `in  itself  nor'under  a  description"`  (Rorty,  1997,  pp.  161-162),  and  he 
suggests  that  no  such  explanation  can  be  found.  At  one  time  Searle  accepted  the  force  of  the 
Strawson  /  Davidson  critique  of  correspondence  (see  Searle,  1995,  p.  204).  Recently, 
however,  he  has  taken  the  view  that  the  statement  of  a  true  sentence  is  a  satisfactory  way  of 
specifying  the  "thing"  that  makes  a  sentence  true  -  "that  which  stands  outside  the  statement 
but  which  makes  it  true"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  21  1).  Together  with  Strawson,  Davidson  and  Rorty, 
we  can  see  no  sense  in  which  the  statement  of  a  true  sentence  can  take  us  beyond  language 
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to  how  things  are  in  the  world  prior  to  our  descriptions;  we  cannot  see  how  a  fact,  defined 
as  "the  statement  of  a  true  sentence",  can  be  extralinguistic.  We  nevertheless  accept  the 
intuition  that  whether  or  not  what  is  claimed  about  the  world  is  true  must  depend  upon  the 
world.  We  therefore  agree  with  Putnam  that  "to  say  that  truth  is  `correspondence  to  reality' 
is  not  false  but  empty"  (Putnam,  1992,  p.  10).  Empty  that  is,  as  long  as  nothing  is  said  about 
what  the  correspondence  is.  And,  unfortunately,  the  Strawson  /  Davidson  critique  of  the 
correspondence  theory  of  truth  leaves  us  with  no  reason  to  think  anything  meaningful  can  be 
said  about  the  nature  of  "correspondence".  No  one  seems  to  be  "able  to  say  in  a  nontrivial 
way  what  sort  of  `thing'  it  is  that  makes  a  sentence  (or  other  truth  bearer)  true"  (Davidson, 
1997,  pp.  110).  The  notion  that  truth  is  a  matter  of  correspondence  to  facts  will  remain  empty 
until  such  time  as  someone  can  "come  up  with  an  intelligible  and  illuminating  way  of 
individuating  the  entities  to  which  true  utterances  or  beliefs  correspond,  along  with  an 
acceptable  semantics  for  talk  about  such  entities"  (Davidson,  1999a,  p.  17)'. 
A  rhetoric  of  correspondence  apparently  permeates  financial  reporting.  Nevertheless, 
the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  can  not  be  a  real  substantial  presupposition  of  financial 
reporting,  because  the  notion  that  truth  consists  in  a  relation  of  correspondence  between 
representation  and  the  (nonlinguistic)  facts  is  essentially  unintelligible.  We  suggest  that 
accounting  theorists  ought  to  avoid  any  talk  of  correspondence  and  facts,  which  seems 
inevitably  to  foster  confusion.  The  notion  of  correspondence  may  be  empty/unintelligible, 
but  it  is  not  innocuous:  Our  deepest  objection  to  the  kind  of  realist-correspondentist  view  put 
forward  by  Searle  and  others,  is  that  it  gives  us  no  grounds  for  well  founded  confidence  that 
our  beliefs  are  securely  in  touch  with  reality.  Indeed,  it  allows  the  possibility  that  all  our 
beliefs,  thoughts  and  theories,  including  those  most  firmly  established  and  best  researched, 
may  be  mistaken:  "We  could  be  totally  mistaken  about  how  the  world  is  in  every  detail" 
(Searle,  1995,  p.  155).  In  contrast,  Davidson's  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  possibility  of 
knowledge,  which  we  sketched  in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  gives  us  good  reason  for 
thinking  that  most  of  our  basic  beliefs  are  true  and  in  touch  with  objective  reality. 
P3:  Conceptual  relativism  of  financial  reporting  schemes 
Conceptual  relativity  for  Searle  basically  consists  in  the  assertion  that:  "All  representations 
of  reality  are  made  relative  to  some  more  or  less  arbitrarily  selected  set  of  concepts"  (Searle, 
1995,  p.  161).  Shapiro  essentially  applies  Searle's  version  of  the  conceptual  relativity  thesis 
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to  financial  reporting.  He  argues  that  that  in  accounting  many  "Different  systems  of 
representations  can  be  used  to  represent  the  same  reality,  and  one  system  may  or  may  not  be 
better  than  another"  (Shapiro,  1997,  p.  167).  Any  full-blooded  relativism,  that  for  example 
made  reality  itself  relative  to  our  conceptual  schemes,  would  of  course  be  fundamentally 
incompatible  with  the  idea  of  an  uninterpreted  reality  that  is  as  it  is  independently  of  our 
representational  schemes.  Therefore,  given  their  commitment  to  external  realism,  Searle's  and 
Shapiro's  invocation  of  relativism  is  perhaps  best  understood  as  a  rhetorical  device  intended 
to  draw  attention  to  their  view  that  any  interpretation  of  reality  is  bound  by  the  conceptual 
scheme  employed  by  the  interpreter;  "we  do  not  make  `worlds';  we  make  descriptions  that 
the  actual  world  may  fit  or  fail  to  fit"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  166).  Conceptual  relativity,  for  Searle 
and  Shapiro,  then  implies  that  true  descriptions  are  always  made  relative  to  some  more  or  less 
arbitrarily  selected  system  of  concepts  for  describing  the  world.  It  is,  however,  important  to 
see  that  this  relativity  of  truth  amounts  to  no  more  than  the  obvious  fact  that  the  truth  or 
falsity  of  any  sentence  is  relative  to  the  language  in  which  it  is  expressed.  The  conceptual 
relativity  of  truth  for  Searle  and  Shapiro  can  not  mean  that  "the  same  statement  (not  the  same 
sentence,  but  the  same  statement)  could  be  true  of  the  world  in  one  conceptual  system  but 
false  of  the  world  in  another  conceptual  system"  (Searle,  1995,  pp.  166-167). 
Searle  rejects  naive  metaphysical  realism°;  in  particular,  he  rejects  the  idea  that  there 
is  a  correct  conceptual  scheme  for  describing  reality.  He  argues,  rather,  that  things  can  be 
represented  under  an  indefinitely  large  number  of  alternative  descriptive  schemes,  points  of 
view  or aspects:  "representation,  and  a  fortiori  all  truthful  representation,  is  always  under 
certain  aspects  and  not  others"  (Searle,  1995,  pp.  175).  He  maintains  that  there  is  no  way 
things  are  in  themselves,  and  warns  us  that  "it  will  be  impossible  to  get  the  coincidence 
between  truth  and  reality  after  which  so  many  traditional  philosophers  seem  to  hanker" 
(Searle.  1995,  p.  176).  His  conceptual  relativism,  therefore  only  allows  the  possibility  that  one 
scheme  of  representation  may  be  better  than  another,  provided  the  term  "better"  is  understood 
in  strictly  pragmatic  terms:  One  scheme  may  be  "better  for  some  purpose"  than  another.  Any 
suggestion  that  some  systems  of  representation  might  somehow  better  reflect,  or  more 
adequately  grasp  reality,  than  others,  would  be  incompatible  with  Searle's  external  realism 
as  a  purely  ontological  thesis  and  with  the  notion  that  "reality  does  not  have  a  point  of  view" 
(Searle,  1995,  pp.  176).  Nor  could  such  a  suggestion  be  squared  with  the  conviction  that  there 
is;  no  "one  best  vocabulary  for  describing  reality"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  155);  no  "privileged 
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conceptual  scheme"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  164).  Nevertheless,  if  Searle's  dualism  of  descriptions 
we  make  (scheme)  and  world  (content)  is  adopted,  and  it  is  accepted  that  the  world  may  fit 
(correspond  to)  some  descriptions  and  fail  to  fit  others,  it  surely  must  become  difficult  to 
resist  the  temptation  to  think  that  some  descriptions  are  more  adequate  to  reality  than  others. 
If  that  temptation  is  succumbed  to,  the  pursuit  of  full  and  correct  descriptions  of  the  one 
reality  must  begin  to  appear  to  be  a  reasonable  goal,  and  any  practical  distinction  between 
Searle's  realism  and  naive  metaphysical  realism  dissolves.  Searle  himself  occasionally  seems 
to  be  tempted  to  recognise  some  descriptive  schemes  as  more  adequate  to  reality  than  others. 
He  claims,  for  example,  that  "It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  certain  models,  e.  g.,  Aristotelian 
physics  and  the  Mercator  projection,  are  mistaken  about  or  distort  certain  features  of  the 
world"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  167). 
In  his  discussion  of  the  possibility  that  some  systems  of  financial  representation 
might  be  "better"  than  others  Shapiro  mainly  confines  his  remarks  to  what  we  have  called 
a  pragmatic  understanding  of  "better",  where  the  "better"  scheme  is  the  one  which  is 
somehow  more  fitting  to  our  interests  and  objectives.  He  does,  however,  seem  in  places  to 
lapse  into  the  suggestion  that  some  systems  of  financial  representation  may  be  better  than 
others;  in  the  sense  that  they  may  more  adequately  grasp  reality.  He  suggests,  for  example, 
that  in  financial  reporting;  "Disagreement  and  other  difficulties  with  definitions  may  suggest 
that  the  definitions  describe  some  features  of  external  reality  better  than  others"  (Shapiro, 
1997,  p.  171).  For  Shapiro  there  does  seem  to  be  a  way  that  economic  reality  is  in  itself,  and 
it  includes  stock  options  -  whether  or  not  they  are  included  in  the  in  the  financial  descriptions 
we  make.  It  seems  that,  for  Shapiro,  truth  and  reality  can  be  made  to  coincide  in  accounting; 
and  including  stock  option  compensation  in  our  scheme  of  financial  representations  would 
be  a  step  towards  more  adequate,  complete  and  faithful  representation  of  reality. 
Searle's  conceptual  relativism  to  allow  the  world  scope  to  impose  itself  upon  our 
conceptual  schemes  only  from  within  those  schemes:  On  this  view,  the  world  itself  has  no 
structure,  which  it  can  impress  on  our  concepts.  Most,  even  very  modest,  realists  would  want 
to  maintain  a  stronger  sense  of  the  world-guidedness  of  our  descriptions,  than  Searle's 
external  realism  allows.  They  would  argue  that  the  world  must  in  itself  "make  some 
boundaries  more  salient  than  others"  (Farrell,  1996,  p.  167).  A  vision  of  a  world  that  "divides 
up  the  way  we  divide  it"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  160),  a  world  with  no  structure  in  itself  prior  to  the 
introduction  of  the  system  of  concepts  that  we  have  "more  or  less  arbitrarily  selected"  for 
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describing  it,  is  clearly  very  difficult  to  consistently  reconcile  with  realism  and  the 
correspondence  theory  of  truth.  Neither  Searle  nor  Shapiro  is  able  to  strictly  maintain  any 
such  reconciliation,  and,  in  relaxing  their  commitment  to  conceptual  relativity,  both  drift 
towards  a  naive  metaphysical  realism. 
Our  basic  objection  to  the  thesis  of  conceptual  relativism  is  that,  in  anything  other 
than  the  banal  sense  that  the  truth  of  a  sentence  must  be  relative  to  the  language  in  which  the 
sentence  occurs,  the  thesis  is  ultimately  unintelligible:  "Conceptual  relativism  is  a  heady  and 
exotic  doctrine,  or  would  be  if  we  could  make  good  sense  of  it.  The  trouble  is,  as  so  often  in 
philosophy,  it  is  hard  to  improve  intelligibility  while  retaining  the  excitement"  (Davidson, 
1974a,  p.  183).  In  his  discussion  of  conceptual  relativism,  Shapiro  seems  to  imply  that  the 
work  of  Davidson  and  Rorty  would  support  the  presupposition  of  conceptual  relativity: 
"(A)ccounting  judgements  are  made  through  the  lens  of  conceptual  schemes, 
and  to  that  extent  they  are  constrained  by  the  inherent  limitations  of  those 
schemes.  Many  philosophers  hold  the  belief  that  no  one  can  completely  shed 
their  conceptual  schemes  and  attain  what  may  be  called  a  God's-eye  view  from 
which  one  may  objectively  compare  alternative  schemes  (e.  g.  Davidson,  1984; 
Rorty,  1991).  " 
(Shapiro,  1997,  pp.  172-173) 
Davidson  and  Rorty  certainly  do  reject  the  notion  of  a  Gods-eye-view,  however  it  would  be 
a  mistake  to  think  that  either  embraces  conceptual  relativism.  Indeed,  Davidson  is  anxious 
to  discourage  talk  of  conceptual  relativism  and  "the  very  idea  of  a  conceptual  scheme" 
(Davidson,  1974a)  as  something  that  might  organise,  fit,  or  construct  reality.  He  strongly 
rejects  the  dualist,  scheme  and  content,  view  which  Searle  and  Shapiro  seem  to  be  committed 
to,  of  a  world  of  facts  which  can  somehow  fit  (or  fail  to  fit)  our  descriptions  and  which  can 
make  them  true  (or  false): 
"I  want  to  urge  that  this  ... 
dualism  of  scheme  and  content,  of  organizing 
system  and  something  waiting  to  be  organized,  cannot  be  made  intelligible 
and  defensible.  " 
(Davidson,  1974,  p,  189) 
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Davidson  rejects  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  and  with  it  the  notion  of  the  mind  or 
language  as  holding  a  mirror  to  reality.  He  equally  clearly  rejects  any  suggestion  that  the 
specular  relation  might  work  in  the  opposite  direction  so  that  our  representations  are 
somehow  projected  upon  and  articulate  the  world.  Davidson  argues  that  our  representations 
must  generally  be  sensitive  to  the  way  the  world  any  way  is;  the  way  it  articulates  itself  (see 
Farrell,  1996,  p.  78). 
Davidson  of  course  recognises  that  we  address  the  world  through  language  -  our 
conceptual  scheme,  and  he  accepts  that  if  different  languages  could  not  be  intertranslated 
they  would  constitute  different  conceptual  schemes,  and  that  we  might  then  sensibly  talk 
about  conceptual  relativity.  Searle  uses  the  example  of  weight  to  illustrate  his  notion  of 
different  conceptual  schemes;  Weight  in  pounds  and  kilograms  supposedly  operate  in 
different  conceptual  schemes:  "the  claim  that  I  weigh  160  pounds  is  consistent  with  the  claim 
that  I  weigh  73  in  kilograms.  External  realism  allows  for  an  infinite  number  of  true 
descriptions  of  the  same  reality  made  relative  to  different  conceptual  schemes"  (Searle,  1995, 
p.  165).  Clearly,  translation  between  pounds  and  kilograms  is  possible  -  there  is  no  "genuine 
inconsistency"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  167),  we  therefore  have  some  difficulty  in  making  any  real 
sense  of  the  notion  that  we  are  dealing  here  with  different  conceptual  schemes.  Davidson 
(1974a)  argues  that  we  can  never  make  much  sense  of  failure  of  intertranslatability,  and 
consequently  we  cannot  make  good  sense  of  the  notion  of  different  conceptual  schemes  or 
of  conceptual  relativism.  Rorty  lends  no  more  support  to  conceptual  relativism  than 
Davidson'. 
Confined  to  the  notion  that  alternative  vocabularies  and  systems  of  representation  can 
be  used  to  represent  the  same  reality,  conceptual  relativism  is  innocuous  if  banal. 
Nevertheless,  we  recommend  that  accounting  theorists  should  avoid  any  talk  of  conceptual 
relativism:  The  problem  is  that  those  who  entertain  the  notion  of  conceptual  relativism  are 
often  unable  to  resist  the  allure  of  more  exotic  and  less  intelligible  variants  of  the  doctrine. 
Shapiro  succumbs  to  this  temptation  when  quoting,  with  apparent  approval,  Morgan's  view 
that  "Accountants 
...  are  subjective  `constructors  of  reality"'  (Morgan,  1988,  p.  477,  quoted 
by  Shapiro,  1997,  p.  172),  he  endorses  the  view  that  alternative  schemes  construct  alternative 
realities.  Shapiro  offers  no  explanation  of  how  this  relativity  of  reality  can  be  reconciled  with 
the  presupposition  of  external  realism  and  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth;  we  suggest  that 
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no  such  reconciliation  is  possible'. 
P4:  Subjective  judgement  (epistemological  subjectivity) 
Shapiro  seems  to  want  to  encourage  us  to  recognise  an  inherent  subjectivity  of  accounting 
judgement: 
"Absolute  epistemological  objectivity  is  not  possible  because  all  accounting 
judgements  are  made  from  a  point  of  view,  subject  to  various  measurement 
biases,  motivated  by  personal  factors,  and  within  a  certain  historical  context.  " 
(Shapiro,  1997,  p.  167) 
From  Searle's  realist-correspondentist  perspective,  judgements  are  `objective'  when  their 
truth  or  falsity  can  be  decided  by  the  facts  of  the  matter;  and  `subjective'  when  "their  truth 
or  falsity  cannot  be  settled  'objectively,  '  because  the  truth  or  falsity  is  not  a  simple  matter  of 
fact  but  depends  on  certain  attitudes,  feelings,  and  points  of  view  of  the  makers  and  hearers 
of  the  judgement"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  8).  Given  Shapiro's  advocacy  of  external  realism  and  the 
correspondence  theory  of  truth,  we  might  have  anticipated  that  he  would  be  committed  to  the 
possibility  of  epistemological  objectivity  in  accounting;  at  least  as  an  ideal.  Otherwise  it 
would  be  hard  to  see  any  point  to  his  talk  of  realism  and  correspondence.  And  indeed  he  does 
seem  to  indicate,  relatively  plainly,  that  he  believes  that  financial  statements  may  be 
objective;  that  is,  in  a  realist-correspondentist  sense,  true  or  false  in  virtue  of  the  facts  of  the 
matter: 
"Once  the  basic  financial  statement  elements  are  defined  it  is  neither  arbitrary 
nor  a  matter  of  opinion  as  to  whether  features  of  external  reality  do  in  fact 
satisfy  the  definitions.  " 
(Shapiro,  1997,  pp.  170-171) 
Furthermore,  the  "transcendental"  argument  advanced  by  Searle  (1995,  pp.  183-294)  in 
support  of  the  external  realism,  embraced  by  Shapiro,  purports  to  show  that  the  normal 
intelligibility  of  a  large  class  of  utterances  requires  a  publicly  accessible  reality  of  phenomena 
that  are  both  ontologically  and  epistemically  objective.  Searle's  effort  to  justify  external 
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realism  is  clearly  motivated  by  his  desire  to  defend  the  possibility  of  epistemological 
objectivity:  "the  rejection  of  realism,  the  denial  of  ontological  objectivity,  is  an  essential 
component  of  the  attacks  on  epistemic  objectivity,  rationality,  truth,  and  intelligence  in 
contemporary  intellectual  life"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  197).  The  presupposition  of  the 
epistemological  subjectivity  of  accounting  sits  uneasily  with  Shapiro's  other  commitments. 
Given  those  commitments  we  would  have  expected  him  to  emphasise  the  possibility  of 
epistemological  objectivity  in  accounting  and  perhaps  agree  with  Searle  that:  "Facts  about 
money  can  be  epistemically  objective  even  if  the  existence  of  money  is  socially  constructed, 
and,  therefore,  to  that  extent,  ontologically  subjective"  (1995,  pp.  190-191).  The 
presupposition  of  the  epistemological  subjectivity  in  accounting  is  attractive  to  those  scheme 
and  content  dualists  who  see  accounting  as  a  representational  scheme  that  constructs  its  own 
reality.  We  should  not  be  surprised  to  find  that  such  theorists  see  "the  idea  of  objectivity  in 
accounting  is largely  a  myth"  (Morgan,  1988,  p.  477).  As  we  have  seen,  Shapiro  is  clearly 
drawn  by  views  such  as  those  expressed  by  Morgan,  and  this  may  explain  his  view  on  the 
subjectivity  of  accounting  judgement. 
It  may  be  that  we  are  reading  too  much  into  Shapiro's  presupposition  of  the 
epistemological  subjectivity  of  financial  reporting;  Perhaps  he  means  to  suggest  no  more  than 
the  platitude  that  `absolute',  understood  as  `complete',  objectivity  is  unattainable.  The 
contrast  between  epistemically  objective  and  epistemically  subjective  judgement  is  however, 
surely,  always  essentially  a  "matter  of  degree"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  8).  We  suggest  that  it  would 
be  difficult  to  find  any  accountant  (academic  or  practitioner)  who  would  want  to  dispute  the 
notion  that  in  accounting,  as  in  most  other  areas  of  contemporary  life,  the  attainment  of 
"complete  epistemic  objectivity  is  difficult,  sometimes  impossible"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  151).  But 
this  would  seem  to  give  scant  justification  for  suggesting  that  financial  reporting  rests  on  a 
presupposition  of  epistemologically  subjectivity.  Surely  financial  reporting  is  predicated 
upon  the  presupposition  that  a  significant  degree  of  "objectivity"  is  attainable  in  accounting; 
The  very  existence  of  accounting  practice  seems  to  rely  on  the  assumption  that  we  can  have 
accounting  knowledge;  And  knowledge  for  a  realist-correspondentist  like  Searle  (and 
Shapiro?  )  is  by  definition  objective: 
"Having  knowledge  consists  in  having  true  representations  for  which  we  can 
give  certain  sorts  of  justification  or  evidence.  Knowledge  is  thus  by  definition 
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objective  in  the  epistemic  sense,  because  the  criteria  for  knowledge  are  not 
arbitrary  and  they  are  impersonal.  " 
(Searle,  1995,  p.  151) 
The  statement  that  absolute  epistemic  objectivity  is  unattainable  is  in  itself  unobjectionable, 
so  long  as  the  emphasis  is  kept  on  the  word  "absolute".  The  problem  with  the  presupposition 
of  "subjective  judgement  (epistemological  subjectivity)"  (Shapiro,  1997,  p.  167)  is  that  it  is 
liable  to  be  (mis)understood,  at  least  by  the  unwary,  as  an  advocacy  of  the  view  that 
objectivity  in  accounting  is  unattainable,  that  is,  as  support  for  the  view  that  "objectivity  in 
accounting  is  largely  a  myth"  (Morgan,  1988,  p.  477).  We  read  the  work  of  both  Searle  and 
Davidson  as  defences  of  the  possibility  of  epistemic  objectivity,  and  find  particularly 
persuasive  Davidson's  defence  of  possibility  that  we  can  have  knowledge  of  the  objective 
public  world  we  share.  Accounting  theorist  should,  perhaps,  avoid  talk  that  could  be 
construed  as  a  dismissal  of  the  possibility  of  epistemic  objectivity  in  accounting. 
P5:  Commitment  to  rationalism  (epistemological  objectivity) 
For  a  realist-correspondentist,  like  Searle,  judgements  are  epistemically  objective  in  so  far 
as  "the  facts  in  the  world  that  make  them  true  or  false  are  independent  of  anybody's  attitudes 
or  feelings  about  them"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  8).  On  Searle's  representationalist  view  of  things 
epistemic  objectivity  is  understood  in  terms  of  accurate  or  true  representation.  Such  a  view 
stands  in  stark  opposition  to  the  antirepresentationalism  of  philosophers  like  Davidson  and 
Rorty,  outlined  in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  that  recognises  that  intersubjectivity  is  all  the 
foundation  we  need,  or  can  have,  for  objectivity.  Shapiro's  fifth  presupposition  of  external 
financial  reporting  "epistemological  objectivity"  seems  to  be  caught  somewhere  between 
these  two  fundamentally  antithetical  views  of  objectivity. 
In  stating  his  fifth  presupposition,  Shapiro  echoes  Searle's  representationalist  view 
that  having  "knowledge  consists  in  having  true  representations  for  which  we  can  give  certain 
sorts  of  justification  or  evidence"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  151,  and  Shapiro,  1997,  p.  167). 
Antirepresentationalist  would,  of  course,  like  us  to  stopped  talking  about  representations 
altogether:  "it  is  good  to  be  rid  of  representations,  and  with  them  the  correspondence  theory 
of  truth,  for  it  is  thinking  that  there  are  representations  which  engenders  thoughts  of 
relativism"(Davidson,  1988,  pp.  165-166,  quoted  by  Rorty,  1998,  p.  48).  If  there  are  no 
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"things"  for  our  true  sentences  to  correspond  to,  there  can  be  nothing  for  them  to  represent. 
Despite  Shapiro's  apparent  commitment  to  representations  and  correspondence,  he  rejects 
the  representationalist  view  of  epistemological  objectivity  -  "absolute  epistemological 
objectivity"  -  in  favour  of  a  conception  of  objectivity  as  intersubjectivity.  With 
presupposition  five  Shapiro  abandons  Searle's  realism  for  Rorty's  pragmatism,  and  suggests 
that  we  should  recognise  that  financial  reporting  presupposes  "a  pragmatic,  intersubjective, 
and  consensus  view"  of  objectivity  (Shapiro,  1997,  p.  167).  In  keeping  with  this  pragmatic 
turn,  Shapiro  endorses  Rorty's  suggestion  that  "there  is  nothing  to  be  said  about  either  truth 
or  rationality  apart  from  descriptions  of  familiar  procedures  of  justification  which  a  given 
society  -  ours  -  uses  in  one  or  another  area  of  inquiry"  (Rorty,  1991,  p.  23,  quoted  by  Shapiro, 
1997,  p.  173). 
These  pragmatic  views  of  truth  and  objectivity  are  plainly  inimical  to  the  realist- 
correspondentist  position  put  forward  by  Shapiro  in  presuppositions  one  and  two.  Those  who 
hold  a  correspondence  theory  of  truth  (with  the  apparent  exception  of  Shapiro)  clearly  do 
think  that  there  is  more  to  be  said  about  truth  than  mere  description  of  our  ways  of 
manufacturing  justification8.  Above  all  else,  it  is  Searle's  commitment  to  a  correspondence 
theory  of  truth  that  distinguishes  his  representationalist  position  from  Rorty's 
antirepresentationalism: 
"The  question  at  issue  between  representationalists  like  Searle  and 
antirepresentationalist  like  me  is  merely  this:  Can  we  pair  off  parts  of  the 
world  with  parts  of  beliefs  or  sentences,  so  as  to  be  able  to  say  that  the 
relations  between  the  latter  match  the  relations  between  the  former?  Can  true 
beliefs  or  sentences  be  treated  on  the  model  of  realistic  portraiture?  " 
(Rorty,  1998,  p.  74) 
For  Rorty  the  "the  substitution  of  objectivity-as-intersubjectivity  for  objectivity-as-accurate- 
representation  is  the  key  pragmatic  move"  (1998,  p.  83).  Shapiro  is  prepared  to  make  that 
move  and  to  encourage  us  to  conceive  of  truth,  in  Rortian  terms,  as  "what  is  good  for  us  to 
believe"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  657).  However,  Shapiro's  talk  of  realism  and  correspondence 
suggests  that  he  remains  caught  within  the  realism/idealism,  scheme/content,  problematics 
which  antirepresentationalist  like  Rorty  want  to  leave  behind. 
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The  representationalist  conception  of  objectivity  as  correspondence  or  true 
representation  is,  as  previously  explained,  essentially  incoherent.  We  therefore  welcome 
Shapiro's  recognition  that  objectivity  must  be  founded  upon  intersubjectivity.  The  notion  of 
objectivity-as-solidarity  is,  however,  surely  unlikely  to  be  taken  seriously  in  accounting 
debate  until  we  stop  talking  about  `correspondence'  and  `true  representations',  and  thereby 
free  ourselves  of  the  illusion  of  objectivity-as-accurate-representation.  Shapiro's  advocacy 
of  external  realism  and  his  attempts  to  resuscitate  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  in 
accounting  can  only  impede  proper  recognition  of  the  necessarily  intersubjective  basis  of 
objectivity. 
The  Presuppositions  -  Summary 
The  presuppositions  of  financial  reporting  articulated  by  Shapiro  are  inconsistent,  one  with 
the  other.  Such  inconsistency  can  do  little  to  facilitate  rational  debate  in  accounting.  The 
main  problems  we  see  with  the  formulation  of  the  presuppositions  of  external  financial 
reporting  offered  by  Shapiro  are  as  follows:  (i)  We  see  no  point  to  the  presupposition  of 
external  realism  except  insofar  as  it  paves  the  way  for  misguided  epistemological  claims  - 
this  presupposition  should  be  dropped  without  replacement.  (ii)  The  correspondence  theory 
of  truth  is  unintelligible  -  it  must  be  dropped.  We  follow  Davidson  in  thinking  that  we  can 
well  do  without  a  stipulative  definition  of  truth  -  we  should  not  look  for  alternative 
definitions  of  truth  in  accounting.  (iii)  In  any  full-blooded  form  conceptual  relativity  is 
difficult  to  make  any  sense  of,  and  it  hardly  seems  worth  stating  the  obvious  fact  that  the 
truth  of  any  sentence  is  relative  to  the  language  in  which  it  occurs.  We  suggest  that  the 
presupposition  of  conceptual  relativism  should  be  dropped,  and  that  accounting  theorists 
should  carefully  avoid  terminology  liable  to  encourage  the  unintelligible  view  that  reality  or 
the  truth  of  statements  (as  opposed  to  sentences)  might  be  scheme  relative.  (iv)  We  agree 
with  Shapiro  that  absolute  epistemological  objectivity  is  not  possible  in  accounting. 
Accounting  does,  however,  deal  with  publicly  accessible  phenomena  and  does  seem  to 
presuppose  the  possibility  that  some  high  degree  of  epistemological  objectivity  can  be 
achieved  (albeit  objectivity  based  on  intersubjectivity).  We  suggest  that  accounting  theorists 
should  avoid  any  terminology  that  implies  that  accounting  is  somehow  incorrigibly 
subjective,  or  that  objectivity  in  accounting  is  a  myth  -  the  statement  of  a  presupposition  of 
"epistemological  subjectivity"  may  foster  such  misconceptions.  We  find  in  Shapiro's 
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presupposition  of  epistemological  objectivity  a  welcome  turn  towards  an 
antirepresentationalist  position  that  recognises  that  the  only  ultimate  foundation  for 
objectivity  is  intersubjectivity.  In  our  discussion  above  we  have  stressed  that  such  a  position 
cannot  be  married  with  a  commitment  to  a  correspondence  theory  of  truth. 
We  have  not  meant,  in  anything  that  we  have  said  above,  to  cast  any  doubt  on  the 
view  that  "truthfulness",  "fairness"  and  "objectivity"  are  absolutely  vital  qualities  in  financial 
reporting.  The  value  of  philosophical  theorising  about  such  matters  is,  perhaps,  altogether 
more  dubious: 
"If  we  antirepresentationalist  and  anticorrespondentists  ever  win  our  argument 
with  Searle,  that  will  give  historians  and  physicists  no  reason  to  behave 
differently  than  they  presently  do.  Nor,  I  suspect,  will  their  morale  or  their 
efficiency  improve  if  Searle  and  his  fellow  representationalists  should  win. 
Honesty,  care,  truthfulness,  and  other  moral  and  social  virtues  are  just  not  that 
closely  connected  to  what  we  philosophy  professors  eventually  decide  to  be 
the  least  problematic  way  of  describing  the  relationship  between  human 
inquiry  and  the  rest  of  the  universe.  " 
(Rorty,  1998,  p.  75) 
Nevertheless,  we  do  believe  the  acceptance  of  an  antirepresentationalist  view  of  accounting 
ought  to  have  significant  implications  for  how  we  conceive  of  the  role  of  rational  argument 
in  accounting  debate.  We  turn  to  that  issue  in  the  next  part  of  this  chapter. 
Rational  argument  in  accounting  debate 
Antirepresentationalism  acknowledges  the  inevitable  contingency  of  language  and  the  human 
condition  (see  Rorty,  1989);  it  recognises  our  referential  categories  as  the  product  of 
historical  discursive  struggle  and  allows  no  scope  for  the  validation  of  our  referential 
schemes  by  test  against  predeterminate  reality.  It  denies  the  possibility  of  a  paradigm-free 
"final  vocabulary"  with  privileged  access  to  reality;  "there  is  no  chance  that  someone  can 
take  up  a  vantage  point  for  comparing  conceptual  schemes  (e.  g.  the  astrologers  and  the  astro- 
physicists)  by  temporarily  shedding  his  own"  (Davidson,  1974a,  p.  185).  For  the 
antirepresentationalist  questions  about  the  accuracy  with  which  our  representations  reflect 
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reality  tend  to  be  supplanted  by  questions  about  the  usefulness  of  our  referential  frameworks 
and  their  political/ethical  justification.  From  this  perspective  it  then  becomes  vital  that  we 
pay  close  attention  to  how  the  accounting,  recognised  as  an  "ethical,  historically  contingent, 
and  socially  constructed"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  657)  practice,  is  developed  through  debate  and 
argument.  Shapiro  has  made  a  welcome  contribution  to  this  project  by  providing  an  analysis 
of  the  conditions  and  maxims  for  rational  debate  concerning  alternative  accounting  practices. 
In  our  view,  however,  Shapiro  misconceives  proper  role  of  argument  in  accounting  debate 
and  thereby  underestimates  its  potential.  Once  we  have  explained  our  critical  assessment  of 
Shapiro's  analysis,  we  will  outline  our  own  Habermasian  view  the  role  and  potential  of 
argument  in  accounting  debate. 
Shapiro's  (conditional)-normative  model  of  rational  argument 
We  have  summarised,  in  Table  2,  the  three  conditions  for  rational  and  objective  debate  over 
alternative  accounting  practices,  put  forward  by  Shapiro  in  his  1997  paper.  Shapiro  develops 
his  analysis  of  the  conditions  for  rational  debate  in  accounting  more  fully  in  his  1998  paper, 
and  Table  3,  briefly  sets  out  the  maxims  for  critical  discussion  he  advances  in  that  paper. 
Table  2.  Three  conditions  for  rational  and  objective  debate  over  alternative  accounting 
practices,  proposed  by  Shapiro  (1997,  p.  166). 
Cl  Participant  in  a  debate  must  give  justification  or  evidence  for  their  assertions  and 
respond  to  counter-arguments. 
C2  Participants  must  ...  assert  only  what  they  know  not  to  be  false  and  avoid  asserting 
something  for  which  they  lack  evidence. 
C3  Participants  must  be  able  to  evaluate  the  extent  to  which  a  particular  financial 
reporting  practice  may  achieve  an  explicitly  stated  financial  reporting  objective, 
independently  of  the  opinions  or  attitudes  they  have  toward  the  particular  reporting 
objective  in  question. 
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Table  3.  Maxims  for  critical  discussion  proposed  by  Shapiro,  (1998)  (adapted  from  Van 
Eemeren  &  Grootendorst,  1987) 
MI  Parties  must  not  prevent  each  other  from  advancing  or  casting  doubt  on  standpoints. 
M2  Whoever  advances  a  standpoint  must  defend  it  if  asked  to  do  so. 
M3  An  attack  on  a  standpoint  must  relate  to  the  standpoint  that  has  really  been 
advanced  by  the  protagonist. 
M4  A  standpoint  may  be  defended  only  by  advancement  of  arguments  related  to  that 
standpoint. 
M5  A  person  can  be  held  to  the  premises  he  leaves  implicit. 
M6  A  standpoint  must  be  regarded  as  conclusively  defended  if  the  defence  takes  place 
by  means  of  arguments  belonging  to  the  common  starting  point. 
M7  A  standpoint  must  be  regarded  as  conclusively  defended  if  the  defence  takes  place 
by  means  of  arguments  in  which  a  commonly  accepted  scheme  of  argumentation 
is  correctly  applied. 
M8  A  failed  defence  must  result  in  the  protagonist  withdrawing  his  standpoint  and  a 
successful  defence  must  result  in  the  antagonist  withdrawing  his  doubt  about  the 
standpoint. 
We  will  attempt  to  justify  our  critique  of  Shapiro's  model  of  rational  argument  in  accounting 
by  concentrating  on  certain  salient  issues  and  in  particular  his  conception  of  the  limits  of 
argument.  We  will  have  little  to  say  about  most  of  the  detail  of  the  maxims  he  proposes.  In 
our  view  the  vital  thing  to  understand  about  Shapiro's  prescription  for  rational  argument 
concerning  alternative  accounting  practices,  is  that  it  places  the  norms  and  values  upon  which 
alternative  accounting  schemes  are  based  beyond  the  scope  of  rational  argument.  For 
Shapiro,  norms  are  not  open  to  objective  validation  and  "...  because  the  objectives  of 
financial  reporting  are  based  on  norms  that  cannot  be  validated  or  empirically  verified, 
reasonable  people  can  disagree  about  those  objectives"  (Shapiro,  1997,  p.  183). 
Shapiro's  denial  of  the  possibility  that  norms  might  be  validated  by  rational  argument 
is  made  the  more  surprising  by  the  fact  that  he  opens  his  1998  paper  with  a  quote  from  an 
essay  in  which  Habermas  (1983)  sets  out  precisely  to  show  how  norms  can  be  objectively 
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validated  through  rational  debate.  Shapiro  seems  to  reject  the  basic  import  of  the 
Habermasian  analysis.  He  appreciates  that  accounting  practice  is  always  historically 
contingent  and  built  upon  norms  and  values.  However,  he  does  not  draw  the  obvious 
Habermasian  implication  that  accounting  practice  can  ultimately  only  be  legitimated  through 
the  objective  validation  of  those  underlying  norms  in  rational  debate.  Instead,  because  he 
assumes  that  accounting  norms  can  not  be  objectively  validated,  he  concludes  that  the 
accounting  practice  built  on  those  norms  can  have  no  objective  basis  or  legitimacy;  "because 
all  financial  reporting  schemes  are  socially  constructed  and  based  on  norms  that  cannot  be 
empirically  refuted  or  verified  ...  they  lack  an  objective  basis  or  absolute  foundation  to 
legitimise  them"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  641). 
Shapiro  rightly  sees  that  norms  invariably  undergird  our  historically  contingent 
accounting  schemes  and  practice;  they  "are  embedded  not  only  in  user-oriented  financial 
reporting  objectives...  , 
but  also  in  qualitative  characteristics  of  accounting  information  such 
as  relevance  and  reliability  ...  ,  and  definitions  of  basic  financial  statement  elements" 
(Shapiro,  1998,  p.  655).  Nevertheless,  despite  his  recognition  of  their  vital  significance  he 
does  not  want  to  make  these  norms  the  focus  of  rational  argument.  For  Shapiro  the  embedded 
norms  are  part  of  the  "common  starting  point  that  makes  a  critical  accounting  discussion 
possible"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  655).  In  Shapiro's  view  of  things,  the  dominant  norms  and  the 
accounting  objectives  and  prized  qualitative  characteristics  of  accounting  that  follow  from 
them,  set  the  bounds  of  acceptable  rational  argument  concerning  alternative  accounting 
practices:  They  are  not  to  be  the  subject  of  that  argument  but  its  starting  point.  Shapiro 
recognises  that  the  norms  underpinning  accounting  practice  are  historically  contingent  and 
socially  contested,  he  appreciates  that  "these  norms  and  the  language  games  they  prescribe 
and  proscribe  ...  are  sites  of  much  conflict"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  647),  yet  his  model  of  rational 
accounting  argument  has  no  place  for  that  contest. 
Shapiro's  maxims  of  rational  argument  are,  in  effect,  his  suggestions  for  how  debate 
should  be  focused  and  disciplined.  Maxim  6,  for  example,  stipulates  that:  "A  standpoint  must 
be  regarded  as  conclusively  defended  if  the  defence  takes  place  by  means  of  arguments 
belonging  to  the  common  starting  point"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  644).  A  key  element  of  the 
discipline  he  proposes  is  the  exclusion  of  "irrelevant"  and  the  "unacceptable"  arguments.  The 
"operational  definition"  of  acceptable  and  relevant  argument,  he  suggests,  will  be  guided  by 
the  common  starting  point  including  "the  stakeholder  objectives  of  financial  reporting,  and 
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the  other  norms  they  entail"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  647).  To  illustrate  the  distinction  between 
acceptable  and  unacceptable  argument  Shapiro  considers  the  position  of  argument  from 
"economic  consequence"  in  context  of  the  concept  of  neutrality.  He  argues  that  the  concept 
of  neutrality  is  predicated  on  the  normative  assertion  that  the  role  financial  reporting  is  to 
facilitate  economic  and  business  decision-making,  and  he  recognises  that,  as  such,  it  has  a 
"partisan  role"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  649).  Nevertheless,  he  happily  suggest  that  the  concept  of 
neutrality  renders  "indirect  economic  consequences  that  result  from  stakeholder  responses" 
(Shapiro,  1998,  p.  649)  irrelevant  to  rational  accounting  debate;  "such  economic 
consequences  arguments  commit  the  argumentum  ad  consequentiam  fallacy"  (Shapiro,  1998, 
p.  649).  For  Shapiro,  the  close  relation  of  the  concept  of  neutrality  to  the  presently  existing 
normative  base  of  financial  reporting  seems  to  place  it  beyond  rational  contention;  it  has  a 
privileged  position  as  a  starting  point  for  rational  debate  in  accounting. 
Shapiro  recognises,  but  makes  no  apology  for  the  fact  that  his  "normative  model  of 
rational  argumentation  imposes  (and  even  condones)  a  certain  kind  of  "violence"  on  the 
heterogeneity  of  language  games  that  seek  to  occupy  the  accounting  debates"  (Shapiro,  1998, 
p.  660).  His  stance  is  stolidly  conservative;  he  seems  to  see  the  status  quo  as  imposing 
"obligations"  on  the  participants  in  accounting  debate: 
"Although  financial  reporting  objectives  lack  an  absolute  or  universal 
foundation,  a  given  set  of  explicit  objectives  imposes  social  obligations  on  all 
participants  (including  rule  making  bodies)  in  the  accounting  standard  setting 
process.  For  example,  user  oriented  financial  reporting  objectives  obligate 
standard  setters  to  establish  and  improve  standards  for  the  benefit  of  external 
users.  " 
(Shapiro,  1998,  p.  642) 
He  provides  no  explanation  or  justification  of  why  we  should  think  that  the  dominant  norms 
and  associated  objectives  and  prized  qualitative  characteristics  of  accounting  impose 
obligations  on  the  participants.  Nor  does  he  give  any  explanation  of  the  nature  of  the 
supposed  obligation.  Our  own  view  is  that  norms  carry  the  obligatory  force  that  they  do,  only 
by  virtue  of  their  validity.  Shapiro  seems  to  think  that  norms  can't  be  validated,  yet  he  clearly 
thinks  these  obligations  are  somehow  strong  enough  to  justify  the  stifling  curtailment  of 
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argument  -  the  "violence"  -  that  he  recognises  his  normative  model  of  rational  argument 
would  impose. 
Shapiro's  approach  to  rational  argument  complements  the  "conditional-normative" 
approach  to  financial  reporting  developed  by  Mattessich  (1995).  Mattessich  recognises  the 
growing  interest  in  the  ethical  and  normative  aspects  of  accounting,  and  he  agrees  with 
Shapiro  that  the  value  judgements  and  associated  norms  that  underlie  accounting  theory  and 
practice  can  have  no  objective  basis,  and  are  not  open  to  validation:  they  "are  neither 
objective  nor  accessible  to  empirical  refutation  or  verification"  (Mattessich,  1995,  p.  264).  He 
suggests  we  should  conceive  of  accounting  as  an  applied  science,  and  that  the  normative 
dimension  of  accounting  might  best  be  accommodated  by  the  adoption  of  what  he  calls  a 
conditional-normative  methodology.  That  methodology  would  recognise  that  our  accounting 
models  rest  on  value  judgements  and  norms;  indeed  it  would  insist  on  their  explicit 
recognition  and  disclosure,  and  require  that  we  acknowledge  that  the  preferred  norms  have 
been  chosen  from  "many  possible  alternatives"  (Mattessich,  1995,  p.  265).  The  elected  norms 
and  value  judgements  would  then  be  incorporated  as  premises  in  the  development  of 
purpose-oriented  accounting  models.  The  contribution  of  the  accounting  researcher/theorist 
would  then  be  to  empirically  research  and  appropriately  theorise  the  relationship  between 
various  norms,  values,  and  purposes  and  accounting  means.  Mattessich  sees  the  conditional- 
normative  methodology  as  a  significant  break  with  positive  accounting  theory,  which  allows 
no  normative  elements  in  its  premises  and  essentially  leaves  the  user  to  tie  together  purposes 
and  accounting  means.  The  essence  of  any  applied  science,  as  Mattessich  sees  it,  is  in  the 
development  of  a  set  of  theoretical  solutions  for  a  range  of  alternative  objectives: 
"Only  then  can  the  user  -  be  she  or  he  a  medical  practitioner,  engineer,  lawyer 
or  accountant  -  take  the  theory  and  apply  it  to  actual  practice  without  getting 
her/himself  involved  in  cumbersome  inferences  of  means-end  relations" 
(Mattessich,  1995,  p.  266). 
Both  Mattessich  and  Shapiro  treat  the  norms  underlying  accounting  practice  as  lying  beyond 
critical  analysis  -  beyond  reason.  For  both,  the  selection  of  ends  in  accounting,  is  a  matter  of 
simple  choice,  an  expression  of  preference  and  power;  reason  is  reserved  for  the  evaluation 
of  means: 
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"Once  the  objectives  are  explicitly  stated,  a  conditional  normative  approach 
makes  it  possible  for  one  to  evaluate  the  extent  to  which  a  proposed  financial 
reporting  practice  (the  means)  may  achieve  the  objectives.  " 
(Shapiro,  1997,  p.  170) 
Shapiro  contributes  to  the  development  of  conditional-normative  approach  to  accounting 
theory  by  giving  more  emphasis  to  the  role  of  argument  in  the  identification  and  selection  of 
appropriate  means,  than  does  Mattessich  who  is  content  to  emphasise  the  identification  of 
appropriate  means  through  logical  analysis  and  empirical  verification.  Mattessich's  approach 
is  to  frankly  urge  the  need  for  the  rigorous  application  of  instrumental  reason.  Shapiro 
recommends  an  instrumental  reason  but  in  terms  perhaps  more  superficially  palatable  to  a 
liberal  audience.  He  repeatedly  suggests  that  the  conditions  of  argument  he  prescribes  are 
somehow  appropriate  for  "critical"  debate,  and  he  explains  that  his  conditional  normative 
model  is  based  on  "the  premise  that  the  goal  of  a  critical  accounting  discussion  should  be  to 
reach  conclusions  by  means  of  reasoned  argument"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  642).  However,  it  is 
not  at  all  clear  how  we  are  expected  to  understand  the  term  "critical"  in  this  context.  The 
conditions  for  argument  that  Shapiro  prescribes,  and  in  particular  the  distinction  they 
maintain  between  the  acceptable  and  unacceptable  argument  in  terms  of  respect  for  the 
common  starting  point,  are  in  our  view  essentially  inimical  to  critical  discussion.  Shapiro's 
conditions  for  rational  argument  set  the  ground  for  debate  between  experts  -  who  know  and 
respect  the  "common  starting  point"  (Maxim  6),  and  "commonly  accepted  scheme  of 
argumentation"  (Maximum  7).  It  provides  for  the  exclusion  of  those  critical  elements,  which 
would  seek  to  disrupt  the  status  quo. 
We  have  two  main  objections  to  the  conditional-normative  approach  that  Shapiro 
seeks  to  develop/advance.  Firstly,  it  relies  heavily  on  the'myth'  of  managerial  effectiveness; 
Mattessich's  accountant  will  supposedly  have  in  his  dispensary  a  battery  of  effective 
accounting  means  to  match  a  wide  range  of  purposes.  One  "very  simple,  yet  probably 
devastating"  problem  with  this  "prediction  and  control  view  of  accounting  science"  is  that 
"we  can't  predict"  (Williams,  1992,  p.  100).  And  there  are  good  reasons  why  we  should 
recognise  that  accounting  research  will  never  yield  the  kind  of  knowledge,  that  is,  a  stock  of 
law-like  generalizations  with  good  predictive  power,  that  would  seem  to  be  necessary  to 
166 Chapter  4:  Validity  in  Accounting  Standard  Setting  and  the  Presuppositions  of  External  Financial  Reporting 
operationalize  Mattessich's  vision  (See  Maclntyre  1985,  ch.  8).  It  would  be  a  mistake, 
however,  to  think  of  the  conditional-normative  approach  as  misconceived  but  harmless.  The 
masquerade  of  managerial  effectiveness  and  hence  justified  authority  is  one  of  the  central 
moral  fictions  of  our  times  -  "and  perhaps  the  most  culturally  powerful  of  them  all" 
(Maclntyre,  1985,  pp.  76).  We  see  Shapiro's  attempt  to  find  a  place  for  "rational"  argument 
in  the  identification  of  means,  as  a  new  twist  to  the  masquerade. 
Our  second  objection  to  the  conditional-normative  approach  is  that  it  maintains  the 
notion  of  accountants  as  primarily  concerned  with  finding/producing  the  most  effective  and 
efficient  means  to  match  the  desired/chosen  ends.  The  ends  are  simply  taken  as  premises  for 
model  development  -  they  are  not  open  to  rational  examination  and  hence  lie  beyond  the 
scope  of  the  accountant's  implicitly  neutral  analysis  of  means-ends  relations.  The  accountant 
need  only  be  concerned  with  the  effectiveness  of  her  models,  and  she  can  maintain  a  claim 
of  moral  neutrality.  The  difficulty  with  this  view  is  that  the  claim  to  effectiveness  is  not 
morally  neutral,  rather  it  is  closely  associated  with  the  domination  of  the  mode  of 
manipulation  in  our  societies;  which  treats  human  beings  as  means  -  rather  than  ends: 
"Managers  themselves  and  most  writers  about  management  conceive  of 
themselves  as  morally  neutral  characters  whose  skills  enable  them  to  devise 
the  most  efficient  means  of  achieving  whatever  end  is  proposed.  ... 
Nonetheless  there  are  strong  grounds  for  rejecting  the  view  that  effectiveness 
is  a  morally  neutral  value.  For  the  whole  concept  of  effectiveness  is 
... 
inseparable  from  a  mode  of  human  existence  in  which  the  contrivance  of 
means  is  in  central  part  the  manipulation  of  human  beings  into  compliant 
patterns  of  behaviour;  and  it  is  by  appeal  to  his  own  effectiveness  in  this 
respect  that  the  manager  claims  authority  within  the  manipulative  mode.  " 
(Maclntyre,  1985,  p.  74) 
The  dominance  of  the  manipulative  mode  in  our  societies  may  not  be  matched  by  any  real 
effective  planned  manipulation.  This  however  does  not  mean  that  "the  activities  of  purported 
experts  do  not  have  effects  and  that  we  do  not  suffer  from  those  effects  and  suffer  gravely" 
(Maclntyre,  1985,  pp.  106-107).  Writing  and  theorising  in  the  conditional-normative  mould 
is  liable  to  serve  to  perpetuate  the  mode  of  manipulation. 
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The  validation  of  norms 
To  conclude  this  chapter,  we  will  briefly  sketch  a  more  optimistic  view  of  the  potential  role 
of  argument  in  accounting  debate.  This  view  is  based  upon  Habermas'  reconstruction  of  the 
potential  for  communicative  rationality  implicit  in  the  intuitions  that  underpin  everyday 
communicative  practice;  his  "discourse  ethics"  (Habermas,  1983).  Habermas  reacts  against 
Weber  and  the  early  Frankfurt  school's  pessimistic  identification  of  rationality  with  means- 
ends  rationality,  described  respectively  as  'goal-rationality'  and  'instrumental  reason'.  He 
argues  that  both  lose  sight  of  the  potential  for  communicative  rationality  that  he  sees  as  a 
basic  competence  of  the  human  species.  He  thinks  that  language  contains  within  itself  an 
impetus  towards  the  development  of  rationally-based  shared  understanding  and  social 
coordination.  And  it  is  this  potential,  implicit  in  the  intuitions  of  everyday  life,  that  Habermas 
seeks  to  reconstruct  and  explicate.  Habermas'  discourse  ethics  originates,  then,  as  a  response 
to  just  the  kind  of  "value  scepticism  growing  out  of  the  scientistic  contraction  of  reason  to 
scientific  and  technical  domains"  (Rehg,  1997,  p.  21),  which  characterises  the  morally 
disarming,  conditional-normative,  approach  to  accounting  -  as  applied  science  -  advocated 
by  Mattessich  and  Shapiro9: 
"Moral  philosophy  does  have  an  enlightening  or  clarificatory  role  to  play  vis- 
a-vis  the  confusions  that  it  has  created  in  the  minds  of  the  educated,  that  is, 
to  the  extent  to  which  value  scepticism  and  legal  positivism  have  established 
themselves  as  professional  ideologies  and  have  infiltrated  everyday 
consciousness  by  way  of  the  educational  system.  Together  scepticism  and 
positivism  have  misinterpreted  and  thus  neutralized  the  intuitions  people 
acquire  in  a  quasi-natural  manner  through  socialization.  Under  extreme 
conditions  they  can  contribute  to  the  moral  disarmament  of  academics  already 
in  the  grip  of  cultivated  scepticism.  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  98) 
Habermas'  basic  purpose  is  to  justify  and  promote  a  communicative  rationality  capable  of 
redeeming  the  enlightenment  promise  and  delivering  a  more  free  and  equal  society.  That  is, 
a  rationality  that  can  be  applied  not  just  to  "means"  but  to  "ends";  a  rationality  that  can  be 
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used  to  validate  or  challenge  norms  of  action: 
"Against  the  pessimistic  vision  of  an  impermeable  instrumentality  -  totalized 
society  -  Habermas'  model  of  rationalization  encloses  the  counterfactual  basis 
for  the  possibility  of  reconstituting  a  public  sphere  in  which  citizens  can 
engage  in  the  discussion  of  ends.  " 
(Power  &  Laughlin,  1996,  p.  444) 
Habermas'  central  concern  has  been  to  analyse  the  human  capacity  to  create  to  a  more 
"rational"  society.  He  finds  the  promise  of  emancipation  in  modernity's  potential  for 
rationality  and  thus  welcomes  the  transition  from  traditional  to  modern  society.  Whilst  the 
transition  to  modernity  is  marked  by  the  struggle  between  reason  and  its  Other  -  the  "sacred", 
modernity  itself,  as  Habermas  sees  it,  is  characterized  by  tension  between  two  modes  of 
reason,  instrumental  reason  and  communicative  reason.  The  full  emancipatory  potential  of 
modernity  can  be  realized  only  through  communicative  reason,  yet  distortions  associated 
with  the  development  of  modernity  are  liable  to  impede  the  growth  of  communicative 
rationality.  In  the  following  paragraphs,  we  provide  a  rudimentary  sketch  of  the  processes 
of  rationalisation  that  Habermas  sees  as  characterising  the  development  of  modern  Western 
society  -  insofar  as  they  the  impact  on  accounting.  This  sketch  will  facilitate  subsequent 
discussion  of  the  nature  of  Habermas'  model  of  communicative  rationality,  its  potential 
application  in  accounting  debate,  and  the  associated  benefits  and  difficulties. 
As  society  becomes  increasingly  pluralistic  and  complex  the  need  grows  for  ever- 
more  sophisticated  mechanisms  of  integration.  Ways  need  to  be  found  of  resolving  conflict 
across  the  whole  of  society  in  circumstances  where  acceptable  norms  of  action  can  no  longer 
be  motivated  by  appeal  to  the  value  preferences  and  self-understandings  associated  with 
particular,  religious  or  metaphysical,  worldviews  or  group  related  conceptions  of  the  "good 
life".  In  such  circumstances,  where  society  can  no  longer  be  effectively  stabilised  around 
shared  traditions  and  taken  for  granted  authorities  that  place  many  issues  and  assumptions 
beyond  consideration,  there  is  an  inevitable  pressure  to  find  explicit  agreement  on  a  widening 
range  of  issues  on  the  basis  of  diminishing  common  ground.  That  pressure,  Habennas  argues, 
gives  impetus  to  processes  of  rationalisation  affecting  society  as  both  "lifeworld"  and  the 
"system". 
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For  Habermas  the  lifeworld  is  the  "background  assumptions"  (Habermas,  1981  a, 
p.  335),  norms,  and  shared  expectations  and  understandings,  through  which  we  make  sense 
of  experience  and  coordinate  social  action.  It  is  the  "scaffolding"  which  forms  the  "horizon" 
of  communicative  understanding  (Habermas,  1981  a  p.  70).  It  is  all  those  social,  cultural,  and 
personal,  aspects  of  life  that  can  only  be  integrated  and  reproduced  through  communicative 
action.  The  term  "system",  in  contrast,  refers  to  society  conceived  of  in  terms  of  the  different 
sub-systems  (e.  g.,  economic,  legal,  educational),  each  with  its  ends  and  means,  which 
together  sustain  the  material  reproduction  of  life  and  are  coordinated  through  the  functional 
interconnection  of  the  consequences  of  action.  The  distinction  between  lifeworld  and  system 
is  essentially  one  of  interpretative  perspective.  As  system,  society  is  viewed  from  an  external 
and  objectifying  viewpoint.  Whilst  as  lifeworld,  society  is  understood  as  it  is  lived  by  the 
participant,  that  is,  the  viewpoint  is  internal  and  performative.  The  two  perspectives  allow 
us  to  separate  two  dimensions  under  which  the  integration  of  society  can  be  analyzed: 
"Whereas  social  integration  presents  itself  as  part  of  the  symbolic 
reproduction  of  the  lifeworld  -  which  depends  not  only  on  the  reproduction 
of  memberships  (or  solidarities)  but  also  on  cultural  traditions  and 
socialization  processes  -  functional  integration  amounts  to  a  material 
reproduction  of  the  lifeworld  that  can  be  conceived  as  system  maintenance. 
The  transition  from  one  problem  area  to  the  other  is  tied  to  a  change  of 
methodological  attitude  and  conceptual  apparatus.  " 
(Habermas,  198lb,  pp.  232-233) 
The  coordination,  integration,  and  regulation  of  almost  all  aspects  of  traditional  society  were 
based  upon  the  lifeworld  of  kinship  and  tradition.  The  rationalisation  of  the  lifeworld  in  the 
transition  to  modernity  is  marked  by  a  shift  from  social  integration  based  on  sacred  symbol 
and  myth,  to  a  social  integration  structured  by  a  consensus  on  norms  motivated  by  shared 
understandings  achieved  through  communicative  action.  As  the  development  of  society 
proceeds,  facilitated  by  the  rationalisation  of  the  lifeworld  including  the  development  of 
modern  law,  there  is  a  tendency  towards  the  differentiation  and  decoupling  of  the  lifeworld 
and  system.  The  increasing  complexity  of  the  material  reproduction  of  life  reveals  the  limits 
and  burdens  of  social  integration  based  on  the  lifeworld  and  the  media  of  language.  There  is 
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then,  necessarily,  increasing  reliance  on  systems  integration,  achieved  as  an  unintended 
consequence  of  action,  through,  for  example,  markets  and  bureaucratic  functioning.  The 
system  of  material  reproduction  eventually  acquires  a  high  degree  of  autonomy,  so  that  it 
tends  to  slip  beyond  symbolic/normative  social  control.  Instead  of  being  guided  by  norms 
and  shared  understandings  developed  through  the  communication  in  the  lifeworld,  the  system 
is  steered  by  media  of  power  and  money.  Furthermore,  irresolvable  tensions  within  the 
system,  and  particularly  within  the  system  of  capitalism,  tend  inevitably  to  drive  it  to  intrude 
upon,  and  damage,  the  lifeworld: 
"(T)he  systemic  imperatives  of  autonomous  subsystems  penetrate  into  the 
lifeworld  and  through  monetarization  and  bureaucratization,  force  an 
assimilation  of  communicative  action  to  formally  organized  domains  of 
action  -  even  in  areas  where  the  action  coordinating  mechanism  of  reaching 
understanding  is  functionally  necessary.  " 
(Habermas,  1981b,  p.  403). 
There  is,  then,  a  contradiction  in  the  process  of  modernisation:  The  rationalisation  of  the 
lifeworld  is  liberating  insofar  as  it  opposes  deference  to  traditional  authorities  and  promotes 
the  public  use  of  reason  in  the  communicative  evaluation  of  norms.  However,  rationalisation 
of  the  lifeworld,  facilitates  the  development  of  sub-systems  which,  acquiring  quasi- 
autonomy,  impose  their  own  methods  and  logic,  instrumental  reason,  on  the  lifeworld  which 
relies  for  its  reproduction  on  communicative  reason: 
"The  rationalization  of  the  lifeworld  makes  possible  a  kind  of  systematic 
integration  that  enters  into  competition  with  the  integrating  principle  of 
reaching  understanding  and,  under  certain  condition,  has  a  disintegrative 
effect  on  the  lifeworld.  " 
(Habermas,  198  1  a,  pp.  342-343) 
This  "colonization"  of  the  lifeworld  by  the  system  in  capitalist  modernity  makes  clients  of 
citizens  and  consumers  of  workers,  and  thereby  inhibits  the  development  of  the  kind  of 
collective  will  formation  that  could  overcome  the  injustices  of  the  capitalist  system. 
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Habermas  sees  a  special  potential  for  resistance  to  the  colonization  of  the  lifeworld  in  the 
"new  resistance  and  withdrawal  movements",  like  environmentalism,  that  share  an  opposition 
to  the  capitalist  growth  on  which  the  welfare-state  compromise,  that  suppresses  class  conflict 
and  the  development  of  class  consciousness,  is  based  (see  Habermas,  1981b,  pp.  391-393). 
Resistance  to  the  colonization  of  the  lifeworld  is  also  hampered  by  the  "differentiation"  that 
is  associated  with  the  rationalization  of  the  lifeworld.  The  segmentation  of  the  lifeworld  into 
separate  fields;  science  and  production,  art  and  aesthetics,  morality  and  law,  each  dominated 
by  experts,  fragments  political  consciousness  and  thereby  impedes  the  development  of  any 
synthesized  position  from  which  colonization  can  be  recognized  and  effectively  resisted.  The 
conditional-normative  conception  of  accounting  as  applied  science  embraces  this  process  of 
fragmentation  and  encourages  us  to  see  accounting  as  a  distinct  field  of  technical  expertise 
clearly  differentiable  from  any  moral/normative  issues.  The  expert  elites  empowered  by  the 
process  of  differentiation  typically  strive  to  sustain  their  positions  by  propagating  the  myth 
of  technical  validity/effectiveness  and  by  isolating  themselves  and  their  expertise  from  non- 
technical  normative  issues.  Nevertheless,  expertise  remains  open  to  challenge,  and  in  the  case 
of  accounting  the  rhetoric  of  effectiveness  regularly  collides  with  real,  and  very  public, 
failures  of  accountability:  "it  increasingly  encounters  legitimacy  problems  not  just  from  its 
own  apparent  technical  failure  to  deliver  expected  forms  of  corporate  control  but  also  from 
non-economic  discourses  of  need  and  effectiveness  which  it  cannot  easily  absorb"  (Power 
&  Laughlin,  1996,  p.  446). 
The  retention  of  any  lifeworld,  or normative,  hold  on  the  differentiated  system,  is 
obstructed  by  the  fact  that  each  sub-systems  will  develop  its  own  semantics  and  "grammar 
for  interpreting  the  world"  (Habermas,  1992,  p.  346).  Communication  between  the  lifeworld 
and  system  then  becomes  problematic.  Functional  sub-systems,  like  accounting,  will 
typically  not  speak  the  language  of  norms.  Habermas  insists,  however,  that  it  is  unrealistic 
to  think  that  "one  can  separate  the  professional  knowledge  of  specialists  from  values  and 
moral  points  of  view",  on  the  contrary  they  are  deeply  interlocked: 
"As  soon  as  specialized  knowledge  is  brought  to  politically  relevant 
problems,  its  unavoidably  normative  character  becomes  apparent,  setting  off 
controversies  that  polarize  the  experts  themselves.  This  by  itself  shows  that 
problems  of  functional  coordination,  when  handled  politically,  are 
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intertwined  with  the  moral  and  ethical  dimensions  of  social  integration. 
(Habermas,  1992,  p.  351) 
He  argues  then  that  it  is  counterproductive,  from  both  the  cognitive  and  legitimacy 
viewpoints,  for  the  system  to  be  allowed  to  become  divorced  from  will-formation  in  the 
public  sphere.  And  he  suggests  that  this  mediation  of  public  sphere  and  system  may  be 
effected  through  the  medium  of  law.  The  language  of  law  may  act  as  a  "transformer"  between 
the  ordinary  language  of  the  lifeworld  and  the  specialised  language  of  systems.  Ideally 
normative/political  issues  should  be  raised  and  debated  in  the  public  sphere  -  where  a  public 
will  can  be  formed,  and  influence  deliberative  bodies  (legislatures  and  quasi-legislatures  such 
as  the  accounting  standard  setting  bodies).  In  this  way,  ideally,  the  public  will  may  be 
expressed  in  law,  a  language  that  the  semi-autonomous  systems  (administrative,  economic, 
educational,  and  others)  can  understand: 
"The  language  of  law  brings  ordinary  communication  from  the  public  and 
private  spheres  and  puts  it  in  a  form  in  which  these  messages  can  also  be 
received  by  the  special  codes  of  autopoietic  systems  -  and  vice  versa.  Without 
this  transformer,  ordinary  language  could  not  circulate  throughout  society. 
(Habermas,  1992,  p.  354) 
Law  can  potentially  tie  together  the  public  sphere  (lifeworld)  and  system.  Indeed,  from  the 
perspective  of  bourgeois  ideology,  systems  can  only  be  regarded  as  legitimate  insofar  as  they 
are  accountable  and  responsive  to  the  public  sphere  -  they  must  respond  to  the  public  will. 
There  are  real  difficulties  associated  with  the  actualisation  of  such  an  ideal;  not  least  in 
respect  of  those  quasi-governmental  institutions,  such  as  the  accounting  standard  setting 
bodies,  that  lack  strongly  developed  and  effective  communicative  ties  with  the  public  sphere. 
The  effectiveness  and  legitimacy  of  the  mediation  of  accounting  expertise  and  the  public 
sphere  is,  of  course,  a  central  concern  of  the  critical  accounting  project: 
"(M)uch  of  what  passes  for  the  "applied  turn"  in  critical  theory  focuses  upon 
the  legitimacy  of  particular  forms  of  expertise  and  on  Habermas'  question  of 
how  "expert  cultures  can  be  mediated  with  everyday  practice"  (1981b, 
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pp.  397-398).  This  brings  critical  theory  face  to  face  with  existing 
preoccupations  with  corporate  governance  and  the  problem  of  making  expert 
insiders  accountable  to  outside  `stakeholders'.  " 
(Power  &  Laughlin,  1996,  p.  446) 
Two  difficulties  seem  to  us  to  be  particularly  salient  in  the  case  of  accounting.  Firstly,  the 
influence  of  the  public  sphere  is  always  procedurally  mediated;  "public  influence  is 
transformed  into  communicative  power  only  after  it  passes  through  the  filters  of  the 
institutionalized  procedures  of  democratic  opinion-and-will-formation  and  enters  through 
parliamentary  debates  into  legitimate  law  making"  (Habermas,  1992,  p.  371).  Yet  the 
institutions  of  accounting  regulation  are  not  directly  linked  to  effective  democratic  or 
parliamentary  processes.  Secondly,  because  the  functional  demands  of  material  reproduction 
of  society  require  a  degree  of  system  autonomy,  the  influence  of  the  public  sphere  on 
functionally  differentiated  systems  such  as  the  economic,  financial  and  accounting  systems, 
can  only  be  indirect: 
"Civil  society  can  directly  transform  only  itself,  and  it  can  have  at  most  an 
indirect  effect  on  the  self-transformation  of  the  political  system;  generally,  it 
has  an  influence  only  on  the  personnel  and  programming  of  this  system.  But 
in  no  way  does  it  occupy  the  position  of  a  macrosubject  supposed  to  bring 
society  as  a  whole  under  control  and  simultaneously  act  for  it.  " 
(Habermas,  1992,  p.  372) 
Furthermore,  in  many  contexts  "the  law  is  combined  with  the  media  of  power  and  money  in 
such  a  way  that  it  takes  on  the  role  of  a  steering  medium  itself'  (Habermas,  1981b,  p.  365). 
Most  commercial  and  administrative  law,  and  accounting  regulation  as  quasi-law,  is  of  this 
type;  it  serves  as  a  means  of  organising  media-controlled  sub-systems  that  are  already 
substantially  autonomous  of  the  lifeworld  and  communicative  action  integrated  through 
mutual  understanding.  Such  law/regulation  deals  with  formally  organised  domains  of  action 
that  are  in  effect  constituted  by  law.  We  must  then  be  content  with  procedural  legitimation 
of  such  regulations/law;  "substantive  justification  is  not  only  not  possible,  but  is  also,  from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  lifeworld,  meaningless"  (Habermas,  1981b,  p.  365).  Habermas  contrasts 
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law  as  steering  medium,  with  those  regulative,  as  distinct  from  constitutive,  legal  institutions 
(and  by  extension  accounting  regulations)  that  are  superimposed  on  areas  of  life  that  are 
already  communicatively  structured.  It  is  with  this  second  category  of  juridification  that  the 
potential  for  colonisation  of  the  lifeworld  arises.  Much  of  accounting  regulation  falls  in  this 
category;  it  is  superimposed  on  communicatively  structured  relationships  of  accountability, 
and  upon  norms  (e.  g.,  truthfulness,  prudence,  and  fairness)  that  are  part  of  the  pre-existing 
order  of  the  lifeworld.  There  is  a  potential  for  accounting  regulation  to  not  merely 
supplement  aspects  of  the  social  order  but  rather  to  convert  them  over  to  the  medium  of 
quasi-legal  regulation.  It  is  this  kind  of  colonisation  of  areas  of  life  that  are  functionally 
dependent  on  social  integration  that  Habermas'  wants  to  help  us  resist: 
"The  point  is  to  protect  areas  of  life  that  are  functionally  dependent  on  social 
integration  through  values,  norms,  and  consensus  formation,  to  preserve  them 
from  falling  prey  to  the  systemic  imperatives  of  economic  and  administrative 
subsystems  growing  with  dynamics  of  their  own,  and  to  defend  them  from 
becoming  converted  over,  through  the  steering  medium  of  the  law,  to  a 
principle  of  sociation  that  is,  for  them,  dysfunctional.  " 
(Habermas,  1981b,  pp.  372-373) 
It  is  with  respect  to  this  second  category  that  issues  of  normative  evaluation  arise;  a 
procedural  justification  will  no  longer  suffice:  "They  need  substantive  justification" 
(Habermas,  1981b,  p.  365).  Habermas  argues  that,  in  our  modem  pluralist  society,  the 
legitimation  of  norms  must  be  based  upon  procedures  of  rational  will  and  consensus 
formation,  that  is,  on  the  institutionalisation  of  the  "discourse  principle"  (D)  that: 
"that  the  only  regulations  and  ways  of  acting  that  can  claim  legitimacy  are 
those  to  which  all  who  are  possibly  affected  could  assent  as  participants  in 
rational  discourse. 
(Habermas,  1994,  p.  459) 
In  late  capitalist  society  the  normative/moral  dimension  of  accounting/financial  reporting  has 
become  suppressed.  That  suppression  of  the  moral  damages  the  commercial  lifeworld  and 
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robs  accounting  of  the  force  of  moral  obligation.  Accounting  and  financial  reporting  is  then 
forced  to  rely  on  legal  sanction  -  which  invites  creative  avoidance.  The  force  of  normative 
obligation  depends  upon  the  perceived  validity  of  the  norm.  Habermas  has  tried  to  show  how 
in  post-traditional  society  norms  can  be  validated;  such  validation  must  rely  on  rational 
consensus  achieved  through  discourse/argument.  Through  discourse  ethics,  financial 
reporting/accounting  may  be  reclaimed  as  a  normative  practice  with  real  moral  force,  and 
thus  be  empowered  to  exercise  a  communicative-normative  influence  on  functional 
subsystems  that  are  otherwise  steered  by  media  of  money  and  power  and  regulation/law  as 
medium. 
A  Habermasian  discourse  ethics  approach  to  accounting  argument  contrasts  sharply 
with  the  conception  of  the  role  of  argument  in  accounting  debate  advanced  by  Shapiro  (1997, 
1998).  To  help  clarify  the  contrast  we  will  briefly  outline  certain  features  of  the  Habermasian 
approach.  We  begin  with  the  most  significant  point  of  contrast,  which  is  simply  that  whereas 
Shapiro  takes  norms  for  granted  as  a  starting  point  of  debate,  Habermas  believes  that  it  is 
possible  to  objectively  validate  norms.  His  basic  aim  is  to  reconstruct  the  moral  point  of  view 
from  which  the  validity  of  competing  normative  claims  can  be  rationally  and  objectively 
judged.  Habermas'  approach  is  to  trace  out  the  implications  of  our  everyday  moral  thinking 
and  judging.  He  contrasts  moral  norms  with  simple  imperatives,  and  argues  that  moral 
norms,  as  distinct  phenomena,  characteristically  have  an  internal  force  that  does  not  rely  on 
external  threat,  reward  or  will.  He  argues  that  the  moral  authority  or  normative  force  of  a 
behavioural  expectation  is  always  associated  with  a  claim  to  an  impersonal  or  general 
validity  that  can  be  supported  with  convincing  reasons: 
"There  is  apparently  an  inner  connection  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
authority  of  generally  accepted  norms  or  commands,  ...  and,  on  the  other  hand 
the  impersonality  of  their  claim.  Such  norms  claim  that  they  exist  by  right  and 
that  if  necessary,  they  can  be  shown  to  exist  by  right.  This  means  that 
indignation  and  reproaches  directed  against  the  violation  of  a  norm  must  in 
the  last  analysis  be  based  on  a  cognitive  foundation. 
... 
To  say  that  I  ought  to 
do  something  means  that  I  have  good  reasons  for  doing  it.  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  pp.  49-50) 
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On  this  view  of  moral  phenomena,  the  moral  authority  or  motivating  force,  of  a  normative 
expectation  relies  on  confidence  that  its  claim  to  validity  can  be  redeemed  -  that  good  reasons 
can  be  given  in  support  of  it.  In  which  case,  clearly,  the  reconstruction  of  the  force  of 
normative  validity  calls  for  an  account  of  convincing  or  rationally  motivating  reason  giving. 
Habermas'  responds  to  this  challenge  by  making  a  formal-pragmatic  analysis  of  the 
communicative  practices  intuitively  adopted  by  competent  participants  in  argumentation 
concerning  moral  validity  claims.  His  conclusion  is  that  any  rationally  motivating  exchange 
of  reasons  must  conform  to  what  he  calls  the  principle  of  universalization  (U),  according  to 
which  every  valid  norm  must  meets  the  following  condition: 
(U)  All  affected  can  accept  the  consequences  and  the  side  effects  its  general 
observance  can  be  anticipated  to  have  for  the  satisfaction  of  everyone's 
interests  (and  these  consequences  are  preferred  to  those  of  known  alternative 
possibilities  for  regulation).  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  65) 
The  principle  of  universalization  reconstructs  the  objective  moral  point  of  view  as  a  rule  of 
argument  that  makes  rationally  binding  consensus  in  moral  discourse  possible:  It  is  "a 
bridging  principle  that  makes  agreement  in  moral  argumentation  possible"  (Habermas,  1983, 
p.  57),  even  in  a  modem  society  characterised  by  a  "pluralism  of  ultimate  value  orientations" 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  76).  At  its  most  basic,  the  idea  behind  (U)  is  that  provided  the 
participants  in  argument  about  hypothetical  norms  are  prepared  to  work  to  gain  an 
understanding  of  their  own  and  each  others  real  interests  and  perspective,  and  have  equal 
opportunity  to  argue  for  and  against  the  proposed  norms,  any  uncoerced  consensus  that 
emerges  must  express  a  generalised  interest,  and  thus  have  an  impersonal  or  general  validity 
or  objectivity  (that  can  be  supported  with  convincing  reasons): 
"The  moral  principle  is  so  conceived  as  to  exclude  as  invalid  any  norm  that 
could  not  meet  with  the  qualified  assent  of  all  who  are  or  might  be  affected 
by  it.  This  bridging  principle,  which  makes  consensus  possible,  ensures  that 
only  those  norms  are  accepted  as  valid  that  express  a  general  will.  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  63) 
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Habermas  insists  that  (U)  can  be  justified  as  a  universal  moral  principle,  rather  than 
merely  a  "generalization  of  moral  intuitions  peculiar  to  our  own  Western  culture"  (Habermas, 
1983,  p.  76).  He  suggests  (but  does  not  formally  work  through  himself)  a  transcendental 
justification  of  the  principle,  designed  to  convince  that  (U)  is  implied  by  certain 
presuppositions  of  argument  which  we  are  all  committed  to,  insofar  as  we  can  not  deny  them 
without  involving  ourselves  in  performative  contradictions.  The  justification  of  (U)  originates 
in  the  fact  that  Habermas'  reconstruction  of  what  is  implicit  in  everyday  moral  thinking  ties 
the  motivating  force  of  moral  claims  to  confidence  that  they  can  be  redeemed  with 
convincing  reasons.  Indeed  from  the  Habermasian  perspective,  developed  in  The  Theory  of 
Communicative  Action,  the  very  meaning  of  a  moral  claim  can  only  be  grasped  through  the 
give  and  take  of  reason  giving,  in  practical  discourse  -  that  is  in  the  performative  attitude: 
"In  order  to  understand  an  utterance  in  the  paradigm  case  of  a  speech  act 
oriented  to  reaching  understanding,  the  interpreter  has  to  be  familiar  with  the 
conditions  of  its  validity;  he  has  to  know  under  what  conditions  the  validity 
claim  linked  with  it  is  acceptable,  that  is,  would  have  to  be  acknowledged  by 
a  hearer.  " 
(Habermas,  1981  a,  p.  115) 
On  this  view,  we  understand  the  meaning  of  any  validity  claim,  including  a  moral  claim,  only 
by  understanding  the  pragmatics  of  its  possible  redemption,  that  is,  by  appreciating  how  it 
can  be  supported  with  convincing  reason  giving,  in  argument.  Therefore,  anyone  who 
understands  the  validity  claims  they  make  (implicitly  or  explicitly)  must  understand  how 
those  claims  can  be  redeemed  in  argument,  and  such  understanding  requires  an  implicit 
recognition  of  the  presuppositions  of  argument  -  from  which,  Habermas  argues,  the  principle 
of  universalization  directly  follows: 
"Every  person  who  accepts  the  universal  and  necessary  communicative 
presuppositions  of  argumentative  speech  and  who  knows  what  it  means  to 
justify  a  norm  of  action  implicitly  presupposes  as  valid  the  principle  of 
universalization,  whether  in  the  form  I  gave  it  above  or  in  an  equivalent 
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form.  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  86) 
In  The  Theory  of  communicative  Action,  Habermas  describes  his  reconstruction  of  the 
conditions  of  argumentation,  (that  is,  communicative  action  oriented  toward  the  achievement 
of  rationally  motivated  consensus),  that  every  competent  speaker  who  believes  that  she  is 
engaged  in  argument  must  presuppose  are  adequately  fulfilled,  as  "an  ideal  speech  situation". 
The  participants  in  argumentation  must,  for  example,  presuppose  that  all  coercion  -  other 
than  "the  force  of  the  better  argument"  -  is  excluded  from  their  communication.  The  detail, 
and  existence,  of  the  presupposition  of  discourse  can  be  demonstrated  through  systematic 
analysis  of  the  performative  contradictions  entailed  by  their  denial;  The  object  of  the  analysis 
being  to  reconstruct  the  pragmatic  rules  of  discourse  which  are  implicitly  used  and  already 
intuitively  known.  Following  Habermas,  Alexy  (1973)  identifies  the  following  pragmatic 
rules  of  rational  discourse,  as  quoted  by  Habermas  (1983,  p.  89): 
(1)  Every  subject  with  the  competence  to  speak  and  act  is  allowed  to  take  part  in  a 
discourse. 
(2)  a  Everyone  is  allowed  to  question  any  assertion  whatever. 
b  Everyone  is  allowed  to  introduce  any  assertion  whatever  into  discourse. 
c  Everyone  is  allowed  to  express  his  attitudes,  desires,  and  needs. 
(3)  No  speaker  may  be  prevented,  by  internal  or  external  coercion  from  exercising 
his  rights  as  laid  down  in  (1)  and  (2). 
Participants  in  discourse  who  suppose  that  any  consensus  they  have  reached  is  rationally 
motivated  must  presume  these  rules  have  been  sufficiently  met.  However  the  nature  of  the 
rules  is  such  that  the  participants  could  never  be  fully  certain  that  the  rules  have  in  fact  been 
fulfilled;  there  is  always  some  room  to  doubt  the  rationality  of  consensus.  The  rules  are,  in 
a  sense,  counterfactuals,  regulative  ideals,  that  we  can  use  as  a  foundation  for  the  evaluation 
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of  our  argumentative  practice  and  our  institutions.  The  rules,  however,  are  not  merely  ideals; 
they  are  fundamentally  constitutive  of  any  real  communicative  action  oriented  towards 
consensus.  Habermas  sees  such  communicative  action  as  the  fundamental  social  action,  and 
thus  takes  us  all,  as  social  animals,  to  be  implicitly  committed  to  these  rules  as 
"transcendentally  necessary  presuppositions,  no  matter  how  mired  they  are  in  contingent 
motives  and  compulsions"  (Hoy,  1994,  p.  181).  Habermas  argues  that  from  these  rules  and 
our  shared  sense  of  what  it  means  to  justify  a  norm  of  action,  we  can  derive  the  principle  of 
universalization  (U): 
"If  every  person  entering  a  process  of  argumentation  must,  among  other 
things,  make  presuppositions  whose  content  can  be  expressed  in  rules  (3.1) 
to  (3.3)  and  if  we  understand  what  it  means  to  discuss  hypothetically  whether 
norms  of  action  ought  to  be  adopted,  then  everyone  who  seriously  tries  to 
discursively  redeem  normative  claims  to  validity  intuitively  accepts 
procedural  conditions  that  amount  to  implicitly  acknowledging  (U). 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  93) 
For  a  full  outline  and  critical  discussion  of  the  derivation  of  (U)  see  Rehg,  (1997,  ch.  3)10. 
The  application  of  (U)  in  real  practical  discourse  yields  the  broad-based  principle  of 
discourse  (D).  Habermas'  reconstruction  of  the  moral  point  of  view  yields  just  one  rule  of 
argument  for  the  impartial  testing  of  norms,  one  rule  that  makes  rational  consensus  on  norms 
possible;  the  principle  of  universalization  (U).  The  institutional  implications  of  that  rule  are 
however  complex.  Ideally  procedures  for  the  testing/validation  of  proposed  norms,  (including 
accounting  norms),  should  be  such  that:  (i)  All  those  potentially  affected  by  the  norm  under 
consideration  are  included  in  the  debate;  steps  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  no  affected  parties 
are  excluded  from  the  exchange  of  arguments;  Shapiro's  maxims  do  not  make  this  crucial 
point  explicit.  (ii)  A  full  exchange  of  arguments  is  facilitated,  and  no  relevant  considerations 
excluded.  Shapiro's  maxims  emphasise  the  need  to  constrain  discourse,  so  that  only 
arguments  which  respect  the  privileged  vocabulary  of  the  "the  common  starting  point"  are 
permitted.  Habermas  recognises  that  we  must  operate  on  the  basis  that  we  share  a  (life)world 
with  those  we  communicate  with,  and  that  it  is  only  against  a  shared  background  that  we  can 
recognise  disagreements.  His  emphasis,  however,  is  quite  the  opposite  of  Shapiro's,  he  insists 
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that  participants  in  debate  must  bring  their  particular  perspective  to  the  argument  -  they 
should  not  be  constrained  to  any  particular  vocabulary  (or  language  game).  For  Habermas, 
the  rational  justification  of  a  norm  requires  that  it  be  shown  to  have  acceptable  consequences 
for  the  interests  of  each  individual  affected  by  it,  and  the  testing  process  demands  that  the 
needs,  wants,  values  and  self-understandings  of  those  affected,  including  their  conceptions 
of  the  good  life,  be  brought  into  moral  discourse  as  content: 
"If  the  actors  do  not  bring  with  them,  and  into  their  discourse,  their  individual 
life-histories,  their  identities,  their  needs  and  wants,  their  traditions, 
memberships,  and  so  forth,  practical  discourse  would  at  once  be  robbed  of  all 
content.  " 
(Habermas,  1982,  p.  255) 
(iii)  Habermas'  discourse  ethics  requires  that  all  external  and  internal  coercive  pressures  must 
be  removed.  Here  we  have  some  level  of  agreement;  Shapiro  also  recognises  that  coercion 
must  be  eliminated;  his  maxim  No.  I  requires  that  parties  must  not  prevent  one  another  from 
participating  in  the  give  and  take  of  argument.  However  Shapiro's  recommendation  that 
debate  be  constrained  by  the  "common  starting  point"  does,  as  he  himself  recognises,  do  a 
kind  of  "violence"  to  debate.  Finally  (iv)  the  principle  of  universalization  (U)  demands  that 
the  validity  of  a  norm  be  tested  "dialogically".  That  is,  it  must  tested  through  a  process  of  real 
public  argument  in  which  all  those  affected  are  prepared  to  try  and  reciprocally  share  one  and 
others'  perspectives,  in  an  effort  to  assess  the  fairness,  for  all,  of  the  proposed  norm. 
"I  have  formulated  (U)  in  a  way  that  precluded  the  monological  application 
of  the  principle.  First,  (U)  regulates  only  argumentation  among  a  plurality  of 
participants;  second,  it  suggests  the  perspective  of  real-life  argumentation,  in 
which  all  affected  are  admitted  as  participants.  In  this  respect  my 
universalization  principle  differs  from  the  one  John  Rawls  proposes.  ... 
Like 
Kant,  Rawls  operationalizes  the  standpoint  of  impartiality  in  such  a  way  that 
every  individual  can  undertake  to  justify  basic  norms  on  his  own.  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  66) 
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Discourse  ethics  locates  the  decision  procedure  for  reaching  valid  norms  in  practical 
discourse  striving  for  consensus,  as  distinct  from  compromise:  "Participants  in  a  practical 
discourse  strive  to  clarify  a  common  interest,  whereas  in  negotiating  a  compromise  they  try 
to  strike  a  balance  between  conflicting  particular  interests"  (Habermas,  1983,  p.  72). 
Shapiro's,  essentially  monological,  approach  does  not  encourage  any  reciprocal  perspective. 
Shapiro's  monological  interests  based  approach  is  most  flagrantly  obvious  in  his  citation  of 
Demski's  (1973)  work  which  following  Arrow  (1963)  work  in  information  economics, 
emphasises  the  impossibility  of  finding  acceptable  (Pareto  optimal)  accounting  standard 
compromises  given  the  divergent  interests  of  affected  parties. 
"Moreover,  the  diverse  goals  and  preferences  of  multiple  stakeholders 
virtually  guarantee  that  a  change  in  external  financial  reporting  rules  will 
benefit  some  stakeholders  and  harm  others,  such  that  it  is  impossible  to 
prescribe  a  set  of  accounting  standards  to  satisfy  all  stakeholder  needs  and 
preferences  (cf.  Demski,  1973;  Dopuch  &  Sunder,  1980).  Accordingly,  social 
welfare  metanarratives  cannot  legitimise  accounting  rule  changes.  " 
(Shapiro,  1998,  p.  641) 
While  Shapiro  remains  focused  on  the  unencumbered  contracting  individuals  with  more  or 
less  arbitrarily  chosen  interests,  Habermas'  approach  is  thoroughly  intersubjectivistic.  The 
discourse  ethics  approach  is  not  a  search  for  compromise,  or  for  the  best  substantive 
argument,  but  for  rational  consensus  driven  by  empathy.  Where  Habermas  sees  discourse 
ethics  as  transcendentally  justified  by  the  presuppositions  of  discourse/argument  itself, 
Shapiro  sees  the  normative  model  of  argument  he  offers  as  simply  a  "contract,  explicit  or  not, 
between  players"  (Shapiro,  1998,  p.  643). 
The  discourse  ethics  ideal  is  fundamentally  counterfactual;  no  institutionalization  of 
(U)  will  be  perfect.  (U)  is  essentially  a  regulative  ideal.  Confidence  in  the  validity/rationality 
of  accounting  norms  must  ultimately  rest  on  the  extent  to  which  the  procedures  through 
which  the  norm  is  developed  and  validated,  approximate  the  discourse  ethics  ideal;  that  is, 
it  must  depend  on  the  quality  of  reciprocal  perspective  taking  achieved.  If  accounting 
regulation  is  to  harness  any  normative  force,  in  our  post-traditional  society,  our  accounting 
standard  setting  procedures  must  be  designed  to  approximate  the  ideal  of  discourse  ethics. 
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Following  Habermas'  lead  we  see  the  foundations  for  the  possibility  of  emancipation  laid 
down  in  modernity's  triumph  over  tradition,  that  is,  in  reason's  triumph  over  the  Other  of 
reason:  that  which  is  immune  to  reason.  In  capitalist  modernity,  however,  the  development 
of  rationality  tends  to  become  pathological:  The  instrumental  rationality  and  spontaneous 
functioning  on  which  the  systems  based  integration  and  material  reproduction  of  society 
relies  tends  to  colonise  those  aspects  of  life  that  depend  on  symbolic  reproduction  through 
communicative  action.  In  chapter  1  we  argued  that  the  rationalisation  of  financial  accounting, 
associated  with  the  modernization  of  society,  reflects  the  pathological  tendencies  inherent  to 
the  capitalist  system  and  in  particular  its  tendency  to  crisis.  We  found  accounting  in  the 
process  of  becoming  little  more  than  an  instrumental  adjunct  to  a  systems  based  integration 
of  society  founded  on  the  automatic  operation  of  markets.  Indeed  we  argued  that 
contradictions  and  in  particular  the  tendency  to  rationality  crisis  within  advanced  capitalism 
undermines  financial  accounting's  capacity  to  fulfil  even  this  limited  role.  The  fuller 
emancipatory  potential  of  communicative  reason  in  modernity  is  certainly  not  realised  in 
contemporary  financial  accounting;  the  potential  of  financial  reporting  to  put  a 
communicatively  based  normative  check  on  the  system  is  undermined  by  the  fact  that  it  itself 
has  been  colonised  and  evades  effective  normative  control. 
In  chapters  2  to  4,  we  argued  that,  in  principle  at  least,  financial  accounting  can 
overcome  the  tendencies  to  rationality  and  legitimacy  crisis  that  afflict  it  in  contemporary 
capitalism.  We  argued  that  it  has  the  capacity  to  be  truly  emancipatory  by  providing  us  with 
knowledge  of  the  objective  world  we  share  and  by  facilitating  a  measure  of  objective 
normative  control  on  the  essentially  systems  based  material  reproduction  of  society  in 
advanced  modernity.  The  view  we  have  presented  in  previous  chapters  looks  for  the 
emancipatory  potential  of  modernity  and  financial  accounting  in  the  tension  between 
instrumental  and  communicative  reason.  In  chapter  2  we  were  hostile  to  those  contemporary 
discourses  within  accounting  theory  that  seem  to  want  to  dismiss  the  possibility  of  rationality 
in  accounting  by  casting  doubt  on  the  possibility  of  accounting  truth  and  objectivity.  Our 
stance  in  chapter  2  echoes  Habermas'  robust  resistance  to  the  post-structuralist/post-modern 
challenge  to  rationality,  that  is,  his  resistance  to  any  invocation/reinvigoration  of  the  Other 
of  reason. 
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In  chapter  5,  which  follows,  we  acknowledge  the  validity  of  the 
poststructuralist/postmodern  critique  of  reason's  exclusion  of  its  Other.  We  admit  that  the 
perspective  of  reason  is  narrowed  by  the  tendency  of  both  instrumental  and  communicative 
reason  to  exclude  those  claims  that  are  not  open  to  discursive  articulation  and  analysis. 
Furthermore,  we  accept  that  the  Habermasian  analysis  of  reason's  potential  is  over  optimistic, 
and  in  particular  we  recognize  that,  despite  his  efforts  to  overcome  the  philosophy  of 
consciousness,  his  discourse  theory  ultimately  relies  on  an  inadequate  model  of  the  subject. 
The  logic  of  the  post-structuralism/post-modernism  critique  of  reason's  closure  need  not 
however  be  read  paranoiacally  as  leading  inevitably  to  the  crowning  of  unreason  and  the 
banishment  of  reason.  A  more  balanced  and  positive  reading  of  the  post-structuralist/post- 
modernist  position  will  see  it  as  tending  to  usefully  destabilize  the  closure  of  reason  and 
allow  the  claim  of  the  Other  some  admittance  /  recognition.  We  take  the  view  that  the 
incitation  of  alterity,  which  is  typical  of  post-structuralist/post-modern  practices  and 
discourses,  is  a  vital  complement  to  any  emancipatory  politics,  and  more  specifically 
accounting  standard  setting,  that  might  be  based  on  discourse  theory  and  communicative 
reason.  The  Habermasian  model  clearly  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  a  post- 
structuralist/psychoanalytic  sensitivity  to  Alterity  and  the  unconscious;  defined  as,  that  which 
is  immune  to  discursive  retrieval  and  communicative  reason.  We  find  the  imaginative 
resources  for  that  supplement  in  the  work  of  the  psychoanalyst  Jacques  Lacan,  and  in 
particular  in  his  conceptualization  of  the  subject.  We  explore  the  Lacanian  psychoanalytic 
framework  by  applying  it  to  the  commercial  firm  and,  building  upon  existing  conceptions  of 
the  firm  as  moral  agent  inspired  by  the  work  of  Donald  Davidson,  developing  a  conception 
of  the  firm  as  a  split  subject;  divided  between  conscious  and  unconscious.  Following  Lacan, 
we  argue  that  the  firm  as  subject  of  the  unconscious  bears  a  moral  responsibility  to  subjectify 
its  own  cause;  it  must  assume  responsibility  for  itself  and  its  desire;  it  must  transcend  its  own 
fantasy.  We  contend  that  it  is  only  through  the  assumption  of  this  responsibility  for  its  own 
cause  in  the  desire  of  the  Other,  that  any  subject,  including  the  firm  as  Lacanian  subject,  can 
come  to  terms  with  the  Other  and  clearly  recognise  and  respond  to  its  absolute  responsibility 
for  the  Other. 
We  recognize  that  the  increase  of  moral  rationality  potentially  obtained  by  stepping 
back  to  the  moral  point  of  view  of  discourse  theory,  from  which  we  can  distinguish  matters 
of  justice  from  those  of  the  good  life  and  objectively  assess  the  validity  of  competing 
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normative  claims,  is  achieved  at  the  price  of  stripping  norms  of  the  motivating  force  that 
traditionally  they  might  draw  from  their  connection  with  powerful  ethical  conceptions  of  the 
good  life: 
At  this  stage,  moral  judgement  becomes  dissociated  from  the  local 
conventions  and  historical  coloration  of  a  particular  form  of  life.  It  can  no 
longer  appeal  to  the  naive  validity  of  the  context  of  the  lifeworld.  Moral 
answers  retain  only  the  rationally  motivating  force  of  insights.  Along  with  the 
naive  self-certainty  of  their  lifeworld  background  they  lose  the  thrust  and 
efficacy  of  empirical  motives  for  action. 
(Habermas,  1983,  pp.  106-109) 
We  conclude  chapter  5  by  suggesting  that  this  motivational  deficit,  that  attends  the 
detachment  of  the  Habermasian  universalist  moral  point  of  view  from  any  ethics  of  the  good 
life,  might  be  compensated  for  by  the  development  of  a  universalist  ethics  of  absolute 
responsibility  for  the  Other  from  which  morality  might  draw  new  motivational  force.  Lacan's 
analysis  of  the  development  of  the  subject  points  the  way  towards  the  potential  realisation 
of  an  ethic  of  absolute  responsibility  for  the  Other,  through  the  transcendence  of  fantasy. 
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"Wo  Es  war,  soll  Ich  werden" 
Introduction 
In  this  chapter  we  suggest  that  the  Habermasian  conception  of  the  subject  as  moral  agent  of 
communicative  action/reason  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  a  post-structuralist/psychoanalytic 
appreciation  of  those  dimensions  of  subjectivity  which  are  not  transparent,  that  is,  those 
dimensions  that  are  not  open  to  discursive  retrieval.  We  use  some  of  the  insights  of  Lacanian 
psychoanalysis  to  build  upon  existing  conceptions  of  the  firm  as  moral  agent,  which  have 
been  inspired  by  the  work  of  Donald  Davidson.  The  object  of  this  chapter  is  to  contribute  to 
the  enrichment  of  notions  of  the  firm  as  a  moral  agent. 
We  begin  with  a  review  of  alternative  accounting  conceptions  of  the  financial 
"reporting  entity".  Specification  of  the  reporting  entity  is  pivotal  to  financial  reporting;  in  the 
privileging  of  any  particular  accounting  point  of  view  alternatives  are  suppressed.  Definition 
of  the  reporting  entity  has  political  implications,  in  so  far  as  alternative  conceptions  of  the 
reporting  entity  may  emphasise  on  the  one  hand  the  interests  of  shareholders  or  on  the  other 
the  interests  of  a  wider  community.  We  develop  our  analysis  by  critically  examining  the 
position  taken  by  the  UK  Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  on  the  reporting  entity  issue, 
in  the  development  of  its  recently  finalised  conceptual  framework  for  financial  reporting,  its 
"Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting"  (Statement  of  Principles)  (ASB,  1995b, 
1999a,  1999d).  The  practical  significance  of  the  issue  is  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  issue 
of  accounting  for  stock  option  compensation.  Our  analysis  reveals  that  alternative  and 
essentially  incompatible  conceptions  of  the  reporting  entity  seem  to  coexist  in  tension  in  the 
ASB  draft  Statement  of  Principles,  and  generally  in  financial  reporting  theory  and  practice. 
We  contend  that  the  equivocation  on  this  issue  can  in  part  be  attributed  to  the  existence  of 
a  real  split  in  the  nature  of  the  firm. 
We  go  on  to  broaden  our  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  firm:  We  briefly  consider 
the  literature  of  the  moral  agent  that  originates  with  Peter  French's  work,  initially  inspired 
by  Donald  Davidson  analysis  of  agency.  We  try  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  conception  of 
the  firm  as  moral  agent,  by  showing  how  it  can  be  enriched  with  some  of  the  post- 
structuralist/psychoanalytic  insights  offered  in  Jacques  Lacan's  work.  We  explore  the  nature 
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of  the  firm  as  a  split  or  divided  subject  using  a  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  framework,  and 
contend  that  the  firm  may  usefully  be  conceived  of  as  divided  between  the  conscious  and  the 
unconscious.  We  argue  that  the  firm,  as  subject  of  the  unconscious,  bears  a  moral 
responsibility  to  subjectify  its  own  cause,  and  assume  responsibility  for  itself  and  its  desire. 
We  conclude  the  chapter  by  turning  to  Habermasian  conception  of  the  subject  of 
discourse  ethics.  We  indicate  the  inadequacy  of  Habermas'  conception  of  an  essentially 
transparent  subject,  and  suggest  that  it  needs  to  be  supplemented  with  a  post- 
structuralist/psychoanalytic  sensitivity  to  alterity.  We  conclude  the  chapter  by  suggesting  that 
the  motivational  deficit  which  attends  the  rationalistic  abstraction  of  the  universalist  moral 
point  of  view,  of  discourse  ethics,  may  be  compensated  for  by  the  development  of  an  a  new, 
universalist  ethics:  An  ethics  of  difference  and  absolute  responsibility  for  the  Other. 
The  reporting  entity 
The  "accounting  point  of  view"  has  long  been  recognised  by  accounting  theorists  as  a  matter 
of  central  importance  to  financial  accounting  theory  and  practice.  The  question  is;  from 
which  perspective  should  business  records  be  maintained  and  accounts  prepared?  The  most 
obvious  alternatives  are  (i)  the  proprietary  view  point  of  the  owner,  and  alternatively  (ii)  the 
viewpoint  of  the  business  entity  itself  as  an  operating  unit. 
The  proprietary  perspective  makes  the  "owner",  that  is  shareholders,  (more  or  less 
broadly  defined  to  include  or  exclude  preference  shares  depending  upon  the  version  of 
proprietary  theory  being  considered),  the  centre  of  attention;  the  focus  of  accounting.  The 
accounting  equation  A-L=P  (assets  minus  liabilities  equals  proprietors'  interest)  reflects 
the  essence  of  the  proprietary  view.  From  this  perspective  the  reporting  entity  tends  to  be 
regarded  as  coextensive  with  its  proprietors;  "Assets  belong  to  the  proprietor  and  liabilities 
are  obligations  of  the  proprietor"  (Kam,  1986,  p.  303).  The  business  undertaking  is  regarded 
as  a  means  by  which  owners  seek  to  achieve  their  purpose  of  increasing  their  wealth.  The 
objective  of  accounting  in  this  context  becomes  the  measurement  and  analysis  of  the 
proprietor's  net  worth;  "...  the  proprietary  theory  may  be  said  to  be 
... 
balance  sheet  oriented. 
Assets  are  valued  and  balance  sheets  are  prepared  to  measure  the  changes  in  the  proprietary 
interest  or  wealth",  (Belkaoui  1985,  p.  224).  Consequently,  supporters  of  the  proprietary 
theory  tend  to  regard  current  values  as  more  relevant  than  historical  costs,  (see  Kam,  1986, 
p.  303).  The  proprietary  approach  to  accounting  dates  from  before  the  rise  of  limited 
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companies,  and  to  a  time  when  most  business  was  conducted  by  partnerships  and  sole  trader 
proprietors.  The  proprietary  perspective  loses  some  pertinence  when  business  activity  is 
carried  out  through  corporations  which  are  legally  separate  from  their  owners,  and  which 
hold  assets  and  assume  obligations  on  their  own  account.  For  example  in  the  case  of  limited 
liability  companies  it  is  difficult  to  regard  the  notion  that  the  company's  obligations  are 
liabilities  of  the  proprietor  as  meaningful.  However  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  proprietary  view 
is  incompatible  with  the  recognition  that  the  corporation  is  a  separate  legal  entity.  Even  sole 
traders  recognise  the  need  to  keep  business  and  private  records  separate.  The  key  issue  is 
from  which  perspective  should  the  business  records  be  maintained.  From  the  proprietary 
point  of  view  income  is  viewed  as  the  increase  in  the  owners'  wealth  arising  from  the 
business  over  a  period:  "Revenue  is  the  increase  in  proprietorship;  expense  is  the  decrease 
in  proprietorship"  (Kam,  1986,  p.  303).  The  influence  of  this  view  is  widely  reflected  in 
accounting  terminology  and  practice.  For  example,  in  the  treatment,  under  UK  Companies 
Act  profit  and  loss  account  formats  (CA  1985,  Sch.  4  part.!  ),  of  wages,  interest,  and  corporate 
taxes  as  expenses  in  the  derivation  of  profit,  the  measurement  of  shareholders'  income 
appears  as  the  privileged  object  of  the  profit  and  loss  account. 
The  main  alternative  to  the  proprietary  perspective  is  to  define  the  reporting  entity  in 
operational  terms.  We  will  describe  this  approach  as  the  entity  perspective.  There  are  two 
distinct  elements  to  entity  theory.  Firstly  it  holds  that  debt  and  equity  can  not  be 
meaningfully  distinguished  (see  Clark,  1993).  This  notion  has  been  given  impetus  in  recent 
years  by  the  proliferation  of  financial  instruments  that  blur  traditional  distinctions  between 
debt  and  equity,  (see  FASB,  1990,  para.  219-222).  Consequently,  a  critical  feature  of  the 
entity  perspective  is  that  profits  ought  to  be  determined  by  reference  to  all  capital  providers; 
that  is,  before  deduction  of  interest.  Secondly,  the  entity  perspective  makes  the  `business' 
itself  as  an  economic  operating  unit  the  focus  of  accounting  attention,  as  a  distinct  entity 
separate  from  its  owners. 
"It  is  the  "business"  whose  financial  history  the  bookkeeper  and  accountant 
are  trying  to  record  and  analyze;  the  books  and  accounts  are  the  record  of  "the 
business";  the  periodic  statements  of  operations  and  financial  condition  are 
the  reports  of  "the  business".  " 
(Paton,  1922,  p.  473) 
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The  entity  theory  is  most  clearly  applicable  to  the  corporate  form  of  business  enterprise, 
where  there  is  a  clear  legal  separation  between  the  corporation  and  providers  of  capital.  From 
the  entity  perspective  the  business  entity  owns  the  assets  of  the  enterprise  and  is  responsible 
for  the  claims  of  shareholders  and  creditors  alike  as  providers  of  funds  and  the  source  of  the 
assets:  The  accounting  equation  becomes  Assets  =  Equities. 
Under  the  proprietary  concept,  the  measurement  of  the  proprietor's  net  worth  in  the 
business  is  the  primary  accounting  objective,  and  therefore  the  balance  sheet  is  of  central 
importance.  In  entity  theory,  because  the  entity  is  the  centre  of  attention,  proprietor's  net 
worth  becomes  a  less  meaningful  concept.  Emphasis  moves  to  the  determination  of  income, 
and  the  income  statement: 
"Because  the  business  unit  is  held  responsible  for  meeting  the  claims  of  the 
equity  holders,  the  entity  theory  is  said  to  be  "income-centred"  and 
consequently  income  statement  oriented.  Accountability  to  the  equity  holders 
is  accomplished  by  measuring  the  operating  and  financial  performance  of  the 
firm.  " 
(Belkaoui,  1985,  p.  225) 
The  entity  concept  recognises  a  division  between  management  and  owners,  who  are 
outsiders  to  the  entity.  And  in  this  context  a  stewardship  role  for  accounting  is  given 
prominence.  Balance  sheet  centred,  valuation  based,  income  measurement  necessarily  entails 
managerial  estimation  and  is  consequently  open  to  manipulation  in  conditions  of  asymmetric 
information.  In  contrast,  income  statement  based  approaches  to  income  determination 
measure  income  by  matching  against  realised  revenue  the  costs  of  generating  that  revenue. 
Valuation  is  avoided,  the  need  for  managerial  estimation  is  reduced,  and  revenue  is 
recognised  only  when  relatively  certainly  earned.  Income  statement  based  "matching" 
approaches  to  income  determination  are  therefore  arguably  better  suited  than  the  valuation 
approaches,  for  the  purpose  of  monitoring  managerial  stewardship,  entity  performance  and 
discharge  of  responsibility  to  providers  of  funds.  The  influence  of  the  entity  view  is  also 
widely  reflected  in  accounting  terminology  and  practice.  For  example,  traditional  definitions 
of  revenue  in  terms  of  an  enterprise's  products  sold  in  a  period,  and  expenses  as  assets 
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consumed  in  generating  those  revenues  "are  consistent  with  the  entity  theory's  preoccupation 
with  an  index  of  performance  and  accountability  to  equity  holders,  "  (Belkaoui  1985,  p.  226). 
From  a  proprietary  perspective  the  boundary  of  the  reporting  entity  is  drawn  in  terms 
of  the  proprietors'  ownership  of  resources.  From  an  entity  perspective  the  reporting  entity  is 
the  business  itself,  with  a  boundary  generally  defined  in  terms  of  effective  operating  control. 
The  preparation  of  consolidated  accounts  for  groups,  defined  in  UK  Companies  Acts  in 
terms  of  control,  is  consistent  with  entity  theory. 
Entity  theory  initially  emphasised  responsibilities  of  the  business  enterprises  to 
providers  of  capital  (debt  or  equity).  However,  the  informational  or  decision  usefulness 
perspective  on  accounting,  which  conceives  of  accounting  as  providing  information,  for 
decision  making  purposes,  to  a  range  of  users  outside  the  business  enterprise  is  compatible 
with  an  entity  perspective.  The  enterprise  perspective  retains  entity  theory's  conception  of 
the  reporting  entity  as  a  separate  business  enterprise  but  expands  recognition  of  the 
enterprise's  responsibilities.  The  Corporate  Report  (ASC,  1975a)  reflects  such  a  perspective 
in  arguing  that  economic  entities  have  a  wide  ranging  duty  of  public  accountability: 
"We  consider  the  responsibility  to  report  publicly  (later  referred  to  as  public 
accountability)  is  separate  from  and  broader  than  the  legal  obligation  to  report 
and  arises  from  the  custodial  role  played  in  the  community  by  economic 
entities.  Just  as  directors  of  limited  companies  are  recognised  as  having  a 
stewardship  relationship  with  shareholders  who  have  invested  their  funds,  so 
many  other  relationships  exist,  both  of  a  financial  and  non-financial  nature. 
For  example,  economic  entities  compete  for  resources  of  manpower, 
management  and  organisational  skills,  materials  and  energy,  and  they  utilise 
community  owned  assets  and  facilities.  They  have  a  responsibility  for  the 
present  and  future  livelihoods  of  employees,  and  because  of  the  inter- 
dependence  of  all  social  groups,  they  are  involved  in  the  maintenance  of 
standards  of  life  and  the  creation  of  wealth  for  and  on  behalf  of  the 
community.  " 
(ASC,  1975a,  para.  1.3,  p.  15) 
In  the  following  section  of  this  chapter  we  examine  the  principles  concerning  the  reporting 
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entity,  that  is  the  accounting  point  of  view,  as  set  out  in  the  ASB's  draft  Statement  of 
Principles. 
The  reporting  entity  and  the  ASB's  Statement  of  Principles 
Our  purpose  in  examining  how  the  ASB  deal  with  the  reporting  entity  issue  in  their  draft 
Statement  of  Principles  (ASB,  1995b)  is  primarily  to  reveal  the  difficulties  of  consistently 
specify  a  reporting  entity  in  unequivocal  terms.  The  draft  Statement  of  Principles  is  a  vehicle 
for  our  analysis;  it  is  not  the  main  focus  of  our  interest  in  this  chapter.  The  revised  draft  of 
the  Statement  of  Principles  (ASB,  1999a)  advocates  fundamentally  the  same  approach  to 
financial  reporting  as  is  found  in  the  1995  draft,  and  carries  forward  in  more  cautious  terms, 
but  substantially  unaltered,  the  provisions  contained  in  the  1995  draft  which  are  most 
pertinent  to  our  analysis.  We  will  therefore  primarily  make  reference  to,  and  where 
appropriate  quote,  the  initial  draft  Statement  of  Principles  (ASB,  1995b),  upon  which  public 
comment  has  been  published  -  which  we  will  also  refer  to. 
The  draft  Statement  of  Principles  (ASB,  1995b)  contains  seven  chapters,  including 
a  final  chapter  which  specifically  addresses  the  definition  of  the  "the  reporting  entity".  The 
issue  provokes  relatively  little  explicit  comment  from  respondents  to  the  draft  Statement  of 
Principles.  This  relative  neglect  perhaps  reflects  the  fact  that  the  ASB's  treatment  of  this 
issue  is  equivocal  and  does  not  make  absolutely  clear  the  real  challenge  it  presents  to  a 
preconception,  clearly  held  by  some  respondents,  that  the  reporting  entity  is  the  operating 
entity. 
Many  aspects  of  the  ASB's  draft  Statement  of  Principles  strongly  reflect  a  proprietary 
perspective.  The  proprietary  accounting  equation,  A-L=P  is  reflected  in  the  draft's 
definition  of  `ownership  interest'  as:  "the  residual  amount  found  by  deducting  all  of  the 
entity's  liabilities  from  all  of  the  entity's  assets"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.39).  The  draft 
Statement  of  Principles  has  a  balance  sheet  orientation  typical  of  the  proprietary  perspective. 
It  defines  gains  and  losses  as  increases  or  decreases  in  ownership  interest,  other  than  those 
relating  to  contributions  from,  or  distributions  to,  owners  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.47;  ASB, 
1999a,  para.  4.40).  The  determination  of  entity  performance  is  made  a  derivative  of  the 
measurement  of  assets  and  liabilities.  Less  than  5%  of  the  one  hundred  and  seventy  five 
published  responses  to  the  exposure  draft  Statement  of  Principles  were  explicitly  supportive 
of  its  balance  sheet  orientation.  And  more  than  45%  of  commentators  were  explicitly 
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opposed  to  it  -  preferring  the  retention  of  an  income  statement  orientated  matching  approach 
to  income  determination,  (for  further  analysis  see  McKernan  &  O'Donnell,  1998). 
Consistent  with  its  balance  sheet  orientation  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles  argues 
that  "practice  should  develop  by  evolving  in  the  direction  of  greater  use  of  current  values  to 
the  extent  that  this  is  consistent  with  the  constraints  of  reliability  and  cost"  (ASB,  1995b, 
para.  5.38)'.  Less  than  10%  of  the  one  hundred  and  seventy  five  published  responses  to  the 
exposure  draft  Statement  of  Principles  were  explicitly  supportive  of  evolution  in  the  direction 
of  greater  use  of  current  values,  whilst  70%  of  commentators  were  explicitly  opposed  to  it, 
(for  further  analysis  see  McKernan  &  O'Donnell,  1998).  The  draft  Statement  of  Principles' 
proposals  with  respect  to  measurement  can  not,  however,  be  considered  as  wholly  congruent 
with  a  proprietary  perspective.  Unlike  the  Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  in  Scotland 
study,  Making  Corporate  Reports  Valuable  (ICAS,  1988),  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles 
does  not  propose  "realisable  value"  accounting,  which  is  arguably  most  consistent  with  a 
proprietary  perspective  /  balance  sheet  orientation.  "Value  to  the  business",  generally  leading 
to  the  use  of  "replacement  cost",  is  the  measurement  basis  preferred  by  the  ASB.  Such  a 
measurement  basis  is  clearly  more  appropriate  to  an  income  statement  based  approach  to 
income  determination,  entailing  the  matching  against  realised  revenue  of  the  replacement 
cost  of  the  assets  consumed  in  the  generation  of  that  revenue.  This  incoherence  in  the  draft 
Statement  of  Principles'  advocated  measurement  system  might  be  understood  as  reflecting 
an  underlying  tension  between  the  proprietary  and  entity  points  of  view  (see  Ernst  &  Young, 
1996b,  pp.  269-270). 
The  draft  Statement  of  Principles  proposes  the  abandonment  of  the  traditional  rule 
that  only  realised  profits  appear  in  the  profit  and  loss  statement.  It  would  require  that  the 
profit  and  loss  account,  and  the  statement  of  total  recognised  gains  and  losses,  report  the 
gains  and  losses  that  arise  in  the  period,  irrespective  of  when  they  are  realised,  (ASB,  1995b, 
para.  6.25)Z.  Such  a  move  would  be  consistent  with  a  proprietary  perspective.  The  proprietary 
conception  of  income  in  terms  of  change  in  owners'  wealth,  tends  to  imply  that  all  changes 
in  wealth,  whether  or  not  realised  by  an  external  transaction,  ought  to  be  included  in  income. 
Less  than  5%  of  the  one  hundred  and  seventy  five  published  responses  to  the  exposure  draft 
Statement  of  Principles  were  explicitly  supportive  of  proposals  to  abandon  the  traditional 
realisation  principles,  whilst  42%  of  commentators  were  explicitly  opposed,  (for  further 
analysis  see  McKernan  &  O'Donnell,  1998). 
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The  proprietary  view  is  concerned  with  the  owners'  wealth,  that  is,  his  or  her  capacity 
to  consume.  To  measure  the  increase  in  capacity  to  consume,  it  is  necessary  to  make 
adjustment  for  instability  in  the  monetary  unit  of  measurement.  The  proprietary  perspective 
is  consistent  with  `financial',  rather  than  `operating',  capital  maintenance  adjustments. 
Financial  capital  maintenance  focuses  on  the  consumption  power  of  owners  and  adjusts 
income  for  the  maintenance  of  the  owners'  consumption  capacity,  by  applying  a  general  price 
index,  generally  reflective  of  the  owners'  consumption,  to  the  opening  capital  amount. 
Operating  capital  maintenance,  on  the  other  hand,  concentrates  on  the  business  enterprise's 
ability  to  maintain  the  level  of  its  physical  operations,  and  makes  provision  for  capital 
maintenance  in  terms  of  specific  price  changes.  The  draft  Statement  of  Principles  advocates 
a  real-terms  capital  maintenance  system: 
"A  real  terms  capital  maintenance  system  improves  the  relevance  of 
information  because  it  shows  current  operating  margins  as  well  as  the  extent 
to  which  holding  gains  and  losses  reflect  the  effect  of  general  inflation,  so  that 
users  of  real  terms  financial  statements  are  able  to  select  the  particular 
information  they  require.  " 
(ASB,  1995b,  para.  5.37,  p.  92) 
A  real-terms  system  in  effect  gives  information  for  both  a  financial  and  operating  capital 
maintenance  perspectives3.  However  the  ultimate  measure  of  "real"  income  is  based  upon 
financial  capital  maintenance.  If  general  inflation  is  less  than  specific  inflation  on  the 
company's  operating  assets,  distribution  of  the  Statement  of  Principles'  measure  of  "total  real 
recognised  gains",  which  includes  holding  gains  (realised  and  unrealised),  would  erode  the 
enterprise's  operating  capacity.  The  Statement  of  Principles'  real-terms  system  mixes  the 
proprietary  and  entity  perspectives,  whilst  ultimately  favouring  the  proprietary  view. 
The  draft  Statement  of  Principles  formulates  the  objective  of  financial  statements  in 
what  seem,  prima  facie,  to  be  wide  ranging  "decision-usefulness"  terms,  consistent  with  an 
entity  perspective: 
"The  objective  of  financial  statements  is  to  provide  information  about  the 
financial  position,  performance  and  financial  adaptability  of  an  enterprise  that 
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is  useful  to  a  wide  range  of  users  for  assessing  the  stewardship  of 
management  and  for  making  economic  decisions.  " 
(ASB,  1995b,  para.  1.1;  see  also  ASB,  1999a,  para.  l.  6) 
In  fact,  this  objective  might  be  regarded  as  consistent  with  what  we  have  described  as  an 
"enterprise"  conception  of  the  reporting  entity,  that  is  an  entity  perspective  with  a  wide- 
ranging  recognition  of  reporting  responsibilities.  The  practical  significance  of  this  objective 
is,  however,  quickly  cut  short  by  the  Statement  of  Principles'  declaration  that: 
"Financial  statements  that  meet  the  needs  of  providers  of  risk  capital  to  the 
enterprise  will  also  meet  most  of  the  needs  of  other  users  that  financial 
statements  can  satisfy.  "  ' 
(ASB,  1995b,  p.  1.6;  see  also  ASB,  1999a,  para.  1.12) 
This  assertion,  which  is  not  supported  by  either  explanation  or  evidence,  is  recognised  by 
many  commentators  as  obviously  dubious  (see  Page,  M.  J.,  1996,  p.  583;  &  Pannell  Kerr 
Forster,  1996,  p.  587).  Mumford  objects  to  the  assertion  in  the  following  terms: 
"Holders  of  quoted  shares  are  not  likely  to  be  typical  of  users  generally: 
unlike  employees,  they  may  be  assumed  to  have  diversified  portfolios,  very 
low  transaction  costs  and  little  long-term  commitment  to  the  company  -  and 
unlike  all  other  user  groups  their  securities  can  easily  be  traded  in  a  uniquely 
information-rich  environment  in  which  transactors  may,  with  some  safety, 
"free-ride"  on  the  knowledge  of  others  impounded  in  market.  " 
(Mumford,  1996,  p.  552) 
The  ASB  seem  intent  on  promoting  a  view  of  financial  reporting  as  primarily  serving  the 
needs  of  shareholders  -  an  essentially  proprietary  perspective:  "The  wide  range  of  users  is 
collapsed  down  to  the  providers  of  risk  capital  -  shareholders"  (Ernst  &  Young,  1996b, 
p.  273).  Again,  we  seem  to  have  a  tension  between  an  entity/enterprise  perspective  and  the 
proprietary  view. 
Chapter  7  of  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles,  entitled  "the  reporting  entity",  prima 
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facie,  supports  the  entity  perspective  on  the  reporting  entity.  It  identifies  control  rather  than 
ownership  as  the  primary  factor  setting  the  boundaries  of  the  reporting  entity:  a  reporting 
"entity  must  be  a  cohesive  economic  unit,  usually  resulting  from  a  unified  control  structure" 
(ASB,  1995b  para.  7.2;  see  also  ASB,  1999a,  para.  2.3).  Chapter  7  proceeds  to  a  discussion 
of  the  proprietary  and  entity  perspectives  in  the  context  of  group  accounts.  Whilst 
recognising  that  "control  provides  the  basis  for  determining  which  investments  should  be 
consolidated"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  7.22),  the  ASB  suggest  that  both  perspectives  have  a  role 
to  play  in  group  accounts:  "deciding  which  perspective  to  use  as  a  basis  for  accounting  for 
subsidiaries  depends  on  the  relative  usefulness  of  the  information  each  provides"  (ASB, 
1995b,  para.  7.21). 
Less  than  10%  of  the  one  hundred  and  seventy  five  published  responses  to  the 
exposure  draft  Statement  of  Principles  explicitly  mention  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles' 
discussion  of  "the  reporting  entity".  No  commentators  explicitly  applaud  the  ASB's  proposal 
on  this  issue.  Among  those  few  commentators  dealing  with  Chapter  7  "the  reporting  entity", 
there  is  something  of  a  consensus  that  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles  fails  to  significantly 
clarify,  or  advance,  thinking.  The  comments  below  are  representative: 
Table  1.  A  selection  of  comments  on  ch.  7  of  ASB's  draft  Statement  of  Principles 
"The  Board's  principle  is  that  "the  financial  statements  should  include  consolidated 
information  relating  to  all  the  activities  controlled  by  an  entity  and  account  for  other 
investments  according  to  the  level  of  influence  exercised  over  them".  The  rest  of 
Chapter  7  is  actually  a  summary  of  current  accounting  practice  and  methods  and  as 
such  has  no  place  in  a  "Statement  of  Principles". 
(TT  Group  PLC,  1996,  p.  673) 
"We  have  struggled  to  find  many  financial  reporting  principles  in  this  chapter  (chapter 
7:  the  reporting  entity).  Much  is  either  academic  discussion  (para.  7.18  is  a  good 
example  of  this)  or  a  description/justification  of  current  practices  (e.  g.,  merger  and 
acquisition  accounting)  or  planned  standards  (goodwill,  associates  and  joint  ventures).  " 
(Coopers  &  Lybrand,  1996,  p.  218) 
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Table  1  (continued).  A  selection  of  comments  on  ch.  7  of  ASB's  draft  Statement  of 
Principles 
"Chapter  7  (the  reporting  entity)  includes  few  principles.  ...  Rather,  the  chapter  is  a 
summary  of  existing  standards  (FRS  2,6  and  7)  and  proposed  standards  (goodwill, 
associates  and  joint  ventures).  " 
(Deloitte  &  Touche,  1996,  p254) 
"We  do  not  see  the  need  for  an  extended  discussion  on  the  reporting  entity  as  presently 
contained  in  Chapter  7  (the  reporting  entity).  In  many  respects,  this  chapter  is  a 
discussion  on  consolidation,  equity  accounting  and  proportional  consolidation,  topics, 
which  are  dealt  with  adequately  elsewhere,  in  for  example  FRS2  and  FRED  11. 
... 
We 
recommend,  ...  that  much  of  this  discussion  is  deleted  from  the  Statement  of 
Principles.  " 
(Arthur  Andersen,  1996,  p.  57) 
"The  issues  raised  by  this  chapter  (chapter  7:  the  reporting  entity)  do  not  seem  to  be 
contentious.  " 
(Bass  plc,  1996,  p.  88) 
The  relative  lack  of  response  to  the  draft  ASB  on  the  issue  of  the  "reporting  entity" 
may  be  due  to  the  fact  the  Chapter  7  of  the  draft  does  not  obviously  challenge  the  status  quo. 
Other  aspects  of  the  draft  which  point  towards  the  proprietary  perspective,  without  making 
the  connection  explicit,  are,  as  discussed  above,  generally  fiercely  resisted  (e.  g.,  the  proposed 
balance  sheet  orientation  and  the  proposed  abandonment  of  the  realisation  principle).  Even 
Professor  Chris  Nobes,  a  sophisticated  and  informed  analyst,  seems  to  have  difficulty  in 
recognising  the  depth  of  the  ASB's  commitment  to  a  proprietary  perspective.  He  indicates 
that  the  chapter  7  "is  not  quite  clear"  to  him  and  asks  whether  the  ASB  might  simplify  it  by 
"taking  an  entity  view  throughout?  "  (Nobes,  1996,  p.  576).  It  is  perhaps  little  wonder  then  that 
almost  no  preparers  or  users  of  accounts  comment  on  Chapter  7. 
Only  in  one  isolated  place,  paragraph  3.52,  does  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles 
make  explicit  and  crystal  clear  a  preference  for  an  extreme  proprietary  perspective,  which 
takes  the  reporting  entity  as  coextensive  with  its  pre-existing  owners.  Paragraph  3.52  does 
not  occur,  as  might  have  been  expected  in  chapter  7,  which  purports  to  deal  with  principles 
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concerning  specification  of  the  reporting  entity,  rather  it  occurs  in  the  context  of  a  discussion 
of  the  practicalities  of  accounting  for  stock  options.  We  will  discuss  paragraph  3.52  in  the 
following  section  of  this  chapter. 
Accounting  for  stock  option  compensation  and  the  accounting  point  of  view 
In  preceding  sections  of  the  chapter  we  have  noted  that  conceptions  of  the  reporting  entity 
have  important  implications  for  design  of  an  accounting  system.  For  example,  and  perhaps 
most  obviously,  a  proprietary  perspective  may  lead  us  towards  measurement  of  financial 
capital  maintenance  whilst  an  entity  perspective  might  lead  to  measurement  of  operating 
capital  maintenance. 
In  this  section  of  the  chapter  we  want  to  further  illustrate  the  importance  of 
alternative  perspectives  on  the  reporting  entity  by  reference  to  a  particular  accounting  issue 
-  accounting  for  stock  option  compensation.  Perspectives  on  the  reporting  entity  are 
recognised  to  be  crucial  to  debate  on  this  issues.  We  will  therefore  look  to  the  ASB's  draft 
Statement  of  Principles  for  guidance  concerning  accounting  for  stock  option  compensation, 
paying  particular  attention  to  the  "reporting  entity"  issue. 
The  draft  Statement  of  Principles  makes  financial  statements  essentially  depend 
entirely  on  three  balance  sheet  elements:  "assets",  "liabilities",  and  "ownership  interest". 
Ownership  interest  is  defined  as  "the  residual  amount  found  by  deducting  all  of  the  entity's 
liabilities  from  all  of  the  entity's  assets,  "  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.39).  The  Statement  of 
Principles  makes  it  clear  that  "any  item  that  does  not  fall  within  one  of  the  definitions  of 
elements  should  not  be  included  in  financial  statements"  (ASB,  1995b,  3.2,  p.  52).  Therefore 
it  is  clearly  necessary  to  consider  stock  option  compensation  in  terms  of  these  fundamental 
financial  statement  elements.  Clearly  it  can  be  argued  that  the  grant  of  stock  options  give  rise 
to  an  asset: 
"...  the  asset  initially  recognized  for  non-vested  employee  stock  options  is 
prepaid  compensation,  which  represents  the  value  already  conveyed  to 
employees  for  services  to  be  received  in  the  future.  Later,  compensation  cost 
is  incurred  as  the  benefits  embodied  in  that  asset  are  used  up;  that  is,  as  the 
employees  render  service  during  the  vesting  period.  " 
(FASB,  1993,  para.  62) 
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The  FASB  make  a  strong  defence  of  this  view  against  common  criticism  of  it  (see  FASB, 
1993,  paras.  63-65).  As  the  definition  of  assets  is  not  the  focus  of  this  chapter  we  will  accept 
this  view  without  debate6.  If  we  accept  the  ASB's  view  that  "the  interrelationship  between 
the  elements  has  the  consequence  that  the  recognition  of  one  element  (for  example  an  asset) 
automatically  requires  the  recognition  of  another  element"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.4),  we  must 
ask  -  what  is  the  nature  of  the  corresponding  element  arising  when  stock  options,  as  prepaid 
compensation,  are  recognised  as  an  asset?  This  is  a  crucial  question  because  measurement 
of  the  related  compensation  expense  will  depend  upon  whether  we  regard  stock  options  as 
giving  rise  to  a  liability  or  to  equity': 
"...  whether  an  employee  stock  option  -a  call  option  written  by  the  employer 
corporation  on  its  own  stock  -  is  considered  to  be  an  equity  instrument  or  a 
liability  is  significant  in  determining  the  date  at  which  the  final  measure  of 
the  related  compensation  expense  should  be  computed.  If  an  employee  stock 
option  is  an  equity  instrument,  the  final  measurement  date  for  compensation 
expense  will  be  the  date  at  which  the  option  is  deemed  to  be  "issued"  because 
changes  in  the  values  of  equity  instruments  after  issuance  are  not  gains  or 
losses  to  be  recognized  in  the  issuer's  financial  statements.  ...  Neither 
subsequent  exercise  of  the  option  nor  its  expiry  without  exercise  would  affect 
the  amount  of  compensation  expense  recognized.  However,  if  granting  an 
employee  stock  option  is  deemed  to  give  rise  to  a  liability,  the  final 
measurement  date  effectively  would  be  the  date  on  which  the  option  is 
exercised  (or  expires)  because  changes  in  the  amount  or  value  of  a  liability 
after  its  incurrence  do  affect  a  debtor's  net  income.  " 
(FASB,  1990,  para.  69) 
Liabilities  are  defined  in  the  ASB's  draft  Statement  of  Principles:  "obligations  of  an  entity 
to  transfer  economic  benefits  as  a  result  of  past  transactions  or  events"  (ASB,  1995b, 
para.  3.21;  ASB,  1999a,  para.  4.24).  Specification  of  "the  entity"  is  clearly  crucial  to  the 
definition  of  liabilities8. 
Advocates  of  an  entity  perspective  will  regard  the  reporting  entity  to  be  the  enterprise 
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itself,  that  is,  as  an  economic  unit  separate  and  distinct  from  its  proprietors.  From  this 
perspective  the  equity  interests  in  the  enterprise  are  claims  on  the  enterprise's  net  assets,  they 
are  not  themselves  assets  of  the  enterprise.  Therefore,  from,  this  perspective  a  call  option 
written  on  the  enterprise's  shares  does  not  meet  the  definition  of  a  liability;  the  enterprise  has 
no  obligation  to  transfer  economic  benefits.  In  fact,  if  the  option  is  eventually  exercised  the 
enterprise  will  receive  assets  (the  exercise  price)  in  a  non-reciprocal  transaction.  Because, 
under  this  view,  the  accounting  enterprise  is  sharply  distinguished  from  the  proprietors  of  the 
equity  interest  in  the  enterprise,  a  transaction  that  benefits  one  group  of  proprietors  at  the 
expense  of  another  group  can  not  give  rise  to  a  gain  or  loss  to  the  enterprise  itself;  "...  An 
enterprise  can  not  gain  or  lose  on  transactions  in  its  own  equity  instruments"  (FASB,  1990, 
para.  125).  If  an  entity  perspective  is  taken  an  option  can  not  fit  the  definitions  of  a  liability. 
In  this  case,  and  almost  by  default,  it  must  be  regarded  as  an  equity  instrument,  part  of  the 
residual  element  "ownership  interest"  determined  by  the  deduction  of  "all  of  the  entity's 
liabilities  from  all  of  the  entity's  assets"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.39;  ASB,  1999a,  para.  4.38). 
If  the  option  is  regarded  as  an  equity  instrument,  the  increment  to  ownership  interest,  and  the 
corresponding  asset  of  prepaid  compensation  that  in  due  course  will  be  reflected  in  the 
income  statement,  should  be  finally  measured  by  reference  to  the  value  of  the  option  when 
it  is  issued.  When  the  option  should  be  regarded  as  being  issued  is  another  matter;  the  grant 
date,  vesting  date,  service  date  and  the  service  expiration  date  are  all  possibilities9. 
From  a  proprietary  perspective  the  reporting  entity  is  not  regarded  as  separate  and 
distinct  from  its  owners.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  essentially  taken  to  be  coextensive  with  its 
owners10,  and  more  specifically,  in  the  context  of  stock  options,  with  its  pre-existing  owners 
(see  FASB,  1990,  para.  131).  Advocates  of  a  proprietary  perspective  will  note  that  stock 
options  represent  an  obligation  upon  the  enterprise  to  issue  shares  at  a  price  that  may  be  less 
than  their  market  price  at  the  date  of  the  transaction.  Such  an  obligation  has  the  potential  to 
transfer  wealth  (economic  benefits)  from  the  pre-existing  shareholders  to  the  option  holders. 
From  a  proprietary  perspective,  stock  options  can  then  be  regarded  as  meeting  the  definition 
of  a  liability  of  the  reporting  entity  in  so  far  as  they  potentially  oblige  the  transfer  of 
economic  benefits  from  the  reporting  entity  (defined  to  be  coextensive  with  the  pre-existing 
shareholders)  to  the  option  holders.  From  an  extreme  proprietary  perspective: 
"...  an  obligation  to  deliver  a  financial  instrument  to  another  entity  on  terms 
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that  may  be  less  than  the  market  price  on  the  date  of  the  delivery  creates  a 
liability  even  if  the  financial  instrument  to  be  transferred  is  the  enterprise's 
own  stock.  If  the  terms  of  a  future  issuance  of  stock  have  the  potential  to  be 
unfavourable  to  the  enterprise's  preexisting  stockholders,  the  terms  are 
deemed  to  be  potentially  unfavourable  to  the  enterprise  itself  and  thus  to  have 
the  potential  of  affecting  the  reported  financial  performance  of  the 
enterprise.  " 
(FASB,  1990,  para.  128) 
If  the  proprietary  /  pre-existing  proprietor  perspective  is  taken,  options  have  the 
character  of  a  liability.  Because  changes  in  the  amount  of  a  liability  after  its  incurrence  affect 
a  creditor's  net  income,  the  final  measurement  date  for  the  liability  will  be  the  exercise  or 
expiry  date  of  the  option.  Measurement  of  the  liability  will  be  revised  until  such  time  as  it 
is  discharged,  so  that  the  amount  of  the  measured  compensation  expense  will  finally  be 
determined  by  reference  to  the  value  of  the  option  at  the  exercise  or  expiry  date  (by  the 
exercise  price  and  market  price  at  that).  The  entity  and  proprietary  perspectives  lead  to 
different  conclusions  on  whether  stock  options  are  liabilities  or  equity;  As  liabilities  the 
compensation  expense  should  finally  be  measured  at  the  exercise  or expiry  date,  whilst  as 
equity  the  compensation  expense  should  be  measured  at  the  issue  date. 
Accounting  for  stock  option  compensation  has  been  the  most  highly  contentious  and 
politicised  issue  in  accounting  regulation  in  recent  years,  (see  Zeff,  1997;  Young,  1997; 
Street  et  al,  1997;  Fraser  et.  al.,  1998).  In  December  1994,  under  extreme  pressure,  the  FASB 
dropped  its  proposal  that  US  companies  be  required  to  charge  the  value  of  share  option 
compensation  as  an  expense  in  their  profit  and  loss  accounts.  A  compromise  was  reached 
which  provided,  instead,  for  footnote  disclosure  of  the  impact  of  options  on  net  profit  and 
EPS  (See  FASB,  1995).  The  chairman  of  the  FASB,  Dennis  Beresford,  indicated  at  the  time 
of  the  climb-down,  that  he  believed  that  the  view  that  share  options  have  value,  are  an 
expense,  and  ought  to  be  charged  against  income,  would  eventually  be  accepted.  For  the 
present  "It  was  a  case  of  the  leader  getting  too  far  ahead  of  the  followers"  (quoted  by 
Peterson,  1995,  p.  3). 
In  the  wake  of  the  highly  politicised  debate  on  the  stock  option  issue  in  the  US,  the 
matter  was  considered  in  the  UK  by  the  ASB's  "Urgent  Issues  Task  Force"  (UITF).  The 
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UITF  statement  issued  by  the  ASB  recommended  footnote  disclosure,  on  the  grounds  that 
"it  is  not  presently  practicable  ...  to  specify  an  appropriate  valuation  method  for  options  as 
a  benefit  in  kind"  (ASB,  1994,  para.  9).  The  UITF  recommendations  are  clearly  less  than  fully 
satisfactory: 
"The  UITF's  proposals  are  flawed  because  they  are  voluntary  and 
cumbersome.  They  are  like  giving  a  user  a  trial  balance  and  leaving  him  to 
prepare  the  final  accounts.  The  UITF  should  return  to  measurement.  A 
simple  workable  method  now  is  more  useful  than  a  theoretically  more 
sophisticated  method  in  the  indefinite  and  remote  future.  " 
(Westwick,  1994,  p.  88) 
The  UITF  recommendations  do  not  close  the  door  on  treating  stock-based  compensation  as 
an  expense  at  some  future  date  when  a  satisfactory  (politically  acceptable)  valuation  approach 
is  determined.  We  believe  that,  in  time,  accounting  standard  setters  in  both  the  UK  and  US 
will  want  to  return  to  the  issue. 
Accounting  for  stock  option  compensation  is  clearly  the  sort  of  difficult  and 
contentious  issue  where  guidance  from  a  coherent  conceptual  framework  might  be  hoped  to 
be  of  most  crucial  value.  We  might  expect  a  conceptual  framework  to  serve  both  as  a  bulwark 
against  interest  group  pressure,  and  as  a  practical  guide  to  the  resolution  of  such  technically 
complex  matters  (see  Solomons,  1978  &  Mozes,  1998).  The  FASB  felt  itself  unable  to 
proceed  with  its  consideration  of  accounting  for  stock  option  compensation  without  first 
reconsidering  its  view  on  certain  fundamental  conceptual  issues  (see  FASB,  1990,  para.  14). 
And  it  only  returned  to  the  topic  in  1992  after  deciding  not  to  pursue  possible  changes  to  its 
conceptual  definition  of  assets  and  liabilities. 
In  previous  sections  of  this  chapter  we  have  explained  that  the  ASB's  draft  Statement 
of  Principles  does  not  give  clear  guidance  on  the  reporting  entity  question.  The  draft  contains 
apparent  expressions  of  support  for  an  entity  perspective.  The  advocacy  of  financial 
statements  which  are  "useful  to  a  wide  range  of  users"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  1.1;  ASB,  1999a, 
para.  l.  6),  and  the  principle  in  chapter  7  that  "an  entity  must  be  a  cohesive  economic  unit, 
usually  resulting  from  a  unified  control  structure"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  7.2;  ASB,  1999a, 
para.  2.3),  both  seem  to  imply  an  entity  perspective.  Other  elements  of  the  draft  Statement  of 
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Principles,  including  fundamental  aspects  of  the  accounting  model  proposed,  seem  to  imply 
a  proprietary  view.  In  our  view  in  its  discussion  of  principles  the  draft  Statement  of  Principles 
is fundamentally  equivocal  on  the  reporting  entity  issue.  Only  in  a  discussion  of  accounting 
for  stock  options  as  a  practical  issue,  which  a  number  of  commentators  noted  might  have 
been  more  fittingly  included  in  a  specific  accounting  standard,  are  the  ASB  emphatically 
driven  off  the  "reporting  entity"  fence.  As  explained  above,  the  stock  options  issue  is  one 
which  forces  the  adoption,  at  least  implicitly,  of  a  view  on  the  specification  of  the  reporting 
entity;  The  Board  take  an  extreme  proprietary  view  which  equates  the  reporting  entity  with 
its  pre-existing  owners: 
"If  the  contribution  received  is  less  than  the  fair  value  of  rights  granted  in 
exchange  the  transaction  will  result  in  a  loss  for  the  pre-existing  shareholders 
and  a  windfall  gain  for  the  new  investor.  Since  the  ownership  interest  as  a 
whole  is  co-extensive  with  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  entity,  a  gain  or  loss 
to  the  existing  holders  as  a  body  resulting  from  an  adjustment  to  their  rights 
in  the  entity  is  a  gain  or  loss  to  the  entity.  " 
(ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.52;  see  also  ASB,  1999a,  para.  4.46) 
Some  commentators  (see  Mumford,  1996  &  Forker,  1996)  take  the  view  that 
para.  3.52  reveals  the  ASB's  essential  advocacy  of  the  proprietary  perspective.  We  do  not 
share  that  view.  As  we  have  explained  above  we  consider  that  the  Statement  of  Principles  is 
fundamentally  ambivalent  on  the  reporting  entity  question.  We  regard  para.  3.52  as  a  forced 
choice  -  given  that  the  Board  clearly  desired  that  the  Statement  of  Principles  might  be 
capable  of  giving  some  guidance  on  the  stock  options  issue.  The  choice  they  make  does,  of 
course,  reveal  their  sympathy  with  the  proprietary  perspective  and  their  privileging  of  the 
interests  of  "owners"". 
Those,  relatively  few,  commentators  who  note  and  comment  on  paragraph  3.52  are 
typically  bemused  or  resistant  to  it.  The  comments  shown  below  in  Table  2  are  representative 
of  those  dealing  with  para.  3.52: 
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Table  2.  Selection  of  comments  on  para.  3.52 
"Paragraph  3.52  contains  a  discussion  of  the  situation  inter  alia  where  the  ownership 
interest  in  an  enterprise  is  increased  by  an  issue  of  securities  to  a  new  investor.  It  suggests 
that  where  the  securities  issued  to  the  new  investor  are  issued  at  an  undervalue,  the 
reporting  entity  has  incurred  a  loss;  this  cannot  be  correct  -  if  there  is  a  loss  it  is  one 
suffered  by  the  previously  existing  shareholders,  just  as  the  gain  is  made  by  the  new 
shareholder.  The  suggested  distinction  between  such  an  issue,  and  an  issue  by  way  of 
rights  at  an  undervalue,  is  irrelevant  in  terms  of  the  position  of  the  reporting  entity  itself.  " 
(The  Law  Society,  1996,  p.  504) 
"We  are  unable  to  see  how  adjusting  the  rights  of  any  particular  class  of  shareholder 
affects  the  value  of  the  business  to  existing  shareholders  as  a  body  (last  sentence  of 
paragraph  3.52,  page  65):  altering  ownership  rights  between  different  types  of 
shareholder  should  have  no  impact  on  the  value  of  the  total  ownership  interest  in  the 
entity.  " 
(Institutional  Fund  Managers'  Association,  1996,  p.  449) 
"We  find  this  (the  last  sentence  of  paragraph  3.52)  peculiar.  The  entity  has  made  no  loss 
(other  than  an  opportunity  loss).  Are  we  to  bring  all  opportunity  losses  into  account? 
(KPMG,  1996,  p.  472) 
"We  do  not  understand  the  last  sentence  of  paragraph  3.52.  We  cannot  think  of  an 
example  of  a  gain  to  the  existing  shareholders  as  a  body  resulting  from  an  adjustment  to 
their  rights  in  the  entity.  If  the  board  has  a  specific  example  in  mind,  it  would  be  useful 
if  you  gave  this  to  illustrate  the  point.  Otherwise  we  are  sceptical  that  such  a  gain  could 
be  a  gain  to  the  entity.  " 
(Pannell  Kerr  Forster,  1996,  p.  588) 
The  proprietary  perspective  certainly  does  not  have  unqualified  support  in  the  wider 
accounting  community  of  preparers  and  users  of  accounts,  (see,  Moores  &  Steadman,  1986). 
In  our  view  a  tension  between  the  proprietary  and  entity  views  also  runs  deep  in  the  thinking 
of  accounting  standard  setters  and  in  particular  the  ASB. 
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Identity  thinking  and  the  reporting  entity 
The  ASB  is  promoting  a  balance  sheet  /  valuation  orientated  accounting  model.  That  model 
has  a  conceptual  coherence  that  its  primary  rival,  the  income  statement  orientated  realisation 
and  matching  model,  can  not  claim.  We  have  argued  elsewhere  (McKernan  &  O'Donnell, 
1998)  that  the  Statement  of  Principles  project  can  be  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  reinforce  at 
the  conceptual  level  a  world  view  threatened  by  its  own  immanent  contradictions.  Financial 
accounting  as  "identity  thinking"  (Adorno,  1966),  works  to  subsume  the  plurality  of  the 
particular  within  a  unitary  systems  of  concepts.  However  the  concepts  through  which  we 
grasp  the  world are  always  inadequate  to  their  object,  their  hold  always  imperfect,  less  than 
total,  and  there  is  always  a  residual  which  can  come  to  threaten  the  coherence  of  any  system 
of  concepts.  Conceptual  frameworks  for  financial  reporting  contain  an  immanent  tendency 
to  failure  because  conceptual  coherence  will  tend  to  be  challenged  by  the  real  pluralities 
moving  beyond  its  grasp.  "What  is,  is  more  than  it  is"  (Adorno,  1966,  p.  161).  In  our  view  the 
inadequate  grasp  of  financial  accounting's  restricted  system  of  concepts  upon  their  objects, 
is  revealed  by  the  ASB's  equivocation  concerning  specification  of  the  reporting  entity.  The 
proprietary  perspective  is  conceptually  consistent  with  the  ASB's  preferred  balance  sheet 
orientation.  However  in  its  draft  Statement  of  Principles  the  Board  are  unable  to  consistently 
sustain  a  proprietary  perspective.  Other  aspects  of  the  social  reality  of  the  entity  force  their 
way  to  recognition.  These  include,  the  legal  separation  of  proprietor  and  enterprise,  the  legal 
definition  of  holding  company  -  subsidiary  relationship  in  terms  of  control,  and  most 
powerful  of  all  the  widespread  social  recognition  of  business  enterprises  as  significant  active 
agents  /  subjects  in  our  societies,  quite  separate  from  their  proprietors. 
In  subsequent  sections  of  this  chapter  we  use  a  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  perspective 
to  explore  the  nature  of  the  firm  as  a  social  subject,  and  to  elucidate  the  tension  between 
`proprietary'  and  `entity'  aspects  which  we  would  argue  runs  deep  in  the  nature  of  the  firm. 
We  will  argue  that  the  commercial  firm  may  be  conceived  as  a  relationally  dependent  subject. 
And,  just  as  the  individual  can  become  a  more  effective  political/moral  agent  by  recognizing 
its  relational  dependence  on  the  Other,  so  too  can  the  commercial  firm.  We  will  develop  our 
analysis  primarily  using  a  Lacanian  model  of  subjectivity.  Before  turning  to  Lacan,  we  will, 
however,  locate  our  conception  of  the  firm  as  moral  agent/subject  by  outlining  key  aspects 
of  the  existing  theory  and  literature  of  the  firm  as  moral  agent. 
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Corporate  moral  agency 
That  existing  theory  of  the  firm  as  moral  agent  originates  in  the  work  of  Peter  French  (1979), 
which  is  in  turn  inspired  by  the  philosopher  Donald  Davidson's  analysis  of  agency.  Davidson 
breaks  with  the  conception  of  language  as  medium  of  representation  (of  the  reality)  or  of 
expression  (of  the  self),  and  he  thus  leaves  behind  any  notion  that  either  reality  or  the 
self/subject  have  any  essential  nature  or  core  waiting  to  be  represented  or  expressed.  He  thus 
breaks  with  the  traditional  picture  in  which  subjects  "are  not  simply  networks  of  beliefs  and 
desires  but  rather  beings  which  have  those  beliefs  and  desires"  (Rorty,  1989,  p.  10).  Davidson 
describes  a  subjectivity  that  has  no  essential  core,  and  is  conceptually  located  in  the  public 
space  of  language.  He  allows  no  priority  to  the  subjective;  The  Davidsonian  subject  exists 
only  in  relation  to  the  other  and  the  objective  world:  "The  objective  and  the  inter-subjective 
are  thus  essential  to  anything  we  call  subjectivity,  and  constitute  the  context  in  which  it  takes 
form"  (Davidson,  1991,  p.  165). 
The  moral  status  of  the  firm  is  a  crucial  issue  in  business  ethics  "...  our  notions  about 
the  nature  of  corporations  must  inevitably  shape  our  positions  on  crucial  questions  relating 
to  corporate  social  responsibility  and  the  most  effective  means  of  exerting  social  control  over 
corporations"  (Metzger  &  Dalton,  1996,  p.  490).  The  debate  concerning  the  ontological  moral 
status  of  the  firm  has  been  long  running.  For  a  recent  reviews  of  the  debate  see  Moore  (1999) 
or  Metzger  &  Dalton  (1996). 
To  many  readers  it  may  seem  to  be  intuitively  clear  that  the  corporation  can  have  no 
moral  status  at  all.  Indeed,  the  nexus  of  contracts  view  of  the  firm  which  has  achieved  some 
dominance  in  legal  and  financial  spheres  "effectually  excludes  corporations  per  se  from  the 
class  moral  persons"  (French,  1979,  p.  207).  In  this  view,  the  firm,  as  no  more  than  a  legal 
fiction  serving  as  a  locus  for  contract  has  no  capacity  for  social  or  moral  obligations  and 
responsibilities.  French  cites  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  as  a  particularly  flagrant  example 
of  this  view.  The  ideological  bias  of  the  nexus  of  contracts  view  is  quite  blatant:  "If  the 
corporation  is  nothing  but  a  nexus  of  contracts,  why  should  the  contractors  be  denied  the 
freedom  to  design  their  contracts  as  they  desire?  "  (Metzger  &  Dalton,  1996,  p.  492).  On  the 
other  hand,  many  will  agree,  with  French  (1979,1984,1995),  that  corporations  are  possibly 
the  most  important  moral  agents  of  our  times,  holding  enormous  potential  both  for  good  and 
bad.  French  argues  that  our  ways  of  thinking  about  moral  agency  have  not  kept  pace  with  the 
invasion  of  our  society  by  corporations.  He  suggests  that  the  intellectual  legacy  of  "atomistic 
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individualist  liberalism"  has  encouraged  the  "anthropological  bigotry"  (Danley,  1980)  which 
has  made  it  difficult  for  us  to  reformulate  our  thinking  to  accommodate  the  moral  agency  of 
the  firm.  In  this  chapter  we  want  to  respond  to  the  challenge  set  by  French  and  contribute  to 
the  enrichment  our  ways  of  thinking  about  the  moral  status  of  the  corporation,  by  bringing 
a  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  perspective  to  bear  on  the  issue. 
French  argues  that  the  firm  qualifies  as  `agent'  or  `actor'  by  virtue  of  its  possession 
of  three  basic  capacities,  which  are  common  to  all  agents.  Firstly  "it  has  purposes,  plans, 
goals  and  interests  that  motivate  some  of  its  behavior".  Secondly  it  has  "the  ability  to  make 
rational  decisions  and  to  consider  rational  arguments".  And  finally  it  has  "the  facility  to 
respond  to  events  and  ethical  criticism  by  altering  intentions  and  patterns  of  behavior  that  are 
harmful  (or  offensive)  to  others  or  detrimental  to  their  own  interests"  (French,  1995,  p.  12). 
For  French  the  firm's  capacity  to  "make  rational  decisions"  and  "to  respond  to  events  and 
ethical  criticism"  resides  in  its  possession  of  a  "corporate  internal  decision"  (CID)  structure. 
Whilst  the  firm  may  not  normally  be  able  to  function  without  the  participation  of  human 
beings  its  agency  is  not  identical  with  theirs;  it  has  the  capacity  for  intentional  action: 
"For  a  corporation  to  be  treated  as  a  Davidsonian  agent  it  must  be  the  case 
that  some  things  that  happen,  some  events,  are  describable  in  a  way  that 
makes  certain  sentences  true,  sentences  that  say  that  some  of  the  things  a 
corporation  does  were  intended  by  the  corporation  itself.  That  is  not 
accomplished  if  attributing  intentions  to  a  corporation  is  only  a  shorthand  way 
of  attributing  intentions  to  the  biological  persons  who  comprise  e.  g.  its  board 
of  directors.  If  that  were  to  turn  out  to  be  the  case  then  on  metaphysical  if  not 
logical  grounds  there  would  be  no  way  to  distinguish  between  corporations 
and  mobs.  I  shall  argue,  however,  that  a  Corporation's  Internal  Decision 
Structure  (its  CID  Structure)  is  the  requisite  redescription  device  that  licenses 
the  predication  of  corporate  intentionality.  " 
(French,  1979,  p.  211) 
French's  (1979)  view  of  the  CID  structure  can  be  criticised  as  being  overly  formal.  It  seems 
to  imply  that  the  decisions  made  by  managers  which  do  not  conform  with  the  CID  structure 
can  not  be  corporate  actions,  (see  Danley,  1980,  p.  185).  We  believe  that  by  conceiving  of  the 
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firm  as  Lacanian  subject,  split  between  conscious  and  unconscious,  French's  idea  of  CID 
structures  may  be  enriched.  In  particular  the  informal  /  unconscious  elements  of  decision 
processes  might  be  given  fuller  acknowledgement.  Clearly  each  firm,  as  agent,  has 
explicit/overt,  we  might  say  conscious,  motivating  "purposes,  plans,  goals  and  interests", 
found  for  example  in  the  firm's  constitution,  mission  statements,  and  so  on.  We  suggest  that 
the  operation  of  desire  in  the  unconscious  is  likely  to  have  just  as  important  effects  on  the 
firm's  behaviour  as  any  consciously  specified  goals  and  purposes. 
An  element  of  continuity,  `sameness',  is  vital  to  the  constitution  of  any  subject.  We 
regard  the  firm  as  a  special  form  of  organisation,  one  with  at  least  minimal  continuity  over 
time  (as  distinct  from  a  mob).  The  firm  has  a  history,  a  "memory",  some  continuity  of 
elements,  and  a  formal  place  in  the  symbolic  order.  It  evidences  an  important  degree  of 
"identity  and  sameness  over  time"  (French,  1995,  p.  329).  Just  as  Singer  (1984)  argues  that 
corporate  conscience  should  be  thought  of  as  an  emergent  property  of  complex  cognitive 
systems,  and  just  as  the  child  develops  /  emerges  as  a  moral  subject,  we  will  argue  that  the 
firm  as  Lacanian  subject  emerges  through  processes  described  by  Lacan  as  alienation  and 
separation. 
Much  of  the  resistance  to  the  conception  of  the  firm  as  a  moral  agent/subject  can  be 
attributed,  in  our  view,  to  the  intellectual  grip  of  methodological  individualism  and  to 
inadequate  biologistic  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  the  human-being  as  subject.  New 
perspectives  on  the  individual  person  tend  to  emphasise  the  fragmented/multiple  nature  of 
the  individual  (Elster,  1986).  Kerlin's  resistance  to  the  notion  of  the  firm  as  moral  agent  is 
typical: 
it...  we  are  more  likely  to  achieve  good  and  avoid  evil  by  refusing  to  reify 
abstractions  or personify  relationships.  ...  we  make  a  serious  practical  and 
ethical  mistake  in  treating  the  group  or  the  organization  as  a  moral  agent  in 
its  own  right.  Where  a  group  is  a  force  for  evil  we  should  change  its 
membership  or  at  the  limit  break  it  up.  Moral  blame  or  punishment  must 
ultimately  go  to  the  people  who  have  deliberately  set  the  viruses  loose  or 
failed  to  control  them  or  willingly  submitted  to  them. 
(Kerlin,  1997,  p.  1437) 
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Kerlin's  view  is  consistent  with  the  notion  of  the  firm  as  machine  (Ladd,  1970;  Danley,  1980; 
Morgan,  1986),  with  the  implication  that  it  is  set  up,  and  more  or  less  controlled,  by 
individuals  who  must  ultimately  bear  responsibility  for  its  actions.  It  reflects  the 
individualistic  principle,  defended  by  Lewis,  that  "...  it  is  the  individual  who  is  the  sole 
bearer  of  responsibility"  (Lewis,  1948/1991,  p.  32).  We  do  not  find  the  `firm  as  machine' 
metaphor  persuasive,  with  Singer  (1994,  p.  201)  we  regard  the  firm  as  much  more  akin  to  a 
living  system  than  to  machine.  And  we  are  persuaded  by  French's  view  of  the  firm  as  capable 
of  intentional  action.  Firms  have  rationality,  purposes,  interests,  and  we  would  argue 
`desires',  which  are  distinct  from  and  transcend  those  of  the  human  beings  upon  which  the 
firm  depends.  '  Velasquez's  (1983)  critique  of  French's  position  follows  a  similarly 
individualistic  line.  He  concedes  that  French  may  be  right  to  argue  that  we  may  infer 
intentions  from  corporate  policies  and  procedures  "and  that  these  intentions  may  be  attributed 
to  the  corporation"  (Velasquez,  1983/1991,  p.  120).  However,  he  argues  that  the  corporation 
can  not  act  intentionally,  because  "...  corporations  do  not  originate  acts  in  the  manner 
required  by  attributions  of  responsibility  -  namely,  by  directly  moving  one's  own  body" 
(Velasquez,  1983/1991,  p.  1  18).  Ranken  (1987)  focuses  on  corporate  motivation  and  argues 
that  a  moral  agent  it  must  be  motivated  to  develop  traits  of  character  associated  with  moral 
responsibility.  She  suggests  that  the  firm  is  incapable  of  such  motive,  "...  it  has  no  inner 
springs  of  change  analogous  to  the  motives  of  natural  persons"  (Ranken  1987,  p.  634).  This 
argument  seems  to  be  simply  another  version  of  the  individualist  case  against  corporate 
moral  agency,  albeit  focussed  on  motivation  rather  than  intention  and  action.  It  seems  clear 
that  French's  basic  argument  applies  as  much  to  motivation  as  it  does  to  intention  and  action. 
Corporate  motive,  for  example  the  institution  of  policies  of  corporate  change,  clearly 
originates,  as  does  corporate  intentionality  in  the  actions  of  individuals,  however  the  firm 
transcends  its  origins  and  "...  accomplishes  a  subordination  and  synthesis  of  the  intentions 
and  acts  of  various  biological  persons"  (French,  1979,  p.  212). 
In  his  recent  writings,  French  seems  to  have  retreated  from  any  claim  that  the  firm  is 
a  moral  `person'  to  the  more  modest  position  that  it  is  moral  agent  (French,  1995,  p.  10).  Such 
distinctions  between  moral  person-hood  and  moral  agency  are  also  advanced  by  other  authors 
(see  Ozar,  1985;  Manning,  1984,1988).  Goodpaster  and  Mathews  (1982)  clearly  regard  the 
projection  of  person-hood  and  conscience  to  the  firm  as  essentially  a  "useful"  analogy.  The 
Lacanian  post-structuralist  perspective  is  thoroughly  anti-biologistic,  the  Lacanian  subject 
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is  `de-centred';  it  is  not  located  within  the  body.  We  will  argue  that  the  firm  may  qualify  as 
a  Lacanian  subject,  and  we  suggest  that,  in  some  respects,  this  might  be  a  helpful  way  of 
thinking  about  the  development  of  the  firm  as  an  emergent  moral  agent. 
The  firm  as  Lacanian  split  subject 
We  now  offer  an  outline  sketch  of  the  firm  as  a  split  Lacanian  subject.  Our  reading  of  Lacan 
is  guided  by  Fink's  critical  interpretation  of  "the  Lacanian  subject"  (Fink,  1995).  It  may 
perhaps  seem  inappropriate  to  apply  a  psychoanalytic  framework  to  an  institution  such  as  a 
commercial  firm.  Yet  it  is  quite  normal  to  relate  to  institutions  as  if  they  were  a  single  person, 
albeit  one  constituted  by  many  bodies,  and  with  the  reservation  that  the  institution  and  its 
`personality'  are  a  `symbolic  fiction'  (See,  Zizek,  1997,  p.  140).  Our  treatment  of  the  firm  as 
subject,  may  appear  less  problematic  if  it  appreciate  that  Lacanian  subject  is  essentially  a 
product  of  the  symbolic  order,  an  effect  of  language: 
"The  subject  is  born  in  so  far  as  the  signifier  emerges  in  the  field  of  the  Other. 
But,  by  this  very  fact,  the  subject  -  which  was  previously  nothing  if  not  a 
subject  coming  into  being  -  solidifies  into  being.  " 
(Lacan,  1964a,  p.  199 
The  Lacanian  subject  is  not  "flesh  and  blood",  not  a  substance,  prior  to  its  emergence  as  an 
effect  of  the  signifier  it  is  "nothing"  12 
. 
We  will  make  use  of  Lacan's  schema  L  to  help  elucidate  his  theorisation  of  the 
subject.  Lacan  employs  various  schemata  in  his  writings.  They  are  all  attempts  to  represent 
his  theories  diagrammatically,  and  all  consist  of  a  number  of  points  connected  by  vectors. 
The  simplified  form  of  the  schema  L,  (Lacan,  1957-58,  p.  193),  is  as  follows: 
/A 
The  symbols  a  and  a'  designate,  indiscriminately,  the  ego  and  its  counterpart,  its  specular 
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image,  the  little  other  (autre),  the  other  that  is  not  radically  other.  It  is  by  identification  with 
its  image,  whether  in  a  real  mirror  or  in  the  mirror  of  the  imitative  gestures  of  those  around 
it,  that  the  child  begins  to  construct  its  ego  in  the  mirror  stage  of  development,  and  that  the 
imaginary  order  is  founded.  The  symbol  A  represents  the  big  Other  of  the  symbolic  order, 
and  S  represent  the  subject,  the  subject  of  the  unconscious".  Whereas  the  ego  exists  as  an 
object  in  the  imaginary  order,  in  relation  to  the  little  other,  the  Lacanian  subject  of  the 
unconscious  exists  as  a  relation  to  the  radical  Other  of  the  symbolic  order14.  The  schema  L 
represents  both  the  intrasubjective  structure  of  the  subject  and  the  intersubjective  structure 
of  relations  through  which  the  subject  comes  into  being  (see  Evans,  1996,  p.  170).  The 
Lacanian  subject  is  not  simply  located  at  the  point  marked  S,  in  schema  L.  Rather,  it  is 
decentred,  it  "is  stretched  over  the  four  comers  of  the  schema"  (Lacan,  1957-58,  p.  194).  The 
Lacanian  subject  is  "split"  or  "divided"  between  ego  and  unconscious:  between  the  false- 
being  of  the  conscious  self  and  the  automatic  operation  of  the  signifying  chain  of  language 
in  the  unconscious.  Schema  L  emphasises  the  opposition  between  the  symbolic  and  the 
imaginary;  the  subject's  symbolic  relation  to  the  Other  is  continually  impeded  by  the 
imaginary  axis,  the  ego's  relation  with  its  counterpart. 
It  is  our  contention  that  the  commercial  firm  can  usefully  be  conceived  of  as  a  "split 
subject",  divided,  and  with  two  radically  separate  avatars:  ego  and  unconscious.  The 
false-being  of  the  ego  is  sustained  by  a  refusal  of  unconscious  thought,  "I  think  where  I 
am  not"  (Lacan,  1957,  p.  166).  We  suggest  that  the  conscious  discourse  of  the  firm,  as  it 
represents  itself,  in  its  annual  report  and  elsewhere,  constitutes  a  narcissistic  ego 
discourse,  which  the  firm,  as  subject  of  the  unconscious,  has  no  interest  in. 
The  ego  and  the  mirror  stage  of  development: 
The  Lacanian  subject  is  not  the  thinking  Cartesian  subject;  it  is  not  the  ego.  The  ego  is, 
however,  one  element  of  the  schema  within  which  Lacan  locates  the  subject,  and  it  is  a 
convenient  starting  point  for  our  analysis:  A  convenient  place  for  us  to  begin  relating 
elements  of  the  Lacanian  theory  of  the  subject  to  the  commercial  firm  as  subject.  The 
Lacanian  ego  is  formed  in  the  process  of  the  child's  identification  with  its  own  specular 
image  in  the  mirror  stage  of  development's.  The  infant  can  recognise  itself  before  it  has 
command  of  its  bodily  movements.  In  its  own  reflection,  then,  it  finds  an  image  of  coherence 
and  unity,  which  contrasts  with  a  real  lack  of  co-ordination  in  its  body.  The  infant's  "joy  is 
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due  to  his  imaginary  triumph  in  anticipating  a  degree  of  muscular  co-ordination  which  he  has 
not  yet  actually  achieved"  (Lacan,  1953,  p.  15).  The  contrast  provokes  an  aggressive  tension 
in  the  infant,  experienced  as  a  rivalry  with  its  own  image.  The  tension  is  resolved  through  the 
child's  identification  with  its  image,  its  counterpart.  It  is  this  process  of  primary  identification 
that  produces  the  ego.  The  ego  then,  is  formed  through  identification  with  something 
external,  something  alien  and  opposed  to  the  subject;  the  subject  is  structured  `as  a  rival  with 
himself  (Lacan,  1948,  p.  22).  Both  the  ego  and  the  imaginary  order  itself,  rest  on  alienation: 
"I  is  an  other"  (Lacan,  1948,  p.  23). 
The  Lacanian  ego  is  effectively  a  crystallisation  of  ideal  images,  a  reified 
agglomeration  with  which  the  child  comes  to  identify.  The  primary  ideal  image  is  of  a  unified 
coherence  in  contrast  with  a  real  confusion  of  sensations  and  impulses.  However,  as  the  child 
develops,  new  images  will  become  sedimented  upon  the  old,  and  various  ideal  images  will 
fuse  to  form  the  child's  sense  of  self.  The  primary  source  of  those  images  will  be  the 
reflections  of  itself  that  the  child  finds  in  its  parents'  "eyes".  Those  images  will  be 
internalised,  ratified,  and  invested  with  value  for  the  child,  by  virtue  of  the  parents'  reactions 
to  them.  They  will  be  structured  by  language,  which  has  both  symbolic  and  imaginary 
aspects;  Whilst  the  signifier  is  the  basis  of  the  symbolic  order,  the  signified  is  part  of  the 
imaginary  order.  So  that  the  child  may  come  to  "see"  or  recognise  herself  through  the 
parental  Other,  as  representative  of  the  symbolic  order,  as  "good"  or  "bad",  "clever"  or 
"stupid",  and  so  on.  For  Lacan  recognition  in  the  imaginary  is  always  misrecognition.  With 
its  entry  to  the  imaginary  order  in  the  ego,  the  child  fundamentally  misrecognizes  itself  as 
unified  and  autonomous;  self-knowledge  (me-connaissance)  becomes  synonymous  with 
misunderstanding  (meconnaissance).  In  the  formation  of  the  ego  in  the  mirror  stage  the 
subject  is  alienated  from  its  symbolic  determination  in  the  discourse  of  the  Other,  the 
unconscious.  The  imaginary  order  is  founded  upon  illusion;  primarily  the  illusion  of  unity: 
"The  illusion  of  unity,  in  which  a  human  being  is  always  looking  forward  to 
self-mastery,  entails  a  constant  danger  of  sliding  back  again  into  chaos  from 
which  we  started;  it  hangs  over  the  abyss  of  a  dizzy  Assent  in  which  one  can 
perhaps  see  the  very  essence  of  Anxiety.  " 
(Lacan,  1953,  p.  15) 
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Financial  accounting  is  dominated  by  the  specular  metaphor.  Clearly  financial 
accounts  may  be  seen  as  one  of  the  reflecting  surfaces  in  which  the  commercial  firm  as 
reporting  entity  comes  to  misrecognize  itself.  The  financial  accounts  are  part  of  the  imaginary 
register  where  the  firm  as  subject  becomes  alienated  from  itself:  alienated  from  its  symbolic 
determinants.  The  financial  accounts  are  of  course  not  the  only  "mirror"  in  which  the  firm 
may  come  to  misrecognize  itself  as  a  unified  entity;  Financial  analysts'  reports,  and  the  stock 
market  itself  constitute  possibly  more  significant  reflecting  surfaces  for  the  modern  firm. 
Arguably  the  primary  ratification  of  the  firm's  ego  image  is  the  valuation  put  upon  the  firm 
by  its  owners  and  the  market  -  its  share  price.  The  firm's  existence  in  the  imaginary  order 
will  be  linguistically  structured  under  the  influence  of  the  symbolic  order,  the  big  Other,  as 
represented  by,  for  example,  shareholders,  analysts,  company  law,  interest  groups,  and  the 
market.  The  firm  may  come  to  recognise  itself  in  the  imaginary  as  "lean",  "sleepy", 
"innovative",  "predatory",  "socially-responsible",  and  so  on.  Above  all  the  firm  will  succumb 
to  the  primary  illusion  of  unity;  in  its  reflection  in  its  accounts,  the  firm  will  misrecognize 
itself  as  unified  entity. 
The  object  of  Lacanian  analysis  is  not  to  provide  the  analysand  with  a  true  "image" 
of  her  self;  The  ego  is  always  a  distortion,  a  seat  of  illusion  and  misunderstanding.  Rather, 
analysis  seeks  to  dislodge  the  alienating  fixations  of  the  imaginary  order.  Whilst  structured 
linguistically,  the  ego  essentially  exists  in  the  imaginary  order  and  as  such  it  tends  to  have 
a  certain  fixity.  In  the  symbolic  order  of  language  slippage  and  displacement  are  of  the 
essence.  Lacanian  psychoanalysis  seeks  to  employ  the  symbolic  to  put  the  imaginary  in 
motion,  to  cross  the  imaginary  "plane  of  identification"  (Lacan,  1964a,  p.  273),  by 
transforming  images  into  words.  In  considering  the  firm  as  ego,  then,  the  object  is  not  to 
identify  the  firm's  true  image:  its  "economic  reality".  Rather,  the  firm  as  ego  in  the  imaginary 
order  is  essentially  an  alienating  fixation,  resistant  to  change  and  the  dialectic  of  desire  and 
an  impediment  to  the  full  development  of  the  firm's  determination  as  subject  in  the  relation 
to  the  symbolic  order. 
Thus  far  we  have  said  little  about  the  development  of  the  Lacanian  subject,  as  distinct 
from  the  ego.  We  will  now  turn  to  the  processes  through  which  the  subject  of  the 
unconscious  comes  into  being;  The  processes  of  alienation,  separation  and  further  separation. 
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Alienation: 
Schema  L  makes  it  clear  that  "Otherness",  that  which  is  alien  to  the  subject,  is  central  to  the 
structuration  of  the  subject.  Lacan's  concept  of  alienation  describes  a  process  of  submission 
to  the  Other  as  language.  The  child  chooses  to  express  itself  in  a  foreign  tongue  -  its  mOther 
tongue.  The  child's  choice  is  forced;  If  it  does  not  submit  to  language  it  can  not  come  into 
being  as  a  subject.  Yet  in  submitting  to  language,  in  presenting  itself  and  its  need  through  the 
distorting  medium  of  language  the  child  is  alienated;  it  chooses  its  own  disappearance.  In  the 
same  moment  that  the  firm  as  subject  appears  in  language  it  fades  behind  language:  "if  it 
appears  on  one  side  as  meaning,  produced  by  the  signifier,  it  appears  on  the  other  as 
aphanasis"  (Lacan,  1964a,  p.  210).  This  alienation  in  language  is,  however,  a  necessary  first 
step  towards  subjectivity.  Through  submission  the  child  becomes  a  subject  of  language. 
Before  alienation  and  submission  there  is  no  subject.  Alienation  institutes  a  location,  a  space 
in  language,  where  a  subject  might  be  expected  to  be;  it  establishes  the  pure  possibility  of 
being.  The  space,  however,  is  empty.  Alienation  institutes  the  symbolic  order  anew  for  each 
subject.  But  in  that  moment  the  subject  slips  behind  the  signifier  and  is  "eclipsed"  by 
language  (Lacan,  1964b,  p.  270),  his  or  her  only  trace  is  as  a  place-marker  in  the  symbolic 
order. 
Just  as  the  child's  place  in  the  symbolic  order  "is  already  inscribed  at  birth,  if  only 
by  virtue  of  his/(her)  proper  name"  (Lacan,  1957,  p.  148),  by  its  parents,  a  place  is  prepared 
for  the  firm  by  its  proprietors.  The  firm's  entry  to  the  symbolic  order  may  be  marked  by  its 
legal  constitution,  whether  by  partnership  agreement  or  in  company  law  as  a  registered 
company.  The  firm  is  given  a  name  and  is  recognised  as  a  legal  person,  it  can  contract  with 
other  parties,  and  it  must  express  and  give  accounts  of  itself  in  language  of  the  Other.  In  a 
sense,  the  firm  "chooses"  to  express  itself  in  the  language  of  the  Other  -  the  language  of 
business,  of  law  and  contract.  The  choice,  of  course,  is  a  forced  one,  a  "your  money  or  your 
life!  "  situation  (Lacan,  1964a,  p.  212).  In  its  entry  to  the  symbolic  order  the  firm  is  alienated 
and  becomes  subjected  to  the  signifier. 
Separation: 
In  the  process  of  alienation  the  subject  confronts  the  Other  as  language  and  in  doing  so 
`disappears'.  Alienation  confers  no  being  on  the  subject;  it  merely  allows  the  possibility  of 
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being.  The  "subject  is  actualized"  (Lacan,  1964b,  p.  271),  that  is,  the  divided  subject  comes 
into  being,  only  through  a  second  confrontation  with  the  Other,  the  Other  as  desire16.  The 
process  of  separation  hinges  upon  the  mother's"  desire,  she  must  reveal  herself  as 
incomplete,  desiring,  as  lacking".  The  child  comes  to  be  as  a  subject  through  desire,  which 
arises  in  subordination  to  the  mOther's  desire;  "man's  desire  is  the  desire  of  the  Other" 
(Lacan,  1960,  p.  312).  The  child  desires  to  be  the  object  of  the  mOther's  desire,  and  tries  to 
fill  the  whole  space  of  her  lack  with  his  own  lack  of  being,  and  thus  restore  a  lost  original 
relation  of  wholeness  with  the  mother.  That  original  relation  of  unity  is  dangerous  to  the 
child,  as  it  is  maintainable  only  by  denial  of  the  possibility  of  the  child's  subjectivity.  The 
mOther's  desire  threatens  to  engulf  the  child.  However,  the  tendency  towards 
superimposition  of  the  mOther's  desire  on  the  child  is  not  fully  realised.  Firstly,  there  is  an 
"incompatibility  between  desire  and  speech"  (Lacan,  1958a,  p.  275),  so  that  the  child  striving 
to  read  between  the  lines  and  catch  the  traces  of  desire  in  what  the  Other  says19  will  always 
fail  to  fully  grasp  or  decipher  "the  enigma  of  the  adult's  desire"  (Lacan,  1964a,  p.  214).  The 
mOther's  desire  is  always  ambiguous  and  constantly  in  motion,  it  is  always  "the  desire  for 
something  else"  (Lacan,  1957,  p.  167).  And,  secondly,  even  if  the  mOther's  desire  were 
known,  the  child  would  rarely  be  in  a  position  to  meet  it.  Other  interests:  the  father,  other 
children,  her  work,  will  command  some  of  the  space  of  her  desire.  Separation  arises  in  the 
child's  forced  and  painful  recognition  that  it  can  not  be  the  mOther's  sole  object  of  desire. 
Separation,  then,  may  be  understood  as  the  outcome  of  a  thwarted  attempt  by  the  subject  to 
make  two  lacks  coincide. 
In  separation  the  child  is  protected  from  engulfment  by  the  introduction  of  a  third 
term,  the  something-other-than-the-child  desired  by  the  mOther,  which  draws  her  away. 
Lacan  refers  to  this  other  term  as  the  name-of-the-father,  the  signifier  of  the  Other's  desire, 
the  primordial  signifier,  and  as  the  phallus  (as  signifier  of  desire).  The  child  obtains  some 
protection  from  the  Other's  desire  through  the  operation  of  the  paternal  metaphor,  that  is, 
through  the  articulation  of  desire  with  language  in  the  symbolic  order.  A  name  is  substituted 
for  the  Other's  desire.  By  its  mediation  in  language  the  Other's  desire  is  thus  made  less 
threatening,  neutralized,  and  the  child  is  able  to  escape  subjection  to  it.  Through  separation 
a  breach  is  made  in  the  unity  of  mOther-child20  which  affords  the  child  some  space  of  its  own 
where  it  can  come  into  being21  as  a  subject,  as  something  more  than  a  mere  place  holder  in 
the  symbolic  order.  When  separation  breaches  the  unity  of  mOther-child  it  leaves  a  remainder 
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which  Lacan  refers  to  as  `object  a',  a  last  trace,  a  reminder,  of  lost  unity. 
The  child's  desire  to  be  the  sole  object  of  the  Other's  desire  "the  desire  of  the  Other" 
(Lacan,  1960,  p.  312)  is  thwarted  in  separation.  However,  the  desire  of  the  Other  remains  the 
driving  force  of  the  child's  desire.  The  child's  desire  is  also  caused  by  that  part  of  the 
mOther's  desire  that  aims  beyond  the  child,  it  is  the  desire  of  the  Other  which  causes  any 
object  to  be  desirable:  "The  object  of  man's  desire 
... 
is  essentially  an  object  desired  by 
someone  else"  (Lacan,  1953,  p.  12).  Object  a  is  the  object  of  desire,  the  one  object  that  always 
arouses  or  causes  the  subject's  desire;  it  is  the  Other's  desire.  In  fantasy,  the  subject  can 
express  and  explore  the  way  it  wants  to  be  related  to  object  a22,  that  is,  how  it  wants  to 
position  itself  in  relation  to  the  desire  of  the  Other.  And  by  manipulating  object  a  in  fantasy 
the  subject  can  orchestrate  for  itself  an  excitementjouissance  23  that  becomes  a  substitute  for 
lost  mother-child  unity.  By  virtue  of  separation,  the  alienated  /  divided  subject,  by  clinging 
to  object  a  in  fantasy,  can  avoid  recognising  its  division24  and  obtain  something  of  being,  as 
distinct  from  existence  as  a  mere  placeholder  in  the  symbolic  order. 
Just  as  the  child  is  brought  into  the  world  by  virtue  of  its  parents'  desire,  the  firm 
arises  because  of  the  desire  of  the  proprietors,  as  primary  representatives  of  the  Other. 
Further,  we  suggest  that  as  the  child  wants  to  be  the  object  of  its  mOther's  desire,  the  firm 
wants  to  be  the  object  of  its  proprietors'  desire,  it  wants  to  fill  the  space  of  their  lack. 
Language  protects  the  firm  from  engulfment  by  the  proprietors'  desire;  Just  as  the  child  can 
not  fully  grasp  the  mOther's  desire  for  "something  else",  because  language  can  not  fully 
capture  desire,  the  firm  can  not  fully  grasp  the  desire  of  its  proprietors.  Furthermore,  just  as 
the  child  is  incapable  of  filling  the  space  of  its  mOther's  lack  so  the  firm  is  incapable  of 
filling  the  space  of  its  proprietors'  desire.  The  proprietors  look  beyond  the  firm,  to  other 
firms  in  which  they  have  an  interest,  and  to  society,  for  some  satisfaction  of  their  desires.  A 
process  of  separation  takes  place  as  the  firm  recognises  that  it  can  not  make  its  own  lack  (of 
being)  coincide  with  the  proprietors'  lack.  In  the  process  of  separation  the  proprietor's  desire 
begins  to  be  mediated  by  language  and  substituted  by  a  third  term,  the  name-of-the-father, 
the  primordial  signifier  which  anchors  the  neurotic29  firm  in  the  symbolic  order.  We  suggest 
that  for  many  firms,  the  signifier  of  the  Other's  desire,  the  name-of-the-father,  seems  to  be 
"the-markets26.  In  this  process  of  separation  the  proprietor's  desire  begins  to  be  mediated 
through  language.  Through  the  introduction  of  a  third  term  the  initial  unity  of  proprietor-firm, 
typical  of  the  origin  of  most  firms,  is  breached,  and  the  is  firm  given  some  space  of  its  own 
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where  it  might  become  a  subject. 
As  the  child  clings  to  object  a,  remainder  of  real  unity  with  its  mother,  we  suggest 
that  the  firm  will  cleave  to  a  reminder  of  unity  with  its  proprietors,  its  object  a,  the  Other's 
desire.  Object  a  is  the  object  which  sets  desire  in  motion,  the  object  around  which  the  drives27 
circle  and  fantasy  is  structured.  It  is  through  fantasy  that  the  subject  "sustains  (it)self  as 
desiring"  (Lacan,  1964a,  p.  185),  and  can  maintain  an  illusion  of  unity  and  wholeness.  The 
specific  object  which  plays  the  part  of  object  a;  will  vary  from  subject  to  subject.  However, 
in  our  society  it  is  clear  that  money  commonly  becomes  the  object  of  desire,  the  object  that 
promises  to  fill  the  space  of  our  lack.  In  fantasy  the  subject  will  orchestrate  its  relations  with 
object  a,  and  manipulate  it,  so  as  to  produce  an  excitement,  jouissance,  compensating  for  the 
loss  of  real  unity.  The  subject  may  adopt  a  number  of  basic  positions  in  relation  to  object  a, 
the  desire  of  the  Other.  Two  dimensions  of  those  possibilities  are  particularly  notable  (see 
Bracher,  1993,  pp.  19-45).  Firstly,  corresponding  with  Freud's  distinction  between  the 
anaclitic  (outward-leaning)  and  narcissistic  libido,  the  subject  may  desire  either  to  have  or 
to  be  object  a.  Secondly,  and  corresponding  with  Freud's  distinction  between  the  active  and 
passive  aims  of  the  libido,  the  subject  may  take  the  position  of  the  active  desiring  subject  or 
may  place  him/herself  as  the  passive  object  of  the  Other's  desire  and  means  for  the  Other's 
jouissance. 
An  active  anaclitic  fantasy  might  involve  the  possession  of  money  as  a  means  for 
one's  own  jouissance.  Here  we  might  think  of  those  firms  that  seem  to  find  some  satisfaction 
in  amassing  great  stores  of  liquidity.  A  passive  anaclitic  fantasy  positions  the  subject  as 
being  the  object  that  the  Other  desires  to  have  as  a  means  to  jouissance.  This  is  essentially 
a  masochistic  fantasy.  Here  we  may  think  of  those  firms  that  seem  to  become  fixated  upon 
their  market/monetary  value,  their  share  price.  The  passive  narcissistic  fantasy  is  the  fantasy 
of  being  the  object  of  the  Other's  love,  it  is  the  fantasy  of  being  special,  a  chosen  people, 
race,  etc.  Here  we  might  think  of  those  firms  which  apparently  become  intoxicated  with  their 
"superiority"  as  the  biggest,  the  best  and  so  on,  in  such  cases  money  may  be  the  measure  of 
that  which  makes  them  more  valuable  than  other  firms.  Finally,  the  active  narcissistic  fantasy 
involves  the  attraction  to  object  a  in  another  and  trying  to  identify  or  unite  with  it.  Here  we 
might  think  of  certain  firms  that  orchestrate  the  production  of  jouissance  around  acquisition 
strategies.  For  many  firms  profit  itself  may  be  object  a.  Lacan  himself,  in  Seminar  XVI 
(Lacan,  1969-70),  equates  object  a  with  Marx's  concept  of  surplus  value.  The 
216 Chapter  5:  The  Reporting  Entity  as  Divided  Subject 
proprietor/capitalist  as  Other  appropriates  surplus  value,  so  that  the  employees  as  subjects, 
and  we  suggest  the  firm  as  subject,  find  themselves  in  the  position  of  being  instruments  of 
the  Other's  jouissance:  "the  subject  finds  him  or  herself  in  the  unenviable  situation  of 
working  for  the  Other's  enjoyment,  sacrificing  him  or  herself  for  the  Other's  jouissance  - 
precisely  what  the  neurotic  most  abhors"  (Fink,  1995,  p.  96). 
Further  separation  -  traversing  the  fundamental  fantasy: 
Through  separation  the  child  can  produce  in  fantasy  a  kind  of  being  for  itself.  However,  in 
fantasy  the  Other's  desire,  as  object  a,  dominates  and  eclipses  the  neurotic  subject,  which 
fades  behind  the  "object  cause".  Lacan  suggests  that  it  is  only  through  a  process  of  further 
separation  that  the  neurotic  subject  might  move  beyond  domination  by  the  Other,  beyond  the 
false  being  of  the  ego  and  the  "aphanatic"  (fading)  being  of  fantasy;  The  subject  must 
traverse  its  fundamental  fantasy.  In  separation,  through  the  operation  of  the  paternal 
metaphor,  the  Other's  desire  is  named,  and  brought  into  the  realm  of  signification.  However 
that  name  is  relatively  static  and  restricted  in  its  power  of  designation,  it  is  not  fully  separated 
from  the  desire  of  the  Other.  The  object  of  the  process  of  further  separation  is  to  put  the 
Other's  desire  fully  into  motion  in  language.  In  the  process  of  further  separation  the  Other's 
desire  is  increasingly  signified,  it  is  "unpacked"  and  brought  into  the  full  play  of  language. 
In  this  process  the  subject  gains  access  to  the  signifier  of  the  Other's  desire,  and  ideally  the 
subject  may  finally  subjectify,  that  is,  assume  responsibility  for,  the  Other's  desire  -  as  its 
own  cause. 
The  Lacanian  subject  is  "an  effect  of  language"  (Lacan,  1964b,  p.  265).  It  is  a 
precipitate  of  meanings,  and  in  particular  the  meanings  generated  by  the  relations  between 
certain  master  signifiers,  associated  with  the-name-of-the-father,  and  all  other  signifiers.  It 
is  "what  the  signifier  represents,  and  the  latter  cannot  represent  anything  except  to  another 
signifier:  to  which  the  subject  who  listens  is  thus  reduced"  (Lacan,  1964b,  p.  265).  The  master 
signifiers  are  those  terms,  closely  linked  with  the  name-of-the-father,  which  put  an  end  to  the 
chain  of  associations  in  language,  for  the  subject,  they  represent  blockages  or  dead-ends  in 
language.  Cut  off  from  the  play  of  language,  they  have  a  relative  fixity  and  their  significance 
or  meaning  for  the  subject  is  opaque;  they  are  nonsensical.  This  opacity  does  not  mean  that 
the  neurotic  subject  is  unable  to  understand  or  use  the  terms  concerned  in  ordinary  speech. 
It  pertains,  rather,  to  the  meaning  of  the  master  signifiers  for  the  subject  in  the  constitution 
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of  the  subject  -  what  they  meanfor  him  or  her.  The  neurotic  split-subject  is  essentially 
eclipsed  by  meaning;  "I  identify  myself  in  language,  but  only  by  losing  myself  in  it  like  an 
object"  (Lacan,  1953b,  p.  86).  The  neurotic,  or  castrated,  subject,  is  the  subject  that  is 
represented,  the  subject  "constituted  by  the  message"  (Lacan,  1960,  p.  305),  by  the  message 
"which  the  sender  receives  back  from  the  receiver  in  an  inverted  form"  (Lacan,  1953b,  p.  85). 
The  fixity  of  the  master  signifiers  "freezes"  the  subject  determined  in  relation  to  them 
(Lacan,  1964b,  p.  269).  Movement  beyond  neurosis,  further  separation,  requires  the 
dialecticization  of  the  master  signifiers.  Their  isolation  must  be  broken.  They  must  be 
brought  into  relationship  with  other  signifiers28,  and  thereby  given  meaning  for  the  subject. 
In  the  forging  of  the  new  linkages  between  the  master  signifier  and  other  signifiers,  in  the 
making  of  new  meaning,  the  subject  as  precipitation,  as  distinct  from  the  subject  as 
precipitate,  flashes  into  being.  This  subject  arising  in  the  precipitation  of  meaning  is  no  more 
than  "metaphor's  creative  spark"  as  "it  flashes  between  two  signifiers"  (Lacan,  1957,  p.  157). 
Lacan  contrasts  the  action  of  metaphorization  and  assimilation.  In  assimilation  there  is  an 
automatic  working  of  the  symbolic  order,  things  fit  into  the  signifying  chain  without 
fundamental  disruption,  sense  is  made  of  things,  things  are  understood,  in  a  way  which 
provides  us  with  a  comforting,  but  false,  sense  of  being  "I  think  therefore  I  am".  Assimilation 
is  characteristic  of  the  alienated  subject  petrified  by  language: 
"The  signifier,  producing  itself  in  the  field  of  the  Other,  makes  manifest  the 
subject  of  its  signification.  But  it  functions  as  a  signifier  only  to  reduce  the 
subject  in  question  to  being  no  more  than  a  signifier,  to  petrify  the  subject  in 
the  same  moment  in  which  it  calls  the  subject  to  function,  to  speak,  as 
subject.  " 
(Lacan,  1964a,  p.  207) 
This  petrified  subject  "is  one  who  asks  no  questions  about  himself'  (Soler,  1995,  p.  48). 
Metaphorization,  in  contrast,  produces  something  new;  new  meaning.  Metaphorization 
unsettles  the  existing  order  in  the  symbolic  by  making  new  connections  between  signifiers. 
The  production  of  new  meaning  through  metaphor  is  more  than  the  automatic  functioning 
of  the  symbolic,  it  draws  on  the  real  and  brings  forth  fleetingly  the  "subject  in  the  real" 
(Lacan,  1964b,  p.  265),  that  is,  the  subject  as  precipitation.  This  subject  appears  as  an 
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evanescent  interruption  of  the  automatic  functioning  of  language  in  the  unconscious,  as  an 
irruption  of  the  "I"  in  the  place  dominated,  in  the  split  subject,  by  "it",  by  the  Other  as; 
language,  desire,  demand,  and  jouissance.  The  "I"  concerned  here  is  not  the  reified  I  of 
conscious  discourse,  it  is  not  the  ego.  Rather,  it  is  an  I  that  takes  responsibility  for  the 
operation  of  the  unconscious,  for  the  linkages  made  there  between  signifiers  and  the 
meanings  created,  including  the  meanings  which  constitute  the  subject  as  precipitate  of 
meaning. 
For  Lacan  the  emergence  of  the  subject  as  precipitation  through  further  separation, 
that  is  the  movement  beyond  the  split  subject  dominated  by  the  "it",  is  an  ethical  imperative; 
it  is  "a  duty  in  the  moral  sense"  (Lacan,  1955,  p.  128).  A  duty  which  Lacan  sees  as  implied 
by  Freud's  motto  "Wo  Es  war,  soll  Ich  werdeni29,  which  for  Lacan  translates  as  a  "there 
where  it  was  it  is  my  duty  that  I  should  come  to  being"  (Lacan,  1955,  p.  129).  The  object  of 
analysis  then  is  to  help  the  subject  on  an  ethically  dictated  path  beyond  the  split,  to  help  the 
subject  to  put  "I"  in  place  of  "it"  in  the  unconscious;  that  is  to  assume  responsibility  for  the 
making  of  new  meaning  in  the  unconscious.  The  aim  or  end  of  analysis  can  then  be 
understood  as  the  acceptance  of  responsibility  for,  or  a  subjectification  of,  the  particular 
Otherness,  which  structures  the  possibility  of  one's  being:  "the  realization  by  the  subject  of 
his  history  in  his  relation  to  a  future"  (Lacan,  1953b,  p.  88).  One  must  become  the  subject  of 
one's  own  history30,  "Wo  Es  war,  soll  Ich  werden". 
In  separation  the  Other's  desire  is  named  and  begins  to  be  mediated  through 
language.  In  further  separation  the  signifier/name  of  the  Other's  desire  is  dialecticized, 
subject  to  further  signiferization,  and  broken  away  from  the  Other's  desire,  so  that  finally  the 
subject  may  take  responsibility  for  his  or  her  own  cause  -  the  desire  of  the  Other  -  by 
subjectifying  the  Other's  desire.  Further  separation,  then,  entails  the  reformulation  of  the 
subject's  relations  to  the  Other  as  language  and  as  desire  (object  a).  It  will  therefore  disturb 
the  subject's  symptomatic  production  of  jouissance,  and  the  semblance  of  being,  obtained 
in  fantasy.  If  the  subject  is  to  achieve  further  separation  it  must  traverse  its  fundamental 
fantasy,  it  must  give  up  its  castration,  its  position  as  subjected  by  the  Other,  and  it  must 
renounce  satisfactions  earned  through  that  submission. 
The  castrated  firm  as  subject,  is  the  firm  that  constantly  represents  itself  to  the  Other, 
the  firm  that  constantly  seeks  attention  and  approval;  from  its  owners,  from  the  market,  from 
financial  analysts,  from  its  industry  regulators,  and  so  on.  The  more  it  represents  itself  the 
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more  it  fades,  "disappears  beneath  the  signifier"  (Lacan,  1964b,  p.  265),  the  more  castrated 
it  becomes.  We  suggested,  rather  speculatively,  that  the  name  of  the  Other's  desire  for  many 
firms,  their  name-of-the-father,  might  be  "the-market".  Closely  linked  with  that  name  we 
would  expect  to  find  a  cluster  of  master  signifiers  with  respect  to  which  the  firm  as  castrated 
subject  is  determined  as  a  sedimentation  of  meaning.  Those  master  signifiers  might  typically 
include  "growth",  "profit",  "competitiveness",  "quality",  "innovation",  and  so  on.  If  the  firm 
is  to  traverse  its  fundamental  fantasy,  the  master  signifiers  that  hold  it  frozen/petrified,  must 
be  set  in  motion,  by  being  subjected  to  a  process  of  increasing  signiferization,  they  must  be 
dialecticized31.  For  example;  if  we  subject  `profit'  to  further  signification  we  might  speak  of 
it  as  a  measure  of  response  to  demand  -  profit  is  a  measure  of  the  success  with  which 
companies  have  directed  their  resources  to  meet  unsatisfied  demand.  From  demand  we  may 
begin  to  speak  of  need  -  and  when  we  speak  of  human  need  we  may  move  to  speak  of  rights, 
legal  and  moral,  which  arise  in  society,  and  so  on.  In  language  the  Other's  desire  can  be  put 
in  motion  and  forced  to  give  way  before  the  signification  of  the  Other's  desire32.  The  Other's 
desire,  the  cause  of  the  firm  as  subject's  desire,  may  thus  be  put  in  motion  so  that  it  moves 
out  from  proprietor  to  society.  Through  this  process  of  increasing  signification,  the  firm  as 
subject  may  come  to  take  responsibility  for,  subjectify,  the  Other's  desire  -  its  own  cause.  To 
achieve  further  separation  the  firm  will  need  to  sacrifice  its  castration  -  give  up  the 
submissive  compensations  habitually  obtained  in  fantasy.  We  regard  the  movement  beyond 
neurosis  and  the  split,  as  a  moral  duty;  the  firm  as  subject  must  come  to  put  "I"  in  place  of 
"it"  in  the  unconscious;  it  must  assume  responsibility  for  the  making  of  new  meaning  in  the 
unconscious,  through  metaphorization,  and  must  subjectify  its  history". 
The  Habermasian  subject  of  discourse  ethics 
In  this  section  of  the  chapter  we  will  argue  that  the  Habermasian  subject  of  discourse  ethics 
stands  in  need  of  theoretical  supplement  from  post-structuralism/psychoanalysis.  We  have 
argued  in  previous  chapter  for  the  institutionalization  of  Habermasian  discourse  ethics  as  a 
regulative  ideal:  It  is  certainly  not  our  intention  in  this  chapter  to  dismantle  the  case  we  have 
tried  to  build  for  the  application  of  communicative  reason  in  accounting  policy  making.  We 
want  to  urge  the  necessity  of  engaging  post-structuralist/post-modemist  sensitivity  to  Alterity 
as  a  supplement  to  communicative  reason,  not  as  an  alternative  to  reason. 
For  Habermas  the  task  of  moral  theory  is  to  reconstruct,  articulate  and  elaborate  the 
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implications  of,  the  normative  presuppositions  of  social  interaction  that  are  intuitively 
grasped  by  competent  social  subjects/actors.  He  contends  that  the  motivating  force  of  moral 
claims  depends  upon  confidence  that  they  can  be  justified  with  convincing  reasons.  He 
argues  that  a  reconstruction  of  convincing  reason  giving  yields  the  insight  that  rationally 
motivating  reasons  for  acceptance  of  a  norm  must  conform  to  the  principle  of 
universalization  (U),  according  to  which  a  norm  is  valid  if: 
(U)  All  affected  can  accept  the  consequences  and  the  side  effects  its  general 
observance  can  be  anticipated  to  have  for  the  satisfaction  of  everyone's 
interests  (and  these  consequences  are  preferred  to  those  of  known  alternative 
possibilities  for  regulation).  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  65) 
(U)  is  the  cornerstone  of  Habermas'  discourse  ethics,  it  ties  the  legitimation  of  norms  to  real 
discourse  leading  to  a  rational  consensus.  It  requires  that  all  those  affected  know  their  own 
real  interests,  and  are  willing  and  able  to  engage  in  debate  with  the  objective  of  reaching 
mutual  understanding.  It  requires  an  uncoerced  debate  in  which  each  participant  has  freedom 
and  the  capacity  to  express  their  own  interests  and  in  which  each  party  makes  a  real  effort  to 
understand  the  others  by  trying  to  share  their  perspective  on  the  issue.  The  basic  idea  is  that 
any  normative  consensus  arising  through  such  a  process  must  encapsulate  a  general  interest. 
Habermas'  discourse  ethics  suggests,  then,  that  behavioural  expectations  can  have 
normative  or  moral  force  (as  distinct  from  the  force  associated  with  legal  or  other 
imperatives)  only  among  subjects  who  hold  themselves  accountable  and  autonomous,  and 
only  insofar  as  its  validity  can  be  justified  to  them  with  convincing  reasons.  (U)  seems  to 
demand  a  certain  self-transparency  from  the  subjects:  "To  the  extent  that  we  want  to  treat  him 
as  a  subject  at  all,  we  must  assume  the  other  opposite  us  could  say  why  he  behaves  in  a  given 
situation  this  way  and  not  that"  (Habermas,  1986,  p.  123  quoted  by  Rehg,  1997,  p.  35). 
Discourse  ethics  is,  clearly,  a  thoroughly  dialogistic  model  of  normative  legitimation. 
Nevertheless,  it  might  seem  that  all  that  discourse  ethics  requires  is  that  each  individual 
subject  affected,  brings  his  or  her  own,  more-or-less  arbitrarily  and  privately  chosen,  values 
and  interests  to  the  debate/dialogue  and  is  prepared  to  engage  with  other  similar  monads  in 
an  effort  to  find  mutually  beneficial  compromises  and  constraining  rules  of  action.  This 
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would  be  a  misconstrual  of  Habermas'  view:  He  is  vitally  concerned  to  move  beyond  the 
philosophy  of  consciousness  -  the  paradigm  of  the  essentially  rational  conscious  individual 
subject.  He  wants  to  locate  (moral)  cognition  in  the  intersubjective,  that  is,  in  communicative 
action  -  in  language.  Habermas  recognizes  that  individual  identities,  self-understandings, 
values,  and  interests  (all  the  contents  of  moral  discourse)  are  socially  developed  and 
embedded  in  social  networks  of  mutual  recognition.  A  central  function  of  morality  is  then 
the  protection  of  the  web  of  relations  within  which  fragile  identities  can  develop  and  thrive: 
"Since  moralities  are  tailored  to  suit  the  fragility  of  human  beings 
individuated  through  socialization,  they  must  always  solve  two  tasks  at  once. 
They  must  emphasize  the  inviolability  of  the  individual  by  postulating  equal 
respect  for  the  dignity  of  each  individual.  But  they  must  also  protect  the  web 
of  intersubjective  relations  of  mutual  recognition  by  which  these  individuals 
survive  as  members  of  a  community.  " 
(Habermas,  1983,  p.  200) 
Habermas  certainly  takes  us  to  the  brink  of  a  transcendence  of  the  philosophy  of 
consciousness  but  he  seems  unwilling  to  take  the  final  step.  (U)  takes  us  beyond 
individualism  by  insisting  that  rational  moral  conviction  must  be  formed  in  relation  to  the 
intersubjective  process  of  a  real  debate  in  which  there  is  full  reciprocal  perspective  taking 
leading  to  consensus.  However,  ultimately  (U)  locates  moral  conviction  in  the  individual:  "it 
still  assumes  that  each  individual  is  the  ultimate  site  of  rational  conviction  or  insight,  the 
common  space  of  exchange  not  withstanding"  (Rehg,  1997,  p.  234). 
Despite  its  counterfactual  and  essentially  paradoxical  nature,  the  full  reciprocal 
perspective  taking  demanded  by  (U)  does  provide  a  valuable  regulative  ideal  against  which 
real  processes  of  normative  legitimation  can  be  measured.  However,  the  "facticity"  of  real 
discourse  points  towards  the  need  for  a  fuller  decentring  of  normative  legitimation.  Real 
perspective  sharing  is  always  less  than  complete,  and  moreover  as  society  becomes  more 
complex  and  differentiated  it  becomes  increasingly  unreasonable  to  assume  that  individuals 
can  have  full  appreciation  of  any  debate.  That  is,  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  to  sustain 
the  idea  that  the  individual  can  form  rational  conviction  or  insight.  In  holding  on  to  a  residue 
of  monadic  individualism,  (U)  fails  to  recognize  the  real  need  for  decentred  cooperative 
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formation  of  rational  conviction.  Confidence  in  the  legitimacy  of  norms  would  then  generally 
need  to  be  based  not  upon  the  individual's  appraisal  of  arguments,  but  rather  on  the  quality 
of  the  argumentative  procedures,  and  it  would  inevitably  entail  reliance  on  trust: 
"If  real  processes  of  discourse  are  decentred 
...  such  that  individual  conviction 
becomes  impossible;  if  rational  consensus  is  cooperative  even  to  the  degree 
of  requiring  a  decentred,  "cooperative  insight,  "  then  it  would  seem  that 
something  like  trust  must  inhabit  the  heart  of  rational  conviction.  " 
(Rehg,  1997,  p.  233) 
Habermas  recognizes  that  subjects  are  individuated  through  language,  but  his 
discourse  ethics  seems  to  require  that  individuals  emerge  from  the  process  of  individuation 
as  relatively  unified,  transparent,  and  autonomous  subjects.  Discourse  ethics  essentially 
requires  that  subjects;  (i)  have  real  interests,  (ii)  know  their  interests  are  able  to  express  them 
in  terms  of  some  relatively  fixed  vocabulary,  and  (iii)  have  the  power  and  inclination  to 
further  their  interests  in  argument.  (U)  relies  on  a  metaphysics  of  presence  -  "the  self- 
presence  of  the  cogito,  consciousness,  subjectivity,  the  co-presence  of  the  other  and  of  self, 
intersubjectivity"  (Derrida,  1967/1976,  p.  12),  that  when  viewed  from  a  post-structuralist 
perspective  will  seem  quite  untenable.  The  ideal  of  complete  reciprocal  perspective  sharing 
reflects  the  vain  dream  of  personal  and  political  transparency;  "the  Rousseauist  dream 
...  of 
a  transparent  society,  visible  and  legible  in  each  of  its  parts"  (Foucault,  1980,  p.  152).  A  post- 
structuralist  analysis  will  emphasize  that  as  we  are  not  transparent  to  ourselves  we  should  not 
expect  other  individuals  or  the  community  to  be  transparent. 
The  post-structuralist,  say  Lacanian,  subject  is  always  in  flux  -  in  process  of 
construction  and  reconstruction  -  always  decentred.  For  Lacan  the  unity  of  the  subject  is 
always  a  fiction,  an  illusion:  "One  can  never  be  sure  of  one's  self,  one's  desires,  one's 
psychic  borders"  (McAfee,  2000,  p.  115).  The  Lacanian  subject,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
essentially  divided,  it  is  constituted  and  located  in  the  relational  tensions  between  conscious 
and  unconscious,  self  and  other;  Its  identity  is  founded  upon  alterity  and  differentiation.  The 
Lacanian  subject's  relation  to  the  other  is  complex,  it  includes  the  threat  of  negation  and  it 
is  only  through  breaking  with  the  Other  that  the  Lacanian  subject  can  come  into  being. 
However  ultimately  the  Lacanian/post-structuralist  view  emphasizes  the  enormity  of  our  debt 
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to  the  Other  -  without  alterity  there  could  be  no  subject.  In  the  Lacanian  split  subject's 
indebtedness  to  the  Other  there  is  the  promise  of  a  new  ethics  of  community.  The  split 
subject  need  not  always  be  at  odds  with  alterity,  rather: 
"she  can  come  to  terms  with  her  strangeness,  and  thus  reconfigure  her 
relationship  with  others.  This  entails  becoming  cognizant  of  her  own  alterity. 
...  a  subject-in-process  can  embrace  alterity  as  a  precondition  for  subjectivity. 
Insofar  as  the  unconscious  and  the  strangers  around  us  are  constitutive  of  our 
own  identity  (identity  being  a  product  of  difference),  we  each  need  others.  " 
(McAfee,  2000,  p.  132) 
In  coming  to  terms  with  our  division  and  alterity  we  may  move  towards  a  more  profound 
recognition  of  our  essential  dependence  on  the  Other  and  our  responsibility  to  the  Other.  Far 
from  disabling  our  effective  political  agency,  the  recognition  of  our  own  history  in  the 
language  and  desire  of  the  Other  can  form  the  basis  for  the  social  trust  which  we  have  argued 
above  is  vital  if  something  like  discourse  ethics  is  to  be  retained  as  persuasive  regulative 
ideal.  Indeed,  we  suggest  that  recognition  of  our  heterogeneity  (our  lack  of 
sovereignty/autonomy)  and  the  fragility  and  thoroughly  relational  nature  of  our  identities  is 
a  precondition  for  our  becoming  effective  political  agents. 
The  post-structuralist/post-modern  supplement  communicative  reason 
In  the  transition  from  traditional  to  modem  society,  morality  is  increasingly  decoupled  from 
ethical  discourse,  conceptions  of  the  good  life  and  related  self-understandings,  and  from  the 
associated  motivational  resources.  The  moral  point  of  view  becomes  intellectualistically 
located  in  rational  discourse  and,  detached  from  powerful  action  motivating  resources; 
morality  faces  a  "motivational  deficit"  (Habermas,  1996,  p.  35).  The  distinction  we  are 
making  here  between  ethics  and  morality  is  important:  We  are  using  the  term  "morality"  in 
a  Habermasian  sense,  to  refer  to  the  norms,  the  obligations  and  prohibitions,  that  we  can 
expect  to  be  binding  on  all  across  society,  and  to  questions  of  how  we  can  justify  such  norms. 
The  moral,  then,  operates  horizontally;  it  refer  to  those  matters  on  which  rational  consensus 
can  be  obtained: 
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"Thus  a  person  takes  the  moral  point  of  view  when  he  deliberates  like  a 
democratic  legislator  on  whether  the  practice  that  would  result  from  general 
observance  of  a  hypothetical  proposed  norm  could  be  accepted  by  all  those 
possibly  affected  viewed  as  potential  co-legislators.  " 
(Habermas,  1996,  p.  30) 
In  our  increasingly  complex  modern  pluralistic  society,  the  need  for  powerful  consensual 
normative  integration  and  coordination  is  surely  self-evident  -  the  alternatives  are  coercion 
or  chaos.  In  the  context  of  our  discussion  here,  two  senses  of  the  term  "ethical"  can  be 
usefully  distinguished.  Firstly  it  refers  to  those  questions  and  discourses  of  "the  good  life", 
often  religiously  based  that  have  traditionally  motivated  morality  -  e.  g.,  with  promises  of 
personal  salvation.  Such  ethical  discourse  always  operates  vertically,  that  is,  it  always  works 
within  particular  life  histories  and  traditions.  The  diversity  of  ethical  conceptions  within 
modern  pluralist  society  undermines  the  capacity  of  the  ethical  to  motivate  norms,  which 
need  to  operate  horizontally  -  across  all  of  society. 
Lacanian  and  other  post-structuralist/post-modern  conceptions  of  the  (split)  subject, 
point  towards  the  need  for  an  alternative  conceptualization  of  "ethics";  an  ethics  of  difference 
and  Alterity,  as  opposed  to  an  ethics  of  unity,  sameness,  and  the  good  life.  Bauman  (1989, 
1993)  argues  that  Levinas'  work  represents  the  most  adequate  attempt  to  think  through  the 
ethical  implications  of  post-structuralism/post-modernity.  Levinas  gives  an  account  of  the 
subject  as  "ethical"  to  its  very  foundation.  For  Levinas  it  is  the  "ethical"  relation  of  absolute 
responsibility  for  the  Other  that  originates,  and  defines  the  space  of,  each  subject's  being: 
"Responsibility  in  fact  is  not  a  simple  attribute  of  subjectivity,  as  if  the  latter  already  existed 
in  itself,  before  the  ethical  relationship"  (Levinas,  1985,  p.  96).  This  ethical  relation  of 
responsibility  operates  at  a  pre/non-discursive  level,  and  indeed  may  be  damaged  by  any 
attempt  to  discursively  rationalize  it.  Rather  than  see  ethics  as  primarily  a  societal  product 
(conventionalism)  and  society  as  man's  saviour  from  natural  barbarity,  Levinas'  ethics  of 
responsibility  encourages  us  to  see  the  ethical  impulse  as  ontologically  foundational  for  the 
subject.  And  it  suggests  that  alienating  social  circumstances  can  undermine  the  immediacy 
of  the  ethical  impulse  to  respond  to  the  Other.  From  this  perspective  we  may  see  society,  and 
in  particular  modern  rationality  (instrumental  and  communicative),  as  potentially  corrosive 
to  the  ethical  impulse.  Such  practices  block  our  response  to  the  other  by  putting  distance  or 
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barriers  between  the  subject  and  the  Other.  Bauman  argues  that  it  is  this  manufacture  of  an 
ethical  distance  in  modernity  which  made  possible  the  horrors  of  the  Holocaust;  the  most 
remarkable  feature  of  which,  for  Bauman,  was  that  through  rationality,  an  abhorrent  project 
was  able  to  overcome  "the  animal  pity  by  which  all  normal  men  are  affected  in  the  presence 
of  physical  suffering"  (Arendt,  1963,  p.  106,  quoted  by  Bauman,  1989,  p.  20). 
We  suggest  that  a  universal  ethics  of  difference  and  responsibility  for  the  Other,  as 
distinct  from  any  tradition  bound  ethics  of  the  good  life,  has  the  potential  to  motivate  and 
supplement  the  moral,  in  even  a  highly  pluralist  society.  And  we  agree  with  Bauman  that 
modern  society  is  characterized  by  certain  external  blocks  on  the  recognition  of  responsibility 
to  the  Other;  Blocks  which  need  to  be  overcome  if  the  promise  of  an  ethics  of  difference  is 
to  be  realized.  Foremost  amongst  the  systemic  blocks  to  the  realisation  of  man's  social  being- 
for-the-other  are  the  relations  of  domination  and  alienation  imposed  by  capitalism  and  the 
ideology  of  commodity  fetishism  which  impedes  recognition  of  reality  of  those  relations.  The 
nascent  subject's  relation  to  fantasy  presents,  however,  an  even  more  fundamental  barrier  to 
the  recognition  of  absolute  responsibility  for  the  Other.  Taking  a  Lacanian  perspective,  we 
suggest  that  the  subject's  ethical  responsibility  for  the  Other  can  only  come  clearly  into  view, 
for  the  subject,  as  it  traverse  its  fundamental  fantasy.  It  is  only  by  moving  through  the  process 
of  "further  separation"  that  the  split  subject  can  move  beyond  domination  by  the  Other,  and 
that  relations  of  subject  and  Other,  characterized/haunted  by  a  threat  of  negation,  can  be 
pacified  and  become  the  basis  for  the  actualization  of  an  ethic  of  responsibility  for  the  Other. 
Transcendence  of  the  fundamental  fantasy  requires  that  the  subject  come  to  terms  with 
Alterity;  it  must  subjectify  its  own  cause  in  the  desire  of  the  Other  by  recognising  and  taking 
responsibility  for  its  relations  to  the  Other  which  are  constitutive  of  its  very  being.  This 
process  requires  that  the  subject  confront  the  fragility  and  thoroughly  divided  and  relational 
nature  of  its  being,  and  demands  that  it  face  up  to  its  essential  dependence  on  the  Other. 
Insofar  as  it  forces  a  break  with  the  illusions  of  unity,  sovereignty  and  autonomy,  the 
transcendence  of  the  fundamental  fantasy  is  a  vital/necessary  step  in  any  subject's 
development  as  an  effective  post-modem  political/moral  agent.  Through  the  recognition  and 
subjectifization  of  our  split/divided  subjectivity  we  may  progress  towards;  (i)  an  ethics  based 
on  difference  and  responsibility  for  the  Other,  and  (ii)  a  morality  founded  upon  the 
institutionalization  of  the  regulative  ideal  of  discourse  ethics  stripped  of  monadic 
individualism  and  sustained  by  a  fuller  recognition  of  the  relational  nature  of  subjectivity  and 
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of  the  necessity  of  our  reliance  on  the  Other  -  the  necessity  of  trust. 
Diana  Coole  (1996)  makes  a  strong  case  that  the  incitation  of  alterity,  typical  of  post- 
structuralist/post-modern  practices  and  discourses,  is  an  essential  supplement  to  any 
emancipatory  politics,  based  on  a  morality  of  communicative  reason.  Coole  suggests  that 
Habermas  shows  hostility  towards  the  discourse  of  post-structuralism/post-modernity  in,  for 
example,  The  Philosophical  Discourse  of  Modernity  (Habermas,  1985a),  primarily  because 
those  discourses  rely  on  an  appeal  to  the  Other,  in  which  he  can  find  no  emancipatory 
potential.  Central  to  Habermas'  work  is  the  thesis  that  both  his  predecessors  in  critical  theory 
(including  Horkheimer  and  Adorno)  and  the  post-structuralists/post-modernists,  have,  in  their 
own  ways,  failed  to  grasp  the  emancipatory  potential  of  reason.  For  Habermas,  the  early 
critical  theorists  follow  Weber  in  making  the  mistake  of  equating  reason  with  purposive- 
instrumental  reason,  while  the  post-modernists,  according  to  Habermas,  forsake  reason 
altogether.  Both  miss  the  emancipatory  potential  of  communicative  reason  orientated  to  the 
cooperative  disclosure  of  the  world,  to  transform  that  world  through  reflexive  critique.  For 
Habermas  modernity  is  characterized  by  the  tension  between  two  modes  of  rationality 
instrumental  and  communicative  reason,  "lifeworld  and  system,  emancipation  and 
reification"  (Coole,  1996,  p.  224).  He  sees  the  struggle  between  reason  and  its  Other  -  the 
sacred,  that  which  is  immune  to  reason  -  as  essentially  occurring  in  the  transition  from 
traditional  to  modern  society.  In  that  transition,  the  Other  of  reason  is  overcome  through  the 
"linguistification  of  the  sacred",  and  the  conditions  are  set  for  the  fulfillment  of  modernity's 
emancipatory  promise.  Coole  suggests  Habermas'  hostility  to  post-modernist  discourse  can 
be  traced  to  its  invocation/reinvigoration  of  the  Other,  the  beyond  of  reason/discursive 
analysis:  "his  entire  project  is  predicated  for  its  emancipatory  claims  on  the  exclusion  of  that 
alterity  to  which  postmodernism  appeals"  (Coole,  1996,  p.  224).  Alterity  is  effectively  excised 
from  his  account  of  the  modem  lifeworld  and  subject.  The  lifeworld  is  defined  in  essentially 
linguistic  terms  and  is  thus,  in  principle,  entirely  open  to  the  possibility  of  communicative 
critique  and  rationality.  And,  the  Habermasian  subject  is  given  an  analogous  transparency: 
"Habermas  gives  subjects  privileged  communicative  access  to  their  inner  selves  such  that, 
despite  communicative  blockages,  there  is  in  principle  nothing  immune  to  rational  self- 
communication"  (Coole,  1996,  p.  226-227).  His  vision  of  emancipation  through 
communicative  rationality  allows  little  room  for  recognition  of  the  Other  of  rationality  -  the 
non-systemic,  non-rational,  pre-and-non-discursive,  forces  and  processes  at  work  within  even 
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modem  society,  and  within  the  subject.  He  overstates  the  potential  of  rationality  by 
substantially  overlooking  the  non-systematic  unconscious;  those  elements  that  can  not  be 
discursively  retrieved  or  validated. 
The  post-structuralist/post-modernist  invocation  of  Alterity  subverts  modernism's 
rationalist  project  not  by  means  of  a  retreat  to  irrationality  but  rather  by  revealing  the 
limitations  of  and  violence  done  by  rationality  (both  instrumental  and  communicative)  when 
it  "it  aims  to  make  everything  knowable,  communicable,  transparent"  (Passerin  d'  Entreves, 
1996,  p.  26).  In  their  initcement  of  alterity,  the  post-modernists  want  to  destabilize  the  rational 
by  opening  it  up  to  the  excluded  voice  of  the  Other,  that  is,  they  intend  to  awake  us  to 
processes  of  exclusion  and  suppression  working  within  rationality's  rendering  of  things 
knowable.  The  post-modernists'  provocations  and  the  absolute  ethical  claim  of  the  Other 
operate  together  within  those  circuits  of  power  and  alterity  that  are  resistant/immune  to 
discursive  redemption/analysis.  However,  we  need  not  see  the  post-structuralism/post- 
modernism  project  as  an  attempt  to  overthrow  reason  and  put  unreason  in  its  place.  It  is  more 
helpful  to  see  it  as  an  attempt  to  destabilize  reason's  closure,  that  is,  as  an  enterprise  that 
worries  reason  along  its  boundaries,  and  allows  the  claim  of  the  Other  to  be  glimpsed  (but 
not  rationally  dissected).  It  is  this  subversive  role  that  makes  post-structuralism/post- 
modernism  political: 
"From  this  perspective  it  is  not  just  purposive-instrumental  reason  that 
colonizes  and  subjugates,  but  a  metaphysical  will  to  lucidity  as  such. 
Irruptions  of  alterity  are  a  means  of  opening  spaces  through  which  the 
unnameable  and  hence  uncolonizable  might  be  glimpsed,  as  a  strategy 
subversive  of  reason's  closures,  not  a  leap  into  the  irrational.  " 
(Coole,  1996,  pp.  238-239) 
The  post-modem  ethics  of  difference  points  to  the  possibility  of  a  reinvigoration  of 
moral  motivation.  While  moral  claims  must  continue  to  draw  force  from  their  "rationality" 
that  force  can  be  underwritten  by  the  ethical  impulse  -  that  is  the  feeling/intuition  of  absolute 
obligation  to  the  Other;  The  sense  of  being  bound,  not  by  a  trained  conscience,  but  simply 
by  the  presence  of  the  Other.  That  is,  bound  by  a  responsibility/obligation  for  the  Other  that 
can  not  be  understood  -a  claim  that  operates  below  the  level  of  discourse  and  rationality  in 
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which  moral  claims  circulate.  It  is  the  immediacy  of  the  ethical  relation  of  absolute 
responsibility  that  gives  it  motivational,  action-guiding,  force.  And,  whilst  this  ethics  of 
responsibility  is  clearly  opposed  to  the  cognitive  discourse  of  morality,  we  suggest  that  its 
force  may  be  harnessed  to  the  moral.  The  ethical  imperative  may  drive  action  in  response  to 
interpreted  moral  claims  by  force  of  the  uninterpreted  and  always  unfulfilled  claim  of  the 
Other,  recognized  by  "its  gnawing  sense  of  unfulfilledness,  by  its  endemic  dissatisfaction 
with  itself'  (Bauman,  1993,  p.  80).  We  are  absolutely  not  suggesting  that  the  ethical  can  be 
subsumed  within  the  moral.  On  the  contrary  if  the  ethical  claim  is  to  maintain  its  force  it 
must  remain  outside  discourse:  "The  transcendence  of  the  other  -  the  infinite  dimension  of 
the  obligation  in  Levinas'  terms  -  is  neutralized  when  obligation  is  subject  to  discourse" 
(Furrow,  1996,  p.  162).  Rather,  we  are  suggesting  that  the  Levinasian  foundational  ethic  of 
being-for-the-Other  provides  us  with  an  account  of  ethical  agency  which  can  put  force  behind 
moral  responsibility,  yet  provide  a  basis  for  the  ethical  transcendence  of  the  moral  point  of 
view,  (the  point  of  view  of  discursive  rationality): 
"This  capacity  to  be  shocked  by  others  suffering,  and  resistance  to  settling 
ersatz  explanations  of  it,  accounts  for  our  capacity  to  transcend  the  limitations 
of  a  moral  point  of  view,  and  provides  us  with  a  recharacterized  sense  of 
universal  moral  agency  ...  The  virtue  of  such  a  position  is  that  it  allows  us  to 
conceptualize  an  ethics  and  politics  that  depends  only  minimally  on  shared 
beliefs.  " 
(Furrow,  1995,  p.  xx) 
The  Lacanian  model  suggests  that  through  the  transcendence  of  the  fundamental  fantasy  the 
subject  may  emerge  as  an  ethical  subject-for-the-Other  and  as  an  effective  political/moral 
agent.  This  post-modem  moral  agent  will  be  reconciled  to  her  own  alterity  and  division.  She 
will  be  deeply  aware  of  her  dependence  on  the  Other  and,  recognizing  the  fragility  of  her  own 
relational  identity,  she  will  appreciate  that  only  within  a  just  and  relatively  stable  framework 
of  social  relations  can  self  and  Other  thrive  and  effectively  pursue  their  ethical  projects  of 
self-realization.  She  will  therefore  be  committed  to  development  and  maintenance  and  of  a 
just  normative  framework.  In  a  modem  pluralism  norms  tend  to  lose  any  motivating 
connection  with  an  ethic  of  the  good  life34  and  must,  in  the  first  instance  be  motivated  by 
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their  rational  validity.  This  post-modern  agent-for-the-Other  will  thus  have  a  commitment 
to  universally  binding  moral  norms  validated  through  communicative  reason  but  her  moral 
motivation  and  commitment  of  will  not  rely  on  just  the  abstraction  of  the  moral  point  of 
view.  It  will  be  impelled  by  an  acceptance  of  an  absolute  ethical  responsibility-for-the-other, 
expressed  as  a  commitment  to  maintenance  and  protection  of  the  relational  space  within 
which  self  and  other  may  realize  themselves. 
This  subject's  real  commitment  to  the  validation  of  norms  through  the  communicative 
reason,  will  be  tempered  by  an  awareness  of  her  own  alterity  and  division,  she  will  recognise 
the  limits  of  reason  and  be  concerned  to  minimise  the  violence  done  by  the  always  premature 
closure  of  reason.  Nevertheless,  just  this  breach  with  monadic  individualism,  this  fuller 
recognition  of  the  relational  and  ultimately  exogenous  nature  of  subjectivity,  associated  with 
the  post-modern/Lacanian  subjectivity,  is  vital  if  the  regulative  ideal  of  discourse  ethics  is 
to  be  made  plausible.  Real  progress  towards  the  realisation  of  the  ideal  of  rational  will 
formation  in  the  public  sphere  of  the  Other  will  require  a  reliance  on  a  measure  of  trust  that 
itself  will  be  plausible  only  among  subjects  who  have  come  to  terms  with  their  own 
otherness. 
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Conclusion 
"Two  roads  diverged  in  a  yellow  wood, 
And  sorry  I  could  not  travel  both 
And  be  one  traveller,  long  I  stood 
And  looked  down  one  as  far  as  I  could 
To  where  it  bent  in  the  undergrowth;  " 
(Robert  Frost,  "The  Road  Not  Taken",  1916,  p.  129) 
This  thesis  set  out  to  defend  the  emancipatory  potential  of  accounting.  Our  efforts  to 
sustain  that  defence  took  us  on  an  intellectual  journey  that  ranged  from  the  analytic 
philosophy  of  Donald  Davidson  through  Jürgen  Habermas'  critical  theory  to  the  post- 
structuralist  psychoanalysis  of  Jacques  Lacan.  In  this  conclusion  we  will  look  back  on  the 
road  taken  and  emphasise  the  continuities  and  logical  development  of  the  route.  We  will 
also  take  some  space  here  to  very  briefly  comment  on  certain  roads  not  taken  by  this 
thesis.  This  thesis  developed  through  a  process  of  auto-critique:  At  each  of  the  main 
phases  of  the  intellectual  progress  charted  here,  the  position  presented  has  been  subject  to 
a  measure  of  critical  reflection,  weaknesses  identified,  and  ways  beyond  the  weaknesses 
offered.  Self-critique  has  therefore  been  integral  to  the  development  of  the  views 
presented  in  previous  chapters;  in  this  conclusion  we  will  review  the  main  points  of  that 
critique  but  will  not  attempt  to  reconstitute  it  in  detail  nor  will  we,  at  this  stage,  undertake 
any  systematic  new  critique. 
The  development  of  the  thesis  was  an  essentially  constructive  process.  Our  auto- 
critique  led  not  to  the  undermining  or  destruction  of  the  views  previously  presented,  but 
generally  to  a  recognition  that  they  needed  to  be  supplemented  in  some  way.  From  the 
outset  we  associated  accounting's  emancipatory  potential  with  its  capacity  to  provide 
knowledge  of  the  objective  publicly  accessible  world  we  share.  Initially  we  addressed 
financial  accounting  as  an  essentially  descriptive  enterprise.  This  does  not  mean  that  we 
somehow  failed  to  appreciate  that  accounting  has  a  moral  aspect;  but  rather  that  we 
implicitly  assumed  that  the  descriptive  and  normative  dimensions  of  accounting  could  be 
cleanly  divided  and  dealt  with  separately.  Taking  that  division  for  granted  we  proceeded 
to  make  a  case  for  the  possibility  of  descriptive  objectivity  in  accounting,  by  inference 
from  the  account  given  by  Davidson's  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  of  any  type.  We 
initially  use  our  Davidsonian  justification  of  the  possibility  that  we  can  have  accounting 
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knowledge  of  the  objective  public  world  we  share  as  a  basis  for  responding  to  those 
theorists  who  cast  doubt  on  the  possibility  of  any  objectivity  in  accounting.  In  particular, 
we  use  Davidson  to  resist  the  logic  of  accounting  theorists,  like  Ruth  Hines,  who  would 
encourage  us  to  drop  altogether  what  they  see  as  the  "mundane"  notion  of  "an  objective, 
shared  and  intersubjectively  accessible  world"  (Hines,  1991,  p.  317).  Our  Davidsonian 
view  of  the  possibility  of  descriptive  objectivity  in  accounting  remains  at  the  very  heart  of 
our  thesis  as  it  develops  in  subsequent  chapters;  it  is  by  no  means  naive  and  at  no  stage  do 
we  abandon  it.  At  all  stages  of  the  development  of  our  views  we  follow  Davidson  in 
arguing  that  intersubjectivity  is  all  the  foundation  we  need,  or  can  have,  for  objectivity. 
Nevertheless  as  our  analysis  proceeds  we  come  to  recognise  that  the  Davidsonian 
perspective  on  accounting  objectivity  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  an  approach  that  more 
explicitly  engages  with  the  moral  dimension. 
In  chapter  3  we  used  an  analysis  of  the  debate  surrounding  the  development  of 
accounting  for  deferred  tax  as  a  vehicle  to  further  our  examination  of  the  nature  of 
financial  accounting  and  the  problem  of  objectivity  in  accounting.  Two  conclusion  of  our 
consideration  of  the  deferred  tax  debate  are  particularly  notable:  Firstly,  we  observed  that 
the  descriptive  objectivity  of  accounting  for  issues  like  deferred  tax  may  be  low  because 
in  such  cases  accounting  concepts  employed  lack  clear  objective  referents  in  the 
intersubjectively  accessible  world.  The  absence  of  clear  objective  referents  for  many 
accounting  concepts  allows  massive  scope  for  failure  of  intersubjective  descriptive 
consensus,  that  is,  failure  of  objectivity.  We  recognised  that  this  issue  has  been  identified 
by  other  observers  of  accounting,  including  Sterling  and  Chambers,  who  have  called  for 
accounting  to  become  more  rational,  less  bound  by  myth  and  tradition,  and  more  like 
science;  that  is,  more  closely  tied  to  an  objective  reality.  Secondly  we  analysed 
accounting  in  terms  of  the  science  ethics  dichotomy  drawn  by  Bernard  Williams  and 
concluded  accounting  is  not  quite  like  science;  more  specifically  we  recognized  that  in 
accounting  the  descriptive  and  the  normative  are  deeply  and  inextricably  entangled.  That 
recognition  impelled  our  recourse  to  Habermasian  discourse  ethics.  Given  our  acceptance 
that  the  moral  and  descriptive  can  not  be  neatly  separated  in  accounting,  we  were  forced 
to  recognize  that  it  can  not  be  sensible  to  conceive  of  accounting  and  accounting 
objectivity  in  purely  descriptive  terms. 
We  use  Habermas'  discourse  theory  to  justify  the  view  that,  at  least  potentially, 
we  can  have  normative  objectivity  in  accounting.  We  progress  from  an  implicit  and 
relatively  unsophisticated  conception  of  financial  accounting  as  a  process  that  can 
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reasonably  be  addressed  as  an  essentially  descriptive  enterprise,  to  a  view  of  it  as  a 
process  within  which  the  descriptive  and  normative  dimension  are  inextricably  entangled. 
This  recasting  of  our  view  of  financial  accounting  compels  us  to  re-conceptualize  the 
problem  of  objectivity  in  accounting  and  drives  us  to  supplement  our  Davidsonian 
analysis  of  the  possibility  of  descriptive  objectivity  in  accounting  with  a  Habermasian 
approach  to  the  possibility  of  normative  objectivity.  The  move  to  Habermas'  theory  of 
discourse  ethics  is  essentially  supplementary;  at  no  stage  do  we  relinquish  our 
Davidsonian  view  of  the  promise  of  descriptive  objectivity  in  accounting.  On  the 
contrary,  our  view  is  that  normative  objectivity  is  a  necessary  complement  to  descriptive 
objectivity  in  accounting:  an  objectively  validated  normative  position  provides  the 
objective  viewpoint  and  concepts  in  terms  of  which  we  can  have  objective  descriptive 
knowledge  of  the  world. 
We  stress  that  we  do  not  argue  that  we  can  have  objective  adjudication  between 
value-preferences  or  between  competing  conceptions  of  the  "good  life".  We  agree  that 
evaluative  questions  can  only  be  addressed  from  within  particular  forms  of  life;  they  are 
simply  not  open  to  objective  validation.  We  are  therefore  certainly  not  suggesting  that  we 
might  somehow  be  able  to  objectively  adjudicate  between  the  value  systems  of  say 
Christianity  and  Hinduism.  Furthermore  we  recognise  that  accounting  norms  may  be 
deeply  affected  by  the  evaluative  system  within  which  they  are  embedded.  However,  we 
follow  Habermas  in  arguing  that  in  modernity  a  set  of  moral/normative  questions  can  be 
broken  away  from  determination  by  the  evaluative  and  addressed  objectively.  Habermas 
argues  that  in  traditional  society  the  ethical  sphere  appears  as  a  totality  in  which  the 
norms  of  action  and  question  of  justice  are  determined  by  answers  given  to  the  evaluative 
questions,  and  consequently  the  norms  in  such  a  society  are  not  open  to  objective 
validation.  However,  in  the  transition  from  traditional  society  to  modernity  the  ethical 
sphere  breaks  into  two  components,  the  evaluative  and  the  moral,  so  that  in  modern 
pluralist  society  a  set  of  moral,  questions  becomes  detached  from  the  evaluative.  The 
moral  questions  are  defined  as  those  very  questions  that  admit  of  a  generalizability  of 
interests  and  are  therefore  open  to  the  possibility  of  objective  validation  through  rational 
argument.  Moreover,  Habermas  suggests  that  these  moral  questions  have  a  priority,  over 
the  evaluative/ethical  questions,  because  their  resolution  allows  the  integration  and 
coordination  of  society  and  thus  sets  the  social  conditions  within  which  particular  forms 
of  life  may  flourish  and  the  ethical  questions  they  raise  be  addressed.  Habermas  shows 
how  moral  norms  of  action  can  be  objectively  validated  through  communicative  reason, 
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that  is,  through  the  institutionalisation  of  what  he  calls  "discourse  ethics".  We  argued  that 
accounting  regulation  falls  within  this  moral  sphere  and  is  open  to  objective  validation 
through  rational  argument  and  in  particular  the  application  of  discourse  ethics.  It  is in  this 
application  of  communicative  reason  that  we  see  the  fuller/second  dimension  of 
accounting's  emancipatory  potential.  Accounting  regulation  established  through  the 
institutionalisation  of  discourse  ethics  may  truly  contribute  to  a  communicative 
integration  of  society  and  help  to  put  a  normative  check  on  the  colonising  depredations  of 
the  system  upon  the  lifeworld  -  within  which  we  have  our  being  as  relational  subjects. 
We  discussed  the  continuity  of  the  Habermasian  and  Davidsonian  perspectives  in 
chapter  3.  We  will  not  repeat  that  discussion  here  except  to  note  that  crucially  both  rely 
on  a  truth/validity  semantics  and  on  the  interpretive  principle  of  charity.  We  see  the 
Habermasian  analysis  as  essentially  an  extension  to  the  normative  domain  of  the 
Davidsonian  view  of  objectivity  as  intersubjectivity.  We  should  like  to  re-emphasise  that 
our  Habermasian  view  of  the  possibility  of  normative  objectivity  complements  rather  than 
supersedes  the  Davidsonian  analysis  of  the  possibility  of  descriptive  objectivity. 
We  located  our  optimistic  defence  of  accounting's  emancipatory  potential  in  terms 
of  Habermas'  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  society.  The  analysis  we  present  in  chapter  1,  of 
the  ASB's  developing  conceptual  framework  for  financial  reporting  project  and  the 
debate  surrounding  their  work,  shows  accounting  in  process  of  transition  from  the 
traditional  towards  modernity.  It  is in  modernity's  potential  for  rationality  that  we  see  the 
possibility  of  emancipation.  In  chapter  2  we  drew  on  Davidson's  work  to  defend 
objectivity  and  rationality  against  those  "totalized  critiques"  of  reason  which  have 
featured  prominently  in  the  critical  accounting  literature  in  recent  decades,  and  which  we 
see  as  undercutting  the  possibility  of  rational  critique.  Modernity,  however,  is 
characterised  by  the  tension  between  two  modes  of  reason,  instrumental  reason  and 
communicative  reason,  which  reflects  a  tension  between  systemic  and  communicative 
integration/coordination  of  society.  We  argue  in  chapter  3  that,  given  the  entanglement  of 
the  descriptive  and  normative  in  financial  accounting,  the  full  emancipatory  potential  of 
modernity  can  only  be  realised  in  the  case  of  accounting  through  the  application  of 
communicative  reason.  In  chapter  4  we  used  Habermas'  analysis  of  discourse  ethics  to 
defend  the  possibility  of  communicative  reason  and  objectivity  in  accounting  against 
those  accounting  theorists  who  would  like  to  reduce  reason  in  accounting  to  instrumental 
reason  and  accounting  objectivity  to  descriptive  objectivity. 
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We  have  tried  to  defend  the  positive  dimension  of  modernity's  triumph  over  the 
traditional;  that  is,  we  have  stressed  the  emancipatory  potential  in  the  triumph  of  reason 
over  the  Other  of  reason.  We  are,  however,  aware  of  the  possible  distortions  associated 
with  the  development  of  modernity  and  we  have  argued  that  the  crisis  tendencies 
immanent  to  capitalist  modernity  can  be  traced  in  modern  financial  accounting.  We  have 
, 
however,  argued  that  those  tendencies  can  be  overcome  through  reason  and  most 
particularly  through  the  application  of  communicative  reason,  construed  in  Habermasian 
terms  of  non-coercive  intersubjectivity,  that  is,  reciprocal  perspective  taking  oriented  to 
the  achievement  of  mutual  understanding  and  attainment  of  rational  consensus.  And  we 
have  emphasised  that  such  communicative  reason  can  only  be  attained  through  the 
deliberate  institutionalisation  of  democratic  processes  and  the  ideals  of  discourse  ethics, 
in  all  spheres  of  society  -  including  accounting  regulation. 
We  argue  throughout  that  objectivity  is  essentially  a  matter  of  degree,  and  that  the 
more  objective  position  is  that  which  is  more  inclusive;  that  which  is  open  to  the  greater 
degree  of  intersubjective  agreement;  that  which  is  less  local  and  narrowly  perspectival. 
We  recognize  a  problem  with  the  Habermasian  moral  point  of  view  of  discourse  ethics. 
The  problem  is  that  it  perspectival,  it  is  the  point  of  view  of  reason,  all  be  it 
communicative  reason.  It  excludes  what  we  have  called  the  other  of  reason,  that  is,  all 
that  can  not  be  consciously  articulated,  and  brought  to  discourse/argument;  it  excludes  the 
unconscious.  Whilst  we  have  resisted  any  totalized  critique  of  reason  (see  chapter  2),  we 
accept  the  validity  of  the  poststructuralist/postmodern  critique  of  reason's  exclusion  of  its 
Other.  We  recognise  that  both  instrumental  and  communicative  reason  perpetrate  this 
exclusion. 
In  the  final  chapter  of  the  thesis  we  turned  to  Lacan's  post-structuralist, 
psychoanalytic  theory  for  supplement  to  the  Habermasian  perspective  of  reason.  We 
accept  that  the  Habermasian  analysis  of  reason's  potential  is  overoptimistic.  In  particular, 
we  appreciate  that,  despite  his  efforts  to  overcome  the  philosophy  of  consciousness, 
Habermas  ultimately  retains  an  inadequate  model  of  the  subject  of  discourse  ethics.  We 
recognise  that  the  Habermasian  model  needs  to  be  augmented  by  a  sensitivity  to  Alterity 
and  the  unconscious;  defined  as,  that  which  is  immune  to  discursive  retrieval  and 
communicative  reason.  We  argue  that  the  post-structuralist  /  psycho-analytic  incitation  of 
the  Other  of  reason  should  not  be  seen  as  leading  to  the  replacement  of  reason  by 
unreason  but  rather  as  means  by  which  the  premature  closure  of  reason  might  be 
identified  and  resisted.  That  is,  we  see  it  as  a  means  by  which  the  narrowness  of  the 
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perspective  of  reason  can  be  challenged.  We  therefore  argued  that,  whilst  we  must  hold 
onto  reason  and  strive  to  develop  our  institutional  capacity  for  instrumental  and 
communicative  reason,  through  which  we  impose  some  measure  of  normative  control  on 
the  system,  we  must  supplement  reason  with  an  openness  to  the  (inarticulate)  claims  of 
the  Other.  Only  through  reason  and  in  particular  through  communicative  reason  can  we 
hope  to  tame  the  system  of  capitalism,  yet  we  must  not  let  reason  become  a  straight- 
jacket;  we  must  learn  to  resist  reason's  "will  to  lucidity".  We  must  allow  the  Other  of 
reason  to  be  reflected  in  our  deliberative  processes.  This  means  that  our  institutions  must 
be  open  to  the  irruption  of  the  unconscious  and  the  inarticulate,  they  must  allow  new 
metaphors  and  meaning  to  be  forged  and  help  us  move  beyond  the  automatic  functioning 
of  language,  that  is  beyond  our  castration  or  eclipse  in  language.  We  need  institutions  that 
help  us  to  ask  questions  about  ourselves  and  help  us  to  move  beyond  our  petrification  in 
the  spontaneous  working  of  language.  We  need  institutions  that  will  challenge  us  to 
reformulate  our  relations  to  the  Other,  to  recast  our  interests  and  transcend  our  fantasies. 
All  this  means  that  we  must  be  prepared  to  institutionalise  instability,  we  must  admit 
other  voices  to  our  debates  and  we  must  not  insist  that  they  speak  "our  language"  we  must 
welcome  disruption.  In  chapter  3  we  criticised  the  Accounting  Standard  Board's 
conceptual  framework  project  for  its  failure  to  do  all  these  things  and  most  especially  we 
criticised  its  premature  closure.  As  modernity  matures  and  the  stifling  grip  of  unreason,  in 
the  shape  of  tradition  and  the  sacred,  recedes  into  history,  we  hope  that  we  may  become 
more  confident  in  the  application  of  a  communicative  reason,  that  does  not  demand 
closure  but  rather  provides  real  "toeholds  for  new  initiatives"  (Rorty,  1991,  p.  13-14). 
On  any  journey  one  is  bound  to  take  certain  paths  and  not  others.  We  recognise 
that  we  can  not  be  fully  aware  of  all  the  paths  that  other,  differently  disposed,  travellers 
might  have  preferred.  We  certainly  will  not  attempt  to  go  down  new  paths  at  this  stage. 
However,  we  are  conscious  of  two  issues  that,  given  time,  we  would  have  liked  to  pursue. 
Firstly,  we  recognize  that  we  have  not  presented  any  carefully  constructed,  detailed, 
argument  to  support  our  claim  that  financial  accounting  can,  in  Habermasian  terms,  be 
properly  conceived  of  as  falling  within  the  moral  domain.  The  moral  sphere,  as  distinct 
from  say  the  evaluative,  includes  those  normative  questions  that  could  be  settled 
discursively  in  terms  of  the  generalizability  of  interests.  Some  accounting  theorists  would 
argue  that  the  ineradicable  conflict  of  class  interest  that  underlies  capitalism  and  the 
tendency  to  crisis  that  we  analysed  in  chapter  1  mean  that  an  accounting  for  capitalism 
ultimately  is  not  open  to  validation  in  terms  of  the  generalizability  of  interests  through 
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communicative  reason  (See  Puxty,  1986;  Dillard,  1991).  To  these  theorists  accounting  is 
"shaped  above  all  by  a  systematic  tendency  to  privilege  the  interests  of  capital  relative  to 
labour"  (Willmott,  1990,  p.  325).  They  would  argue  that  within  the  systematically 
distorted  system  of  capitalism  accounting's  claim  to  serve  the  public  interest  will  always 
be  essentially  false;  it  serves  the  private  interests  of  capital.  Our  own  view  is  perhaps  a 
little  less  radical;  we  take  the  view  that  even  in  our  capitalist  society  law  and  regulation, 
including  accounting  regulation,  produced  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  discourse 
theory  has  the  potential  to  put  a  real  public  interest  check  on  the  capitalist  system.  The 
possibility  of  social  progress  lies  not  in  the  destruction  of  capitalism  but  in  its  disciplining 
and  modification  through  communicative  reason:  "The  intention  is  to  tame  the  capitalist 
economic  system,  that  is,  to  "restructure"  it  socially  and  economically"  (liabermas,  1998, 
p.  19). 
Which  questions  fall  within  the  moral  sphere  and  can  be  settled  in  terms  of 
generalizability  of  interests,  can  ultimately  only  be  decided  by  the  outcome  of  real 
practical  discourse/debate  governed  by  the  principles  of  discourse  theory.  Outside  of  such 
a  process  we  have  no  way  to  prove  that  accounting  regulations  fall  within  the  moral 
sphere.  We  recognize  that  those  theorists  who  are  inclined  to  insist  that,  under  capitalism, 
financial  accounting  will  always  be  systematically  distorted  are  liable  to  find  our  views 
rather  naive  and  idealistic;  perhaps  dangerously  so.  We  appreciate  of  course  that  financial 
accounting  is  historically  rooted  in  the  functions  of  capitalism,  we  simply  don't  accept 
that  it  must  remain  so.  We  place  faith  in  the  disruptive  /  liberative  potential  of  democracy 
and  communicative  reason,  and  take  the  view  that  through  those  institutions  accounting 
might  help  the  lifeworld  impose  some  communicatively  based  moral  discipline  upon  the 
system  of  capitalism.  We  recognize,  however,  that  we  might  have  done  more  to  address 
the  concerns  of  those  who  see  financial  accounting  under  capitalism  as  inevitably  in  thrall 
to  capital;  as  inevitably  privileging  private  interests  over  public. 
Secondly,  we  have  not  discussed,  in  any  detail,  the  practical  impediments  to  the 
realisation  of  the  discourse  ethics  ideal.  We  have  preferred  to  concentrate  on  what  we  see 
as  the  main  theoretical  problem  of  the  Habermasian  analysis,  that  is,  his  effective 
exclusion  of  Alterity  from  the  account  he  gives  of  the  modern  lifeworld  and  the  subject  of 
discourse  ethics.  We  argued  that  the  post-structuralist  outlook  of  the  psychoanalyst 
Jacques  Lacan  might  be  drawn  on  to  supplement  the  Habermasian  perspective  and  in 
particular  provide  some  antidote  to  its  neglect  of  the  Other  of  reason.  Nevertheless,  we 
acknowledge  that  we  have  not  thoroughly  discussed  and  explored  the  practical 
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impediments  to  the  realisation  of  the  ideals  of  discourse  theory.  We  accept  that  the 
examination  of  the  real  forces  and  vested  interests  that  might  block  the  development  of  an 
emancipatory  accounting,  including  the  systematic  power  imbalances  and  distortions  of 
communications  associated  with  capitalism,  is  rather  a  neglected  avenue  in  this  thesis;  a 
road  not  taken. 
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1.  The  instance  of  rationalisation  we  describe  and  the  threat  it  poses  to  the  lifeworld  of 
the  "everyday  consciousness"  (of  preparers  and  users  of  accounts),  is  typical  of  the 
wider  experience  of  the  process  of  rationalisation  leading  to  colonisation: 
"the  differentiation  of  science,  morality,  and  art,  which  is 
characteristic  of  Occidental  rationalism,  results  not  only  in  a  growing 
autonomy  for  sectors  dealt  with  by  specialists,  but  also  in  the  splitting 
off  of  these  sectors  from  a  stream  of  tradition  continuing  on  in 
everyday  practice  in  a  quasi-natural  fashion. 
...  Everyday 
consciousness  sees  itself  thrown  back  on  traditions  whose  claims  to 
validity  have  already  been  suspended;  where  it  does  escape  the  spell 
of  traditionalism,  it  is  hopelessly  splintered.  In  place  of  "false 
consciousness"  we  today  have  a  "fragmented  consciousness"  that 
blocks  enlightenment  by  the  mechanism  of  reification.  It  is  only  with 
this  that  the  conditions  for  a  colonisation  of  the  lifeworld  are  met. 
When  stripped  of  their  ideological  veils,  the  imperatives  of 
autonomous  subsystems  make  their  way  into  the  lifeworld  from  the 
outside  -  like  colonial  masters  coming  into  tribal  society  -  and  force 
a  process  of  assimilation  upon  it.  " 
(Habermas,  1981b,  p.  355) 
2.  The  ASB  avoid  the  use  of  the  term  "conceptual  Framework",  however,  in  terms  of 
content  and  purposes  their  "Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial  Reporting" 
exposure  draft  (ASB,  1995b),  can  be  seen  as  a  conceptual  framework  underpinning 
and  guiding  the  development  of  financial  reporting: 
'...  the  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting 
...  addresses  the 
concepts  underlying  the  information  presented  in  financial  statements. 
The  objective  of  this  Statement  of  Principles  is  to  provide  a 
framework  for  the  consistent  and  logical  formulation  of  individual 
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accounting  standards.  The  framework  also  provides  a  basis  on  which 
others  can  exercise  judgement  in  resolving  accounting  issues.  " 
(ASB,  1993,  para.  4) 
The  exposure  draft  contains  all  the  elements,  which  have  become  de  rigueur  in  a 
conceptual  framework  for  financial  reporting. 
3.  The  Study  Group  on  Business  Income  (1952,  p.  23)  suggest  that  the  matching 
approach  to  accounting  came  to  dominate  practice  from  the  early  years  of  the  20th 
century  because  of;  (i)  fears  that  the  current  value  approach  might  encourage  the 
premature  taxation  of  unrealised  gains,  (ii)  the  growing  separation  of  ownership  and 
control  which  rendered  the  relatively  high  level  of  subjectivity  involved  in  the  current 
value  approach  increasingly  problematic,  and  (iii)  the  restriction  of  distributable 
income,  under  the  matching  approach,  to  realised  profits  gave  creditors  a  measure  of 
protection  from  perhaps  overly  optimistic  distribution  plans.  Whatever  the  reasons, 
we  suggest  that  they  "need  to  be  openly  discussed  before  reverting  to  the  earlier 
model"  (Grinyer,  1996,  p.  327). 
4.  Miller  et  al  (1994,  pp.  140-141)  outline  reasons  why  current  value  approaches  have 
tended  to  be  unpopular  with  both  auditors  and  preparers.  They  suggest  that  auditors 
find  them  unattractive  because  exposure  to  audit  risk  may  be  increased  by  the  need 
to  carry  the  audit  beyond  documented  historic  transaction  costs  into  the  unfamiliar 
territory  of  valuation.  And  preparers  find  them  unattractive  because  of  the  costs  of 
implementation,  the  volatility  that  valuations  may  induce  in  reported  earnings,  the 
loss  of  control  over  reported  results,  and  the  fact  that  reported  income  from 
operations  will  tend  to  be  lower  than  under  a  historical  cost  system  because  the  cost 
of  goods  sold  and  depreciation  expense  tend  to  be  higher  under  a  current  value 
system  in  times  of  rising  prices. 
5.  The  FASB  (1996)  proposals  effectively  allow  reported  earnings  to  continue  to  be 
transaction  and  cost  based  whilst  providing  for  unrealised  gains  and  losses  to  be 
recognised,  outside  earnings,  as  a  component  of  comprehensive  income.  They  thus 
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accommodate  the  entrenched  body  of  resistance  to  any  suggestions  that  unrealised 
gains  and  losses  might  be  included  in  reported  earnings  (see  Swieringa,  1997,  p.  85). 
6.  The  ASB  superseded  the  ASC  as  the  UK's  private  accounting  standard  setting  body 
in  August  1990,  following  a  review  of  UK  standard  setting,  under  the  Chairmanship 
of  Sir  Ron  Dearing  (1988),  which  was  prompted,  in  part  by  the  loss  of  confidence  in 
the  ASC  provoked  by  the  SSAP16  debacle.  The  ASB  is  a  prescribed  standard  setting 
body  for  the  purposes  of  UK  Companies  Acts.  Where  accounts  do  not  comply  with 
applicable  accounting  standards  the  courts  may  order  the  preparation  of  revised 
accounts. 
7.  Our  descriptive  analysis  of  the  comments  is  coarse.  For  example  the  classification 
"accountants"  includes  accounting  firms  ranging  from  the  big  six  to  sole  practitioners 
and  the  professional  bodies. 
8.  The  mental  accounting  experiments  have  been  replicated  and  extended  to  various 
groups  including  business  managers  (Mowen  &  Mowen,  1986),  consumers  (Peterson 
et  al,  1986)  and  students  (Singer  et  al  1986).  The  mental  accounts  concept  has  been 
used,  by  Thaler  (1980,1985)  and  Hirst  et  al.  (1994),  as  a  foundation  element  in  a 
developing  positive  theory  of  consumer  behaviour.  It  has  been  employed  in 
management  accounting  research  (Lipe,  1993)  and  in  auditing  research  (Shields  et  al., 
1987).  And  considerable  use  has  been  made  of  the  concept  of  mental  accounts  in 
finance  research,  and  in  particular  in  the  modelling  and  study  of  investment  behaviour 
(Thaler  &  Johnson,  1990;  Shefrin  &  Statman,  1985). 
9. 
10. 
Summers  &  Carroll's  (1987)  finding  (cited  by  Thaler  1990)  that  the  marginal 
propensity  for  consumption  of  capital  gains  in  the  stock  market  was  close  to  zero, 
suggests  that  unrealised  capital  gains  tend  to  be  categorised  as  mental  asset  account 
items. 
Landsberger's  (1966)  analysis  of  the  consumption  behaviour  of  Israeli  families  which 
received  restitution  payments  after  World  War  II,  (cited  by  Thaler  1990),  revealed 
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that  the  families  which  received  the  largest  compensation  payments  had  marginal 
propensity  for  consumption  of  the  windfall  of  about  23%,  suggesting  that  even  cash 
receipts  are  liable  to  be  coded  to  mental  asset  accounts  if  the  amount  is  large. 
Interestingly  the  families  which  received  the  smallest  payments  had  marginal 
propensity  for  consumption  of  the  windfall  of  more  than  200%, 
11.  Hatsopoulos  et  al's.,  (1989)  finding  (cited  by  Thaler,  1990)  that  the  marginal 
propensity  for  consumption  of  cash  generated  for  stockholders  by  takeovers  is  around 
59%,  suggesting  that  gains  realised  on  the  disposal  of  an  asset  are  categorised  as 
income  account  items. 
12.  See  Johnson,  (1996)  for  analogous,  and  much  fuller,  discussion  of  the  metaphorical 
relation  between  the  economic  and  moral  domains  and  the  relative  groundedness  of 
the  moral  domain  in  the  nature  of  bodily  experience  and  the  kind  of  experiences  that 
make  it  possible  for  human  beings  to  survive  and  flourish. 
13.  Accounting's  failures  were  highly  publicised,  with  studies  of  creative  accounting  even 
featuring  in  the  "best  sellers  lists"  (Griffiths,  1986;  Smith,  1992). 
14.  Analysis  of  the  savings  and  loans  crisis  revealed  that  by  failing  to  present  information 
on  the  current  value  of  assets  and  liabilities  many  "savings  institutions  published 
financial  statements  that  concealed  their  weaknesses  instead  of  revealing  them" 
(Miller,  1994,  p.  141). 
15.  The  informational  or  decision  usefulness  approach  does  not  seem  to  have  ever 
achieved  full  acceptance.  Armstrong  (1977)  reports  that  a  1976  survey  of  the  attitudes 
of  various  parties  involved  in  financial  accounting  found  that  only  37%  of 
respondents  were  able  to  agree  with  the  Trueblood  report  (AICPA,  1973)  that  the 
"basic  objective  of  financial  statements  is  to  provide  information  useful  for  making 
economic  decisions.  " 
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Shapiro,  (1997,  p.  168)  suggests  that  we  may  usefully  conceive  of  realism  as  a  purely 
ontological  thesis  lacking  any  semantic  or  epistemic  content.  We  agree  with 
Davidson  that  the  motive  for  realist  talk,  even  when  it  is  couched  carefully  in  terms 
of  ontological  realism,  is  generally  ultimately,  if  covertly,  epistemic: 
"it  is futile  either  to  reject  or accept  the  slogan  that  the  real  and  the 
true  are  "independent  of  our  beliefs.  "  The  only  positive  sense  we  can 
make  of  this  phrase,  the  only  use  that  derives  from  the  intentions  of 
those  who  prize  it,  derives  from  the  idea  of  correspondence,  and  this 
is  an  idea  without  content.  " 
(Davidson,  1990a,  p.  305) 
It  comes  as  no  surprise,  then,  to  find  following  fast  on  Shapiro's  talk  of  realism  as  a 
purely  ontological  thesis,  the  vacuous  suggestion  that  truth  as  correspondence  should 
be  counted  as  one  of  the  presupposition  of  external  financial  reporting. 
2.  The  overriding  financial  reporting  requirement  in  UK  law  is  that  financial  statements 
give  a'true  and  fair  view'  (Companies  Act,  1985,  s.  226).  Whilst  truth  and  fairness' 
is  not  defined  in  Companies  Acts,  legal  opinion  suggests  that  the  courts  are  likely  to 
regard  adherence  to  codified  accounting  standards  as  strong  prima  facie  evidence  that 
financial  statements  give  a  'true  and  fair  view'  (e.  g.  see  McGee,  1991  and  Arden, 
1993).  However,  in  the  foreword  to  Accounting  Standards  the  ASB  recognises  'truth 
and  fairness'  in  representationalist  terms  as  a  quality  independent  of  compliance  with 
standards: 
"because  accounting  standards  are  formulated  with  the  objective  of 
ensuring  that  the  information  resulting  from  ý  their  application 
faithfully  represents  the  underlying  commercial  activity,  the  Board 
envisages  that  only  in  exceptional  circumstances  will  departure  from 
the  requirements  of  an  accounting  standard  be  necessary  in  order  for 
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financial  statements  to  give  a  true  and  fair  view.  " 
(ASB,  1993,  para.  18) 
3.  Endorsement  of  the  ideal  of  faithful  representation  in  accounting  does  not,  of  course, 
entail  acceptance  of  the  adequacy  of  present  accounting  practice  or  representational 
categories.  One  may  support  the  ideal  yet  consider  the  mirror  of  accounting 
hopelessly  distorted:  Certain  Marxists  would  argue  that  accounts  of  exchange-values 
serve  to  obscure  use-values  and  the  true  nature  of  social  relations,  and  yet  envisage 
an  undistorted  accounting  which  would  serve  to  illuminate  real  relations  of 
production  and  use-values.  Nor  does  advocacy  of  representational  faithfulness  as  an 
ideal  necessarily  imply  that  it  is  considered  to  be  attainable.  In  accounting 
representational  faithfulness  is  often  advocated,  on  pragmatic  grounds,  as  a  necessary 
but  unattainable  ideal  (see  Solomons,  1991a).  Such  self-contradictory  positions 
reflect  a  classic  paradox: 
"The  champions  of  an  absolutist,  correspondence  theory  of  truth 
defend  their  positions  on  pragmatic  grounds:  it  has  desirable 
consequences,  is  necessary  to  the  preservation  of  essential  values.  We 
need  not  believe  in  the  possibility  of  actually  attaining  truth,  the 
argument  runs,  but  we  must  believe  that  there  is  a  truth  -a  way  things 
are,  a  true  meaning  of  a  text  or  utterance  -  or  else  research  and 
analysis  lose  all  point;  human  enquiry  has  no  goal.  The  proponents  of 
a  pragmatist  view  reply  that,  whatever  the  consequences  of  their 
relativism,  we  must  live  with  them  because  this  is  the  truth,  the  way 
things  are:  truth  is  relative,  dependent  on  a  conceptual  framework. 
Both  attempts  to  maintain  a  position  give  rise  to  a  deconstructive 
movement  in  which  the  logic  of  the  argument  used  to  defend  a 
position  contradicts  the  position  affirmed.  " 
(Culler,  1983,  p.  155) 
Solomons  himself  finds  the  deconstructive  moment  in  Tinker's  (1991)  rejection  of  the 
very  idea  of  'faithful  representation': 
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If  signs  are  "arbitrary"  and  are  "independent"  of  what  is  being 
signified,  then  we  are  all  beating  the  air,  including  the  philosophers 
who  makes  such  a  statement,  for  his  signs  are  also  independent  of  the 
reality  that  he  is  vainly  trying  to  depict. 
(Solomons,  1991b,  p.  312) 
4.  Correspondence  theorists  want  to  explain  what  it  is  for  whole  sentences  (or  beliefs) 
to  be  true  in  terms  of  their  correspondence  with  something  else  -  facts:  "...  truth  is  a 
matter  of  correspondence  to  facts"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  199).  Davidson  uses  a  line  of 
argument,  initially  advanced  by  Frege  (1892)  to  show  that  "...  if  a  statement 
corresponds  to  one  fact,  it  corresponds  to  all"  (Davidson,  1969,  p.  42),  in  which  case 
we  can  not  explain  truth  in  terms  of  correspondence  to  facts. 
The  argument  trys  to  show  that  any  sentential  operator,  such  as:  's 
corresponds  to  the  fact  that...  ',  which  allows  the  substitution  of  co-extensive  terms 
within  the  sentences  being  operated  on,  is  truth  functional,  that  is,  all  that  matters  is 
the  truth  value  of  the  sentences  connected.  Consider  the  statement  "'Naples  is  farther 
north  than  Red  Bluff'  corresponds  to  the  fact  that  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red 
Bluff.  If  Naples  is  the  largest  Italian  city  within  thirty  miles  of  Ischia,  then  the  fact 
that  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff  is  the  same  fact  as  that  the  largest  Italian 
city  within  thirty  miles  of  Ischia  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff.  It  is  clearly 
reasonable  to  allow  the  substitution  of  coextensive  singular  terms  in  this  context. 
Therefore,  from 
1.  "'Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  IIluff'  corresponds  to  the 
fact  that  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff 
We  can  infer, 
2.  "'Naples  is farther  north  than  Red  Bluff'  corresponds  to  the 
fact  that  the  largest  Italian  city  within  thirty  miles  of  Ischia  is 
farther  north  than  Red  Bluff.  ' 
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If  we  also  accept  that  we  can  always  substitute  logically  equivalent  sentences,  that  is 
sentences  which  can  not  possibly  differ  in  truth  value,  we  can  go  on  to  infer,  from  I 
that: 
3.  "'Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff"  corresponds  to  the 
fact  that  London  is  in  England.  " 
The  argument  begins  by  noting  that  the  following  sentence  is  logically  equivalent  to 
"Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff': 
4.  x  (x  =x  and  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff)  =  x(x  =  x) 
This  sentence  asserts  the  equivalence  of  two  sets.  On  the  right-hand  side  is  the  set  of 
self-identical  things,  everything.  On  the  left-hand  side  is  the  set  of  things  that  are  self- 
identical  and  are  such  that  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff.  If  the  sentence 
'Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff  is  true  (false)  then  the  sentence  'x  (x  =x  and 
Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff)  =  x(x  =  x)'  is  true  (false). 
If  we  substitute'x  (x  =x  and  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff)  =  x(x  = 
x)'  for  its  logical  equivalent  'Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff  in  I  we  have  the 
following: 
5.  "'Naples  is farther  north  than  Red  Bluff'  corresponds  to  the 
fact  that  x  (x  =x  and  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff) 
=  x(x  =  x)". 
If  we  accept  substitution  of  coextensive  singular  terms  in  this  context,  which 
we  suggested  above  was  reasonable,  we  might  substitute  another  term  for  'x  (x  =x 
and  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff)'.  As  Naples  is  indeed  further  north  than 
Red  Bluff,  the  term'x  (x  =x  and  Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff)'  names  the 
set  which  includes  all  self-identical  things,  everything.  We  could  therefore  take  any 
true  statement  such  as  'London  is  in  England'  and  create  a  term  such  as  'x  (x  =x  and 
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London  is  in  England)',  which  is  coextensive  with  'x  (x  =x  and  Naples  is  farther 
north  than  Red  Bluff)'.  By  substitution  of  coextensive  terms  in  5  we  have: 
6.  "'Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff'  corresponds  to  the 
fact  that  x  (x  =x  and  London  is  in  England)  =  x(x  =  x)". 
The  sentence'x  (x  =x  and  London  is  in  England)  =  x(x  =  x)'  is  logically  equivalent 
to  the  sentence'London  is  in  England'.  Therefore,  by  substitution,  we  end  with: 
7.  "'Naples  is farther  north  than  Red  Bluff'  corresponds  to  the 
fact  that  London  is  in  England". 
5. 
All  that  the  sentences  'Naples  is  farther  north  than  Red  Bluff  and  'London  is  in 
England'  needed  to  have  in  common,  to  allow  the  transformation  from  I  to  7,  was 
their  truth-value.  The  suspicion  is  confirmed  that  "...  if  a  statement  corresponds  to  one 
fact,  it  corresponds  to  all",  and  "we  may  read  the  result  of  our  argument  as  showing 
that  there  is  exactly  one  fact 
... 
The  Great  Fact"  (Davidson,  1969,  p.  42).  Davidson 
concludes  that  given  that  'corresponds  to  The  Great  Fact'  can  apparently  not  be  told 
apart  from  'is  true'  it  is  obvious  that  we  can  have  no  explanation  of  truth  in  terms  of 
correspondence.  Searle,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  Davidson's  argument, 
commonly  known  as  the  slingshot  argument,  should  be  understood  as  showing  the 
falsity  of  its  presuppositions  -  in  particular  the  presupposition  that  'logically 
equivalent  sentences  can  be  substituted  salva  veritate  in  (such)  contexts"  (Searle, 
1995,  p.  223). 
Pursuit  of  this  debate  is beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  For  further  basic 
explanation  of  the  slingshot  argument  see  Evnine  (1991,  pp.  180-182),  and  for 
evaluation  of  the  argument  see  Neale  (1995)  and  Neale  and  Dever  (1997).  Davidson 
repeats  his  essential  commitment  to  the  slingshot  argument  in  various  places 
including  (1990a,  pp.  302-305),  and  recently  (1999b,  p.  89). 
Manicas  (1993),  for  example,  in  presenting  a  'scientific  realist'  (See  Bhasker,  1986) 
view  of  accounting,  stresses  that  it  is  vital  to  recognise  that  reality  constrains  the 
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development  of  our  theories: 
"...  our  claims  to  knowledge  are  about  a  reality  which  is  "out  there". 
... 
The  something  out  there  cannot  determine  our  theory  ...  , 
but  the 
something  out  there  does  pose  constraints  on  what  our  theory  can  say 
that  something  is. 
(Manicas,  1993,  p.  155) 
6.  Bernard  Williams  also  trace  the  inadequacy  of  Putnam's  internal  realism  directly  to 
its  commitment  to  a  dubious  dualism  of  scheme  and  content,  the  internal  and 
external: 
"If  we  ... 
insist  that  the  only  standpoint  is  "inside"  human  experience, 
we  are  still,  in  fact  using  the  idea  of  a  boundary:  we  are  claiming  that 
there  is  a  boundary,  and  that  everything  intelligible  is  on  this  side  of 
it.  Once  we  are  stuck  in  that  formulation,  people  who  say  such 
sensible  things  as  that  the  world  has  certain  characteristics  that  affect 
our  experience  -  help  to  form  our  sciences,  for  instance  -  are  read  as 
trying  to  push  the  world  and  its  characteristics  back  to  the  outside  of 
this  boundary....  An  internal  realism  must  be  inside  something,  but 
what  we  have  learned  is  that  there  is  nothing  for  it  to  be  inside.  " 
(Williams,  1991,  p.  13) 
7.  We  focus  on  Hines'  work  as  we  see  it  as  among  the  most  influential,  dualist 
accounting  theory,  of  its  type.  Hines  (1991,  p.  314,  note.  2)  herself  provides  a  useful 
but  "by  no  means  comprehensive"  listing  of  papers  which  share  fundamental  aspects 
of  her  dualist  view  of  accounting. 
8.  There  seem  to  be  some  inconsistencies  in  the  view  developed  by  Hines.  We  have 
greatest  difficulty  in  making  sense,  within  her  terms,  of  her  suggestions  that  we  might 
usefully  make  a  distinction  between  those  features  of  reality  which  pre-exist  our 
representations  those  which  we  create.  Such  a  suggestion  appears  in  her  discussion 
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of  the  FASB's  use  of  the  accounting  as'mirror'  or'map-making'  analogies: 
"The  analogies  are  often  inappropriate  because  the  referent  is  a 
physical  phenomenon  such  as  physical  terrain,  which  unlike  a 
business  enterprise,  pre-exists  accounts  and  significations  of  it.  " 
(Hines,  1991,  p.  320) 
She  makes  a  similar  distinction  in  the  1988  paper: 
"There  is  a  reality:  there's  something  there  alright.  Do  not  think  for  a 
moment  that  we  imagine  the  world!  Oh  no,  not  at  all!  The  bricks  are 
there,  and  the  people,  and  those  containers  -  no  doubt  about  it.  But  the 
organization,  and  most  of  the  minute  particles  in  the  bricks,  and 
revenue,  well,  we  create  them.  " 
(Hines,  1988,  p.  253) 
Our  difficulty  is  that  we  can  not  see  any  place  for  such  distinctions  within  what  is 
otherwise  apparently  an  essentially  anti-representationalist  position.  Given  Hines' 
rejection  of  correspondence  and  her  preferred  Rortian  view  of  truth  as  "what  it  is 
better  for  us  to  believe"  (Hines,  1991,  p.  328),  we  would  have  expected  her  to  follow 
Rorty  in  denying: 
"...  that  it  is  explanatorily  useful  to  pick  and  choose  among  the 
contents  of  our  minds  or  our  language  and  say  that  this  or  that  item 
"corresponds  to"  or  "represents"  the  environment  in  a  way  that  some 
other  item  does  not.  On  an  anti-representationalist  view,  it  is  one 
thing  to  say  that  a  prehensile  thumb,  or  an  ability  to  use  the  word 
'atom'  as  physicists  do,  is  useful  for  coping  with  the  environment.  It 
is  another  thing  to  attempt  to  explain  this  utility  by  reference  to 
representationalist  notions,  such  as  the  notion  that  the  reality  referred 
to  by  the  "quark"  was  "determinate"  before  the  word  "quark"  came 
along  (whereas  that  referred  to  by,  for  example,  "foundation  grant" 
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only  jelled  once  the  relevant  social  practices  emerged).  " 
(Rorty,  1991,  p.  5) 
9.  Hines'  clearly  relativist  view  of  truth  seems  to  be  influenced  by  both  Foucaultian  and 
pragmatist  thought.  She  cites  with  apparent  approval  Foucault's  view  that  "truth"  and 
"knowledge"  are  socially  constructed  "products  of  interests  and  power  relations" 
(Hines,  1988,  p.  259,  note  6).  And,  she  advocates  a  classic  pragmatist  view  when  she 
suggests  that  "a  socially  desirable  stance  for  researchers  is  to  see  truth  as  "what  it  is 
better  for  us  to  believe"  rather  than  as  the  "accurate  representation  of  reality"  (Hines, 
1991,  p.  328).  The  common  theme  is  relativist;  There  is  no  absolute  truth,  however 
we  may  have  a  use  for  truth  as  a  construct,  operating  within,  or  relative  to,  our 
particular  conceptual  schemes;  truth  for  us  as  what  is  better  for  us  to  believe. 
Hines'  comments  on  truth  tend  towards  the  paradoxical  and  cryptic:  "there  is 
no  such  thing  as  the  truth,  but  there  is  such  a  thing  as  stretching  the  truth  too  far" 
(Hines,  1988,  pp.  253).  She  makes  no  effort,  for  example,  to  explain  or  develop  her 
synoptic  view  that  truth  is  "what  it  is  better  for  us  to  believe";  And  surely  the  notion 
of  "better"  calls  for  some  development.  Putnam  suggests  that  the  thinking  of  William 
James'  from  which  Hines'  preferred  definition  seems  to  be  derived  has  commonly 
been  misunderstood  (1992a,  p.  8).  He  argues  that  James  did  not  mean,  or  indeed  say, 
that  a  belief  was  'true'  when  its  effects  are  good,  and  he  reminds  us  that  James 
actually  wrote: 
"The  true"  to  put  it  very  briefly,  is  only  the  expedient  in  the  way  of 
our  thinking,  just  as  "the  right"  is  only  the  expedient  in  the  way  of  our 
behaving.  Expedient  in  almost  any  fashion;  and  expedient  in  the  long 
run  and  on  the  whole  of  course,  for  what  meets  expediently  all  the 
experience  in  sight  won't  necessarily  meet  all  further  experiences 
equally  satisfactorily.  Experience,  as  we  know,  has  ways  of  boiling 
over,  and  making  us  correct  our  present  formulas.  " 
(James,  1907,  p.  106) 
Putnam  draws  our  attention  to  the  phrase  "expedient  in  almost  any  fashion",  and 
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argues  that  on  analysis  of  James  writings,  it  emerges  that: 
"different  types  of  statements  correspond  to  different  types  of 
"expediency";  there  is  no  suggestion  that  an  arbitrary  statement  is  true 
if  it  is  expedient  in  any  way  at  all  (even  "in  the  long  run").  For 
example,  the  view  that  a  statement  is  true  if  it  will  make  people 
subjectively  happy  to  believe  it  -  is  explicitly  rejected  by  him.  In  the 
case  of  paradigm  "factual"  statements,  including  scientific  ones,  a  sort 
of  expediency  that  James  repeatedly  mentions  is  usefulness  for 
prediction,  while  other  desiderata  -  conservation  of  past  doctrine, 
simplicity,  and  coherence...  are  said  to  apply  statements  of  all  types.  " 
(Putnam,  1992a,  p.  9-10) 
In  addition,  and  perhaps  unsurprisingly  given  the  above,  Hines  fails  to  explicate  or 
problematise  the  "us"  in  "what  it  is  better  for  us  to  believe".  Presumably  she  takes  it 
for  granted  that  her  reader  will  understand  that  "us"  should  be  'unpacked'  along  the 
lines  of  "we  postmodern  bourgeois  liberals"  (see  Rorty,  1983). 
10.  The  dualist  view  set  out  by  Hines  does  not  seem  to  allow  any  possibility  that  we 
might  actually  be  securely  in  touch  with  an  objective  world.  However,  she  recognises 
that,  generally,  it  is  only  in  "academic  discourse"  that  we  have  been  able  to  face  up 
to  the  supposedly  tenuous  condition  of  our  'reality'.  She  attributes  the  wider 
incorrigibility  of  "the  assumption  of  an  objective,  shared  and  intersubjectively 
accessible  world"  (Hines,  1991,  p.  317),  to  the  essential  cultural  relativity  of  all 
reasoning: 
Breaching  the  assumptions  and  reasoning  of  one's  own  culture 
represents  a  highly  problematic  task,  because  the  tools  for  doing  so 
-  the  assumptions  and  reasoning  that  will  be  perceived  as  convincing 
by  members  of  one's  culture  -  are  the  very  target  of  the  intended 
breaching. 
(Hines,  1991  p.  317) 
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Hines'  position  is  thoroughly  relativist,  knowledge,  truth  and  reason  are  all  relative: 
She  insists  on  "the  essential  culture  and  value-dependency  of  logic,  reasoning  and 
rationality"  (Hines,  1991,  p.  313). 
11.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  conceive  of  Davidson  work  as  an  attempt  to  develop  a 
unified  theory  of  truth  reconciling  the  intuitions  which  motivate  the  correspondence 
and  coherence  theories;  he  rejects  both: 
"I  do  not  aim  to  reconcile  the  two  positions.  I  find  the  epistemic 
views  untenable,  and  the  realist  views  ultimately  unintelligible.  " 
(Davidson,  1990a,  p.  298) 
12.  Wittgenstein's  naturalistic  view  of  language,  which  Davidson's  analysis  grows  out  of, 
is  explained  and  interestingly  applied  to  accounting  by  Lyas  (1993). 
13.  In  considering  how  it  is  possible  for  sentences  to  have  meaning  some  philosophers 
begin  with  the  intuition  that  words  only  seem  to  have  meaning  in  social  context.  That 
is  meaning  seems  to  depend  on  the  speaker's  intention.  Such  philosophers  tend  to 
believe  that  meaning  can  be  reduced  to  the  content  of  mental  states.  Grice  for 
example  suggests  that  meaning  can  be  reduced  to  a  speaker's  intention  to  induce  a 
belief  in  an  audience  through  their  recognition  of  that  intention:  "to  ask  what  A  meant 
is  to  ask  for  a  specification  of  the  intended  effect"  (Grice,  1957,  p.  46).  Davidson 
rejects  any  such  approach.  He  argues  that  "neither  language  nor  thinking  can  be  fully 
explained  in  terms  of  the  other,  and  neither  has  conceptual  priority"  (Davidson,  1975, 
p.  156):  For  Davidson,  thoughts  acquire  their  content  and  sentences  their  meaning 
together,  through  interpretation,  and  in  relation  to  their  context. 
Davidson  wants  to  show  how  empirically  verifiable  interpretive  theories  of 
truth  can  be  constructed  which  do  not  assume  at  the  outset  too  much  of  what  the 
theory  sets  out  to  describe,  that  is,  without  "smuggling  into  the  foundations  of  the 
theory  concepts  too  closely  allied  to  the  concept  of  meaning"  (Davidson,  1984, 
p.  xiii).  The  challenge  is  to  explain  how  adequate  theory  can  be  constructed  on  the 
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basis  of  evidence  plausibly  available  to  an  interpreter  with  no  prior  knowledge  of 
either  the  language  or  the  detailed  content  the  speaker's  thoughts:  Davidson  thinks 
that  we  can  construct  adequate  but  purely  extensional  theories  of  meaning. 
Davidson  draws  on  the  tradition  of  formal  semantics,  which  tries  to  show  how 
the  meanings  of  sentences  are  systematically  constructed  from  the  meanings  of  their 
parts.  Frege  (1892)  suggests  that  for  each  meaningful  part  of  a  language  two  distinct 
properties  can  be  identified;  intensions  and  extensions.  He  refers  to  these  properties 
respectively  as  Sinn  and  Bedeutung,  usually  translated  as  sense  and  reference.  The 
extension  of  a  singular  term  is  the  object  it  'stands  for'  or  designates,  and  the 
extension  of  a  predicate  is  the  objects  which'fall  under'  it.  A  key  Fregian  insight  was 
the  realisation  that  the  truth-value  of  a  sentence  is  systematically  dependent  upon  the 
references  of  its  parts,  what  they'stand  for'  in  the  world,  and  the  relations  between  the 
parts.  It  follows  that  the  extension  of  a  sentence,  for  Frege  its  truth-value,  ought  not 
to  be  sensitive  to  the  substitution  of  co-extensive  terms.  The  terms  'morning  star'  and 
'evening  star'  are  co-extensive;  they  refer  to  the  same  planet.  Therefore  the  truth-value 
of  the  sentence  'the  morning  star  is  the  second  planet  from  the  sun'  will  not  be 
changed  if  we  substitute  the  co-extensive  term  and  produce  'the  evening  star  is  the 
second  planet  from  the  sun'.  There  is  however  a  problem;  It  appears  that  many  natural 
language  contexts  are  in  fact  non-extensional:  If,  for  example,  Kenneth  believes  that 
the  morning  star  is  the  second  planet  from  the  sun,  but  does  not  know  that  the  terms 
'morning  star'  and  'evening  star'  refer  to  the  same  object.  Then  while  the  sentence 
'Kenneth  believes  that  the  morning  star  is  the  second  planet  from  the  sun'  will  be  true, 
the  sentence  'Kenneth  believes  that  the  evening  star  is  the  second  planet  from  the  sun' 
will  be  false.  The  truth-value  of  sentences  in  contexts  such  as'believes  that'  or'means 
that'  appear  to  be  sensitive  to  the  substitution  of  co-extensive  terms.  Frege's  way  of 
dealing  with  this  problem  was  to  introduce  another  notion  into  the  theory  of  meaning 
-  sense. 
The  intension,  or  sense,  of  an  expression  is  not  the  object  referred  to,  but  the 
way  it  is  referred  to;  The  intension  is  a  way  of  presenting  a  reference,  and  clearly  the 
same  reference  may  be  presented  in  different  ways.  The  intension  of  a  name  is  a 
concept  under  which  falls  one  extension,  the  intension  of  a  predicate  is  the  function 
which  associates  it  with  its  extension,  and  the  intension  of  a  sentence  we  might  think 
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of  as  the  thought  it  expresses;  the  proposition  which  specifies  the  conditions  which 
would  need  to  be  satisfied  for  the  sentence  to  be  true.  Intensions  are  clearly  more 
'finely-grained'  than  extensions.  The  following  expressions  are  all  ways  of  referring 
to  the  planet  Venus;  'the  morning  star',  'the  evening  star',  'the  second  planet  from  the 
sun'.  These  three  expressions  do  not  however,  have  the  same  sense  or  meaning.  It 
seems  clear  that  the  statement  'the  morning  star  is  the  morning  star',  does  not  have  the 
same  meaning  as'the  morning  star  is  the  second  planet  from  the  sun'.  If  the  meaning 
of  a  sentence  were  simply  what  it  referred  to,  its  truth  value,  then  "all  sentences  alike 
in  truth-value  must  be  synonymous  -  an  intolerable  result"  (Davidson,  1967,  p.  19). 
An  adequate  theory  of  meaning  obviously  must  yield  the  fine-grain  of  intensions,  it 
must  respect  the  intensionality  of  meaning. 
However,  If  a  theory  of  meaning  for  a  language  is  to  be  developed  on  the 
basis  of  evidence  plausibly  available  to  the  'radical  interpreter'  it  can  not  be  based  on 
obscure  entities  such  as  senses,  propositions  or  meanings,  it  can  "make  no  use  of 
meanings,  whether  of  sentences  or  of  words"  (Davidson,  1967,  p.  24).  Davidson 
thinks  that  an  adequate  theory  of  meaning  can  be  expressed  in  a  purely  extensional 
metalanguage,  that  is,  in  a  language  restricted  to  contexts  in  which  the  extensions  of 
sentences  are  insensitive  to  the  substitution  of  co-extensive  terms. 
Davidson  endorses  no  stipulative  definition  of  truth: 
"We  should  not  say  that  truth  is  correspondence,  coherence, 
warranted  assertability,  ideally  justified  assertability,  what  is  accepted 
in  the  conversation  of  the  right  people,  what  science  will  end  up 
maintaining,  what  explains  the  convergence  on  single  theories  in 
science,  or  the  success  of  our  ordinary  beliefs.  " 
(Davidson,  1990a,  p.  309) 
Indeed,  he  regards  the  search  for  definition  of  truth  as  "folly"  (Davidson,  1996).  I  Ie 
takes  the  concept  of  truth  as  a  primitive,  and  tries  to  show  how  the  extension  of  the 
predicate  "is  true"  can  be  fixed  for  a  language  by  an  interpreter.  It  is  such  empirical 
theories  of  truth,  rather  than  any  definition  of  truth,  which  he  sees  as  the  essential 
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core  of  "the  scheme  we  all  necessarily  employ  for  understanding,  criticizing, 
explaining,  and  predicting  thought  and  action"  (Davidson,  1990a,  p.  282). 
Nevertheless,  some  of  the  terminology  used  by  Davidson  in  certain  early 
papers  encouraged  the  mistaken  view  that  he  was  offering  a  definition  of  truth  as 
correspondence  and  /or  coherence.  In  an  important  paper  entitled  "A  Coherence 
Theory  of  Truth  and  Knowledge"  (1983),  Davidson  sets  out  an  argument  which  he 
says  shows  "that  coherence  yields  correspondence".  At  that  time  Davidson  thought 
that  the  fact  that  the  development  of  the  type  of  recursive  characterisation  of  truth  for 
a  language,  which  he  sees  as  central  to  interpretation,  required  that  the  words  be  put 
into  relation  with  objects  "was  enough  to  give  some  grip  for  the  idea  of 
correspondence"  (1990a).  In  other  words,  he  considered  that  the  semantic  conception 
of  truth  developed  by  Tarski  of  truth  "deserve(d)  to  be  called  a  correspondence  theory 
because  of  the  part  played  by  the  concept  of  satisfaction"  (Davidson,  1969,  p.  48). 
Satisfaction  is  a  relation  between  words  and  objects,  not  a  relation  between  sentences 
and  facts.  And  clearly,  relations  between  words  and  objects  can  not  explain  the  truth 
of  sentences.  Davidson  recognizes  that  a  Tarski-style  theory  does  not  give  an 
explanation  of  truth,  which  is  something  that  correspondence  theories  of  truth,  have 
always  been  conceived  of  as  providing  (see  Davidson,  1990b,  p.  135):  "...  'Dolores 
loves  Dagmar'  would  be  satisfied  by  Dolores  and  Dagmar"  however  "the  fact  that 
verifies  'Dolores  loves  Dagmar'  should  somehow  include  the  loving.  This  'somehow' 
has  always  been  the  nemesis  of  theories  of  truth  based  on  facts"  (1969,  p.  48). 
Davidson  has  not  changed  the  essential  elements  of  his  analysis  in  any  way,  but  he 
has  come  to  regret  expressing  his  ideas  in  such  a  way  that  he  could  be  misconstrued 
as  advocating  either  a  coherence  or  a  correspondence  theory  of  truth: 
I  would  now  change  the  title  of  "A  Coherence  Theory",  and  I  would 
not  describe  the  project  as  describing  how  coherence  yields 
correspondence.  ... 
The  mistake  is  in  a  way  only  a  misnomer,  but 
terminological  infelicities  have  a  way  of  breeding  conceptual 
confusion,  and  so  it  is  here. 
... 
I  also  regret  having  called  my  view  a 
coherence  theory.  My  emphasis  on  coherence  was  probably  just  a 
way  of  making  a  negative  point,  that  'all  that  counts  as  evidence  or 
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justification  for  a  belief  must  come  from  the  same  totality  of  belief  to 
which  it  belongs.  "' 
(Davidson,  1990b,  pp.  134-135) 
15.  Tarski  sought  to  provide  a  definition  of  truth-in-L  such  that  for  each  sentence  of  the 
language  L,  it  would  entail  an  equivalence,  expressed  in  a  metalanguage,  in  which  the 
sentence  is  named  on  the  left  side  and  used  on  the  right  side.  Thus  if  we  consider  the 
sentence  "snow  is  white",  an  adequate  theory  of  truth  ought  to  imply  the  equivalence: 
'Snow  is  white'  is  true  in  English  if,  and  only  if,  snow  is  white. 
Such  equivalences  are  referred  to  as  T  sentences.  Their  general  pattern,  variously 
referred  to  as  "convention  T",  "schema  T",  or  "form  T",  is  as  follows: 
S  is  true-in-L  if,  and  only  if,  p 
where  S  is  the  name  of  a  sentence  of  the  object  language  L  and  p  is  the  correct 
translation  of  that  sentence  into  the  metalanguage.  Tarski's  aim  was  to  provide  a 
recursive  definition  of  truth  which  would  'do  justice'  to  our  intuitions  about  truth  and 
in  particular  the  Aristotelian  intuition  that:  "to  say  of  what  is  that  it  is  not,  or  of  what 
is  not  that  it  is,  is false,  while  to  say  of  what  is  that  it  is,  or  of  what  is  not  that  it  is  not, 
is  true"  (quoted  Tarski,  1944,  p.  343).  He  proposed  convention  (T)  as  the  appropriate 
test  of  any  definition  of  truth: 
"we  wish  to  use  the  term  "true"  in  such  a  way  that  all  equivalences  of 
the  form  (T)  can  be  asserted,  and  we  shall  call  a  definition  of  truth 
"adequate"  if  all  these  equivalences  follow  from  it.  " 
(Tarski,  1944,  p.  344) 
Because  there  is  aT  sentence  corresponding  to  each  sentence  of  the  language  for 
which  a  theory  of  truth  is  being  explicated,  the  totality  of  T  sentences  fixes  the 
extension  of  the  truth  predicate,  that  is  convention  T  "fixes  the  domain  of  truth". 
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16. 
Davidson  sees  convention  T  as  providing  the  vital  link  between  the  intuitively 
obvious  truths  about  truth  and  formal  semantics:  "Without  convention  T,  we  would 
have  no  reason  to  believe  that  truth  is  what  Tarski  has  shown  us  how  to  characterize" 
(Davidson,  1973b,  p.  66). 
We  might  expect  that  a  theory  of  meaning  for  an  object  language  L  ought  to  consist 
of  a  way  of  directly  mapping  meaningful  expressions  in  L  onto  meanings  expressed 
in  a  metalanguage,  entailing  for  all  sentences  of  L,  a  sentence  of  the  form's  means 
that  p,  where  's'  is  a  metalanguage  name  for  the  object  language  sentence,  and  p'  is 
a  metalanguage  sentence  giving  the  meaning  of  the  object  language  sentence.  And  we 
might  hope  to  develop  such  a  theory  through  verification  of  the  sentences  it  entails. 
Davidson  sees  no  hope  for  this  approach,  because  it  seems  that  it  must  take 
intensions,  the  thoughts  and  propositions  expressed  by  sentences,  as  foundational, 
thereby  assuming  too  much  of  what  the  theory  sets  out  to  describe: 
"In  a  way,  nothing  could  be  easier:  just  write  's  means  that  p',  and 
imagine  p  replaced  by  a  sentence.  ... 
It  looks  as  though  we  are  in 
trouble  ... 
however,  for  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  in  wrestling 
with  the  logic  of  the  apparently  non-extensional  'means  that'  we  will 
encounter  problems  as  hard  as,  or  perhaps  identical  with,  the 
problems  our  theory  is  out  to  solve.  " 
(Davidson,  1967,  p.  22) 
Davidson  suggests  that  we  should  abandon  the  troublesomely  intensional  'means  that, 
and  along  with  it  any  notion  of  an  interpretative  theory  capable  of  giving  the  meaning 
of  a  sentence  by  directly  associating  it  with  obscure  intensional  entities  such  as 
propositions.  He  thinks  that  we  need  to  look  for  a  way  of  developing  a  theory  of 
meaning  for  a  language  in  strictly  extensional  language,  avoiding  any  contexts  where 
the  extensions  of  sentences  are  sensitive  to  the  substitution  of  co-extensive  terms.  lie 
proposes  that  a  Tarskian  theory  of  truth  may  serve  that  purpose: 
"The  only  way  I  know  to  deal  with  this  difficulty  is  simple,  and 
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radical.  Anxiety  that  we  are  enmeshed  in  the  intensional  springs  from 
using  the  words  'means  that'  as  a  filling  between  description  of 
sentence  and  sentence,  but  it  may  be  that  the  success  of  our  venture 
depends  not  on  the  filling  but  on  what  it  fills.  The  theory  will  have 
done  its  work  if  it  provides,  for  every  sentence  s  in  the  language 
under  study,  a  matching  sentence  (to  replace  )7)  that,  in  some  way  yet 
to  be  made  clear,  'gives  the  meaning'  of  s.  One  obvious  candidate  for 
matching  sentence  is  just  s  itself,  if  the  object  language  is  contained 
in  the  metalanguage;  otherwise  a  translation  of  s  in  the  metalanguage. 
As  a  final  bold  step,  let  us  try  treating  the  position  occupied  by  p' 
extensionally:  to  implement  this,  sweep  away  the  obscure  'means 
that',  provide  the  sentence  that  replaces  p'  with  a  proper  sentential 
connective,  and  supply  the  description  that  replaces  's'  with  its  own 
predicate.  The  plausible  result  is: 
(T)  s  is  T  if  and  only  if  p. 
... 
it  is  clear  that  the  sentences  to  which  the  predicate  'is  T  applies  will 
be  just  the  true  sentences  of  L,  for  the  condition  we  have  placed  on 
satisfactory  theories  of  meaning  is  in  essence  Tarski's  convention  T 
that  tests  the  adequacy  of  a  formal  semantical  definition  of  truth.  " 
(Davidson.  1967,  pp.  22-23) 
In  place  of  the  intensional  'means  that'  in  the  sentence  's  means  that  p',  Davidson 
proposes  the  extensional,  truth-functional,  sentential  connective  'if  and  only  if.  And, 
if  we  use  a  sentential  connective  we  need  a  sentence  on  the  left-hand  side,  what  we 
have  is  s,  which  is  not  a  sentence  but  a  metalanguage  name  for  an  object  language 
sentence;  A  sentence  is  easily  made  by  attaching  a  predicate  T.  We  then  have  s  is  T 
if  and  only  ifp. 
Davidson  wants  to  use  Tarski's  theory  of  truth,  which  shows  how  the  truth  of 
a  sentence  systematically  depends  on  the  semantic  properties  of  its  parts,  to  yield  a 
theory  of  meaning  which  shows  "how  the  meanings  of  sentences  depend  upon  the 
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meanings  of  words"  (Davidson,  1967,  p.  23).  He  proposes  an  inversion  of  Tarski 
approach;  While  Tarski  defined  truth  by  assuming  translation,  Davidson  suggests  that 
by  taking  truth  as  basic  we  can  derive  an  account  of  interpretation.  He  certainly  does 
not  want  to  suggest  that  the  truth  conditions  of  a  sentence  directly  yield  its  meaning. 
Rather  he  intends  to  show  how  we  can  have  interpretive  theories  of  meaning  which 
will  allow  the  meaning  of  words  and  sentences  to  be  drawn  indirectly  from  the  whole 
structure  of  T-sentences  entailed  by  the  truth  theory  for  the  language: 
"If  sentences  depend  for  their  meaning  on  their  structure,  and  we 
understand  the  meaning  of  each  item  in  the  structure  only  as  an 
abstraction  from  the  totality  of  sentences  in  which  it  features,  then  we 
can  give  the  meaning  of  any  sentence  (or  word)  only  by  giving  the 
meaning  of  every  sentence  (and  word)  in  the  language.  Frege  said  that 
only  in  the  context  of  a  sentence  does  a  word  have  meaning;  in  the 
same  vein  he  might  have  added  that  only  in  the  context  of  a  language 
does  a  sentence  (and  therefore  a  word)  have  meaning.  " 
(Davidson,  1967,  p.  22) 
We  have  already  seen  that  for  Davidson  adequate  theories  of  meaning  need  to  be 
empirically  verifiable  on  the  basis  of  evidence  plausibly  available  to  someone  with 
no  prior  knowledge  of  the  semantics  of  object  language.  In  Tarski's  work  an  adequate 
definition  of  truth  entails  T-sentences  taken  to  be  true  because  the  sentence  used  on 
the  right-hand  side  of  the  biconditional  is  either  identical  with,  or  assumed  to  be  a 
translation  of,  the  sentence  mentioned  on  the  left-hand  side  for  which  truth  conditions 
are  being  given.  Davidson's  does  not  see  how  translation  without  prior  knowledge  of 
the  object  language,  can  be  verified.  We  cannot  start  by  assuming  that  we  can 
recognize  correct  translation  "without  pre-empting  the  point  of  radical  interpretation" 
(Davidson,  1973a,  p.  134).  If  T-theories  are  to  be  put  to  empirical  test  we  require: 
"...  a  way  of  judging  the  acceptability  of  T-sentences  that  is  not 
syntactical,  and  makes  no  use  of  the  concepts  of  translation,  meaning, 
or  synonymy,  but  is  such  that  acceptable  T-sentences  will  in  fact 
259 Notes  to  chapter  2:  Accounting  Knowledge 
yield  interpretations.  " 
(Davidson,  1974b,  p.  15  0) 
17. 
If  Convention  T  is  to  "go  empirical"  it  must  be  modified  in  such  a  way  that  no  appeal 
is  made  to  the  notion  of  translation.  Recall  that  Convention  T  requires  that  an 
adequate  theory  of  truth,  expressed  in  a  metalanguage,  for  object  language  L  will 
entail,  for  every  sentence  s,  of  L,  an  equivalence,  expressed  in  the  metalanguage,  of 
the  form:  's  is  true-in-L  if,  and  only  if,  p',  where  s  is  the  name  of  an  object  language 
sentence,  and  p  is  a  correct  translation  of  the  sentence.  Davidson  suggest  a 
modification  of  Convention  T  so  that  an  acceptable  theory  of  truth  will  be  one  which 
entails,  for  every  sentences  of  the  object  language,  a  sentence  of  the  form:  "s  is  true 
if  and  only  if  p,  where  p'  is  replaced  by  any  sentence  that  is  true  if  and  only  if  s  is" 
(Davidson,  1973a,  p.  134).  Instead  of  requiring  that  the  sentence  used  on  the  right- 
hand  side  is  a  translation  of  the  sentence  named  on  the  left-hand  side  we  have  the 
weaker  requirement  that  the  sentence  used  on  the  right  is  true  if  and  only  if  the 
sentence  named  on  the  left  is  true. 
It  may  not  seem  as  if  Davidson's  modified  Convention  T  demands  enough  of 
T-sentences  to  provide  a  basis  for  the  emergence  of  interpretation  and  meaning;  "And 
of  course  this  would  be  the  case  if  we  took  T-sentences  in  isolation"  (Davidson, 
1973a,  p.  134).  Considering  T-sentences  in  isolation  and  provided  we  are  sure  of  their 
truth,  the  modified  Convention-T  gives  no  direct  basis  for  considering  a  theory  which 
entails  "'Snow  is  white'  is  true  if  and  only  if  snow  is  white',  any  more  correct  than  a 
theory  which  entails  "'Snow  is  white'  is  true  if  and  only  if  grass  is  green".  Davidson's 
claim  is  that  meaning  will  emerge  from  the  whole  complex  of  T-sentenccs:  "the  hope 
is  that  by  putting  certain  appropriate  formal  and  empirical  restrictions  on  the  theory 
as  a  whole,  individual  T-sentences  will  in  fact  serve  to  yield  interpretations" 
(Davidson,  1973a,  p.  134). 
The  object  of  Davidson's  reformulation  of  Convention  T  was  to  give  us  T-sentences 
that  are  verifiable  on  evidence  plausibly  available  to  the  radical  interpreter;  evidence 
that  they  are  true.  If  it  is  not  to  beg  the  question,  the  evidence  can  not  assume 
knowledge  of  meanings,  and  it  cannot  consist  of  detailed  descriptions  of  beliefs,  the 
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attribution  of  which  must  rely  on  much  the  same  evidence  as  will  the  identification 
of  meaning.  Davidson  thinks  that  all  the  evidence  we  need  to  verify  the  truth  of 
modified  T-sentences  can  come  in  the  form  of  observations  that  at  certain  times  and 
under  certain  circumstances,  speakers  of  the  object  language  hold  particular  sentences 
to  be  true.  The  identification  of  an  attitude  of  holding  or  accepting  a  sentence  as  true, 
is  of  course  the  identification  of  a  belief.  However,  it  does  not  demand  that  we  be 
able  to  make  fine  discriminations  between  beliefs:  "It  is  an  attitude  an  interpreter  may 
plausibly  be  taken  to  be  able  to  identify  before  he  can  interpret,  since  he  may  know 
that  a  person  intends  to  express  a  truth  in  uttering  a  sentence  without  having  any  idea 
what  truth"  (Davidson,  1973a,  p.  135).  It  is  not  immediately  obvious  that  we  are 
justified  in  taking  such  observations  as  evidence  for  the  truth  of  T-sentences.  Our  aim 
is  to  verify  T-sentences  of  the  form: 
(T)  'Es  schneit'  is  true-in-German  when  spoken  by  x  at  time  t  if 
and  only  if  it  is  snowing  near  x  at  time  t. 
Our  observations,  however,  give  us  evidence  in  the  form: 
(E)  Kurt  belongs  to  the  German  speech  community  and  Kurt 
holds  true  'Es  schneit'  on  Saturday  at  noon  and  it  is  snowing 
near  Kurt  on  Saturday  at  noon. 
Davidson  acknowledges  that  (E)  is  not  conclusive  evidence  for  (T),  the  speaker  may 
be  mistaken  in  his  belief.  However  he  thinks  that  we  must  operate  by  what  he  calls 
the  principle  of  charity  and  accept  that  (E)  is  prima  facie  evidence  that  (T)  is  true: 
I  propose  that  we  take  the  fact  that  speakers  of  a  language  hold  a 
sentence  to  be  true  (under  observed  circumstances)  as  prima  facie 
evidence  that  the  sentence  is  true  under  those  circumstances.  For 
example,  positive  instances  of  'Speakers  (of  German)  hold  "Es 
schneit"  is  true  when,  and  only  when,  it  is  snowing'  should  be  taken 
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to  confirm  not  only  the  generalization,  but  also  the  T-sentence,  "'Es 
schneit"  is  true  (in  German)  for  a  speaker  x  at  time  t  if  and  only  if  it 
is  snowing  at  t  (and  near  x).  " 
(Davidson,  1974b,  p.  152) 
In  Davidson's  view  it  is  only  by  the  adoption  of  a  principle  of  charity  that  the  radical 
interpreter  can  overcome  the  apparent  interpretive  impasse  presented  by  the 
interdependence  of  belief  and  meaning.  A  speaker  who  accepts  a  sentence  as  true  will 
do  so  in  consideration  of  both  what  she  believes  and  what  she  takes  the  sentence  to 
mean.  In  all  but  the  simplest  of  cases  we  can  not  hope  to  know  what  a  speaker  means 
by  a  sentence  unless  we  already  know  some  of  the  speaker's  beliefs,  and  we  can  not 
hope  to  infer  beliefs,  except  in  the  most  basic  of  cases,  unless  we  already  know  the 
meaning  of  some  words  for  the  speaker. 
A  speaker's  verbal  behaviour  is  a  joint  product  of  meaning  and  belief.  There 
seems  to  be  no  way  of  solving  for  both  of  these  factors  at  once.  However  given 
sufficient  independent  evidence  about  one  of  these  factors,  and  assurance  of  the 
speaker's  sincerity,  we  might  reasonably  expect  to  be  able  to  solve  for  the  other  factor 
with  relative  ease.  The  principle  of  charity  operates  by  "restraining  the  degrees  of 
freedom  allowed  belief'  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  316),  while  solving  for  meaning.  The 
principle  of  charity  directs  the  radical  interpreter  to  "read  some  of  his  own  standards 
of  truth  into  the  pattern  of  sentences  held  true  by  the  speaker"  (Davidson,  1983, 
p.  315),  and  to  assume  that  the  speaker  shares  his  standards  of  rationality. 
Interpretation  must  then  proceed  in  such  a  way  as  to  maximise  agreement  between 
speaker  and  interpreter  on  matters  of  belief,  that  is,  on  the  basis  that  the  speaker's 
words  express  beliefs  with  which  the  interpreter  is  largely  in  agreement.  In  this  way 
the  interpreter  can  achieve  enough  of  a  fix  on  the  speaker's  beliefs  to  allow 
interpretation  of  the  speaker's  utterances.  The  interpreter  need  not  assume  that  she 
agrees  with  the  speaker  in  all  things,  some  explicable  disagreement  is  to  be  expected 
given  variation  in  epistemic  standpoints.  However  the  interpreter  must  avoid 
attributing  inexplicable,  bizarre,  beliefs  to  the  speaker.  Davidson  considers  the 
principle  of  charity  justified  by  the  fact  that  we  simply  cannot  have  interpretation 
unless  we  can  find  substantial  agreement: 
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"What  justifies  the  procedure  is  the  fact  that  disagreement  and 
agreement  alike  are  intelligible  only  against  a  background  of  massive 
agreement.  ... 
If  we  cannot  find  a  way  to  interpret  the  utterances  and 
other  behaviour  of  a  creature  as  revealing  a  set  of  beliefs  largely 
consistent  and  true  by  our  own  standards,  we  have  no  reason  to  count 
that  creature  as  rational,  as  having  beliefs,  or  as  saying  anything. 
(Davidson,  1973a,  p.  136-137) 
18. 
Davidson  thinks  that  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of  charity,  the  notion  of  truth  can  be 
taken  as  a  basis  for  the  production  of  interpretive  theory  of  meaning.  Part  of  the 
appeal  of  his  approach  is  that  all  that  is  required  as  foundation  for  such  theory  is 
observation  of  the  speaker's  acceptance  or  rejection  of  various  sentences  and  the 
conditions  in  the  world,  understood  in  the  interpreter's  own  terms,  which  correlate 
with  the  speakers  attitudes  to  sentences.  On  that  basis,  the  radical  interpreter  can 
construct  an  empirical  theory,  linking  the  speaker's  sentences  with  sentences  of  her 
own.  The  developing  theory  will  provide  a  basis  for  the  prediction  of  the  speaker's 
future  pattern  of  the  assent  and  dissent  to  sentences.  And  the  success  or  otherwise  of 
those  predictions  will  facilitate  the  ongoing  refinement  of  the  theory. 
The  Davidsonian  radical  interpreter  must  match  sentences  of  her  own  with  the 
speaker's  utterances,  to  derive  an  interpretive  theory  of  truth  for  the  speaker. 
Davidson  accepts  that  if  interpretation  is  approached  in  the  way  he  suggests  we 
should  not  expect  that  one  uniquely  right  theory  will  be  found  to  fit  the  speaker's 
behaviour.  He  regards  this  indeterminacy  as  the  "semantic  counterpart  of  Quinc's 
indeterminacy  of  translation".  Davidson  accepts  Quine's  view  that  no  amount  of 
behavioural  evidence  can  fix  meaning;  it  is  always  possible  to  fit  alternative 
incompatible  translations  to  the  behavioural  data  (Quine  1969;  Davidson,  1979). 
Davidson's  approach,  however,  and  in  particular  his  advocacy  of  the  adoption  of  the 
principle  of  charity  on  an  across-the-board  basis,  allows  much  less  room  for 
indeterminacy  than  Quine  contemplates,  (see  Davidson,  1979,  p.  235).  For  Davidson, 
indeterminacy  of  meaning  does  not  signify  the  failure  of  theory  to  capture  significant 
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distinctions,  on  the  contrary:  "it  marks  the  fact  that  certain  apparent  distinctions  are 
not  significant.  If  there  is  indeterminacy,  it  is  because  when  all  the  evidence  is  in, 
alternative  ways  of  stating  the  facts  remain  open"  (Davidson,  1979,  p.  235).  Such 
indeterminacy  is  obviously  not  of  real  concern.  Davidson  tries  to  clarify  this  point 
using  the  analogy  of  measurement  in  physical  sciences: 
"A  rough  comparison  may  help  give  the  idea.  A  theory  of 
measurement  for  temperature  leads  to  the  assignment  to  objects  of 
numbers  that  measure  their  temperature.  Such  theories  put  formal 
constraints  on  the  assignments,  and  also  must  be  tied  empirically  to 
qualitatively  observable  phenomena.  The  numbers  assigned  are  not 
uniquely  determined  by  the  constraints.  But  the  pattern  of 
assignments  is  significant.  (Fahrenheit  and  Centigrade  temperature 
are  linear  transformations  of  each  other;  the  assignment  of  numbers 
is  unique  up  to  a  linear  transformation.  )  In  much  the  same  way,  I 
suggest  that  what  is invariant  as  between  different  acceptable  theories 
of  truth  is  meaning.  The  meaning  (interpretation)  of  a  sentence  is 
given  by  assigning  the  sentence  a  semantic  location  in  the  pattern  of 
sentences  that  comprise  the  language.  Different  theories  of  truth  may 
assign  different  truth  conditions  to  the  same  sentence  (this  is  the 
semantic  analogue  of  Quine's  indeterminacy  of  translation),  while  the 
theories  are  (nearly  enough)  in  agreement  on  the  roles  of  the 
sentences  in  the  language.  " 
(Davidson,  1977,  p.  225) 
Just  as  we  might  assign  temperature  in  terms  of  centigrade  of  Fahrenheit  scales,  we 
can  assign  meanings  in  accordance  with  different  theories  of  truth,  different  truth 
conditions.  The  indeterminacy  allowed  will  not  be  significant,  provided  pattern  of 
sentential  roles  is  maintained  by  the  constraints,  principally  those  entailed  by  the 
principle  of  charity,  put  upon  theory  development: 
"Because  there  are  many  different  but  equally  acceptable  ways  of 
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interpreting  an  agent,  we  may  say,  if  we  please  that  interpretation  or 
translation  is  indeterminate,  or  that  there  is  no  fact  of  the  matter  as  to 
what  someone  means  by  his  or  her  words.  In  the  same  vein,  we  could 
speak  of  the  indeterminacy  of  weight  or  temperature.  But  we 
normally  accentuate  the  positive  by  being  clear  about  what  is 
invariant  from  one  assignment  of  numbers  to  the  next,  for  it  is  what 
is  invariant  that  is  empirically  significant.  " 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  161) 
Callinicos  argues  that  Davidson's  approach  effectively  defuses  the  issue  of 
indeterminacy,  and  he  sees  this  as  the  key  contribution  of  his  work:  "Davidson's 
contribution  to  the  philosophy  of  language  has  been  in  large  part  to  offer  a  way  out 
of  the  indeterminacy  of  translation,  ... 
"  (Callinicos,  1987,  p.  105). 
Davidson,  returns  to  the  physical  measurement  analogy  in  various  places 
(e.  g.,  1991,  p.  164).  In  an  interesting  comment,  with  clear  implications  for  accounting, 
Davidson  makes  it  clear  that  in  his  view  numbers  have  a  degree  of  objectivity: 
"The  analogy  I  proposed  between  measurement  in  the  physical 
sciences  and  the  assignment  of  contents  to  the  words  and  thoughts  of 
others  is  imperfect  in  an  essential  respect.  In  the  case  of  ordinary 
measurement,  we  use  the  numbers  to  keep  track  of  the  facts  that 
interest  us.  In  the  case  of  the  propositional  attitudes  we  use  our 
sentences.  But  there  is  this  difference:  we  can  mutually  specify  the 
properties  of  the  numbers.  The  numbers,  like  the  objects  we  apply 
them  to,  lie,  as  it  were,  halfway  between  ourselves  and  others.  This 
is  what  it  means  to  say  they  are  objective,  that  they  are  objects.  It 
cannot  be  this  way  with  our  sentences.  You  and  I  cannot  come  to 
agree  on  the  relevant  properties  of  our  sentences  as  a  preliminary  to 
using  them  to  interpret  others,  for  the  process  of  coming  to  such  an 
agreement  involves  interpretation  of  the  very  sort  we  thought  to 
prepare  for.  " 
(Davidson,  1997,  pp.  121-122) 
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Rorty  is  "shocked"  by  the  above  passage,  which  he  sees  as  "flirting"  with  dubious 
ontological  distinctions,  the  subjective  and  the  objective  (Rorty,  1997,  p.  151). 
Davidson's  acceptance  of  Quine's  views  on  the  inscrutability  of  reference  and 
the  indeterminacy  of  translation,  (See  Quine  1969;  Davidson,  1979),  underlie  his 
refusal  to  allow  intensions,  meanings,  or  beliefs  any  foundational  role  in  his  theory 
of  meaning,  that  is,  his  commitment  to  a  purely  extensional  theory  of  meaning: 
"...  if  meaning  and  belief  are  interlocked  as  I  suggested,  then  the  idea 
that  each  belief  has  a  definite  object,  and  the  idea  that  each  word  and 
sentence  has  definite  meaning,  cannot  be  invoked  in  describing  the 
goal  of  a  successful  theory.  For  even  if,  contrary  to  what  may 
reasonably  be  expected,  there  were  no  indeterminacy  at  all,  entities 
such  as  meanings  and  objects  of  belief  would  be  of  no  independent 
interest.  We  could,  of  course,  invent  such  entities  with  a  clear 
conscience  if  we  were  sure  there  were  no  permissible  variant  theories. 
But  if  we  knew  this,  we  would  know  how  to  state  our  theories 
without  mention  of  the  objects.  " 
(Davidson,  1974b,  pp.  153) 
19.  Davidson's  modified  T-sentences  give  the  truth  conditions  of  the  object  language 
sentences  to  which  they  refer.  If  truth-values  were  the  only  consideration  "'Snow  is 
white'  is  true  if  and  only  if  grass  is  green",  would  be  perfectly  reasonable  T-sentcnce. 
Taken  in  isolation,  Davidsonian  T-sentences  can  not  be  presumed  to  give  the 
meaning  of  the  named  object  language  sentence:  In  isolation,  they  give  an  interpreter 
no  clear  basis  for  distinguishing  between  the  predictive  success  of  a  T-sentcnce  such 
as  "'Snow  is  white'  is  true  if  and  only  if  snow  is  white"  where  the  used  sentence 
seems  to  reflect  the  meaning  of  the  named  sentence,  and  a  T-sentence  like  "'Snow  is 
white'  is  true  if  and  only  if  grass  is  green",  which  would  have  equal  predictive  success 
but  in  which  there  is  clearly  no  reflection  of  the  meaning  of  the  named  sentence. 
Davidson  suggests  that  "we  may  be  confident  perhaps  that  no  satisfactory 
theory  of  truth  will  produce  such  anomalous  T-sentences"  (Davidson,  1973a,  p.  137). 
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He  thinks  that  the  gap  between  truth  and  meaning  can  be  bridged  by  the  principle  of 
charity.  For  certain  types  of  sentence  evidence  about  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
are  held  true  by  a  speaker  would  seem  to  provide  a  good  basis  for  interpretation.  We 
can  reasonably  anticipate  a  speaker's  attitude  to  the  sentence  "It  is  snowing  here  and 
now.  "  to  vary  depending  upon  the  prevailing  conditions,  and  through  that  variation 
we  may  have  access  to  the  meaning.  More  problematic,  however  are  those  sentences, 
such  as  "Snow  is  white.  "  which  we  would  expect  to  be  held  true  by  informed 
speakers,  no  matter  what  the  circumstances.  For  these  sentence  variation  in  the 
conditions  in  which  they  are  held  true  will  provide  no  access  to  meaning.  Davidson 
thinks  that  the  problem  can  be  overcome  if  we  extend  the  principle  of  charity  to  the 
assumption  that  the  speaker's  utterances  are  rationally  /  logically  interrelated.  That  is 
we  must  extend  the  principle  of  charity  from  the  correspondence  to  coherence: 
"Making  sense  of  the  utterances  and  behaviour  of  others,  even  their 
most  aberrant  behaviour,  requires  us  to  find  a  great  deal  of  reason  and 
truth  in  them.  To  see  too  much  unreason  on  the  part  of  others  is 
simply  to  undermine  our  ability  to  understand  what  it  is  they  are  so 
unreasonable  about" 
(Davidson,  1974b,  pp.  152-153) 
An  adequate  theory  of  truth  in  the  Tarski-Davidson  style  must  show  how  the  truth 
conditions  of  sentences  depend  upon  the  semantic  features  of  the  words  used  and  the 
effects  of  their  combination.  The  T-sentences  entailed  by  such  a  theory  of  truth  are 
therefore  locked  together  in  relationship  by  virtue  of  the  component  parts  that  they 
share.  A  T-sentence  such  as  "'snow  is  white"  is  true  if  and  only  if  snow  is  white'  will 
be  the  product  of  a  theory  which  attributes  semantic  features  to  the  elements  of  the 
sentence,  which  will  be  applied  in  the  production  of  other  T-sentences  such  as  "'salt 
is  white"  is  true  if  and  only  if  salt  is  white'  ,  or  "'snow  is  cold"  is  true  if  and  only  if 
snow  is  cold'.  Meaning  is  provided  by  T-sentences  only  as  part  of  a  whole  truth 
theory  constrained  by  the  principle  of  charity. 
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"...  in  radical  interpretation  we  cannot  assume  that  a  T-sentence 
satisfies  the  translation  criterion.  What  we  have  been  overlooking, 
however,  is  that  we  have  supplied  an  alternative  criterion:  this 
criterion  is  that  the  totality  of  T-sentences  should  ...  optimally  fit 
evidence  about  sentences  held  true  by  native  speakers.  The  present 
idea  is  that  what  Tarski  assumed  outright  for  each  T-sentence  can  be 
indirectly  elicited  by  a  holistic  constraint.  If  that  constraint  is 
adequate,  each  T-sentence  will  in  fact  yield  an  acceptable 
interpretation.  " 
(Davidson,  1973a,  p.  139) 
Davidson  hopes  that  as  the  theory  develops  under  the  pressure  of  experience  as  a 
whole,  and  taking  account  of  the  interrelations  of  various  sentences,  its  theorems  will 
yield  the  meaning,  and  not  just  the  truth  conditions,  of  the  object  language  sentences. 
20.  Our  capacity  to  understand  new  sentences  seems  obviously  to  depend  on  them  having 
been  compiled  in  familiar  ways  using  words  we  already  know  (sec  Davidson,  1965). 
It  follows  then  that  a  satisfactory  theory  of  meaning  for  a  language  must  give  an 
account  of  how  the  meaning  of  sentences  depends  on  the  meanings  of  words  and  the 
effects  of  their  combination  in  accordance  with  the  conventions  of  the  language.  This 
seems  to  imply  that  the  concept  of  reference  must  have  some  important  place  in  any 
theory  of  meaning.  And  it  might  seem  to  suggest  that  we  might  usefully  take  an 
atomistic  or  'building  block'  approach  to  a  theory  of  meaning  and  start  by  trying  to 
connect  words  with  the  non-linguistic  objects,  events,  or  actions  to  which  they  refer. 
Davidson  considers  such  an  approach  hopeless.  We  can  have  no  direct  explanation 
of  the  semantic  features  of  individual  words  on  the  basis  of  non-linguistic 
phenomena: 
"If  the  name  'Kilimanjaro'  refers  to  Kilimanjaro,  then  no  doubt  there 
is  some  relation  between  English  (or  Swahili)  speakers,  the  word  and 
the  mountain.  But  it  is  inconceivable  that  one  should  be  able  to 
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explain  this  relation  without  first  explaining  the  role  of  the  word  in 
sentences;  and  if  this  is  so  there  is  no  chance  of  explaining  reference 
in  non-linguistic  terms.  " 
(Davidson,  1977,  p.  220) 
We  can  not  hope  to  use  a  notion  of  reference  as  the  foundation  for  a  theory  of 
meaning:  "we  must  give  up  the  concept  of  reference  as  basic  to  an  empirical  theory 
of  language"  (Davidson,  1977,  p.  221).  An  alternative  approach  to  a  theory  of 
meaning  would  begin  at  the  point  where  we  can  observe  the  connection  between 
language  and  the  extra-linguistic  interests  and  activities  that  it  serves.  That 
connection  appears  at  the  level  of  sentences.  Such  an  approach  would  allow  no 
foundational  role  to  reference,  yet  as  we  have  seen,  an  account  of  the  semantic 
features  of  the  parts  of  sentences  seems  to  be  a  necessary  part  of  an  adequate  theory 
of  meaning.  Davidson  suggests  that  this  dilemma  can  be  dissolved  if  we  accept  a 
distinction  between  explanation  within  theory  and  of  theory.  Within  theory  the 
meaning  of  a  sentence  may  be  specified  by  reference  to  a  postulated  sentence 
structure  and  concepts  such  as  reference.  However  when  we  want  to  interpret  or 
explain  the  theory  as  a  whole  we  turn  to  the  relation  at  the  sentential  level  of  human 
interests  and  activities  and  language.  He  draws  an  analogy  with  science  where  we 
may  explain  observed  phenomena  by  means  of  a  postulated  theory  of  unobserved 
phenomena  and  relations  -  the  microscopic  level,  whilst  theory  is  developed  and 
tested  by  reference  to  observed  phenomena  -  the  macroscopic  level.  For  Davidson 
"words,  meanings  of  words,  reference,  and  satisfaction  are  posits  we  need  to 
implement  a  theory"  (Davidson,  1977,  p.  222).  Yet  they  need,  and  can  have,  no  direct 
empirical  basis,  they  are  given  content  indirectly  when  sentences  arc: 
"The  building-block  theory,  and  theories  that  try  to  give  a  rich  content 
to  each  sentence  directly  on  the  basis  of  non-semantic  evidence  ...  try 
to  move  too  far  too  fast.  The  present  thought  is  rather  to  expect  to 
find  a  minimum  of  information  about  the  correctness  of  the  theory  at 
each  single  point;  it  is  the  potential  infinity  of  points  that  makes  the 
difference.  A  strong  theory  weakly  supported,  but  at  enough  points, 
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may  yield  all  the  information  we  need  about  the  atoms  and  molecules 
-  in  this  case,  the  words  and  sentences.  " 
(Davidson,  1977,  p.  225) 
Thus  whilst  Davidson  attacks  the  notions  of  reference,  and  the  meaning  of  words,  as 
foundations  for  a  theory  of  language  he  certainly  does  not  resist  the  suggestion  that 
we  may  sensibly  employ  such  notions  within  an  adequate  holistically  constructed 
theory  of  meaning  for  a  language: 
"Once  we  have  the  theory,  though,  we  can  explain  the  truth  of 
sentences  on  the  basis  of  their  structure  and  the  semantic  properties 
of  the  parts.  " 
(Davidson,  1990a,  p.  300) 
21.  Davidson  thinks  that  "all  understanding  of  speech  involves  radical  interpretation" 
(Davidson,  1973a,  p.  125).  Where  an  interpretive  theory  of  truth  for  a  language  has 
been  established,  it  will  not  necessarily  be  obvious  in  use,  especially  where  the 
speaker  and  interpreter  share  the  same  language.  Nonetheless  understanding  is  always 
ultimately  underpinned  by  radical  interpretation.  His  theory  of  content  extends  to  our 
understanding  of  our  own  beliefs  and  utterances,  even  they  are  given  content  through 
radical  interpretation;  Their  meaning  is  an  effect  of  interpretation,  and: 
"the  agent  has  only  to  reflect  on  what  a  belief  is  to  appreciate  that 
most  of  his  basic  beliefs  are  true,  and  among  his  beliefs,  those  which 
are  most  securely  held  and  that  cohere  with  the  main  body  of  his 
beliefs  are  most  apt  to  be  true.  " 
(Davidson,  1983,  p.  319) 
Davidson's  approach  fends  off  generalised  skepticism,  all  coherent  beliefs  are 
justified  to  some  extent,  and  the  whole  structure  of  belief  can't  be  false  -  it  doesn't  tell 
us  what  counts  as  sufficient  justification  for  any  particular  belief. 
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22.  Davidson  expresses  these  ideas  particularly  clearly  in  the  following  passage,  in  which 
he  describes  the  process  of  teaching  someone  a  language: 
"...  until  the  triangle  is  completed  connecting  two  creatures,  and  each 
creature  with  common  features  of  the  world,  there  can  be  no  answer 
to  the  question  whether  a  creature,  in  discriminating  between  stimuli, 
is  discriminating  between  stimuli  at  the  sensory  surfaces  or 
somewhere  further  out,  or  further  in.  Without  this  sharing  of  reactions 
to  common  stimuli,  thought  and  speech  would  have  no  particular 
content  -  that  is,  no  content  at  all.  It  takes  two  points  of  view  to  give 
a  location  to  the  cause  of  a  thought,  and  thus  to  define  its  content.  We 
may  think  of  this  as  a  form  of  triangulation:  each  of  two  people  is 
reacting  differently  to  sensory  stimuli  streaming  in  from  a  certain 
direction.  If  we  project  the  incoming  lines  outward,  their  intersection 
is  the  common  cause.  If  the  two  people  now  note  each  other's 
reactions  (in  the  case  of  language,  verbal  reactions),  each  can 
correlate  these  observed  reactions  with  his  or  her  stimuli  from  the 
world.  The  common  cause  can  now  determine  the  contents  of  an 
utterance  and  a  thought.  The  triangle  which  gives  content  to  thought 
and  speech  is  complete.  But  it  takes  two  to  triangulate.  Two,  or,  of 
course,  more.  " 
(Davidson,  1991,  pp.  159-160) 
23.  Richard  Rorty  has  been  a  leading  champion  of  Davidson's  work  over  many  years. 
However  in  his  eagerness  to  co-opt  Davidson  to  his  Pragmatist  camp  he 
underestimates  Davidson's  commitment  to  the  idea  that  the  world  directly  determines 
certain  of  our  beliefs: 
"Rorty  wants  to  explain  away  my  claim  that  most  of  our  simplest  and 
most  basic  beliefs  are  true  as'saying  that  most  of  anybody's  beliefs 
must  coincide  with  most  of  our  beliefs'  (1995,  p.  286)  or  that  'the 
pattern  truth  makes  is  the  pattern  that  justification  to  us  makes'  (ibid.  ) 
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I  agree  with  these  claims,  but  do  not  agree  that  they  give  my  reason 
for  holding  that  most  of  our  beliefs  are  true.  The  beliefs  I  have  in 
mind  are  our  perceptual  beliefs,  the  beliefs  that  are  directly  caused  by 
what  we  see  and  hear  and  otherwise  sense.  These  I  hold  to  be  in  the 
main  true  because  their  content  is,  in  effect,  determined  by  what 
typically  causes  them.  ... 
The  point  is  that  I  believe  in  the  ordinary 
notion  of  truth:  there  really  are  people,  mountains,  camels  and  stars 
out  there,  just  as  we  think  there  are,  and  those  objects  and  events 
frequently  have  the  characteristics  we  think  we  perceive  them  to 
have.  Our  concepts  are  ours,  but  that  doesn't  mean  they  don't  truly  as 
well  as  usefully  describe  an  objective  reality.  " 
(Davidson,  1999a,  p.  19) 
24.  Davidson  offers  more  than  one  version  of  his  basic  argument  as  to  why  it  can  not  be 
the  case  that  in  general  a  speaker  and  interpreter  understand  one  another  on  the  basis 
of  erroneous  beliefs.  The  basic  theme  of  the  argument  always  hinges  upon  Davidson's 
view  of  the  causal  relation  of  belief  and  the  world.  In  one  interesting  version  of  the 
argument  he  uses  the  device  of  a  fictitious  omniscient  interpreter  to  try  and  clarify  his 
position: 
"Why  couldn't  it  be  that  the  speaker  and  interpreter  understand  one 
another  on  the  basis  of  shared  but  erroneous  beliefs?  This  can,  and  no 
doubt  often  does,  happen.  But  it  cannot  be  the  rule.  For  imagine  for 
a  moment  an  interpreter  who  is  omniscient  about  the  world,  and  about 
what  does  and  would  cause  a  speaker  to  assent  to  any  sentence  in  his 
potentially  unlimited  repertoire.  The  omniscient  interpreter,  using  the 
same  method  as  the  fallible  interpreter,  finds  the  fallible  speaker 
largely  consistent  and  correct,  the  fallible  speaker  is  seen  to  be  largely 
correct  and  consistent  by  objective  standards.  We  may  also  if  we 
want,  let  the  omniscient  interpreter  turn  his  attention  to  the  fallible 
interpreter  of  the  fallible  speaker.  It  turns  out  that  the  fallible 
interpreter  can  be  wrong  about  some  things,  but  not  in  general;  and 
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so  he  cannot  share  universal  error  with  the  agent  he  is interpreting. 
Once  we  agree  to  the  general  method  of  interpretation  I  have 
sketched,  it  becomes  impossible  correctly  to  hold  that  anyone  could 
be  mostly  wrong  about  how  things  are.  " 
(Davidson,  1983,  p.  317) 
If  the  omniscient  interpreter  were  to  take  the  stance  of  interpreter,  it  would  need  to 
find  the  speaker's  beliefs  substantially  in  agreement  with  its  own,  and  because  the 
interpreter's  beliefs,  in  this  cases,  are  defined  to  be  true  the  speaker's  beliefs  must  also 
be  substantially  true.  This  argument  relies  on  Davidson's  view  that  beliefs  and 
utterances  can  only  be  given  content  through  radical  interpretation.  If  it  were  possible 
to  determine  the  content  of  beliefs  and  utterances  apart  from  the  context  of 
interpretation,  that  is  the  world  we  share,  the  omniscient  being  would  not  need  to  take 
the  interpretive  stance  and  could  find  that  the  speaker's  beliefs  were  substantially 
different  from  its  own  -  and  in  error. 
25.  The  method  of  radical  interpretation  requires  us  to  go  directly  to  the  objects  and 
events  in  the  world  in  order  to  determine  the  content  of  mental  states  and  utterances, 
it  allows  no  epistemological  intermediary  between  the  meaning  of  our  beliefs  and 
utterances  and  the  world;  "if  I  am  right,  we  can't  in  general  first  identify  beliefs  and 
meanings  and  then  ask  what  caused  them.  The  causality  plays  an  indispensable  role 
in  determining  the  content  of  what  we  say  and  believe"  (Davidson,  1983,  p.  317). 
Thus,  whilst  experience  remains  causally  fundamental,  it  is  denied  an  evidential  or 
epistemological  role,  and  no  sense  can  be  made  of  the  skeptic's  worry  that  our  senses 
might  be  systematically  deceived.  Davidson  is  able  to  side-step  the  challenge  of 
skepticism  by  showing  why  we  have  a  reason  for  thinking  most  of  our  beliefs  are  true 
which  is  not  itself  a  form  of  evidence: 
"Neurath,  Carnap  and  Hempel  were  right,  I  believe,  in  abandoning  the 
search  for  a  basic  sort  of  evidence  on  which  our  knowledge  of  the 
world  could  rest.  None  is  available,  and  none  is  needed.  What  they 
perhaps  failed  to  appreciate  is  why  it  is  not  needed.  It  is  not  needed 
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because  the  causal  relations  between  our  beliefs  and  speech  and  the 
world  also  supply  the  interpretation  of  our  language  and  of  our 
beliefs.  In  this  rather  special  sense,  'experience'  is  the  source  of  all 
knowledge.  But  this  is  a  sense  that  does  not  encourage  us  to  find  a 
mental  or  inferential  bridge  between  external  events  and  ordinary 
beliefs.  The  bridge  is  there  all  right  -a  causal  bridge  that  involves  the 
sense  organs.  the  error  lies  as  Neurath  saw  in  trying  to  turn  this  causal 
bridge  into  an  epistemological  one,  with  sense  data,  uninterpreted 
givens,  or  unwritable  sentences  constituting  its  impossible  spans.  " 
(Davidson,  1982,  p.  332)) 
26.  The  crucial  Davidsonian  notion  that  "communication  begins  where  causes  converge" 
(Davidson,  1983,  p.  317),  has  clear  ancestry  in  Wittgenstein's  claim  that  "if  language 
is  to  be  a  form  of  communication,  there  must  be  agreement  not  only  in  definitions 
... 
but  also  in  judgments"  (1967,  para.  242,  quoted  by  Lyas,  1993,  p.  164). 
27.  Davidson  never  tires  of  repeating  his  commitment  to  an  extensional  theory  of 
meaning  and  a  publicly  knowable  world: 
"Our  thoughts  are'  inner'  and  'subjective'  in  that  we  know  what  they 
are  in  a  way  no  one  else  can.  But  though  possession  of  a  thought  is 
necessarily  individual,  what  gives  it  content  is  not.  The  thoughts  we 
form  and  entertain  are  located  conceptually  in  the  world  we  inhabit, 
with  others.  Even  our  thoughts  about  our  own  mental  states  occupy 
the  same  conceptual  space  and  are  located  on  the  same  public  map. 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  165) 
28.  Clearly  Davidson  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  possibility  of  knowledge  applies 
equally  to  the  'social'  and  the  'natural'  worlds: 
"If  I  did  not  know  what  others  think  I  would  have  no  thoughts  of  my 
own  and  so  would  not  know  what  I  think.  If  I  did  not  know  what  I 
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think,  I  would  lack  the  ability  to  gauge  the  thoughts  of  others. 
Gauging  the  thoughts  of  others  requires  that  I  live  in  the  same  world 
as  them,  sharing  many  reactions  to  its  major  features,  including  its 
values.  " 
(Davidson,  1991,  p.  166) 
The  features  of  the  world  which  cause  our  knowledge  include  its  social  features 
including  its  value  systems.  Davidson  would  agree  with  Manicas  that  "Social  reality 
is  both  subjectively  created  and  objectively  real"  (Manicas,  1993,  p.  157).  For 
Davidson,  of  course,  intersubjectivity  provides  our  only  standard  of  objectivity. 
29.  Davidson's  analysis  emphasises  the  triangular  interdependence  of  the  three  types  of 
knowledge:  He  follows  Wittgenstein  in  thinking  that  all  knowledge  depends  on 
communication.  Before  a  base  line  is  established  in  communication  it  makes  no  sense 
to  say  that  a  person  has  a  thought  or  that  her  utterances  have  propositional  content. 
Knowledge  of  other  minds  is  then  clearly  vital  to  all  thought  and  knowledge.  We  can 
have  knowledge  of  other  minds  only  if  we  have  knowledge  of  the  world;  Davidson's 
analysis  of  interpretation  shows  that  the  process  of  triangulation  which  is  so  vital  to 
thought,  demands  that  speaker  and  interpreter  recognise  that  they  stand  in  relation  to 
a  shared  world.  In  addition,  because  communication  is  necessary  for  propositional 
thought,  we  can  not  have  knowledge  of  the  content  of  our  own  minds  unless  we  have 
knowledge  of  the  world  and  knowledge  of  other  minds.  And,  the  attribution  of 
thoughts  to  others  requires  that  we  match  their  utterances  with  thoughts  of  our  own; 
We  can't  attribute  thoughts  to  others  unless  we  have  and  know  our  own  thoughts. 
30  An  adequate  conceptual  scheme  that  "fit  the  facts"  would  presumably  be  one  that  was 
true.  Dualist  thinking  has  nothing  intelligible  to  add  to  the  concept  of  truth  which  we 
have  seen  arises  and  has  application  only  through  communication.  Davidson's  directs 
us  back,  to  all  we  have,  interpretation  -  and  Tarski  like  formulations  of  the  notion  of 
truth. 
"The  trouble  is  that  the  notion  of  fitting  the  totality  of  experience  like 
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the  notion  of  fitting  the  facts,  or  of  being  true  to  the  facts,  adds 
nothing  to  the  simple  concept  of  being  true.  ... 
Nothing,  however,  no 
thing,  makes  sentences  or  theories  true:  not  experience,  not  surface 
irritations,  not  the  world,  can  make  our  sentences  true.  That 
experience  takes  a  certain  course,  that  our  skin  is  warmed  or 
punctured,  that  the  universe  is  finite,  these  facts,  if  we  like  to  talk  that 
way,  make  sentences  and  theories  true.  But  this  point  is  put  better 
without  mention  of  facts.  The  sentence'my  skin  is  warm'  is  true  if  and 
only  if  my  skin  is  warm.  Here  there  is  no  reference  to  a  fact,  a  world, 
an  experience,  or  a  piece  of  evidence.  " 
(Davidson  1974a,  pp.  193-194) 
31.  Belkaoui  suggests  that  the  Sapir  and  Whorf  linguistic  relativity  hypothesis,  "which 
emphasises  the  role  of  language  as  a  mediator  and  shaper  of  the  environment" 
(Belkaoui,  1978,  p.  97),  may  be  applied  to  accounting  as  the  "language  of  business". 
He  suggests  that  according  to  the  hypothesis  the  features  of  accounting  as  a  language 
will:  "...  shape  the  perception  and  thoughts  of  those  who  have  assimilated  the 
accounting  discipline.  Accounting  as  a  language  predisposes  "users"  to  a  given 
method  of  perception  and  behaviour"  (1978,  p.  97). 
32.  By  the'linguistic  turn'  we  mean  those  various  trends  in  thought  which  seem  to  look 
to  language  as  the  philosophical  limit  of  knowledge  and  truth:  the  notion  that  there 
is  nothing  beyond  the  text,  no  facts  beyond  language  and  no  reality  other  than  that 
presented  in  language. 
33.  Callinicos  (1989,  p.  76)  draws  a  direct  comparison  between  the  Saussurian  tradition's 
insistence  on  the  mediation  of  reality  through  language,  and  Kant's  view: 
"...  that  we  could  not  know  things  in  themselves,  but  only  sense- 
impressions  organized  by  the  categories  of  the  understanding  inherent 
in  the  structure  of  transcendental  subjectivity  underlying  experience. 
The  difference  is  that  Derrida  sets  difference  in  place  of  the 
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unknowable  Ding-an-sich  and,  resolving  the  subject  into  the  play  of 
presence  and  absence,  sets  the  categories  themselves  in  motion.  " 
(Callinicos,  1989,  pp.  76-77) 
Norris  (1991)  also  emphasises  the  dualist  nature  of  Saussurian  thought: 
"Meanings  are  bound  up,  according  to  Saussure,  in  a  system  of 
relationship  and  difference  that  effectively  determines  our  habits  of 
thought.  ... 
In  this  view,  our  knowledge  of  things  is  insensibly 
structured  by  the  systems  of  code  and  convention  which  alone  enable 
us  to  classify  and  organize  the  chaotic  flow  of  experience.  " 
(Norris,  1991,  pp.  4-5) 
34.  The  influence  of  structuralist  and  poststructuralist  perspectives  on  accounting  thought 
has  provoked  considerable  resistance.  The  debate  concerning  the  importation  of 
Foucaultian  perspectives  has  been  especially  vigorous:  See  Ncimark  (1990)  for  a 
particularly  trenchant  appraisal  of  the  influence  of  the  Foucaultian  perspective  the 
critical  accounting  literature. 
35.  Gadamer  conceives  of  our  horizons  as  constantly  evolving,  particularly  through  those 
interpretive  encounters  that  challenge  us  to  risk  our  prejudices.  The  framework  of  any 
living  tradition  will  be  in  constant  process  of  development: 
"We  started  by  saying  that  a  hermeneutical  situation  is  determined  by 
the  prejudices  that  we  bring  with  us.  They  constitute,  then,  the 
horizon  of  a  particular  present,  for  they  represent  that  beyond  which 
it  is  impossible  to  see.  ...  the  horizon  of  the  present  is  continually  in 
the  process  of  being  formed  because  we  are  continually  having  to  test 
all  our  prejudices.  An  important  part  of  this  testing  occurs  in 
encountering  the  past  and  in  understanding  the  tradition  from  which 
we  come.  ... 
In  a  tradition  this  process  of  fusion  is  continually  going 
on,  for  there  old  and  new  are  always  combining  into  something  of 
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living  value,  without  either  being  explicitly  foregrounded  from  the 
other.  " 
(Gadamer,  1960,  p.  306) 
Indeed,  Gadamer  is  very  explicit  in  his  rejection  of  any  the  notion  that  our  horizons 
are  fixed  or  closed: 
"..  the  closed  horizon  that  is  supposed  to  enclose  a  culture  is  an 
abstraction.  The  historical  movement  of  human  life  consists  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  never  absolutely  bound  to  any  one  standpoint,  and  hence 
can  never  have  a  truly  closed  horizon.  The  horizon  is,  rather 
something  into  which  we  move  and  that  moves  with  us.  Horizons 
change  for  a  person  who  is  moving.  thus  the  horizon  of  the  past,  out 
of  which  all  human  life  lives  and  which  exists  in  the  form  of  tradition, 
is  always  in  motion.  " 
(Gadamcr,  1960,  p.  304) 
Bernstein  (1983,  p.  167)  is  then  correct  to  note  that  Gadamer  is  critical  of  the  Myth 
of  Framework,  understood  as  "the  myth  that  we  forever  are  enclosed  in  our  own 
horizon".  Interpretation  for  Gadamer  entails  the  fusion  of  horizons.  This  vision  of 
evolving  horizons  does  not,  however,  fundamentally  change  Gadamer's  most  basic 
of  views  -  the  notion  that  all  our  understandings  are  developed  on  a  pre-structured 
framework  of  pre-understandings;  we  are  fundamentally  constrained  by  the 
framework  of  our  pre-understandings,  that  is  by  our  ongoing  tradition. 
36.  For  Gadamer,  tradition  is  "essentially  verbal  in  character"  (Gadamer,  1960,  p.  389), 
and  language  is  the  mediator  through  the  world  comes  into  being  for  us: 
"Language  is  not  just  one  of  man's  possessions  in  the  world;  rathcr  on 
it  depends  the  fact  that  man  has  a  world  at  all.  ... 
language  has  no 
independent  life  apart  from  the  world  that  comes  to  language  within 
it.  Not  only  is  the  world  only  insofar  as  it  comes  into  language,  but 
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language,  too  has  its  real  being  only  in  the  fact  that  the  world  is 
presented  in  it. 
...  this  world  is  verbal  in  nature.  ...  man's  being  in  the 
world  is  primordially  linguistic.  " 
(Gadamer,  1960,  p.  443) 
37.  Gadamer's  primary  interest  is  in  the  understanding  /  interpretation  of  texts,  works  of 
art,  and  our  relation  to  our  historical  tradition.  However,  he  sees  the  hermeneutical 
problem  as  universal.  The  parties  to  any  communication  whether  across  time  or 
cultural  distance  operate  within  the  horizons  of  their  own  historical  being, 
understanding  then,  always  entails  a  fusion  of  horizons. 
38.  See  Bernstein  (1983)  for  an  analysis  of  Gadamer's  somewhat  obscure  comments  on 
the  question  of  truth.  Essentially,  Gadamer's  view  of  understanding  as  mediated 
through  tradition  entails  a  relativist  conception  of  truth: 
"In  effect,  I  am  suggesting  that  Gadamer  is  appealing  to  a  concept  of 
truth  that  (pragmatically  speaking)  amounts  to  what  can  be 
argumentatively  validated  by  the  community  of  interpreters  who  open 
themselves  to  what  tradition  "says  to  us.  "  This  does  not  mean  that 
there  is  some  transcendental  or  ahistorical  perspective  from  which  we 
can  evaluate  competing  claims  to  truth.  we  judge  and  evaluate  such 
claims  by  the  standards  and  practices  that  have  been  hammered  out 
in  the  course  of  history.  " 
(Bernstein,  1983  p.  154) 
For  Gadamer,  interpretations  are  always  open  to  revision  as  the  tradition  evolves;  and 
the  correctness  of  any  interpretation  can  be  judged  only  in  the  context  of  the  state  of 
the  tradition  from  which  it  springs: 
"The  historical  life  of  a  tradition  depends  on  being  constantly 
assimilated  and  interpreted.  An  interpretation  that  was  correct  in  itself 
would  be  a  foolish  ideal  that  mistook  the  nature  of  tradition.  Every 
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interpretation  has  to  adapt  itself  to  the  hermeneutical  situation  to 
which  it  belongs.  " 
(Gadamer,  1960,  p.  397) 
39.  Lavoie  seems  to  suggest  that  the  development  of  tradition  arising  from  the  fusion  of 
horizons  in  "good  conversation"  will  somehow  take  us  along  the  "path  to  truth": 
Rejecting  objectivism  does  not  entail  embracing  relativism.  While 
alternative  paradigms  cannot  be  objectivistically  translated  into  a 
neutral  language  and  measured  against  a  common  set  of  standards, 
this  does  not  mean  that  rivals  should  give  up  their  search  for  truth  and 
all  go  their  own  relativistic  way.  On  the  contrary,  our  only  path  to 
truth  lies  in  the  process  of  contention.  It  is  out  of  the  confrontation 
between  two  incommensurable  theories,  their  mutual  attempts  to  re- 
interpret  and  criticize  one  another,  that  we  can  hope  to  construct 
effective  comparisons  between  them.  " 
(Lavoie,  1989,  p.  587) 
We  find  Lavoie's  claim  that  hermeneutics  can  take  us  beyond  relativism  on  a  path  to 
truth,  difficult  to  make  sense  of  within  a  Gadamerian  hermeneutic  tradition,  which 
recognises  all  understanding  as  being  historically  conditioned.  In  the  paradigm  case 
of  the  hermeneutic  problem,  an  interpreter  of  a  text  from  a  previous  culture  views  the 
past  and  its  texts  from  her  own  particular  horizon,  her  own  pre-understandings.  I  Icr 
interpretation  of  the  text  therefore  involves  a  fusion  of  horizons  in  an  interplay  of  past 
and  present.  As,  in  this  way  of  viewing  things,  any  understanding  is  inevitably 
historically  framed  and  open  to  subsequent  revision,  it  makes  more  sense  to  talk  of 
understanding  and  interpretation  in  terms  of  authenticity  than  in  terms  of  truth.  An 
authentic  interpretation  would  entail  good  reflective  use  of  the  interpreter's  tradition. 
And  the  reflective  interpreter  must  be  prepared  to  explore  and  challenge  her  own 
prejudices,  that  is  she  must  endeavour  to  understand  herself.  Such  understanding  will 
be  promoted  by  interpretive  confrontation  with  the  past.  However,  whilst  the 
interpreter  may  challenge  and  revise  particular  prejudices  she  has  no  basis  for 
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challenging  the  authority  of  her  entire  tradition  -  the  tradition  can  not  be  transcended, 
even  through  reflection  -  it  is  the  ground  of  our  being. 
Lavoie  insists  that  the  Gadamerian  view  that  "'we  live  wholly  within  a 
language,  '  does  not  ...  constitute  a  form  of  'linguistic  relativism"',  such  as  that 
suggested  by  the  by  the  Sapir  and  Whorf  Hypothesis.  Nonetheless,  the  hermeneutic 
view  does  maintain  that  understanding  is  always  relative  to  a  particular  horizon  of 
pre-understandings,  and  that  the  meta-institution  carrying  forward  our  pre- 
understandings  is language.  Following  Davidson  we  have  some  difficulty  making 
sense  of  Lavoie's  talk  of  "alternative  paradigms"  and  the  confrontation  of 
"incommensurable  theories".  We  understand  Lavoie  to  mean  that  translation  is 
possible  but  not  by  some  objective  standard;  the  interpreter  must  translate  by  the 
standards  of  her  own  tradition.  What  we  find  to  be  missing  in  this  view  is  proper 
Davidsonian  recognition  of  (i)  the  primary  role  of  the  concept  of  truth  in  facilitating 
translation,  (ii)  the  role  of  the  objective  world  in  causing  or  constituting  meaning. 
Other  advocates  of  a  hermeneutic  approach  to  accounting  seem  more  prepared 
to  be  unequivocal  in  accepting  its  implication  that  we  give  up  the  search  for  truth: 
Boland  recommends  an  hermeneutic  approach  to  accounting  research  and  urges  that 
we  should  relinquish  "the  quest  for  universal  truth  and  be  content  to  engage  in  good, 
interesting  conversations"  (Boland,  1989,  p.  601).  It  may  be  that  Lavoie  intends  to 
suggest  the  possibility  of  a  movement  beyond  the  constraints  of  the  Gadamerian 
position;  His  analysis  does  little  to  elucidate  such  a  possibility. 
40.  Habermas  criticizes  the  ontological  priority  which  Gadamerian  hermeneutics  gives 
to  tradition:  For  Gadamer,  understanding  always  presupposes  the  structure  of 
prejudices  of  an  ongoing  consensus.  Whilst  individual  elements  of  a  tradition  may  be 
questioned,  the  priority  given  to  tradition  allows  no  basis  for  development  of 
criticism  of  the  consensus  as  a  whole: 
"It  is  a  hermeneutical  requirement  that  we  refer  to  a  concrete  pre- 
understanding  which  itself,  in  the  last  analysis,  goes  back  to  the 
process  of  socialization,  i.  e.  the  introduction  into  a  shared  tradition. 
None  of  them  is  in  principle  beyond  criticism;  but  neither  can  they  be 
281 Notes  to  chapter  2:  Accounting  Knowledge 
questioned  abstractly.  This  would  only  be  possible  if  we  could 
examine  a  consensus  that  had  been  achieved  through  mutual 
understanding  by,  as  it  were  looking  into  it  from  the  side  and 
subjecting  it,  behind  the  backs  of  the  participants,  to  renewed 
demands  for  legitimation.  But  we  can  only  make  demands  of  this 
kind  in  the  face  of  participants  by  entering  into  dialogue  with  them. 
In  this  case  we  submit,  yet  again,  to  the  hermeneutic  demand  to 
accept,  for  the  time  being,  the  clarifying  consensus  which  the 
resumed  dialogue  might  arrive  at,  as  a  supporting  agreement.  It  would 
be  senseless  to  abstractly  suspect  this  agreement,  which  admittedly, 
is  contingent,  of  being  false  consciousness  since  we  cannot  transcend 
the  dialogue  that  we  are.  This  leads  Gadamer  to  conclude  to  the 
ontological  priority  of  linguistic  tradition  over  all  possible  critique; 
we  can  consequently  criticize  specific  traditions  only  on  the  basis  that 
we  are  part  of  the  comprehensive  context  of  the  tradition  of 
language.  " 
(liabermas  1971,  p.  204) 
Habermas  is  not  suggesting  that  Gadamer's  hermeneutics  puts  the  contents  of 
tradition  entirely  beyond  criticism,  but  rather  that  it  allows  no  basis  for  questioning 
of  the  legitimacy  of  the  tradition  as  such.  Such  a  questioning  would  necessarily  entail 
engagement  in  dialogue  with  its  participants  and  hence  submission,  at  least  for  the 
time  being,  to  the  ongoing  consensus.  It  makes  no  sense  in  such  a  case  to  suspect  the 
consensus,  because  it  can  not  be  transcended.  Gadamer  gives  us  no  way  to  step 
outside  our  tradition  and  no  standard  against  which  to  judge  the  supporting 
consensus.  It  seems  that  we  must  be  accepted  the  authority  of  the  tradition.  Indeed 
Gadamer  wants  to  rehabilitate  authority  and  tradition,  and  justify  a  presupposition  of 
their  legitimacy.  He  argues  that  the  enlightenment  opposition  of  reason  and  freedom 
to  authority  and  tradition  overlooks  the  possibility  that  authority  may  be  a  source  of 
truth.  He  wants  to  justify  a  "prejudice  in  favour  of  the  legitimacy  of  prejudices  (or 
prejudgments)  validated  by  tradition"  (Habermas,  1967,  p.  170),  by  arguing  that 
authority  is  ultimately  based  on  knowledge.  Authority  and  knowledge  are  not 
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opposed,  in  fact,  they  coincide: 
"The  Enlightenment's  distinction  between  faith  in  authority  and  using 
one's  own  reason  is,  in  itself,  legitimate.  If  the  prestige  of  authority 
displaces  ones  own  judgment,  then  authority  is  in  fact  a  source  of 
prejudices.  But  this  does  not  preclude  it  being  a  source  of  truth,  and 
that  is  what  the  Enlightenment  failed  to  see  when  it  denigrated  all 
authority.  ... 
In  fact  the  denigration  of  authority  was  not  the  only 
prejudice  established  by  the  enlightenment.  It  also  distorted  the  very 
conception  of  reason  and  freedom,  the  concept  of  authority  could  be 
viewed  as  diametrically  opposed  to  reason  and  freedom:  to  be  in  fact 
blind  obedience.  ... 
But  this  is  not  the  essence  of  authority  ...  the 
authority  of  persons  is  ultimately  based  not  on  subjection  and 
abdication  of  reason  but  on  an  act  of  acknowledgement  and 
knowledge  -  the  knowledge,  namely,  that  the  other  is  superior  to 
oneself  in  judgment  and  insight  and  that  for  this  reason  his  judgment 
takes  precedence.  ... 
Indeed,  authority  has  to  do  not  with  obedience 
but  rather  with  knowledge.  " 
(Gadamcr,  1960,  p.  279) 
Habermas  challenges  the  uncritical  acceptance  of  the  validity  of  tradition.  lie  argues 
that  the  consensus  on  which  authority  is  based  does  not  arise  in  free  circumstances 
but  rather  through  historical  processes  characterized  by  domination  and  force, 
circumstances  that  systematically  distort  "the  dialogue  that  we  arc": 
"The  dogmatic  recognition  of  tradition,  and  this  means  the  acceptance 
of  the  truth  claims  of  this  tradition,  can  be  equated  with  knowledge 
itself  only  when  freedom  from  force  and  unrestricted  agreement  about 
tradition  have  already  been  secured  within  this  tradition.  Gadamer's 
argument  pre-supposes  that  legitimizing  recognition  and  the 
consensus  on  which  authority  is founded  can  arise  and  develop  free 
from  force.  The  experience  of  distorted  communication  contradicts 
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this  pre-supposition.  Force  can,  in  any  case,  acquire  permanence  only 
through  the  objective  semblance  of  an  unforced  pseudo- 
communicative  agreement.  Force  that  is  legitimated  in  such  a  way  we 
call,  with  Max  Weber,  authority.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  there  has  to 
be  that  principle  proviso  of  a  universal  agreement  free  from 
domination  in  order  to  make  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
dogmatic  recognition  and  true  consensus.  Reason,  in  the  sense  of  the 
principle  of  rational  discourse,  represents  the  rock  which  factual 
authorities  have  so  far  been  more  likely  to  crash  against  than  build 
upon.  " 
(liabcrmas  1971,  pp.  207-208) 
By  taking  language  to  be  the  sole  meta-institution  and  treating  tradition  as  self 
sufficient,  Gadamer  fails  to  recognise  either  their  dependency  on  other  social 
processes  or  their  ideological  role  in  sustaining  and  legitimising  relations  of 
systematic  inequality  and  domination: 
"There  is  good  reason  to  conceive  language  as  a  kind  of  meta- 
institution  on  which  all  social  institutions  depend. 
...  But  clearly  this 
meta-institution  of  language  as  tradition  is  dependent  in  turn  on  social 
processes  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  normative  relationships. 
Language  is  also  the  medium  of  domination  and  social  power.  It 
serves  to  legitimate  relationships  of  organized  force.  In  so  far  as 
legitimations  do  not  articulate  the  power  relationships  whose 
institutionalisation  they  make  possible,  insofar  as  the  relationship  is 
merely  manifested  in  the  legitimation,  language  is  also  ideological. 
In  that  case  it  is  not  so  much  a  question  of  deception  in  language  as 
deception  with  language  as  such. 
(liabcrmas,  1967,  p.  172) 
Habermas  thinks  that  a  Gademarian  hermeneutics,  which  urges  the  necessity  of 
submission  to  authority  and  tradition,  would  be  unable  to  reveal  "deceptions  with 
284 Notes  to  chapter  2:  Accounting  Knowledge 
language  as  such"  which  sustain  relations  of  domination.  We  may  face  not  merely 
local  error  or  failure  of  understanding,  but  a  system  of  deception.  The  systematic 
distortions  that  underpin  language,  are  likely  to  go  unrecognized  by  an  hermeneutic 
approach  constrained  to  truth  expressed  at  the  level  of  social  consensus  and  by  the 
structure  of  prejudices  legitimised  as  tradition: 
"If  I  understand  correctly,  then  Gadamer  is  of  the  opinion  that  the 
hermeneutical  clarification  of  incomprehensible  or  misunderstood 
expressions  always  has  to  lead  us  back  to  a  consensus  that  has  already 
been  reliably  established  through  converging  tradition.  This  tradition 
is  objective  in  relation  to  us  in  the  sense  that  we  cannot  confront  it 
with  a  principled  claim  to  truth.  The  prcjudgemcntal  structure  of 
understanding  not  only  prohibits  us  from  questioning  the  factually 
established  consensus  which  underlies  our  misunderstanding  and 
incomprehension,  but  makes  such  an  undertaking  appear  senseless" 
(liabcrmas,  1971,  p.  204) 
Because  the  forces  driving  and  distorting  consensus  arise  outside  language,  a 
hermeneutic  analysis,  in  itself,  will  not  reveal  them.  Only  a  systematic  (albeit 
hermeneutically  informed)  analysis  of  the  underlying  realities,  will  give  access  to  the 
deception  within  language.  Analysis  must  respect  the  grounding  of  language  in  the 
material  world  and  the  lived  relations  of  the  production  of  our  lives.  In  so  far  as  the 
hermeneutic  tradition  follows  Gadamer  in  seeing  language  as  the  essence  of  tradition, 
it  risks  descending  into  naive  "linguistic  idealism",  which  reduces  the  conception  of 
our  relation  to  the  world  to  a  matter  of  intersubjectivc  ideas  and  practices  circulating 
in  language: 
"An  interpretive  sociology  that  hypostatizes  language  as  the  subject 
of  life  forms  and  of  tradition  binds  itself  to  the  idealist  presupposition 
that  linguistically  articulated  consciousness  determines  the  material 
being  of  life-practice.  But  the  objective  context  of  social  action  is  not 
reducible  to  the  dimension  of  intersubjectively  intended  and 
285 Notes  to  chapter  2:  Accounting  Knowledge 
symbolically  intended  meaning.  The  linguistic  infrastructure  of 
society  is  a  moment  in  a  complex  that,  however  symbolically 
mediated,  is  also  constituted  by  the  constraints  of  reality:  by  the 
constraints  of  external  nature  which  enters  into  the  procedures  of 
technological  exploitation,  and  by  constraints  of  inner  nature  which 
is  reflected  in  the  repression  of  social  relationships  of  power. 
(11abermas,  1967,  p.  173-174) 
Habermas  thinks  that  commitment  to  the  rehabilitation  of  authority  in  Gadamerian 
hermeneutics,  and  its  acceptance  of  the  final  validity  of  tradition,  prevents  its  full 
recognition  of  the  ideological  status  of  tradition  and  language,  and  of  the  capacity  of 
reflection  to  challenge  and  modify  tradition: 
"Against  this  stand  the  insight  that  the  reflective  appropriation  of 
tradition  breaks  the  quasi-natural  substance  of  tradition  and  alters  the 
position  of  subjects  within  it 
...  when  reflection  understands  the 
genesis  of  the  tradition  from  which  it  proceeds  and  to  which  it 
returns,  the  dogmatism  of  Life-praxis  is  shaken.  " 
(Ilabermas,  1967,  p168) 
Habermas  thinks  that  science  can  provide  the  critical  autonomy  /  distance,  from 
tradition,  necessary  for  critical  reflection  on  the  interests  and  forces  underlying  the 
development  of  tradition.  And  he  believes  that  the  advance  of  science  and  the 
scientific  mentality  has  shaken  the  grip  and  continuity  of  tradition  in  our  society  and 
considerably  altered  our  relation  to  it.  We  are  better  able  to  sec  tradition  for  what  it 
is  and  less  accepting  of  the  claims  of  authority.  The  inability  of  hcrmcncutics  to 
acknowledge  the  power  of  reflection  encourages  and  supports  traditional  relations  of 
domination  and  exploitation.  Habermas  wants  to  argue  that  through  reflection  and 
communicative  reason  we  may  distinguish  between  a  consensus  which  has  been 
imposed  by  dominative  force  and  a  consensus  openly  and  rationally  accepted: 
"Substantiality  disintegrates  in  reflection,  because  the  latter  not  only 
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confirms  but  breaks  dogmatic  forces.  Authority  and  knowledge  do  not 
converge.  Certainly,  knowledge  is  rooted  in  actual  tradition;  it 
remains  bound  to  contingent  conditions  ...  But  as  reflection  recalls 
that  path  of  authority  through  which  the  grammars  of  language  games 
were  learned  dogmatically  as  rules  of  worldview  and  action,  authority 
can  be  stripped  of  that  in  it  that  was  mere  domination  and  dissolved 
into  the  less  coercive  force  of  insight  and  rational  decision.  " 
(Habermas,  1967,  p.  170) 
By  insisting  that  authority  and  knowledge  coincide  Gadamer  undercuts  the 
possibility  of  critique  "anything  that  might  challenge  the  legitimacy  of  tradition  must 
be  regarded  as  a  form  of  non-knowledge.  ...  For  hermeneutics  tradition  is  always 
ultimately  right"  (How,  1995,  p.  143-144). 
Habermas  accepts  that  our  pre-understandings  condition  all  our 
understandings,  he  recognises  language  as  a  meta-institution  that  lends  symbolic 
structure  to  all  social  action,  and  he  certainly  thinks  that  hermeneutic  analysis  has  the 
potential  to  help  reveal  those  structures  which  frame  our  understanding  and 
knowledge.  But  he  wants  to  insist,  against  Gadamer,  that  critical  reflection  which  lays 
bare  the  structure  of  tradition  and  its  pattern  of  development  should  fundamentally 
alter  our  relation  to  tradition  and  curtail  our  capacity  to  accept  the  authority  of 
prejudices.  After  reflection  we  can  no  longer  take  the  authority  of  tradition  for 
granted.  Habermas'  aim  is  not  to  deny  the  critical  value  of  hermeneutic  analysis,  as 
such.  He  wants  to  reject  the  "linguistic  idealism"  he  finds  in  Gadamerian 
Hermeneutics;  its  tendency  to  absolutize  language,  and  hence  its  inability  to  confront 
the  realities  of  force,  technology,  and  domination  operating  behind  language.  There 
is  a  moral  dimension  to  Habermas'  insistence  on  the  power  of  reflection.  lie  objects 
to  the  determinist  strain  in  Gadamer's  thought,  which  privileges  tradition  and  seems 
to  deny  the  possibility  that  human  beings  might  shake-off  the  grip  of  their  tradition 
and  achieve  self-determination.  Habermas  also  attacks  the  similar  denigration  of  the 
liberative  potential  of  reflection  that  he  identifies  in  the  post-structuralist  tradition. 
Habermas  does  not  think  that  we  can  find  an  Archimedian  point  somewhere 
outside  our  own  culture  from  which  we  might  obtain  the  leverage  to  critique  our  own 
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tradition.  There  is  no'outside',  and  no  possibility  of  a'Gods  eye  view': 
"It  is,  of  course,  true  that  criticism  is  always  tied  to  the  context  of 
tradition  which  it  reflects.  Gadamer's  hermeneutic  reservations  are 
justified  against  monological  self-certainty  that  merely  arrogates  to 
itself  the  title  of  critique.  There  is  no  validation  of  depth- 
hermeneutical  interpretation  outside  of  the  self-reflection  of  all 
participants  that  is  successfully  achieved  in  a  dialogue.  " 
(Iiabermas,  1971,  p.  209) 
Habermas  does,  however,  think  that  we  can  retain  the  ideal  of  objectivity  in  the  social 
sciences,  and  much  of  his  work  has  been  directed  towards  showing  how  we  might 
move  beyond  the  tradition  bound  pluralism  of  a  Gadamcrian  hermeneutics.  I  labcrmas 
thinks  that  truth  and  objectivity  interpretation  /  knowledge  can  emerge  in  the 
consensus  achieved  through  rational  discourse  in  conditions  of  free  and  unconstrained 
dialogue;  in  "ideal  speech".  He  believes  every  act  of  communication  anticipates  the 
possibility  of  an  'ideal  speech'  situation,  the  possibility  of  dialogic  consensus 
orientated  to  truth: 
"A  critically  enlightened  hermeneutic  that  differentiates  between 
insight  and  delusion  incorporates  the  meta-hermeneutic  awareness  of 
the  conditions  for  the  possibility  of  systematically  distorted 
communication.  It  connects  the  process  of  understanding  to  the 
principle  of  rational  discourse,  according  to  which  truth  would  only 
be  guaranteed  by  that  kind  of  consensus  which  was  achieved  under 
the  idealized  conditions  of  unlimited  communication  free  from 
domination  and  could  be  maintained  over  time.  ... 
If  the 
understanding  of  meaning  is  not  to  remain  a  fortiori  indifferent 
towards  the  idea  of  truth  then  we  have  to  anticipate,  together  with  the 
concept  of  a  kind  of  truth  which  measures  itself  on  an  idealized 
consensus  achieved  in  unlimited  communication  free  from 
domination,  also  the  structures  of  solidarity  co-extensive  in 
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communication  free  from  force.  Truth  is  that  characteristic 
compulsion  towards  unforced  universal  recognition;  the  latter  is  itself 
tied  to  an  ideal  speech  situation.  i.  e.  a  form  of  life,  which  makes 
possible  unforced  universal  agreement.  " 
(11abermas,  1971,  pp.  205-206) 
41.  Even  theorists  like  Manicas  (1993)  who  seek  to  advance  realist  views  of  accounting's 
possibilities,  are  apt  to  understate  the  strength  of  those  foundations.  Manicas,  for 
example,  seems  to  suggests  that  accounting  as  a  critical  social  science  has  to 
acknowledge:  "that  it  lacks  any  sort  of  secure  foundations"  (Manicas,  1993,  p.  157). 
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Notes  to  chapter  3:  Objectivity  in  Accounting  -  the  Case  of  Deferred  Tax 
1.  Conflict  over  the  allocation  of  goods  seldom  remains  on  a  bluntly  practical  level. 
Typically  such  conflict  will  be  expressed  in  ethical  terms:  "if  the  parties  want  to  settle 
it  by  ordered  speech  rather  than  by  violence,  they  will  invoke  more  substantive 
judgements,  usually  of  justice,  and  the  children  will  talk  of  fairness  and  the  heroes 
of  precedence"  (Williams,  1985,  pp.  133-134). 
2.  Williams  (1985,  pp.  142-143)  identifies  three  conditions  of  propositional  knowlcdgc: 
(a)  the  judgement  made  must  be  believed,  (b)  the  judgement  must  be  true,  and  (c)  the 
beliefs  acquired  must  "track  the  truth",  so  that  it  is  no  accident  that  the  beliefs 
acquired  are  true,  and  in  different  circumstances,  a  different  true  belief  would  be 
acquired. 
3.  The  fact  of  convergence  in  Western  science  is  reasonably  uncontroversial.  I  Iowever, 
critics  of  Williams  position,  including  Rorty  (1980,  p.  344-345),  would  argue  that 
such  convergence  is  not  best  explained  as  a  convergence  guided  by  how  things  arc, 
but  rather  as  a  socio-cultural  effect  (see  Rorty,  1991,  p.  58).  Rorty's  hostility  to 
Williams'  view  seems  to  reflect  his  resistance  to  the  full  import  of  the  Davidsonian 
notion  that  the  content  of  many  of  our  beliefs,  and  particularly  our  perspectival 
beliefs,  is  effectively  determined  by  their  distal  causes  in  the  world  (sec  Davidson 
1999,  pp.  18-19). 
4.  Williams  is  conscious  of  the  apparent  paradox  entailed  in  this  statement.  One  might 
argue  that  if  the  locals'  statements  are  true  then  the  observer  can  correctly  say  that 
they  are  true.  He  notes  that  his  view  may  seem  to  conflict  with  Tarski's  convention 
T  (the  disquotational  principle),  but  argues  that,  in  fact,  there  is  no  conflict  (Sec 
Williams,  1985,  pp.  143-145). 
5.  In  view  of  the  level  of  opposition  raised  by  some  of  the  more  controversial  aspects 
of  the  1995  exposure  draft  Statement  of  Principles,  the  ASB  agreed  to  consult  more 
fully  before  proceeding  with  the  development  of  a  final  statement  (ASB,  1996,  p.  1), 
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and  a  revised  exposure  draft  (ASB,  1999a),  responsive  to  criticism  of  the  earlier  draft, 
was  issued  prior  to  the  issue  of  a  final  version  of  the  Statement  of  Principles  (ASB, 
1999d). 
6.  The  draft  Statement  of  Principles  defined  gains  and  losses  as  increases  or  decreases 
in  ownership  interest,  other  than  those  relating  to  contributions  from  or  distributions 
to  owners  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.47),  and  defined  ownership  interest  itself  as  the 
entity's  assets  less  its  liabilities  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  3.39). 
7.  ASB's  Statement  of  Principles  generally  draws  heavily  on  the  FASB  Conceptual 
Framework  project:  The  ASB  acknowledge  that  their  framework  is  "based  on  the 
International  Accounting  Standards  Committee's  (IASC)  'Framework  for  the 
Preparation  and  Presentation  of  Financial  Statements. 
...  (Which)  was  in  turn  based 
on  the  US  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board's  (FASB)  pioneering  work  on  its 
Statements  of  Financial  Accounting  Concepts"  (ASB,  1999a,  preface). 
8.  The  positive  accounting  researcher  moves  into  the  position  of  detached  observer 
rather  than  participant  in  a  way  of  life,  and  hence  is  unwilling  to  use  the  normative 
language  of  the  participants.  Many  critics  of  positive  accounting  research  would 
argue  that  the  positive  approach  does  not  in  fact  succeed  in  eliminating  normative 
theory  from  accounting  research  but  merely  suppress  its  recognition  (see  Tinker, 
1982). 
9.  If  we  allow  that  members  of  an  unreflective  society  may  have  ethical  knowledge 
when  they  correctly  apply  their  concepts  using  appropriate  criteria,  and  we  therefore 
agree  that  there  can  be  ethical  knowledge  at  the  unreflective  level.  And  if  we  accept 
that  ethical  reflection  tends  to  undermine  thick  ethical  concepts,  and  that  reflection 
itself  can  not  give  us  ethical  knowledge,  then  we  can  say  that  "reflection  can  destroy 
knowledge"  (Williams,  1985,  pp.  145-148). 
10.  A  thick  ethical  concepts  may  survive  reflection  "just  in  the  sense  that  that  we  would 
not  have  encountered  any  considerations  that  led  us  to  give  it  up,  lose  hold  on  it,  or 
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simply  drift  away  from  it"  (Williams,  1995,  p.  206).  Survival  in  this  sense  does  not 
mean  that  the  concept  will  somehow  be  validated  by  reflection  in  anything  like  the 
way  that  scientific  perspectival  knowledge  can  be  justified  by  explanation. 
11.  For  fuller  analysis  of  the  relevance  of  Habermas'  work  for  accounting  scc,  for 
example;  Laughlin,  1987;  Arrington,  &  Puxty,  1991;  Power  &  Laughlin,  1996. 
12.  Habermas  adumbrates  a  transcendental-pragmatic  justification  of  (U),  but  dots  not 
himself  present  its  formal  derivation.  See  Rehg  (1997)  for  an  outlinc  and  critical 
discussion  of  the  formal  derivation  of  (U). 
13.  For  fuller  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  the  views  of  i  iabcmias  and  Davidson 
see  Schatzki,  (1986),  Baynes,  (1990),  and  Hoy  (1994). 
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Notes  to  chapter  4:  Validity  in  Accounting  Standard  Setting  and  the  Presuppositions 
of  External  Financial  Reporting 
1.  We  follow  Davidson's  advice,  and  accept  that  we  should: 
"...  not  say  that  truth  is  correspondence,  coherence,  warranted 
assertibility,  ideally  justified  assertibility,  what  is  accepted  in  the 
conversation  of  the  right  people,  what  science  will  end  up 
maintaining,  what  explains  the  convergence  on  single  theories  in 
science,  or  the  success  of  our  ordinary  beliefs.  " 
(Davidson,  1990,  p.  309) 
2.  Correspondence  theories  of  truth  have  historically  tended  to  be  realist,  and  many 
philosophers  including  Davidson  (1990,  p.  308)  have  written  as  if  the  correspondence 
theory  of  truth  implied  realism.  Searle,  for  example,  suggests  that  "On  a  normal 
interpretation,  the  correspondence  theory  implies  realism  since  it  implies  that  there 
is  a  reality  to  which  statements  correspond  if  they  are  true"  (Searle,  1995,  p.  154).  We 
understand  realism  to  be  the  thesis  that  certain  things  exist  independently  of  mind, 
and  we  accept  that  correspondence  theories  of  truth  are  not  necessarily  intrinsically 
realist;  Strictly  speaking,  a  correspondence  theory  "requires  that  a  certain  state  of 
affairs  x  obtains,  but  not  that  it  obtain  independently  of  mind.  It  is  perfectly  possible 
to  hold  that  truth  consists  in  correspondence  with  facts  and  to  hold  also  that  facts  are 
mind-dependent  entities"  (Kirkham,  1992,  p.  133-134).  Nevertheless,  without  realism 
the  thesis  of  correspondence  is  weak,  and  almost  all  theorists  who  arc  attracted  to 
correspondence  theories  of  truth  prefer  a  substantial  version  of  the  thesis  entailing 
realism. 
3.  Davidson  uses  a  line  of  argument,  initially  advanced  by  Frege  (1892)  to  show  that  "... 
if  a  statement  corresponds  to  one  fact,  it  corresponds  to  all"  (Davidson,  1969,  p.  42), 
in  which  case,  we  can  not  explain  truth  in  terms  of  correspondence  to  facts. 
4.  Metaphysical  realism  is  a  term  used  by  Putnam  to  describe  the  conjunction  of  the 
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following  theses:  (i)  The  ontological  thesis  that  reality  exists  independently  of  our 
representations  of  it.  (ii)  The  epistemological  thesis  that  there  is  one  correct  scheme 
for  describing  reality.  And  (iii)  the  thesis  that  truth  consists  in  the  correspondence 
between  representation  and  representation-independent  reality: 
"...  the  world  consists  of  some  fixed  totality  of  mind-independent 
objects.  There  is  exactly  one  true  and  complete  description  of  'the 
way  the  world  is'.  Truth  involves  some  sort  of  correspondence 
relation  between  words  or  thought-signs  and  external  things  and  sets 
of  things.  " 
(Putnam,  1981,  p.  49) 
Searle  does  not  accept  that  there  is  one  correct  scheme  for  describing  the  world. 
5.  Rorty  enthusiastically  claims  Davidson's  rejection  of  scheme-content  dualism  as 
supportive  of  his  own  pragmatist  position:  "his  repudiation  of  ...  the  idea  that 
something  like  'mind'  or  'language'  can  bear  some  relation  such  as  'fitting'  or 
'organizing'  the  world  ...  makes  it  tempting  to  see  Davidson  as  belonging  to  the 
American  pragmatist  tradition"  (Rorty,  1986,  p.  333). 
6.  Morgan  clearly rejects  external  realism;  He  does  not  think,  as  Shapiro  does,  that 
"external  reality  exists  independently  of  the  financial  statements  that  attempt  to 
represent  it"  (Shapiro,  1997,  p.  167).  Morgan  seems  to  take  a  thoroughly  idealist 
position,  drawing  inspiration  directly  form  Berkley  (see  Morgan,  1988,  p.  482). 
Berkley's  views  are  commonly  interpreted  as  a  reaction  against  Locke's  empiricism 
-  the  thesis  that  the  mind  is  furnished  with  ideas  by  experience  (sensory  mediation). 
Berkley  was  particularly  opposed  to  the  radical  scepticism  that  Locke's  empiricism 
seemed  to  invite:  If  all  we  have  is  our  ideas,  what  is  to  guarantee  that  any  of  them  arc 
actually  in  touch  with  the  world?  Berkley's  answer  was  to  deny  the  existence  of 
matter.  He  maintained  that  the  ordinary  objects  of  experience  are  just  "collections  of 
ideas",  radical  scepticism  then  becomes  impossible  because  it  makes  no  sense  to 
argue  that  things  might  not  be  as  they  appear.  Berkley  then  faces  an  issue  of  what 
294 Notes  to  chapter  4:  Validity  in  Accounting  Standard  Setting  and  the  Presuppositions  of  External  Financial  Reporting 
causes  our  ideas?  He  deals  with  this  question  by  invoking  God.  Shapiro's  willingness 
to  enlist  idealist  and  social  constructionist  thinking  is  made  all  the  more  surprising 
by  the  fact  that  John  Searle  explicitly  defends  his  realism  against  the  antircalist 
challenge  of  "phenomenalist  idealism"  and  "social  constructionism",  (see  Searle, 
1995,  pp.  183-197). 
7.  Just  a  few  paragraphs  prior  the  passage  quoted  by  Shapiro  in  both  his  1997  and  1998 
papers,  Rorty  explicitly  points  out  that  antirepresentationalists  like  himself  who  sec 
objectivity  in  teens  of  intersubjectivity  have  no  use  for  the  notion  of  correspondence: 
"(T)hose  who  wish  to  reduce  objectivity  to  solidarity  -  call  them 
"pragmatists"  -  do  not  require  either  a  metaphysics  or  an 
epistemology.  They  view  truth  as,  in  William  James'  phrase,  what  is 
good  for  us  to  believe.  So  they  do  not  need  an  account  of  a  relation 
between  beliefs  and  objects  called  'correspondence,  '  nor  an  account 
of  human  cognitive  abilities  which  ensures  that  our  species  is  capable 
of  entering  into  that  relation.  " 
(Rorty,  1991,  pp.  22-23) 
8.  Rorty's  own  `cautionary'  use  of  the  concept  of  truth,  (sec  Rorty,  1986  &  1995), 
suggests  that  he  himself  "knows  that  there  is  a  difference  between  our  beliefs  being 
justified  and  our  beliefs  being  true"  (Davidson,  1999,  p.  18).  And  once  it  is  accepted 
that  truth  differs  from  justification,  one  must  surely  acknowledge  that  "there  has  to 
be  something  about  truth  that  you  don't  understand  when  you  understand  `all  about' 
justification"  (Davidson,  1999,  p.  18). 
9.  In  recent  times,  "postmodernism",  in  its  many  guises,  has  overtaken  scientism  and 
become  the  dominant  mode  of  moral  scepticism;  we  might  now,  more  usually,  think 
of  discourse  ethics  as  a  response  to  postmodernism. 
At  the  ideal  limit  a  "balanced"  modernization  process  is  posited  in 
which  the  three  fundamental  spheres  of  social  reproduction  can  at  all 
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times  be  mediated  by  communicative  action,  that  is,  action  which 
explicitly  raises  claims  to  truth,  rightness  and  sincerity  within 
institutional  contexts  in  which  such  claims  may  be  consensually 
resolved.  This  involves  something  like  sustaining  the  lines  of 
substantive  public  accountability  between  quasi-autonomous  sub- 
systems,  such  as  the  economy,  and  the  public  sphere  of  dialogue  and 
debate  concerning  fundamental  ends.  " 
(Power  &  Laughlin,  1996,  p.  444) 
10.  The  transcendental-pragmatic  justification  of  (U),  we  have  discussed  here,  does  not 
constitute  proof  or  ultimate  justification  of  discourse  ethics.  Rather,  it  locates 
discourse  ethics  "among  the  reconstructive  sciences  concerned  with  the  rational  bases 
of  knowing,  speaking,  and  acting"  (Habermas,  1983,  p.  98). 
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Notes  to  chapter  5:  The  Reporting  Entity  as  Divided  Subject 
In  the  revised  1999  draft  of  the  SoP,  the  ASB  is  rather  more  guarded  in  its  advocacy 
of  current  value  accounting.  However,  the  Board  does  continue  to  express  its  faith 
that  current  values  will  often  be  the  most  relevant  measurement  basis  (ASB,  1999a, 
para.  6.24),  and  that  markets  may  develop'so  as  to  make  current  values  more  reliable 
and  relevant  (ASB,  1999a,  para.  6.25). 
2.  In  view  of  recent  international  moves  towards  a  single  performance  statement,  the 
ASB's  revised  1999  draft  of  the  SoP  does  not  discuss  the  relative  roles  of  a  profit  and 
loss  statement  and  a  statement  of  total  recognised  gains  and  losses.  Ilowever  it 
remains  clear  that  the  ASB  continue  to  view  income/performance  from  proprietary 
perspective  which  understands  income  in  terms  of  change  in  the  owners'  wealth: 
"The  difference  (between  the  opening  and  closing  balance  sheets, 
adjusted  for  capital  contributions  and  distributions)  is  equal  to  the 
total  of  all  components  of  financial  performance,...  " 
(ASB,  1999b  para.  13) 
3.  The  ASB's  revised  1999  draft  of  the  SoP  is  less  explicit  than  the  1995  draft  in 
advocacy  of  a  "real  terms"  capital  maintenance  model.  However,  consistent  with  "real 
terms",  it  does  imply  that  adjustment  for  both  general  and  specific  price  change  might 
be  appropriate  in  times  of  inflation  (ASB,  1999a,  para.  6.43). 
4.  Our  purposes  here  could  have  been  equally  well  served  through  the  exploration  of 
various  other  accounting  issues.  In  accounting  for  stock  option  compensation  we  have 
selected  an  issue  where  the  reporting  entity  issue  is  salient  and  obvious.  It  is  equally 
obvious  in  many  group  accounting  issues.  Presently  UK  GAAP  seems  to  apply 
proprietary  and  entity  perspectives  on  a  quite  arbitrary  basis  to  group  accounting 
issues.  Consider  FRS2's  treatment  of  disposals  versus  its  treatment  of  intra  group 
trading: 
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"Where  the  group  decreases  its  stake  in  an  undertaking  whether  or  not 
it  continues  to  be  a  subsidiary  undertaking,  a  profit  or  loss  generally 
arises.  Consolidated  financial  statements  are  prepared  from  the 
perspective  of  investors  in  the  parent  undertaking  of  the  group.  Where 
the  group  disposes  of  part  of  its  interest  in  a  subsidiary  undertaking 
it  transacts  directly  with  third  parties  and  a  profit  or  loss  for  the  group 
arises  and  is  reported  in  the  consolidated  financial  statements.  This 
can  be  contrasted  with  the  treatment  of  intra-group  transactions  where 
no  profit  or  loss  arises  for  the  group  as  a  whole  because  the 
transaction  involves  only  undertakings  included  in  the  consolidation 
and  under  common  control  and  does  not  directly  involve  any  third 
party.  " 
(ASB,  1992b,  para.  91) 
5. 
In  para.  91  the  entity  perspective  prevails  for  treatment  of  intra  group  trading  whereas 
a  proprietary  perspective  is  taken  on  the  treatment  of  the  disposal  of  an  interest  in  a 
subsidiary.  The  justification  given  for  the  adoption  of  different  perspectives  is, 
obviously  flimsy;  How  we  define  the  entity  will  affect  our  identification  of  'third 
parties'.  We  might  have  hoped  that  the  ASB's  SoP  project  might  have  helped  us 
resolve  such  confusions  and  contradiction.  In  fact  the  SoP  gives  little  guidance.  The 
Board,  surely  rather  disingenuously,  suggest  that:  "Deciding  which  perspective  to  use 
as  a  basis  for  accounting  for  subsidiaries  depends  on  the  relative  usefulness  of  the 
information  each  provides"  (ASB,  1995b,  para.  7.19).  But  how  should  we 
conceptualise  usefulness?  From  the  perspective  of  a  "wide  range  of  users"  (ASB, 
1995b,  para.  1.1)  or  as  collapsed  down  to  the  perspective  of  the  providers  of  capital 
(Ernst  &  Young,  1996b,  p.  273)?  The  alternative  perspectives  on  the  definition  of  the 
reporting  entity,  tend  to  privilege  the  information  needs  of  alternative  user  groups: 
"whose  presumed  "perspective"  should  be  incorporated  into  the  measurement  of 
enterprise  performance"  (FASB,  1990,  para.  140). 
The  FASB,  found  this  issue  critical  to  its  project  on  accounting  for  stock 
compensation: 
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"...  advocates  of  the  opposing  views  on  the  nature  of  an  enterprise's 
contractual  obligation  to  issue  its  own  stock  at  a  specified  price  -a 
call  option  written  on  its  own  stock  -  generally  view  the  relationship 
between  an  enterprise  and  its  owners  differently.  " 
(FASB,  1990,  para.  15). 
Appendix  B  of  the  FASB's  Discussion  Memorandum,  Distinguishing  between 
Liability  and  Equity  Instruments  and  Accounting  for  Instruments  with  Characteristics 
of  Both,  (FASB,  1990)  is  devoted  to  discussion  of  this  issue. 
6.  We  will  also  avoid  any  detailed  discussion  of  recognition  and  measurement  issues. 
However  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  draft  SoP  includes  provisions,  (which  some 
commentators  argue  would  be  more  fittingly  included  in  an  accounting  standard), 
which  would  mean  that  under  the  SoP  recognition  would  have  to  await  the 
employees'  delivery  of  service: 
"When  either  party  to  a  transaction  has  performed,  the  assets  and 
liabilities  arising  from  that  performance  should  be  recognised.  Thus 
if  payment  is  made  before  delivery  of  stock,  an  asset  representing  the 
claim  on  the  supplier  is  recognised.  More  usually,  delivery  will  be  the 
first  act  of  performance  and  the  stock  and  an  obligation  to  pay  for  it 
will  be  recognised  at  that  time.  In  the  case  of  property  being  acquired 
under  a  long-term  contract  the  project  and  related  obligations  are 
recognised  as  the  contractor  performs.  Performance  has  not  occurred, 
conversely,  in  respect  of  future  services  of  employment,  and  so  no 
asset  or  liability  should  be  recognised.  ... 
" 
(ASB,  1995b,  para.  4.19) 
The  ASB  give  no  justification  for  the  treatment  of  "future  employment  services" 
which  they  propose.  The  FASB  dealing  with  the  same  issue,  come  to  a  different 
conclusion  supported  by  more  careful  reasoning: 
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"Fully  executory  contracts  under  which  neither  party  has  begun  to 
fulfil  its  obligations  are  usually  not  recognized  as  assets,  liabilities, 
or  equity  in  financial  statements.  Once  an  employee  stock-option  is 
granted,  however,  it  no  longer  is  a  fully  executory  contract.  The 
employer  has  already  conveyed  to  the  employee  the  right  to  benefit 
from  future  increases  in  the  price  of  the  underlying  stock,  which  is  the 
essence  of  an  option.  Moreover,  the  employee  begins  rendering  the 
agreed-upon  future  service  at  the  grant  date.  Accordingly,  both  parties 
have  begun  to  fulfil  the  terms  of  the  contract,  which  makes  it  partially 
executory.  Accountants  routinely  recognize  partially  executory 
contracts  -  examples  are  transactions  in  debt  and  equity  securities  that 
are  recognized  at  the  trade  date  rather  than  the  settlement  date.  " 
(FASB,  1993,  para.  65) 
7.  The  FASB  recognised,  in  1988,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  resolve  accounting  for  stock 
compensation  "without  first  considering  the  more  fundamental  issues  in  the  broader 
project  on  distinguishing  between  liabilities  and  equity"  (FASB,  1990,  para.  14). 
8.  The  FASB's  Concept  Statement  6  definitions  of  assets  and  liabilities  also  refer  to  "an 
entity".  However,  para.  24  of  Concept  Statement  6  defines  the  "entity"  as  the 
"business  enterprise",  economic  operating  unit;  that  is  the  entity  is  defined  in  terms 
of  entity  theory  rather  than  proprietary  theory: 
"All  elements  are  defined  in  relation  to  a  particular  entity,  which  may 
be  a  business  enterprise,  an  educational  or  charitable  organization,  a 
natural  person,  or  the  like.  " 
(FASB,  1985,  para.  24) 
Therefore  the  FASB  are  able  to  clearly  conclude  that  an  enterprise's  obligation  to 
issue  stock  is  not  a  liability  in  terms  of  the  FASB  conceptual  framework: 
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"A  call  written  on  an  enterprise's  own  stock  fails  to  exhibit  the  first 
characteristic  of  a  liability  as  defined  in  Concepts  Statement  6 
because  it  does  not  embody  an  obligation  to  transfer  the  enterprise's 
assets  or  to  provide  services  to  another  entity  in  the  future.  ... 
The 
terms  of  the  eventual  "exchange"  if  the  option  is  exercised  cannot  be 
unfavourable  to  the  enterprise  itself,  although  the  terms  may  well  be 
unfavourable  to  the  enterprise's  preexisting  shareholders  -  its  group 
of  stockholders  just  before  the  transaction  occurs.  " 
(FASB,  1990,  para.  119) 
9.  The  measurement  date  for  a  stock  option  is  the  date  at  which  the  share  price  that 
enters  into  the  final  measurement  of  the  option  is  fixed.  Subsequent  changes  in  the 
price  of  the  underlying  share  will  have  no  effect  on  the  measurement  of  the  option  as 
a  liability  or  equity  instrument  or  on  the  measurement  of  the  related  compensation 
cost,  (see  FASB,  1993,  paras.  80-99). 
10.  By  "proprietors",  advocates  of  the  proprietary  perspective  generally  mean  "the 
stockholder  group  existing  just  before  an  issue  of  stock  or  remaining  after  a 
repurchase  of  stock"  (FASB,  1990,  para.  131). 
11.  We  believe  that  financial  reporting  standard  setting  in  late  capitalist  societies  is 
inevitably  'political'.  The  development  of  a  conceptual  framework  for  financial 
reporting  accounting  is  in  itself  a  political  act;  Both  the  proprietary  and  entity 
conceptions  of  the  reporting  entity  are  essentially  ideological  constructs. 
12.  Lacan's  analysis  may  be  regarded  as  deeply  antibiologistic.  He  "locates  subjectivity 
entirely  in  language  -  of  which  the  body  becomes  merely  an  effect"  (Blum  &  Nast, 
1996,  p.  569).  Lacan's  antibiologism  is  considered  by  some  commentators  to  be  a 
weakness.  Lefebvre,  whilst  appropriating  much  of  the  Lacanian  analytic  framework, 
objects  to  the  "logical,  epistemological  and  anthropological  priority"  it  gives 
language  over  space  (Lefebvre,  1974,  p.  35-36).  Lefebvre  sees  the  Lacanian  subject 
as  two-  dimensional:  image  and  language.  And  he  argues  that  the  material  and  the 
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political  dimensions  are  typically  omitted  from  such  structural  analyses: 
In  point  of  fact  this  approach  leaves  two  areas  untouched,  one  on  the 
near  side  and  the  other  on  the  far  side,  so  to  speak,  of  the 
readable/visible.  On  the  near  side,  what  is  overlooked  is  the  body.... 
For  it  is  by  means  of  the  body  that  space  is  perceived,  lived  -  and 
produced.  On  the  far  side  of  the  readable/visible,  and  equally  absent 
... 
is  power.  " 
(Lefebvre,  1974,  p.  162) 
For  other  critics,  however,  the  problem  with  Lacan's  analysis  is  that  he  fails  to 
sufficiently  omit  the  body;  and  in  particular  that  he  is  unduly  reliant  on  csscntializcd 
anatomies.  For  example,  Gilles  Deleuze  and  Felix  Guattari  (1972)  attack  what  they 
see  as  Lacan's  attempt  to  ground  the  subject  of  the  unconscious  in  private  Oedipal 
experience  and  fantasy.  They  argue  that  the  unconscious  is  a  social  product,  and  that 
all  fantasy  is  group  fantasy. 
13.  For  Lacan,  "the  unconscious  is  neither  primordial  nor  instinctual"  (Lacan,  1957, 
p.  170),  it  exists  entirely  in  the  symbolic  order  of  language,  it  is  "the  discourse  of  the 
Other"  (Lacan,  1957-58,  p.  193).  The  Lacanian  unconscious  is  not  something  interior 
to  the  subject.  Rather,  it  precedes  the  subject,  it  is  "intersubjective",  "transindividual" 
(Lacan,  1953b,  p.  49).  Lacan  equates  the  subject  with  the  id.  The  equation  is  reflected 
in  the  homophony  he  exploits  between  the  German  term  ES  (it)  and  the  letter  S,  the 
symbol  by  which  Lacan  designates  the  subject  (Lacan,  1955,  p.  129).  Lacan  conceives 
of  the  id  as  the  symbolic  it,  the  force  at  the  origin  of  speech,  beyond  the  imaginary 
false-being  of  the  ego.  He  stresses  that  the  forces  concerned  are  linguistic  not 
primitive  biological  drives. 
14.  In  opposition  to  the  imaginary  and  the  symbolic  orders,  Lacan  identifies  a  third  order, 
the  real.  The  real  is  "that  which  resists  symbolization  absolutely"  (Lacan,  1953-54, 
p.  66).  It  is  all  that  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  or  represent  symbolically.  For  example, 
the  body  is  in  the  real  until  it  is  inscribed  by  language  and  transformed  into  a  social 
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reality;  The  symbolic  "kills  the  real". 
15.  The  mirror  stage  is  not  merely  a  developmental  phase.  Lacan  clearly  regards  it  as  part 
of  the  permanent  structure  of  subjectivity,  the  paradigm  case  of  the  imaginary 
register,  (see  Evans,  1996,  p.  114). 
16  Lacan  distinguishes  between  'need',  'demand',  and  'desire'.  Need  is  biological  -  the 
human  child  depends  on  others  for  satisfaction  of  his  needs  (and  needs  can  be 
satiated).  To  get  the  Other's  help  the  infant  must  articulate  his  need  in  language  as 
demand,  and  "in  so  far  as  his  needs  are  subjected  to  demand,  they  return  to  him 
alienated"  (Lacan,  1958b,  p.  286).  The  infant's  demands  call  the  Other  to  address  its 
needs.  The  presence  of  the  Other  takes  on  significance  beyond  the  satisfaction  of 
need  -  it  symbolises  the  Other's  love.  Demand  then  has  double  function  -  the 
articulation  of  need  and  a  call  for  love.  After  the  need  articulated  in  demand  has  been 
satisfied  a  residual  will  remain  -  desire  -  the  insatiable  craving  for  love:  "Desire 
begins  to  take  shape  in  the  margin  in  which  demand  becomes  separated  from  need" 
(Lacan,  1960,  p.  311). 
17.  The  mother  as  parent  is  first  representative  of  the  symbolic  order  to  the  child.  She  is 
thus,  also  (m)Other  to  the  child;  the  big  Other  of  radical  alterity  -  equated  with 
language  and  law.  "The  Other  is,  therefore,  the  locus  in  which  speech  is  constituted" 
(Lacan,  1955,  p.  141),  and  the  mOther  is  the  first  occupier  of  this  locus  for  the  child. 
She  introduces  the  child  to  the  symbolic  order,  by  which  she  is  herself  bound  and 
structured.  She  introduces  the  world  of  rules  and  regulations,  language  and  law,  that 
is,  the  father's  world. 
18 
19. 
What  most  threatens  the  child  is  a  "lack  of  the  lack"  in  the  maternal:  The  fantasy  of 
maternal  plenitude,  the  perfect  fit  between  the  mother  and  child's  needs. 
The  incompatibility  of  language  and  desire  should  not  be  understood  as  designating 
desire  to  some  primordial  pre-linguistic  realm;  Desire  is  inconceivable  without 
language,  and  can  only  be  recognised  when  it  is  brought  into  speech. 
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20.  The  unity  of  mOther-child  need  not  be  exclusively  conceived  of  in  temporal  terms, 
it  is  also  a  logical  or  structural  moment  in  the  development  of  the  subject.  The 
operation  of  the  paternal  metaphor  is  clearly  related,  in  Freudian  terms,  to  the  reality 
principle,  which  does  not  cancel  the  pleasure  principle  but  rather  directs  it  in  socially 
acceptable  ways.  The  symbolic  order  blocks  the  child's  pleasurable  contact  with  the 
mother,  so  that  the  child  is  driven  to  pursue  pleasure  in  more  socially  acceptable 
ways.  The  symbolic  kills  the  real  and  makes  of  it  a  socially  acceptable  reality. 
21.  For  Lacan,  being  is  constituted  through  language,  and  is  existence  in  the  symbolic 
order.  It  is  therefore  possible  for  something  to  exist  in  the  real,  without  being.  Each 
person  has  an  "ineffable,  stupid  existence"  (Lacan,  1957-58,  p.  194),  an  element 
which  can  not  be  fully  rendered  in  the  symbolic.  The  subject  originates  in  a  lack  of 
being  (manque-ä-titre),  which  causes  desire,  which  is  always  essentially  a  desire  for 
being;  "desire  is  the  metonymy  of  the  want-to-be,  the  ego  is  the  metonymy  of  desire" 
(Lacan,  1958a,  p.  274). 
22.  Object  a  may  also  be  thought  of  as  the  little  other  of  schema  L,  the  ego's 
phantasmatic  counterpart.  In  separation  the  subject  becomes  split  between  the  ego 
and  the  unconscious,  and  the  Other  is  correspondingly  divided  between  object  a,  a 
remnant  of  the  real,  and  the  lacking  Other  of  the  symbolic  order. 
23.  The  symbolic  order,  the  Law,  is  "grounded  in"  the  prohibition  of  jouissance; 
"jouissance  is  forbidden  to  him  who  speaks"  (Lacan,  1960,  p.  319).  This  prohibition, 
the  pleasure  principle,  acts  as  a  restraint  on  excitement/enjoyment,  which  the  subject 
rails  against.  Beyond  the  prohibition  pleasure  becomes  pain,  painful  pleasure; 
jouissance.  In  the  subject's  entry  to  the  symbolic  order,  through  separation,  the 
subject  must  give  up  the  jouissance  associated  with  union  with  the  mother.  It  must 
stop  trying  to  be  the  phallus  for  the  mOther  and  suffer  castration  in  language: 
"Castration  means  that  jouissance  must  be  refused,  so  that  it  can  be  reached  on  the 
inverted  ladder  (1echelle  renversee)  of  the  Law  of  desire"  (Lacan,  1960,  p.  324). 
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24.  The  subject  projected  into  fantasy  by  the  process  of  separation  is  blocked  from 
realising  its  cause  -  the  Other  as  desire  and  language. 
. 
"This  second  subordination  (to  the  Other  as  desire  in  separation)  not 
only  closes  the  effect  of  the  first  (subordination  to  the  other  as 
language  in  alienation)  in  projecting  the  topology  of  the  subject  into 
the  instant  of  fantasy;  it  seals  it,  refusing  to  allow  the  subject  of  desire 
to  realize  that  he  is  an  effect  of  speech,  to  realize,  in  other  words,  that 
he  is but  the  Other's  desire.  " 
(Lacan,  1964b,  p.  265) 
25.  In  Lacan's  work  the  term  neurosis  refers  to  a  particular  clinical  structure.  Neurosis  is 
the  predominant  human  condition.  The  neurotic  subject  follows  the  pattern  of 
alienation  and  separation  we  have  described  in  this  section  of  the  paper.  For  Lacan 
the  unconscious  is  instituted  on  the  basis  of  relations  between  signifiers,  anchored, 
for  the  neurotic,  by  the  signifier  of  the  Other's  desire.  The  neurotic  subject  is 
anchored  in  the  sense  that  all  the  signifiers  used  by  a  neurotic  are  tied  back  to  the 
subjects  master  signifiers  which  Lacan  links  with  the  signifier  of  the  Other's  desire 
-  the  name-of-the-father.  Every  word  used  by  the  neurotic  speaks  of  his/her  relation 
to  the  desire  of  the  Other.  The  neurotic  subject  is  then  fully  implicated  in  language. 
The  principal  alternative  to  neurosis,  psychosis,  results  from  the  failure  of  the 
paternal  metaphor.  The  psychotic  fails  to  assimilate  the  name-of-the-father  into 
his/her  symbolic  universe,  and  so  the  words  used  by  the  psychotic  are  not  pinned 
back  to  the  subject;  the  psychotic  is  not  anchored  in  language. 
26.  The  name-of-the-father  is  a  signifier,  for  Lacan,  but  it  is  different  from  other 
signifiers:  It  is  primally  repressed,  unpronounceable,  and  has  a  certain  fixity  so  that 
it  is  not  fully  in  the  play  of  language  -  it  can  not  be  substituted  or  overlapped  by  other 
signifiers.  Essentially  the  primordial  signifier  for  the  firm  is  dependent  upon  the 
subject's  reaching  towards  the  desire  of  the  other.  We  are  not  suggesting  that  'the- 
market'  is  a  universal  primordial  signifier  for  firms.  For  some  firms  the  name-of-  thc- 
father  may  be  something  altogether  more  mysterious. 
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27.  Again  we  should  stress  the  antibiologistic  aspect  of  Lacan's  thought.  For  Lacan  the 
drives  are  completely  removed  from  biology.  They  are  cultural  products  of  the 
symbolic  order.  They  should  not  be  conceived  of  as  "some  ultimate  given,  something 
archaic,  primordial"  (Lacan,  1964a,  p.  162).  Unlike  need,  drives  do  not  aim  at 
satisfaction,  but  at  the  repetitive  movement  around  their  object.  For  Lacan  every  drive 
is  ultimately  a  death  drive,  they  are  all  repetitive,  excessive  and  finally  destructive 
(see  Evans,  1996,  p.  46-49). 
28.  Analysis  aims  at  a  kind  of  deconstruction,  it  aims  to  put  into  motion  the  meaning  of 
the  master  signifiers.  It  is  tempting  to  think  of  the  master  signifiers  as  "transcendental 
signifiers".  Whilst  recognising  that  no  signifier  is  truly  "transcendental",  no  signifier 
is  fully  isolated  from  the  flow  of  language  and  history,  it  seems  clear  that  power,  for 
example  the  power  of  the  Other's  desire,  holds  certain  signifiers  very  firmly  in  place. 
Lacanian  analysis  is  in  a  sense  ideology  critique  for  the  subject.  Once  the  master 
signifier  has  been  deconstructed,  put  in  motion,  the  subject  as  sedimentation  of 
meaning  is  correspondingly  mobilised,  its  anchorage  points  in  the  name-of-the-father 
/  master  signifier  are  loosened. 
29.  The  translation  of  "Wo  Es  war,  soll  Ich  werden"  given  by  the  standard  English 
translation  of  Freud's  works  "Where  id  was,  there  ego  shall  be"  (Freud,  1933,  p.  80), 
is  explicitly  rejected  by  Lacan  (1955,  p.  128). 
30.  An  analogous  moral  imperative  is  implicit  in  Marx's  theory  of  history.  For  Marx  too 
man  must  subjectivize  his  own  history  and  the  living  must  shake  free  of  the  dcad: 
"Men  make  their  own  history,  but  they  do  not  make  it  just  as  they 
please;  they  do  not  make  it  under  circumstances  chosen  by 
themselves,  but  under  circumstances  directly  encountered,  given,  and 
transmitted  from  the  past.  " 
(Marx,  1851,  p.  300) 
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31.  The  analyst  clearly  has  a  role  to  play  in  helping  the  subject  on  the  path  beyond 
neurosis.  This  is  not  the  place  for  a  full  discussion  of  that  role;  however  one  or  two 
thoughts  seem  pertinent.  In  analysis,  the  analyst  will  tend  to  be  cast  by  the  subject  in 
the  role  of  "the  one  who  knows"  the  Other  as  the  locus  of  speech  and  meaning.  In 
attempting  to  represent  itself  to  the  analyst  the  subject  is  further  alienated;  it  slips 
behind  more  language.  As  a  surrogate  object  a,  the  analyst  will  also  typically  come 
to  represent  the  Other  as  desire  for  the  subject.  The  Lacanian  analyst  will  typically 
adopt  strategies  designed  to  be  to  disrupt  the  neurotic  subject's  comfortable  alienation 
in  language.  For  example,  the  analyst  may  unexpectedly  halt  a  session  whilst  the 
analysand  is  in  the  process  of  providing  the  explanations  which  he/she  assumes  the 
analyst  wants  to  hear.  The  analysand  pushed  towards  the  recognition  that  he/she  does 
not  know  what  the  analyst  wants,  that  his/her  relation  to  object  a  is  not  quite  as  he/she 
assumed  in  fantasy.  By  confronting  the  subject  with  the  enigma  of  the  Other's  desire, 
the  analyst  aims  to  put  the  subject's  relations  to  the  Other  as  language  and  desire  in 
motion.  For  the  commercial  firm  the  financial  analyst  may  take  the  part  of  the 
psycho-analyst.  Certainly  in  their  relations  with  financial  analysts  many  firms  will 
be  confronted  by  the  enigma  of  the  Other's  desire  -  they  will  be  left  wondering  "what 
do  the  analysts  want?  " 
32.  The  disappearance  of  the  firm  beneath  financial  signifiers  can  be  understood  in  terns 
of  the  colonization  of  the  lifeworld: 
"The  colonizing  potential  of  accounting  consists  not  only  in  the 
instrumental  reach  of  its  information  system  technology  but  also  in 
its  capacity  to  capture  organizational  self  understandings  and  reframe 
them  in  accounting  terms,  thereby  insulating  accounting  from 
systematic  inquiry  other  than  in  terms  of  technical  success  or  failure. 
Hence  accounting  can  be  regarded  as  a  disciplinary  practice  ...  which 
colonizes  areas  of  social  life  by  creating  newly  internalized  facts  and 
vocabularies  which  potentially  undermine  the  capability  of  actors  to 
question  its  self-evident  mission.  " 
(Laughlin  &  Power,  1996,  p.  447) 
307 Notes  to  chapter  5:  The  Reporting  Entity  as  Divided  Subject 
33. 
That  colonization  effected  through  the  constraint  of  dominant  signifiers  imposes 
constraints  on  the  networks  of  social  /communicative  relations  which  sustain  and 
allow  the  development  of  the  identities  of  the  human  individuals  associated  with  the 
firm  and  the  firm  itself  as  accountable,  responsible,  moral  agent  and  subject.  In  the 
case  of  the  firm  the  dominance  of  the  financial  signifiers  threatens  to  deny  the  firm's 
subjectivity  and  reduce  it  to  an  irresponsible  element  of  the  systemic  apparatus.  Fuller 
understandings  of  firm  must  be  developed  through  its  openness  to  difference  and  the 
other  (including  new  social  movements  as  Other)  -  and  the  Other  as  the  stranger 
within  -  the  unconscious. 
In  this  paper  we  have  equated  transcendence  of  the  profit  motive  with,  the  Lacanian 
ethical  imperative,  the  firm  as  subject's  transcendence  of  its  fundamental  fantasy. 
With  some  exceptions  in  the  tradition  of  Friedman  (1970),  there  is  growing 
recognition  of  the  social  benefits  that  might  follow  a  transcendence  of  the  profit 
motive  (Arrow,  1973;  Sen,  1977,1987;  Etzioni,  1988;  Singer,  1994). 
We  suggest  that  the  conception  of  the  firm  as  a  Lacanian  subject,  split 
between  conscious  and  unconscious,  may  be  usefully  extended  in  other  directions. 
It  seems  to  have  relatively  direct  application  at  least  two  spheres.  The  concept  of  the 
firm  as  agent  has  been  as  hotly  debated  in  the  field  of  strategic  management  as  in 
ethics.  And  the  linkages  and  similarities  between  strategy  and  moral  philosophy  have 
been  clearly  drawn  by  Singer  (1994).  He  defends  the  concept  of  the  firm  as  both 
strategic  agent  and  moral  agent,  and  he  argues  that  moral  philosophy  might  inform 
strategic  management  and  provide  a  valuable  counter-balance  to  economic 
considerations.  We  believe  that  a  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  perspective  on  the  firm 
could  yield  valuable  insights  in  the  field  of  strategic  management. 
A  number  of  commentators  argue  that  Law  has  not  been  a  relatively 
ineffective  mean  of  controlling  corporations  (see  Metzger  &  Dalton,  1996)  and  have 
called  for  enriched  perspectives  on  the  firm  as  moral  agent.  Metzger  and  Dalton 
(1996)  have  argued  that  legal  efforts  to  control  the  corporation  would  stand  to  gain 
from  further  ontological  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the  firm.  We  suggest  that  Lacanian 
perspective  might  provide  useful  insight  on  the  issue  of  corporate  responsibility.  The 
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attribution  of  criminal  responsibility  generally  depends  upon  two  conditions  -  firstly 
the  agent's  wrongful  action  (actus  reus)  and  secondly  criminal  intent  (mens  rca). 
Much  of  the  debate  concerning  corporate  moral  responsibility  has  centred  on  the 
issue  of  intentionality  -  whether  or  not  it  is  possible  to  establish  a  corporate  "mens 
rea"  (see  Phillips,  1995).  Under  the  legal  principle  of  identification,  the  states  of 
mind  of  certain  controlling  officers  of  the  corporation  may  be  taken  to  be  the  state  of 
mind  of  the  corporation  itself  (see  Metzger  &  Dalton,  1996;  Moore,  1999).  Some 
commentators  have  argued  that  the  attribution  of  criminal  liability  in  the  absence  of 
moral  culpability,  which  the  principle  of  identification  facilitates,  is  ill  advised  (see 
Metzger,  1996).  In  our  view  the  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  perspective  may  provide 
justification  for  alternative  routes  to  the  attribution  of  intent  to  the  corporation,  for 
example,  in  circumstances  where  no  intention  is  formed  in  the  minds  of  any 
individuals  but  exists  in  the  firm  as  subject  -  perhaps  in  its  unconscious. 
34.  We  suggest  that  a  fuller  recognition  of  centrality  of  responsibility  for  the  other  and 
the  necessity  of  "The  Inclusion  of  the  Other"  is  becoming  more  strongly  evident  in 
some  of  Habermas'  more  recent  work: 
"  If  we  interpret  justice  as  what  is  equally  good  for  all,  then  the 
"good"  that  has  been  extended  step  by  step  to  the  "right"  forms  a 
bridge  between  justice  and  solidarity.  For  universal  justice  also 
requires  that  one  person  should  take  responsibility  for  another,  and 
even  that  each  person  should  stand  in  and  answer  for  a  stranger  who 
has  formed  his  identity  in  completely  different  circumstances  and 
who  understands  himself  in  terms  of  other  traditions.  The  remnant  of 
good  at  the  core  of  the  right  reminds  us  that  moral  consciousness 
depends  on  a  particular  self-understanding  of  moral  persons  who 
recognize  that  they  belong  to  a  particular  moral  community.  All 
individuals  who  have  been  socialized  into  any  communicative  form 
of  life  at  all  belong  to  this  community.  Because  socialized  persons 
can  only  stabilize  their  identities  through  relations  of  reciprocal 
recognition,  their  identity  is  particularly  vulnerable  and  they  are 
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consequently  in  need  of  special  protection.  They  must  be  able  to 
appeal  to  a  source  of  authority  beyond  their  own  community  -  G.  H. 
Mead  speaks  in  this  connection  of  the  "ever  wider  community.  " 
Every  concrete  community  depends  on  the  wider  community  as  its 
"better  self,  "  so  to  speak.  As  members  of  this  community,  individuals 
expect  to  be  treated  equally,  while  it  is  assumed  at  the  same  time  that 
each  person  regards  every  other  person  as  "one  of  us.  "  From  this 
perspective  solidarity  is  simply  the  reverse  side  of  justice.  " 
(Habermas,  1996,  p.  29) 
310 References 
References 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (July  1992a),  Statement  of  Principles  Chapter  3-  The 
elements  offinancial  statements;  Discussion  Draft,  (London:  Accounting  Standards 
Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (July  1992b),  Financial  Reporting  Standard  FRS  No.  2: 
Accounting  for  subsidiary  undertakings,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (October  1992c),  Financial  Reporting  Standard  FRS 
No.  3:  Reporting  financial  performance,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (November  1992d),  Urgent  Issues  Task  Force  Abstract 
6:  Accounting  for  post-retirement  benefits  other  than  pension,  (London:  Accounting 
Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (June  1993a),  Foreword  to  Accounting  Standards, 
(London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (September  1994),  Urgent  Issues  Task  Force  Abstract 
10:  Disclosure  of  director's  share  options,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (March  1995a),  Accounting  for  tax:  Discussion  Paper, 
(London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (November  1995b),  Statement  of  Principles  for 
Financial  Reporting:  Exposure  Draft,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (July  1996),  Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial 
Reporting  -  the  way  ahead.  -  Progress  Paper  on  the  exposure  draft,  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Board). 
311 References 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (March  1999a),  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial 
Reporting:  Revised  Exposure  Draft,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (March  1999b),  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial 
Reporting:  Some  Questions  Answered,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (August  1999c),  Deferred  Tax:  Financial  Reporting 
Exposure  Draft  FRED  No.  19,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  (December  1999d),  Statement  of  Principles  for 
Financial  Reporting,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC)  originally  known  as  the  Accounting  Standards 
Steering  Committee,  (November  1971),  Statement  ofStandaral  Accounting  Practice 
SSAP  No.  2-  Disclosure  of  Accounting  Policies,  (London:  Accounting  Standards 
Committee). 
Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC)  originally  known  as  the  Accounting  Standards 
Steering  Committee,  (May  1973),  Accounting  for  deferred  taxation:  Exposure  Draft 
11,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Committee). 
Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC)  originally  known  as  the  Accounting  Standards 
Steering  Committee,  (1975a),  The  Corporate  Report:  A  discussion  paper,  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Committee). 
Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC)  originally  known  as  the  Accounting  Standards 
Steering  Committee,  (August  1975b),  Statement  of  Standard  Accounting  Practice  !!. 
Accounting  for  deferred  taxation,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Committee). 
Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC),  (October  1978),  Accounting  for  deferred  tat: 
Statement  of  Standard  Accounting  Practice  SSAP  15,  (London:  Accounting  Standards 
Committee). 
312 References 
Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC),  (March  1980a),  Current  Cost  Accounting: 
Statement  of  Standard  Accounting  Practice  SSAP  No.  16,  (London:  Accounting 
Standards  Committee). 
Accounting  Standards  Committee  (ASC),  (August  1980b),  Accounting  for  Contingencies: 
Statement  of  Standard  Accounting  Practice  SSAP  No.  18,  (London:  Accounting 
Standards  Committee). 
Adorno,  T.  W.,  (1966),  Negative  Dialektic,  (Frankfurt  am  Maine:  Suhrkamp),  translated  by 
E.  B.,  Ashton,  as  Negative  Dialectics,  1973,  (London:  Routlcdgc  and  Kcgan  Paul). 
Alexander,  S.  S.,  (1950),  "Income  Measurement  in  a  Dynamic  Economy",  in  Five 
Monographs  on  Business  Income  (New  York:  American  Institute  of  Certified  Public 
Accountants),  revised  by  D.  Solomons  and  reprinted  in  Studies  in  Accounting  Theory, 
W.  T.  Baxter  &  S.  Davidson  (eds.  ),  1962,  pp.  126-200,  (Homewood,  Ill:  Richard  D. 
Irwin  Inc,  ). 
Alexy,  A.,  (1973),  "Eine  Theorie  des  praktischen  Diskurses",  in  W.  Oclntüllcr  (cd.  ), 
Normenbegriindung,  Normendurchsetzung,  pp.  22-58,  (Praderbor:  Schöningh), 
summarised  and  extended  as  "A  Theory  of  Practical  Discourse",  in  The 
communicative  Ethics  Controversy,  S.  Benhabib  &  F.  Dallmayr  (eds.  ),  1990,  pp.  151- 
190,  (Cambridge:  MIT  Press). 
Altham,  J.  E.  J.,  (1995),  "Reflection  and  Confidence",  in  World,  Blind,  and  Ethics:  Essays  on 
the  Ethical  Philosophy  of  Bernard  Williams,  J.  E.  Altharn  &  R.  Harrison  (cds.  ), 
pp.  156-169,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
American  Institute  of  Certified  Public  Accountants  (AICPA),  (1973),  Objectives  of  Financial 
Statements:  the  Report  of  a  Study  Group  chaired  by  R.  Trueblood,  (New  York: 
American  Institute  of  Certified  Public  Accountants). 
313 References 
Ansari,  S.  L.  and  McDonagh,  J.  J.,  (1980),  "Intersubjectivity  -  The  Challenge  and  Opportunity 
for  Accounting",  Accounting  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  5,  No.  1,  pp.  129-142. 
Arden,  M.,  (1993),  The  True  and  Fair  Requirement,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Arendt,  H.,  (1963),  Eichmann  in  Jerusalem:  A  Report  on  the  Banality  of  Evil,  (Ncw  York: 
Viking  Press). 
Armstrong,  M.  S.,  (February  1977),  "The  Politics  of  Establishing  Accounting  Standards", 
Journal  of  Accountancy,  pp.  76-79. 
Arnold,  P.  &  Hammond,  T.,  (1994),  "The  Role  of  Accounting  in  Ideological  Conflict: 
Lessons  From  the  South  African  Divestment  Movement",  Accounting,  Qrgani.  ativ»s 
and  Society,  Vol.  19,  No.  2,  pp.  111-126. 
Arrington,  C.  E.  &  Puxty,  A.  G.,  (1991),  "Accounting,  Intcrests,  and  Rationality:  A 
Communicative  Relation",  Critical  Perspectives  on  Accounting,  Vol.  2,  No.  1,  pp.  31- 
58. 
Arrow,  K.  J.,  (1963),  Social  Choice  and  Individual  Values,  (New  haven:  Yale  University 
Press). 
Arrow,  K.  J.,  (1973),  "Social  Responsibility  and  Economic  Efficiency",  Public  Policy, 
Vol.  XXI,  No.  3,  reproduced  in  Ethical  Issues  in  Business:  A  Philosophical  Approach, 
T.  Donaldson  &  P.  H.  Werhane  (eds.  ),  1996,  pp.  227-237,  (Upper  Saddle  River,  N.  J.: 
Prentice  Hall). 
Arthur  Andersen,  (1995),  Comment  on  -  Accounting  for  tax;  Discussion  Paper,  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Arthur  Andersen,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  37-57,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
314 References 
Barth,  M.  E.  &  Landsman,  W.  R.,  (1995),  "Fundamental  Issues  Related  to  Using  Fair  Value 
Accounting  For  Financial  Reporting",  Accounting  Horizons,  Vol.  9,  No.  4,  pp.  97- 
107. 
Bass  p1c,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  86-89,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Bauman,  Z.,  (1989),  Modernity  and  the  Holocaust,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Bauman,  Z.,  (1993),  Postmodern  Ethics,  (Oxford:  Blackwell). 
Baynes,  K.,  (1990),  "Rational  Reconstruction  and  Social  Criticism:  IIabermas's  Model  of 
Interpretive  Social  Science"  in  Hermeneutics  and  Critical  Theory  In  Ethics  and 
Politics,  M.  Kelly  (ed.  ),  pp.  123-145,  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  The  MIT  Press). 
Beaver,  W.  H.,  (1981),  Financial  Reporting:  An  Accounting  Revolution,  (New  Jcrscy: 
Prentice-Hall). 
Belkaoui,  A.,  (1978),  "Linguistic  Relativity  in  Accounting",  Accounting,  Organisations  and 
Society,  Vol.  3,  No.  2,  pp.  97-104. 
Belkaoui,  A.,  (1985),  Accounting  Theory  2nd  edition,  (San  Dicgo:  Ilarcourt  Bracc 
Jovanovitch). 
Bernstein,  J.,  (1983),  Beyond  Objectivism  and  Relativism:  Science,  Ilermeneutics  and  Praxis, 
(Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell). 
Bhaskar,  R.,  (1986),  Scientific  realism  and  human  emancipation,  (London:  Vcrso). 
Blackburn,  S.,  (1986),  "Making  Ends  Meet",  Philosophical  Books,  VoI.  XXVII,  No.  4, 
pp.  193-203. 
315 References 
Blum,  V.  &  Nast,  H.,  (1996),  "Where's  the  difference?  The  heterosexualization  of  altcrity  in 
Henri  Lefebvre  and  Jacques  Lacan",  Environment  and  Planning  D:  Society  and 
Space,  Vol.  14,  pp.  559-580. 
Boland,  R.  J.,  (1989),  "Beyond  the  Objectivist  and  Subjectivist:  Learning  to  Rcad  Accounting 
as  Text",  Accounting,  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  14,  No.  5/6,  pp.  591-604. 
Boswell,  J.,  "The  Life  of  Samuel  Johnson,  LL.  D.  (London:  Bliss  Sands,  1791). 
Bracher,  M.,  (1993),  Lacan,  Discourse  and  Social  Change:  A  Psychoanalytic  Cultural 
Criticism,  (Ithica,  New  York:  Cornell  University  Press). 
Bromwich,  M.,  (1992),  Financial  Reporting,  Information  and  Capital  Markets,  (London: 
Pitman). 
Callinicos,  A.,  (1987),  Making  History:  Agency,  Structure  and  Change  In  Social  Theory, 
(Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Callinicos,  A.,  (1989),  Against  Postmodernism:  A  Alarxist  Critique,  (Cambridge:  Polity 
Press). 
Chambers,  R.,  (1966),  Accounting,  Evaluation  and  Economic  Behaviour,  (Englewood  Cliffs, 
New  Jersey:  Prentice-Hall). 
Chambers,  R.  J.,  (1980),  "The  myths  and  science  of  Accounting",  Accounting  OrganiuNlons 
and  Society,  Vol.  5,  No.  1,  pp.  167-180. 
Chambers,  R.  J.,  (1996),  "Ends,  Ways,  Means  and  Conceptual  Frameworks",  Abacus,  Vol.  32, 
No.  2,  pp.  119-132. 
Chaney,  P.  K.  and  Jeter,  D.  C.,  (1989),  "  Accounting  for  Deferred  Incomc  Taxcs:  Simplicity? 
316 References 
Usefulness?  ",  Accounting  Horizons,  Vol.  3,  No.  2,  pp.  6-13. 
Clark,  G.  L.  &  Dear  M.  J.,  (1984),  State  Apparatus:  Structures  and  Language  of  Legltlnracy, 
(Winchester,  Mass:  Allen  &  Unwin). 
Clark,  M.  W.,  (1993),  "Entity  Theory,  Modem  Capital  Structure  Theory,  and  the  Distinction 
Between  Debt  and  Equity",  Accounting  Horizons,  Vol.  7,  No.  3,  pp.  14-31. 
Coole,  D.,  (1996),  "Habermas  and  the  Question  of  Alterity",  in  Iabermas  and  the  Unfinished 
Project  of  Modernity:  Critical  Essays  on  the  Philosophical  Discourse  of  Modernity, 
M.  P.  d'Entreves  &  S.  Benhabib  (eds.  ),  pp.  221-244,  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  The 
MIT  Press) 
Coopers  &  Lybrand,  (1995),  Comment  on  -  Accounting  for  tax;  Discussion  Paper,  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Coopers  &  Lybrand,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial 
Reporting:  Exposure  Draft,  pp.  208-229,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Culler,  J.,  (1983),  On  Deconstruction:  Theory  and  Criticism  after  Structuralism,  (London: 
Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul). 
Daly,  G.,  (1994),  "Post-metaphysical  culture  and  politics:  Richard  Rorty  and  Laclau  and 
Mouffe",  Economy  and  Society,  Vol.  23,  No.  2,  pp.  173-200. 
Danley,  J.  R.,  (1980),  "Corporate  Moral  Agency:  The  Case  for  Anthropological  Bigotry",  in 
Action  and  responsibility:  Bowling  Green  Studies  in  Applied  Philosophy  -  Vol.  11, 
reproduced  in  Business  Ethics:  Readings  and  cases  in  corporate  morality,  I  loffman, 
W.  M.  &  Frederick,  R.  E.  (eds.  ),  pp.  183-189,  (New  York:  McGraw-Hill,  1995). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1965)  "Theories  of  Meaning  and  Learnable  Languages",  in  Proceedings  of 
the  1964  International  Congress  for  Logic,  Methodology  and  Philosophy  of  Science, 
317 References 
Bar-Hillel  Y.  (ed.  ),  pp.  383-394,  (Amsterdam:  North  Holland  Publishing  Co), 
reprinted  in  Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  3-15,  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1967),  "Truth  and  Meaning",  Synthese,  Vol.  17,  pp.  304-23,  rcprintcd  in 
Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  17-36  (Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1969),  "True  to  the  Facts",  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  21,  pp.  748-764, 
reprinted  in  Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  37-54,  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1973a),  "Radical  Interpretation",  Dialectica,  Vol.  27,  pp.  313-328,  reprinted 
in  Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  125-139,  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1973b),  "In  Defence  of  Convention  T",  in  Truth,  Syntax  and  Afodality,  11. 
Leblanc  (ed.  ),  pp.  76-86,  (Amsterdam:  North  Holland  Publishing  Co.  ),  rcprintcd  in 
Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  65-75,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1974a),  "On  the  Very  Idea  of  a  Conceptual  Scheme",  Proceedings  and 
Addresses  of  the  American  Philosophical  Association,  Vol.  47,  pp.  5-20,  reprinted  in 
Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  183-198,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1974b)  "Belief  and  the  Basis  of  Meaning",  Synthese,  Vol.  27,  pp.  309-323, 
reprinted  in  Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  141-154,  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1975),  "Thought  and  Talk",  in  Mind  and  Language,  S.  Guttcnplan  (cd.  ), 
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press),  reprinted  in  Inquiries  Into  Truth  &  Interpretation, 
318 References 
1984,  pp.  155-170,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1977),  "Reality  Without  Reference",  Dialectica,  Vol.  31,  pp.  247-253, 
reprinted  in  Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984,  pp.  215-225,  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1979),  "The  Inscrutability  of  Reference",  Southwestern  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  Vol.  10,  pp.  7-19,  reprinted  in  Inquiries  into  Truth  &  Interpretation,  1984, 
pp.  227-241  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1982),  "Empirical  Content",  Grazer  Philosophische  Studien,  special  issue  on 
Schlick  und  Neurath:  Ein  Symposium,  R.  Haller  (ed),  16/17,  pp.  471-489  (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi),  reprinted  in  Truth  and  Interpretation:  Perspectives  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Donald  Davidson,  E.  Lepore  (ed.  ),  1986,  pp.  320-333,  (Oxford:  Blackwell) 
Davidson,  D.,  (1983),  "A  Coherence  Theory  of  Truth  and  Knowledge",  in  Kant  oder  llegºe!, 
D.  Henrich  (ed.  ),  pp.  423-438,  (Stuttgart:  Klctt-Cotta),  reprinted  in  Truth  and 
Interpretation:  Perspectives  on  the  Philosophy  of  Donald  Davidson,  E.  Leporc  (cd.  ), 
1986,  pp.  307-319,  (Oxford:  Blackwell) 
Davidson,  D.,  (1984),  Inquiries  into  Truth  and  Interpretation  (Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1988),  "The  Myth  of  the  Subjective",  in  Bewusstsein,  Sprache  und  die  Kunst, 
M.  Benedikt  &  R.  Burger  (eds.  ),  pp.  45-54  (Wien:  Verlag  der  Österreichischen 
Staatsdruckerei)  reprinted  in:  Relativism:  Interpretation  and  Confronta:  Ion,  Krausz,  M 
(ed.  ),  1989,  pp.  159-72  (Notre  Dame,  Ind.:  University  of  Notre  Dane  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1990a),  "The  Structure  and  Content  of  Truth",  The  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
Vol.  LXXXVII,  No.  6,  pp.  279-328. 
Davidson,  D.,  (1990b)  "Afterthoughts,  1987",  in  Reading  Rorty:  Critical  Responses  to 
319 References 
Philosophy  and  the  Mirror  of  Nature  (and  Beyond),  A.  R.  Malachowski  &  J.  Burrows 
(eds.  ),  pp.  134-138,  (Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1991),  "Three  Varieties  of  Knowledge",  in  A.  J.  Ayer:  Memorial  Essays.  Royal 
Institute  of  Philosophy  Supplement:  30,  A.  Phillips  Griffiths  (cd.  ),  pp.  153:  166, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1996),  "The  Folly  of  Trying  to  Define  Truth",  The  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
Vol.  XCIII,  No.  6,  pp.  263-278. 
Davidson,  D.,  (1997),  "Indeterminism  and  Antirealism",  in  Reallsm/Antirealism  and 
epistemology,  B.  Kulp  (ed.  ),  pp.  109-122,  (Maryland:  Rowman  &  Littlcticld 
Publishers,  Inc). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1999a),  "Is  truth  a  goal  of  inquiry:  Discussion  with  Rorty",  in  Donald 
Davidson:  Truth,  meaning  and  knowledge,  U.  M.  Zcglcn  (cd),  pp.  17-19,  (London: 
Routledge). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1999b),  "Reply  to  Stephen  Neale",  in  Donald  Davidson:  Truth,  meaning  and 
knowledge,  U.  M.  Zeglen  (ed),  pp.  67-89,  (London:  Routlcdgc). 
Davidson,  D.,  (1999c),  "Reply  to  Roger  F.  Gibson",  in  Donald  Davidson:  Truth,  meaning 
and  knowledge,  U.  M.  Zeglen  (ed),  pp.  134-135,  (London:  Routledgc). 
Davis,  C.,  (1996),  Levinas:  An  Introduction,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Dearing,  R.,  (1988),  The  Making  ofAccounting  Standards:  Report  of  the  review  committee 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Sir  Ron  Dearing,  presented  to  the  Consultative  Committee 
of  Accounting  Bodies,  (London:  Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  in  England  & 
Wales). 
Defliese,  P.  L.,  (August  1983),  "Deferred  taxes  forever  -  professional  notes",  Journal  of 
320 References 
Accountancy,  pp.  44-55. 
Deleuze,  G.  &  Guattari,  F.,  (1972),  L'Anti-Oedipe,  (Paris:  Les  Editions  de  Minuit)  translated 
by  R.  Hurley,  M.  Seem,  &  R.  Lane  as  Anti-Oedipus:  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia, 
1984  (London:  Athlone  Press). 
Deloitte  Touche,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  248-255,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board) 
Demski,  J.,  (1973),  "The  general  impossibility  of  normative  accounting  standards",  The 
Accounting  Review,  Vol.  48,  pp.  718-723. 
Derrida,  J.,  (1972),  Positions  (Paris:  Les  Editions  dc  Minuit)  translated  by  A.  Bass  as 
Positions,  1981,  (London:  Athlone  Press). 
Derrida,  J.,  (1967),  De  la  Grammatologie,  (Paris:  Lcs  Editions  do  Minuit,  1967),  translated 
by  G.  C.  Spivak  as  Of  Grammatology  corrected  edition,  1976,  (Baltimore:  John 
Hopkins  University  Press). 
Derrida,  J.,  (1979),  "Living  On:  Border  Lines",  in  Deconstruction  and  Criticism,  11.  Bloom, 
et.  al.  (eds.  ),  pp.  75-175,  (New  York:  Seabury). 
Dewey,  J.,  (1953),  Essays  in  Experimental  Logic,  (New  York:  Dover). 
Dillard,  J.  E.,  (1991),  "Accounting  as  a  Critical  Social  Science",  Accounting,  Auditing  & 
Accountability  Journal,  Vol.  4,  No.  1,  pp.  8-28. 
Dopuch,  N.  &  Sunder,  S.,  (1980),  "FASB's  Statements  on  Objectives  and  Elements  of 
Financial  Accounting:  A  Review",  The  Accounting  Review,  Vol.  LV,  No.  1,  pp.  1- 
21. 
Eagleton,  T.,  (1991),  Ideology  -  An  Introduction,  (London:  Verso). 
321 References 
Economist  (The),  (1994),  "Auditors'  liability  -  if  the  cap  fits",  The  Economist,  26  February, 
p.  103. 
Economist  (The),  (1995),  "British  accountants'  liability  -  Big  Six  plc",  The  Economist,  7 
October,  pp.  135&138. 
Edwards,  E.  &  Bell,  P.,  (1961),  The  Theory  and  Management  of  Business  Income,  (I)crklcy: 
University  of  California  Press). 
Edwards,  J.,  Kay,  J.  &  Mayer,  C.,  (1987),  The  Economic  Analysis  nfAccountbtg  11rofitability, 
(Oxford:  Clarendon  Press). 
Elster,  J.,  (1986),  The  Multiple  Self,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Ernst  &  Young,  (September  1993),  The  Future  Direction  of  UK  Financial  Reporting, 
(London:  Ernst  &  Young). 
Ernst  &  Young,  (1995),  Comment  on  -  Accounting  for  tax;  Discussion  paper.  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Ernst  &  Young,  (1996a),  The  ASB's  Framework  -  Time  to  Decide,  (London:  Ernst  &  Young, 
February). 
Ernst  &  Young,  (1996b),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  265-277,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Etzioni,  A.  (1988),  The  Moral  Dimension:  Towards  a  New  Economics,  (New  York:  Free 
Press). 
Evans,  D.,  (1996),  An  Introductory  Dictionary  of  Lacanian  Psychoanalysis,  (London: 
Routledge). 
322 References 
Evnine,  S.,  (1991),  Donald  Davidson,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Farrell,  F.  B.,  (1996),  Subjectivity,  Realism  and  Postmodernism:  The  Recovery  of  the  World 
in  Recent  Philosophy,  (Cambridge,  University  of  Cambridge  Press). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1978),  Objectives  of  Financial  Reporting 
by  Business  Enterprises  -  Statement  of  Financial  Reporting  Concepts  No.  1,  (Sr-AC 
1),  (Stamford:  FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1979),  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting 
Standards  No.  33:  -  Financial  Reporting  and  Changing  prices  (FAS  33),  (Stamford: 
FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1980a),  Statement  of  Finccial  Accounting 
Concepts  No.  2:  Qualitative  Characteristics  of  Accounting  Information,  (Stanford: 
FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1980b),  Elements  of  Financial  Statements 
of  Business  Enterprises:  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Concepts  No.  3, 
(Stamford:  FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1985),  Elements  of  Financial  Statements: 
Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Concepts  No.  6,  (Stamford:  FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1986),  Financial  Reporting  and  Changing 
prices:  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Standards  No.  89,  (FAS  89),  (Stamford: 
FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1990),  Distinguishing  beta  een  Liability  and 
Equity  Instruments  and  Accounting  for  Instruments  with  Characteristics  of  Both: 
Discussion  Memorandum,  (Norwalk,  Connecticut:  FASB). 
323 References 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1992),  Accounting  for  Income  Taxes: 
Statement  of  Accounting  Standards  No.  109  (FAS  109),  (Norwalk,  Connecticut: 
FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1993),  Accounting  For  Stock-based 
Compensation:  Exposure  Draft  Proposed  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting 
Standards,  No.  127-c,  (Norwalk,  Connecticut:  FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1995),  Accounting  For  Stock-based 
Compensation:  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Standards  No.  123  (FAS  123), 
(Norwalk,  Connecticut:  FASB). 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB),  (1996),  Proposed  Statement  of  Financial 
Accounting  Standards  -  Reporting  Comprehensive  Income:  Exposure  Draft  No.  162- 
A,  (Norwalk,  CT:  FASB). 
Fink,  B.,  (1995),  The  Lacanian  Subject:  Between  Language  and  Jouissance,  (Princeton,  New 
Jersey:  Princeton  University  Press). 
Forker,  J.,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  286-292,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Foucault,  M.,  (1980),  "The  Eye  of  Power",  in  Power/Knotivledge:  Selected  Interviews  and 
Other  Writings,  1972-1977,  C.  Gordon  (ed.  ),  translated  by  C.  Gordon  et  al.,  (Ncw 
York:  Pantheon). 
Foucault,  M.,  (1980),  Power/Knowledge:  Selected  Interviews  and  Other  Writings,  1972. 
1977,  C.  Gordon  (ed.  ),  translated  by  C.  Gordon  et  al.,  (New  York:  Pantheon). 
Foucault,  M.,  (1982),  "The  Subject  and  Power",  in  Michel  Foucault:  Beyond  Structuralism 
and  Hermeneutics,  H.  L.  Dreyfus  and  P.  Rabinow  (eds.  ),  pp.  208-226,  (  Chicago: 
324 References 
University  of  Chicago  Press). 
Francis,  J.  R.,  (1990),  "After  Virtue?  Accounting  as  a  Moral  and  Discursive  practice", 
Accounting  Auditing  and  Accountability  Journal,  Vol.  3,  No.  3,  pp.  5-17 
Fraser,  D.  R.,  Lee,  D.  S.,  Reising  J.  J.  &  Wallace,  W.  A.,  (winter  1998),  "Political  Costs  and  the 
Fate  of  the  FASB  Proposal  to  Recognize  the  Costs  of  Employcc  Stock  Options", 
Journal  of  Financial  Statement  Analysis,  pp.  67-79. 
Frege,  G.,  (1892),  "Auf  Sinn  und  Bedeutung",  Zeitschrift  Fur  Philosophic  unf  philosophische 
Kritik,  Vol.  100,  pp.  25-50,  translated  by  Black,  M.  as  "On  Sense  and  Reference",  in 
Philosophical  Writings,  M.  Black  &  P.  T.  Geach  (eds.  ),  1962,  pp.  56-78,  (Oxford: 
Blackwell). 
Freud,  S.,  (1933),  New  introductory  Lectures  on  Psycho-Analysis,  in  The  Standard  Edition 
of  the  Complete  Psychological  works  of  Sigmund  Freud.  Volume 
,  LV!!,  New 
Introductory  Lectures  on  Psycho  Analysis  and  Other  Works,  translated  by  J.  Strachey 
in  collaboration  A.  Freud  and  assisted  by  A.  Strachey  &A  Tyson,  1964,  (London: 
Hogarth  Press). 
French,  P.  A.,  (1979),  "The  Corporation  as  a  Moral  Person",  American  1'hllosaphlcal 
Quarterly,  Vol.  16,  No.  3,  pp.  207-215. 
French,  P.  A.,  (1984),  Collective  and  Corporate  Responsibility,  (New  York:  Columbia 
University  Press). 
French,  P.  A.,  (1995),  Corporate  Ethics,  (Fort  Worth,  Dallas:  Harcourt  Brace). 
Friedman,  M.,  (1957),  A  Theory  of  the  Consumption  Function,  (Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton 
University  Press). 
Friedman,  M.,  (1970),  "The  social  responsibility  of  business  is  to  incrcasc  its  profits",  New 
325 References 
York  Times  Magazine,  September  13,  reproduced  in  Ethical  Issues  in  Business:  A 
Philosophical  Approach,  T.  Donaldson  &  P.  H.  Werhane  (eds.  ),  1996,  pp.  222-227, 
(Upper  Saddle  River,  N.  J.:  Prentice  Hall). 
Frost,  R.,  (1916),  "The  Road  Not  Taken",  in  Mountain  Interval,  reproduced  in  Complete 
Poems  of  Robert  Frost,  1951,  p.  129,  (London:  Jonathan  Cape). 
Furrow,  D.,  (1995),  Against  Theory:  Continental  and  Analytic  Challenges  in  Moral 
Philosophy,  (Routledge:  New  York). 
Gadamer,  H.  G.,  (1960),  Wahrheit  und  Methode,  (Tübingen:  J.  C.  B.  Mohr  Paul  Sicbcck), 
translated  by  J.  Weinsheimer  and  D.  G.,  Marshall  as  Truth  and  Method,  2nd  revised 
edition,  1989,  (London:  Sheed  &  Ward). 
Gadamer,  H.  G.,  (1967),  Kleine  Schriften,  (Tübingen:  J.  C.  B.  Mohr  Paul  Siebeck),  translated 
and  edited  by  David  E.  Linge  as  Philosophical  hermeneutics,  1976,  (California: 
University  of  California  Press). 
Gambling,  T.,  (1977),  "Magic  accounting  and  morale",  Accounting  Organizations  and 
Society,  Vol.  2,  No.  2,  pp.  141-152. 
Gellein,  O.  S.,  (June  1987),  "Periodic  Earnings  Income?  or  Indicator?  ",  Accounting  Ilorlron  c, 
pp.  59-64. 
Gerboth,  D.  L.,  (July  1973),  "Research,  Intuition,  and  Politics  in  Accounting  Inquiry", 
Accounting  Review,  Vol.  LXVII,  No.  3,  pp.  475-482. 
Gerboth,  D.  L.,  (1987),  "The  Conceptual  Framework:  Not  Definitions  But  Professional 
Values",  Accounting  Horizons,  Vol.  1,  No.  3,  pp.  1-8. 
Goodpaster,  K.  E.,  &  Matthews,  J.  B.,  (January-February  1982),  "Can  a  Corporation  Nave  a 
Conscience?  ",  Harvard  Business  Review,  pp.  132-141. 
326 References 
Gorz,  A.,  (1991),  Capitalisme,  Socialisme,  Ecologie,  (Paris:  Editions  Galilee),  translated  by 
C.  Turner  as  Capitalism,  Socialism,  Ecology,  1994,  (London:  Verso). 
Grice,  H.  P.,  "Meaning",  (1957),  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  66,  pp.  377-388,  rcprintcd  in 
Philosophical  Logic,  P.  F.  Strawson  (ed.  ),  1967,  pp.  39-48,  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University  Press). 
Griffiths,  I.,  (1986),  Creative  Accounting:  How  to  Make  Your  Profits  What  You  Want  Them 
to  Be,  (London:  Sidgwick  and  Jackson). 
Grinyer,  J.,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  For  Financial  Reporting; 
Exposure  Draft,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Group  of  Scottish  Finance  Directors  (The),  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of 
Principles  for  Financial  Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  (London:  Accounting  Standards 
Board). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1967),  "Zur  Logic  der  Sozialwissenschaften",  originally  published  as  a  special 
supplemental  volume  of  the  journal  Philosohhische  Rundschau,  first  published  in 
book  form  as  Zur  Logic  der  Sozialwissenschaften,  1979  (Frankfurt  am  Main: 
Suhrkamp  Verlag),  translated  by  S.  W.  Nicholson  &  J.  Shark  as  On  the  Logic  of  the 
Social  Sciences,  1988  (Cambridge:  Basil  Blackwell), 
Habermas,  J.,  (1971)  "Der  Universalitätsanspruch  der  Ilcrmcncutik"  in  Hermeneutik  fund 
Ideologiekritik;  Apel.  K-0,  et  al  (eds.  ),  (Frankfurt  am  Maine:  Suhrkamp  Verlag), 
translation  by  J.  Bleicher  as  "The  Hermeneutic  claim  to  universality",  in 
Contemporary  hermeneutics:  Hermeneutics  as  method,  philosophy  and  critique, 
1980,  pp.  181-211,  (London:  Routledge). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1973),  Legitimationsprobleme  in  Spatkapitalisn:  us  (Frankfurt  am  Main: 
Suhrkamp),  translated  by  T.  McCarthy  as  Legitimation  Crisis,  1976,  (London: 
327 References 
Heinemann  Educational). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1981  a),  Theorie  des  Kommunitativen  Handelns,  Bandl:  Ilandlungsrationalitat 
und  gesellschaftkliche  Rationalisierung,  (Frankfurt  am  Main:  Suhrkamp  Verlag), 
translated  by  T.  Carthy  as  The  Theory  of  Communicative  Action,  Vol:  une  I,  Reason 
and  the  Rationalization  of  Society,  1984,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1981b),  Theorie  des  Kommunitativen  Handelns,  Band  2:  Zur  Kritik  der 
funktionalistischen  Vernunft,  (Frankfurt  am  Main:  Suhrkamp  Verlag),  translated  by 
T. Carthy  as  The  Theory  of  Communicative  Action,  Volume  2,  Lifetivorld  and  System: 
A  Critique  of  Functionalist  Reason,  1987,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1981c),  "Die  Moderne  -  ein  unvollendetes  Projekt',  in  Jürgen  Ilabermas 
Kleine  Politische  Schriften  1-IV,,  pp.  444-464,  (Frankfurt  am  Main:  Suhrkamp  Verlag), 
translated  by  N.  Walker  as  "Modernity:  An  Unfinished  Project",  in  Ilabermas  and 
the  Unfinished  Project  of  Modernity:  Critical  Essays  on  the  Philosophical  Discourse 
of  Modernity,  M.  P.  d'EntrBves  &  S.  Benhabib  (eds.  ),  1996,  pp.  38-55,  (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  The  MIT  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1982),  "A  reply  to  My  Critics",  translated  by  T.  McCarthy,  in  llabernucs: 
Critical  Debates,  J.  B.  Thompson  and  D.  Held  (eds.  ),  1982,  pp.  219-283,  (Cambridge: 
MIT  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1983),  Moralbewusstsein  und  kommunikatives  handeln,  (Frankfurt  am  Main: 
Suhrkamp  Verlag),  translated  by  C.  Lenhardt  &  S.  W.  Nicholson  as  Moral 
Consciousness  and  Communicative  Action,  1990,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press) 
Habermas,  J.,  (1985a),  Der  philosophische  Diskurs  der  Moderne:  Zwölf  Vorlesungen, 
(Frankfurt  am  Main:  Suhrkamp  Verlag),  translated  by  F.  Lawrcnce  as  The 
Philosophical  Discourse  of  Modernity:  Twelve  Lectures,  1987,  (Cambridge:  Polity 
Press). 
328 References 
Habermas,  J.,  (1985b),  "Questions  and  Counterquestions"  translated  by  J.  Bohman  in 
Habermas  and  Modernity,  R.  Bernstein  (ed.  ),  pp.  192-216,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1986),  "Vorlesungen  zu  einer  sprachtheoretischen  Grundlegung  der 
Soziologie",  in  Vorstudies  und  Erganzungen  zur  Theorie  des  kommunikativen 
Handelns,  2nd  ed,  pp.  11-126  (Frankfurt  am  Main:  Suhrkamp  Verlag). 
Habermas,  1988,  "Law  and  Morality",  translated  by  K.  Bayncs,  in  The  Tanner  Lectures  on 
Human  Values,  Vol.  8,  S.  M.  McMurrin  (ed.  ),  pp.  217-279,  (Salt  Lake  City:  University 
of  Utah  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1992),  Faktizität  und  Geltung:  Beiträge  zur  Diskurstheorle  des  Rechts  und  des 
demokratischen  Rechtsstaats,  (Frankfurt  am  Main:  Suhrkamp  Verlag),  translated  by 
W.  Rehg  as  Between  Facts  and  Norms:  Contributions  to  a  Discourse  Theory  of  Law 
and  Democracy,  1996,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1994),  "Postscript  1994",  translated  by  W.  Rehg  and  included  in  13ettt.  eeir 
Facts  and  Norms:  Contributions  to  a  Discourse  Theory  of  Law  and  Democracy, 
1996,  pp.  447-462,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1996),  Die  Einbeziehung  des  anderen.  Studies  zur  politischen  Theorie, 
(Frankfurt  am  Main:  Suhrkamp  Verlag),  translated  by  C.  Cronin  as  The  inclusion  of 
the  Other:  Studies  in  Political  Theory,  C.  Cronin  &  P.  Dc  GrcifT  (eds.  ),  1998, 
(Cambridge:  Polity  Press,  1998). 
Habermas,  J.,  (1998),  "Paradigms  of  Law",  translated  by  W.  Rchg  and  included  in  !  labermas 
on  Law  and  Democracy:  Critical  Exchanges,  M.  Rosenfeld  &  A.  Arato  (cds),  pp.  13. 
25,  (Berkley:  University  of  California  Press). 
Hall,  R.  &  Mishkin,  F.,  (1982),  "The  Sensitivity  of  Consumption  to  Transitory  Income: 
Estimates  from  Panel  Data  on  Households",  Econometrics,  Vol.  50,  pp.  461-481. 
329 References 
Hatsopoulos,  G.  N.,  Krugman,  P.  R.,  &  Poterba,  J.  M.,  (1989),  "Over  consumption:  The 
Challenge  to  U.  S.  Economic  Policy",  American  Business  Conference. 
Heidegger,  M.,  (1927),  Sein  und  Zeit,  translated  by  J.  Macquarrie  and  E.  Robinson  as  Being 
and  Time,  1962,  (London:  SCM  Press). 
Held,  D.,  (1980),  Introduction  to  Critical  Theory  -  Horkheimer  to  Ilabermas,  (Cambridge: 
Polity  Press). 
Hicks,  J.  R.,  (1946),  Value  and  Capital,  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press). 
Hilferding,  R.,  (1910),  Das  Finanzkapital  (Vienna:  s.  n.,  ),  translated  by  M.  Watnick  &  S. 
Gordon  as  Finance  Capital,  1981,  (London:  Routlcdgc  &  Kcgan  Paul). 
Hines,  R.  D.,  (1988),  "Financial  Accounting:  In  Communicating  Itcality  We  Construct 
Reality",  Accounting,  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  13,  No.  3,  pp.  251-26  1. 
Hines,  R.  D.,  (1991),  "The  FASB's  Conceptual  framework,  financial  accounting  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  social  world",  Accounting  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  16, 
No.  4,  pp.  313-332. 
Hirst,  D.  E.,  Joyce,  E.  J.  &  Shadewald,  M.  S.,  (1994),  "Mental  Accounting  and  Outcomc 
Contiguity  in  Consumer-Borrowing  Decisions",  Organizational  1lehavlour  and 
Human  Decision  Processes,  Vol.  58,  pp.  136-152. 
Hope,  T.  and  Briggs,  J.,  (1982),  "Accounting  Policy  Making  -  Some  Lessons  from  the 
Deferred  Taxation  Debate",  Accounting  and  Business  Research,  Vol.  12,  No.  46, 
pp.  83-96. 
Hope,  T.  and  Gray,  R.,  (1982),  "Power  and  Policy  Making:  The  Development  of  an  It  &D 
Standard",  Journal  of  Business  Finance  and  Accounting,  Vol.  9,  No.  4,  pp.  531-558. 
330 References 
Hopper,  T.,  Cooper,  D.,  Lowe,  T.,  Capps,  T. &  Mouritsen,  J.,  (1986),  "Management  Control 
and  Worker  Resistance  in  the  National  Coal  Board:  Financial  Controls  in  the  Labour 
Process",  in  Managing  the  Labour  Process,  D.  Knights  and  11.  Willmott  (cds.  ),  Ch.  6, 
1986,  (Aldershot:  Gower). 
Hoy,  D.  Z.,  (1994),  "The  Contingency  of  Universality:  Critical  Theory  as  Gcncalogical 
Hermeneutics",  in  Critical  Theory,  D.  Z.  Hoy  &  T.  McCarthy,  pp.  172.200, 
(Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Blackwell). 
How,  A.,  (1995),  The  Habermas  -  Gadamer  Debate  and  the  Nature  of  the  Social:  Back  to 
Bedrock,  (Aldershot,  Avebury:  Ashgate  Publishing  Ltd). 
Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  of  Scotland  (ICAS),  (1988),  Making  Corporate  Reports 
Valuable:  A  Discussion  Document  by  the  Research  Committee  of  The  Institute  of 
Chartered  Accountants  of  Scotland,  P.  N.  McMonnies  (cd.  ),  (London:  ICAS  &  Kogan 
Page). 
Institutional  Fund  Managers'  Association,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles 
for  Financial  Reporting:  Exposure  Draft,  pp.  448-451,  (London:  Accounting 
Standards  Board). 
Institute  of  Investment  Management  and  Research,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of 
Principles  For  Financial  Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  pp.  440.447  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Board). 
International  Accounting  Standards  Committee  (IASC),  (1996),  Income  Taxes,  International 
Accounting  Standard  No.  12,  lAS.  12,  (London:  International  Accounting  Standards 
Committee). 
James,  W.,  (1907/1909)  Pragmatism:  a  new  name  for  some  old  ways  of  thinking  (originally 
published  1907);  [and]  The  meaning  of  truth:  a  sequel  to  'Pragmatism'  (originally 
published  1909),  (New  York:  Longmans  Green),  published  as  a  onc-volume  cdition 
331 References 
entitled  Pragmatism  and  the  Meaning  of  Truth,  1978,  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  I  larvard 
University  Press) 
Jardine,  N.,  (1995),  "Science,  ethics  and  objectivity",  in  World,  Mind,  and  Ethics:  Essays  on 
the  ethical  Philosophy  of  Bernard  Williams,  J.  E.  Altham  &  R.  1larrison  (cds.  ),  pp.  32- 
45,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Jensen,  M.,  &  Meckling,  W.,  (1976),  "Theory  of  the  Firm:  Managerial  Behavior,  Agency 
Costs  and  Ownership  Structure",  Journal  of  Financial  Economics,  Vol.  3,  pp.  305-360. 
Johnson,  L.  T.,  Reither,  C.  L  &  Swieringa,  R.  J.,  (1995),  "Towards  Reporting  Comprehensive 
Income",  Accounting  Horizons,  Vol.  9,  No.  4,  pp.  128-137. 
Johnson,  M.  L.,  (1996),  "How  Moral  Psychology  Changes  Moral  Theory",  in  1lfl,  ul  cuul 
Morals:  Essays  on  Ethics  and  Cognitive  Science,  L.  May,  M.  Friedman,  &  A.  Clark 
(eds.  ),  ch.  3,  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  The  MIT  Press). 
Kahneman,  D.  &  Tversky,  A.,  (1979),  "Prospect  Theory:  An  Analysis  of  Decision  Under 
Risk",  Econometrica,  Vol.  47,  No.  2,  pp.  263-291. 
Kahneman,  D.  &  Tversky,  A.,  (1984),  "Choices,  Values,  and  Frames",  American 
Psychologist,  Vol.  39,  No.  4,  pp.  341-350. 
Kant,  I.,  (1781),  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  (Riga),  translated  by  J.  M.  U.  Mciklejohn  as 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  revised  and  expanded  translation  edit  by  V.  Politis,  1993, 
(London:  Orion  Publishing  Group). 
Kam,  V.,  (1986),  Accounting  Theory  2nd  edition,  (New  York:  Wiley). 
Kerlin.  M.  J.,  (1997),  "Corporate  Ethics  and  The  Wizard  of  Oz",  Journal  of  J3tLsiness  Ethics, 
Vol.  16,  pp.  1432-1438. 
332 References 
Kirkham,  R.  L.,  (1992),  Theories  of  Truth:  A  Critical  Introduction,  (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  The  MIT  Press). 
KPMG,  (1995),  Comment  on  -  Accounting  for  tax;  Discussion  Paper,  (London:  Accounting 
Standards  Board). 
KPMG,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting; 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  461-494,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Kuhn,  T.  S.,  (1962),  "The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions",  originally  published  as  part 
of  the  International  Encyclopoedia  of  Unified  Science,  2nd  edition,  1970,  (Chicago: 
University  of  Chicago  Press) 
Lacan,  J.,  (1948),  "L'  agressivit6  en  psychanalyse",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  Zcrlts,  1966,  (Paris: 
Editions  du  Seuil),  translated  by  A.  Sheridan,  as  "Aggressivity  in  Psychoanalysis"  in 
Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits:  A  Selection,  1977,  pp.  8-29,  (London:  Routlcdgc). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1953),  "Some  Reflections  on  the  Ego",  The  International  Journal  of  Psycho- 
analysis,  Vol.  XXXIV,  pp.  11-17. 
Lacan,  J.,  (1953b),  "Fonction  et  champ  de  la  parole  et  du  langage  en  psychanalyse",  in 
Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits,  1966,  (Paris:  Editions  du  Scuil),  translated  by  A.  Sheridan,  as 
"The  function  and  field  of  speech  and  language  in  psychoanalysis",  in  Jacques 
Lacan,  Ecrits:  A  Selection,  1977,  pp.  30-113,  (London:  Routledge). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1953-54),  Le  Sdminaire,  Livre  1,  Les  arils  techniques  de  Freud,  1953-54, 
Jacques-Alain  Miller  (ed.  ),  1975,  (Paris:  Editions  du  Scuil),  translated  by  J.  Forrcstcr 
as  The  Seminar  of  Jacques  Lacan.  Book  1,  Freud's  papers  on  technique,  1953.54, 
1988,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1955),  "Le  chose  freudienne",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits,  1966,  (Paris:  Editions  du 
Seuil),  translated  by  A.  Sheridan,  as  "The  Freudian  thing",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  1crits. 
333 References 
A  Selection,  1977,  pp.  114-145,  (London:  Routledge). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1957),  'L'  instance  de  la  lettre  dans  1'  inconscient  ou  raison  dcpuis  Freud",  in 
Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits,  1966,  (Paris:  Editions  du  Seuil),  translated  by  A.  Sheridan,  as 
"The  agency  of  the  letter  in  the  unconscious  or  reason  since  Freud",  in  Jacques 
Lacan,  Ecrits:  A  Selection,  1977,  pp.  146-178,  (London:  Routledge). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1957-58),  "D'  une  question  preliminaire  ä  tout  traitcmcnt  possible  dc  la 
psychose",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits,  1966,  (Paris:  Editions  du  Scuil),  translated  by 
A.  Sheridan,  as  "On  a  question  preliminary  to  any  possible  treatment  of  psychosis", 
in  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits:  A  Selection,  1977,  pp.  179-225  (London:  Routledge). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1958a),  "La  direction  de  la  cure  et  les  pricipes  dc  son  pouvoir",  in  Jacques  Lacwt, 
. Ecrits,  1966,  (Paris:  Editions  du  Seuil),  translated  by  A.  Sheridan,  as  "The  direction 
of  treatment  and  the  principles  of  its  power",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  Grits:  4  Selection, 
1977,  pp.  226-280,  (London:  Routledge). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1958b),  "La  signification  du  phallus",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  L"`crlts,  1966,  (Paris: 
Editions  du  Seuil),  translated  by  A.  Sheridan,  as  "The  signification  of  the  phallus", 
in  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits:  A  Selection,  1977,  pp.  281-291,  (London:  Itoutlcdgc). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1960),  "Subversion  du  sujet  et  dialectique  du  d6sir  daps  l'inconscicnt  frcudien", 
in  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits,  1966,  (Paris:  Editions  du  Scuil),  translated  by  A.  Sheridan, 
as  "The  subversion  of  the  subject  and  the  dialectic  of  desire  in  the  Freudian 
unconscious",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits:  A  Selection,  1977,  pp.  292-325,  (London: 
Routledge). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1964a),  Le  Seminaire.  Livre  XI.  Les  quatre  concepts  fondamentatir  do  la 
psychanalyse,  Jacques-Alain  Miller  (ed),  1973,  (Paris:  Editions  du  Scuil),  translated 
by  A.  Sheridan  as  The  Four  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Psychoanalysis,  1977, 
(London:  Hogarth  Press). 
334 References 
Lacan,  J.,  (1964b),  "Position  de  1'  inconscient",  in  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits,  1966,  (Paris: 
Editions  du  Seuil),  translated  by  B.  Fink  as  "Position  of  the  Unconscious"  in  Reading 
Seminar  XI:  Lacan's  Four  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Psychoanalysis,  R.  Feldstein, 
B.  Fink  &  M.  Jaanus  (eds.  ),  1995,  pp.  259-282,  (Albany,  New  York:  State  University 
of  New  York  Press). 
Lacan,  J.,  (1969-70),  Le  Seminaire.  Livre  XVII.  L'  envers  de  la  psychanalyse.  Teat 
established  by  Jacques-Alain  Miller,  1991  (Paris:  Editions  du  Scuil). 
Ladd,  J.,  (1970),  "Morality  and  the  Ideal  of  Rationality  in  Formal  Relations",  The  Monist, 
Vol.  54,  pp.  488-516. 
Landsberger,  M.  (June  1966),  "Windfall  Income  and  Consumption:  Comnicnt",  American 
Economic  Review,  Vol.  56,  pp.  534-539. 
Latour,  B.,  (1999),  Pandora's  Hope:  Essays  on  the  Reality  of  Science  Studies,  (Cambridge 
Massachusetts:  The  Harvard  University  Press). 
Laughlin,  R.  C.  &  Puxty,  A.  G.,  (1983),  "Accounting  Regulation:  An  Alternative  l'crspcctivc", 
Journal  of  Business  Finance  &  Accounting.  Vol.  10,  No.  3,  pp.  451-479. 
Laughlin,  R.  C.,  (1987),  "Accounting  Systems  in  Organizational  Contexts:  A  Casc  for  Critical 
Theory",  Accounting,  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  12,  No.  5,  pp.  479-502. 
Lavoie,  D.,  (1987),  "The  Accounting  of  Interpretations  and  the  Interpretation  of  Accounts: 
The  Communicative  Function  of  "The  Language  of  Business",  Accounting, 
Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  12,  No.  6,  pp.  597-604. 
Law  Society  (The),  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial 
Reporting:  Exposure  Draft,  pp.  499-510,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Lefebvre,  H.,  (1974),  Production  de  1'  espace,  (Paris:  Editions  Anthropos),  translatcd  by  D, 
335 References 
Nicholson-Smith  as  The  Production  of  Space,  1991,  (Oxford:  IIlackwcll  Publishers 
Ltd). 
Lehman,  C.  &  Tinker,  T.,  (1987),  "The  "Real"  Cultural  Significance  of  Accounts", 
Accounting,  Organizations,  and  Society,  Vol.  12,  No.  5,  pp.  503-522. 
Levinas,  E.,  (1985),  Ethics  and  Infinity:  Conversations  with  Philippe  Nemo,  translated  by 
R.  A.  Cohen,  (Pittsburgh:  Duquesne  University  Press). 
Lewis,  H.  D.,  (1948),  "Collective  Responsibility",  Philosophy:  The  Journal  of  the  Royal 
Institute  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  24,  No.  83,  reproduced  in  Collective  Responsibility:  Five 
Decades  of  Debate  in  Theoretical  and  Applied  Ethics,  May,  L.  &I  loffiihan,  S.,  (eds.  ), 
1991,  pp.  17-33,  (Savage,  Maryland:  Rowman  &  Littleficld). 
Lipe,  M.  G.,  (October  1993),  "Analyzing  the  Variance  Investigation  Decision:  The  Effects 
of  Outcomes,  Mental  Accounting,  and  Framing",  The  Accounting  Review,  Vol.  68, 
No.  4,  pp.  748-764. 
London  Investment  Banking  Association,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles 
For  Financial  Reporting;  Exposure  Draft,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Lowenstein,  G.  &  Thaler,  R.  H.,  (1989),  "Intertemporal  Choice",  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives,  Vol.  3,  No.  4,  pp.  181-193. 
Lukäcs,  G.,  (1923),  Gesichichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein  (Neuwied:  Luchterhand),  translated 
by  R.  Livingstone  as  History  and  Class  Consciousness,  1971,  (London:  Merlin 
Press). 
Lyas,  C.  (1993),  "Accounting  and  language",  in  Philosophical  perspectives  on  accounting: 
Essays  in  honour  of  Edward  Stamp,  M.  J.  Mumford  &  K.  V.  I'casncll  (cds.  ),  1993, 
pp.  156-175,  (London:  Routledge). 
336 References 
Macintosh,  N.  B.,  Shearer,  T.,  Thornton,  D.  B.  &  Welker,  M.,  (2000),  "Accounting  as 
simulacrum  and  hyperreality:  perspectives  on  income  and  capital",  Accounting, 
Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  25,  pp.  13-50. 
Maclntyre,  A.,  (1981),  After  Virtue:  a  study  in  moral  theory,  2nd  edition  1985  (London, 
Duckworth). 
Mandel,  E.,  (1976),  "Introduction"  to  Marx,  K.,  Capital  volume  1,  pp.  11-88  (London: 
Penguin  Books). 
Manicas,  P.,  (1993),  "Accounting  as  a  human  science",  Accounting  Organlzatlons  and 
Society,  Vol.  18,  No.  2/3,  pp.  147-161. 
Manning,  R.  C.,  (1984),  "Corporate  Responsibility  and  Corporate  Pcrsonhood",  Journal  of 
Business  Ethics,  Vol-3,  pp.  77-84. 
Manning,  R.  C.,  (1988),  "Dismemberment,  Divorce  and  Hostile  Takeovers:  A  comment  on 
Corporate  Personhood",  Journal  of  Business  Ethics,  Vol.  7,  pp.  639-643. 
Marx,  K.  (1851),  The  Eighteenth  Brumaire  of  Louis  Bonaparte,  in  Karl  Marx:  Sciectccl 
Writing,  D.  McLellan  (ed),  1977,  pp.  300-325,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Prcss). 
Marx,  K.,  (1867),  Das  Kapital  (Vol.  1),  translated  by  B.  Fowkcs  as  Capital  (Vol.  1),  1976 
London:  Penguin  Books). 
Marx,  K.,  (1868),  Letter  to  Kugleman,  in  Karl  Marx:  Selected  1Vrllings,  D.  McLcllan  (cd), 
1977,  pp524-525,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press). 
Mattessich,  R.,  (1995),  "Conditional-normative  accounting  methodology:  Incorporating  value 
judgments  and  means-end  relations  of  an  applied  science  ",  Accounting  Organl:  atiow 
and  Society,  Vol.  20,  No.  4,  pp.  259-284. 
337 References 
McAfee,  N.,  (2000),  Habermas,  Kristeva,  and  Citizenship,  (Ithica:  Cornell  University  Press). 
McCloskey,  D.  N.,  (1990),  If  Your'e  So  Smart:  The  Narrative  of  Economic  Expertise, 
(Chicago,  Illinois:  The  University  of  Chicago  Press). 
McGee,  A.,  (November  1991),  "The  'True  and  Fair  View  Debate':  A  Study  in  the  Legal 
Regulation  of  Accounting".  The  Modern  Law  Review,  Vol.  54,  pp.  874-888. 
McGoun,  E.,  (1997),  "Hyperreal  Finance",  Critical  Perspectives  on  Accounting,  Vol.  8, 
pp.  97-122. 
McKernan,  J.  F.  &  O'Donnell,  P.,  (1998),  "Financial  Accounting:  Crisis  and  the  commodity 
fetish",  Critical  Perspectives  on  Accounting,  Vol.  9,  pp.  567.599. 
McSweeney,  B,  (1997),  "The  Unbearable  Ambiguity  of  Accounting",  Accounting 
Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  27,  No.  7,  pp.  691-712. 
Megill,  A.,  (1994),  "Four  Senses  of  Objectivity",  in  Rethinking  Objectivity,  A.  Mcgill  (cd), 
pp.  1-29,  (London:  Duke  University  Press). 
Metcalf,  M.,  (November  1999),  "Alchemical  accounting",  Accountancy,  pp.  100-101. 
Metzger,  M.  B.,  &  Dalton,  D.  R.,  (Summerl996),  "Seeing  the  elephant:  An  organizational 
perspective  on  corporate  moral  agency",  American  Business  Law  Journal,  Vol.  33, 
No.  4,  pp.  489-578. 
Miller,  P.  B.,  Redding,  R.  J.  &  Bahnson,  P.  R.,  (1994),  The  FAS13  -  The  People,  the  Process 
and  the  Politics  third  edition,  (Burr  Ridge,  Illinois:  Irwin). 
Mitchell,  A.,  Puxty,  A.,  Sikka,  P.  &  Willmott,  H.,  (August  1991),  Accounting  For  Change, 
Proposals  for  Reform  of  Audit  and  Accounting  -  Fabian  Society  Discussion  Paper 
No.  7,  (London:  Fabian  Society). 
338 References 
Modigliani,  F.  &  Brumberg,  R.,  (1954),  "Utility  analysis  and  the  consumption  function:  An 
interpretation  of  cross-section  data",  in  Post  Keynesian  Economics,  K.  K.  Kurihara 
(ed),  pp.  388-436  (New  Brunswick,  NJ:  Rutgers  University  Press). 
Moonitz,  M.,  (Spring  1966),  "Some  Reflections  on  the  Investment  Crcdit  Experience", 
Journal  of  Accounting  Research,  pp.  47-61. 
Moore,  G.,  (1999),  "Corporate  moral  agency:  Review  and  implications",  Journal  of  Business 
Ethics,  Vol.  21,  no.  4,  pp.  329-343. 
Moores,  K.,  &  Steadman,  G.  T.,  (1980)  "The  comparative  viewpoints  of  groups  of 
accountants:  More  on  the  entity  -  proprietary  debate",  Accounting  Organizations  and 
Society,  Vol.  11,  No.  1,  pp.  19-34. 
Morgan,  G.,  (1986),  Images  of  Organization,  (Newbury  Park,  Calif.:  Sagc). 
Morgan,  G.,  (1988),  "Accounting  as  reality  construction:  Towards  a  new  epistemology  for 
accounting  practice",  Accounting,  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  13,  No.  5,  pp.  477- 
485. 
Mowen,  M.  N.  &  Mowen,  J.  C.,  (1986),  "An  empirical  examination  of  the  biasing  effects  of 
framing  on  business  decisions",  Decision  Sciences,  Vol.  17,  pp.  596-602. 
Mozes,  H.  A.,  (1998),  The  FASB's  Conceptual  Framework  and  Political  Support:  111C  Icsson 
From  Employee  Stock  Options,  ABACUS,  Vol.  34,  No.  2,  pp.  141-161. 
Mumford,  M.  J.,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp542-556,  London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Murdoch,  I.,  (1971),  The  sovereignty  of  Good,  (London:  Routledgc  and  Kcgan  Paul). 
339 References 
Nagel,  T.,  (1986),  The  View  From  Nowhere,  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press). 
Neale,  S.,  (1995),  "The  Philosohpical  Significance  of  Godel's  Slingshot",  Mind,  Vol.  104, 
pp.  761-825. 
Neale,  S.,  &  Dever,  J.,  (1997),  "Slingshots  and  Boomerangs",  Mind,  Vol.  106,  pp.  143-168. 
Neimark,  M.,  (1990),  "The  King  is  Dead  -  Long  Live  the  King",  Critical  Perspectives  on 
Accounting,  Vol.  1,  pp.  103-114. 
Nobes,  C.,  (1992),  "A  Political  History  of  Goodwill  in  the  UK.:  An  Illustration  of  Cyclical 
Standard  Setting",  Abacus,  Vo1.28,  No.  2,  pp.  142-159. 
Nobes,  C.  W.,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  575-576,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Norris,  C.,  (1988),  "Reading  Donald  Davidson:  truth,  meaning  and  right  interpretation",  in 
Deconstruction  and  the  interests  of  theory,  pp.  59-83,  (London:  Pinter). 
Norris,  C.,  (1990),  What's  wrong  with  postmodernism:  critical  theory  and  the  ends  of 
philosophy,  (New  York:  Harvester  Wheatsheaf). 
Norris,  C.,  (1991),  Deconstruction  Theory  and  Practice,  revised  cdition,  (London  and  New 
York:  Routledge) 
O'Connor,  J.,  (1984),  Accumulation  Crisis,  (New  York:  Blackwell). 
Ozar,  D.  T.,  (October  1985),  "Do  Corporations  Have  Moral  Rights?  ",  Journal  of  Business 
Ethics,  Vol.  4,  pp.  277-281. 
Page,  M.  J.,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  582-585,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
340 References 
Pannell  Kerr  Forster,  (1996),  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial 
Reporting:  Exposure  Draft,  pp.  586-589,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Passerin  d'  Entreves,  M.  (1996),  "Introduction"  in  Habermas  and  the  Unfinished  Project  of 
Modernity:  Critical  Essays  on  the  Philosophical  Discourse  of  Modernity,  M.  P. 
d'Entreves  &  S.  Benhabib  (eds.  ),  1996,  pp.  1-37,  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  The 
MIT  Press). 
Paton,  W.,  (1922),  Accounting  Theory  -  with  Special  Reference  to  the  Corporate  Enterprise, 
(New  York:  The  Ronald  Press  Company),  republished  1962,  (New  York:  Scholars 
Books). 
Paton,  W.  A.  &  Littleton,  A.  C.,  (1940),  An  Introduction  to  Corporate  Accounting  Standards, 
(Chicago:  American  Accounting  Association). 
Peasnell,  K.  V.,  (summer  1978),  "Statement  on  Accounting  Theory  and  Theory  Acceptance: 
A  review  Article",  Accounting  &  Business  Research,  pp.  217.225. 
Peterson,  J.  R.,  (February  1995),  "FASB  admits  defeat  on  share  options",  The  Accountant, 
p.  3. 
Peterson,  R.  A.,  Hoyer,  W.  D.  &  Wilson,  W.  R.,  (1986),  "Reflections  on  the  role  of  affect  in 
consumer  behavior",  The  role  of  affect  in  consumer  behavior,  In  R.  A.  Peterson,  W.  D. 
Hoyer,  &  W.  R.  Wilson  (eds.  ),  pp.  141-159,  (Lexington,  MA:  Lexington  Books). 
Phillips,  M.  J.,  (1995),  "Corporate  Moral  Responsibility:  When  it  might  mattcr",  Business 
Ethics  Quarterly,  Vol.  5,  No.  3,  pp.  555-576. 
Power,  M.,  &  Laughlin,  R.,  (1996),  "Habermas,  Law  and  Accounting",  Accounting, 
Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  21,  No.  5,  pp.  441-465. 
341 References 
Price  Waterhouse,  (1995),  Comment  on  -  Accounting  for  tax;  Discussion  Paper,  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Pushkin,  A.  B.  &  Pariser,  D.  B.,  (1991),  "Political  and  Economic  Forces  Shaping  Regulatory 
Accounting  for  Troubled  Debt  Restructuring",  Critical  Perspectives  on  Accotunting, 
Vol.  2,  No.  2,  pp.  127-144. 
Putnam,  H.,  Reason,  Truth  and  History,  (1981),  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Putnam,  H.,  (1987),  The  Many  Faces  of  Realism:  The  Paul  Cams  Lectures, 
Washington,  1985,  (La  Salle,  Ill.:  Open  Court). 
Putnam,  H.,  (1990),  Realism  with  a  Human  Face,  edited  by  J.  Conant,  (Canmbridge,  Mass.: 
Harvard  University  Press). 
Putnam,  H.,  (1992a),  II  Pragmatismo:  Una  Questione  Aperta,  (Roma-Bari:  Guis,  Latcrza  & 
Figli  Spa),  translated  as  Pragmatism:  An  Open  Question,  1995,  (Cambridge,  Mass.: 
Basil  Blackwell). 
Putnam,  H.,  (1992b),  Renewing  Philosophy:  The  Gifford  Lectures,  St  Andrews,  1990, 
(Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press). 
Puxty,  A.  G.,  (1986),  "Social  Accounting  as  Immanent  Legitimation:  A  Critique  of  Tcchnicist 
Ideology",  Advances  in  Public  Interest  Accounting,  Vol.  1,  pp.  95-112. 
Puxty,  A.  G.,  Willmott,  H.  C.,  Cooper,  D.  J.  &  Lowe,  T.,  (1987),  "Modes  of  Regulation  in 
Advanced  Capitalism:  Locating  Accounting  in  Four  Countries",  Accounting, 
Organizations,  and  Society,  Vol.  12,  No.  3,  pp.  273-292. 
Puxty,  A.  G.,  (1997),  "Accounting  Choice  and  a  Theory  of  Crisis:  The  Cases  of  I'ost- 
privatization  British  Telecom  and  British  Gas",  Accounting,  Organizations,  and 
Society,  Vol.  22,  No.  7,  pp.  713-753. 
342 References 
Quine,  W.  V.,  (1969),  "Ontological  relitivity"  in  Ontological  relativity  and  other  essays, 
pp.  26-68,  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press). 
Ranken,  N.  L.,  (1987),  "Corporations  as  persons:  Objections  to  Goodpastcr's'Principle  of 
Moral  Projection"`,  Journal  of  Business  Ethics,  Vol.  6,  pp.  633-637. 
Rappaport,  A.,  (May  1977),  "Economic  Impact  of  Accounting  Standards  -  Implications  for 
the  FASB",  Journal  ofAccountancy,  pp.  89-98. 
Rawls,  J.,  (1973),  A  Theory  ofJustice,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press). 
Rehg,  W.,  (1997),  Insight  &  Solidarity:  The  Discourse  Ethics  ofJilrgen  Ilabermas,  (Berkley: 
California,  University  of  California  Press). 
Richardson,  A.  J.,  (1987),  "Accounting  as  a  legitimating  Institution",  Accounting, 
Organizations,  and  Society,  Vol.  12,  No.  4,  pp.  341-355. 
Ricoeur,  P.,  (1974),  The  Conflict  of  Interpretations:  Essays  in  Ilermeneutles,  trans  Don  Ihde 
et  al.  (Evanston:  Northwestern  University  Press). 
Robson,  K&  Cooper,  D.,  (1990),  "Understanding  the  Development  of  the  Accountancy 
Profession  in  the  United  Kingdom",  Critical  Accounts,  in  D.  J.  Cooper  &  T.  M., 
Hopper  (eds.  ),  pp.  366-390,  (London:  The  Macmillan  Press). 
Rorty,  R.,  (1980),  Philosophy  and  the  Mirror  of  Nature  (Oxford:  Blackwcll). 
Rorty,  R.,  (October  1983),  "Postmodernist  Bourgeois  Liberalism",  The  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  Vol.  80,  pp.  583-589,  reprinted  in  Objectivity,  relativism,  and  truth: 
Philosophical  papers  Volume  1,1991,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Rorty,  R.,  (1986),  "Pragmatism,  Davidson  and  Truth",  in  Truth  and  Interpretation: 
343 References 
Perspectives  on  the  Philosophy  of  Donald  Davidson,  Ernest  LePore  (cd),  pp.  333-368, 
(Oxford:  Blackwell). 
Rorty,  R.,  (1989),  Contingency,  irony,  and  solidarity  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press). 
Rorty,  R.,  (1991),  Objectivity,  relativism,  and  truth:  Philosophical  papers  Volume  1, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Rorty,  R.,  (1995),  "Is  Truth  a  Goal  of  Enquiry?  Davidson  vs.  Wright",  Philosophical 
Quarterly,  Vol.  45,  pp.  281-300. 
Rorty,  R.,  (1997),  "Realism,  Antirealism,  and  Pragmatism",  in  Realisn/Antirealism  and 
epistemology,  B.  Kulp  (ed.  ),  pp.  149-171  (Maryland:  Rowman  &  Littleficid 
Publishers,  Inc.  ). 
Rorty,  R.,  (1998),  Truth  and  Progress:  Philosophical  papers  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press). 
Rosenfield,  P.  and  Dent.  W.  C.,  (February  1983),  "No  More  Deferred  Taxes:  A  case  against 
interperiod  income  tax  allocation  and  for  letting  the  taxes  follow  the  tax  return", 
Journal  of  Accountancy,  pp.  44-  55. 
Ruland,  R.  G.,  (1984),  "Duty,  Obligation,  and  Responsibility  in  Accounting  Policy  Making", 
Journal  ofAccounting  and  Public  Policy,  Vol.  3,  No.  3,  pp.  223-237. 
Saussure,  F.,  (1931),  Cours  de  linguistique  generate,  cd.  Tullio  dc  Mauro,  (Paris:  Payot), 
transalted  by  Wade  Baskins  as  Course  in  General  Linguistics,  (Glasgow: 
Fontana/Collins,  1974). 
Schatzki,  T.  R.,  (1986),  "The  Rationalization  of  Meaning  and  Understanding:  Davidson  and 
Habermas",  Synthese,  Vol.  69,  pp.  51-79). 
344 References 
Searle,  J.,  (1995),  "The  Construction  of  Social  Reality",  (London:  Penguin  Books) 
Sen,  A.  K.,  (1977),  "Rational  Fools:  A  critique  of  the  behavioural  foundations  of  economic 
theory",  Philosophy  and  Public  Affairs,  Vol.  6,  N.  4,  pp.  317.344. 
Sen,  A.  K.,  (1987),  On  Ethics  and  Economics,  (Oxford:  Blackwell). 
Shapiro,  B.,  (1997),  "Objectivity,  Relativism  and  Truth  in  External  Financial  Reporting: 
What's  Really  at  Stake  in  the  Disputes",  Accounting  Organizations  and  Society, 
Vol.  22,  No.  2,  pp.  165-185. 
Shapiro,  B.,  (1998),  "Toward  a  normative  model  of  rational  argumentation  for  critical 
accounting  discussion",  Accounting  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  23,  No.  7, 
pp.  641-664. 
Shefrin,  H.  &  Statman,  M.,  (1985),  "The  disposition  to  Scll  Winners  Too  Early  and  Ride 
Losers  Too  Long:  Theory  and  Evidence",  The  Journal  of  Finance,  Vol.  XL,  No.  3, 
pp.  777-790. 
Shefrin,  H.  M.  &  Thaler,  R.  H.,  (1988),  "The  Behavioural  Life-cycle  I  Iypothesis",  Econon:  lc 
Inquiry,  Vol.  26,  pp.  609-643. 
Shields,  M.  D.,  Solomon,  I.  &  Waller,  W.  S.,  (1987),  "Effects  of  alternative  sample  space 
representations  on  the  accuracy  of  auditors'  uncertainty  judgements",  4,1ccounting, 
Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  12,  No.  4,  pp.  375-385. 
Singer,  A.  E.,  Singer,  M.  S.,  &  Ritchie,  G.,  (1986),  "The  role  of  transactions  in  mental 
accounting",  Psychological  Reports,  Vol.  59,  pp.  835-838. 
Singer,  A.  E.,  (1984),  "Planning,  consciousness  and  conscience",  Journal  of  Business  Elbics, 
Vol.  3,  pp.  113-117. 
343 References 
Singer,  A.  E.,  (1994),  "Strategy  as  Moral  Philosophy",  Strategic  Management  Journal, 
Vol.  15,  pp.  191-213. 
Smith,  T.,  (1992),  Accounting  For  Growth:  Stripping  the  Camouflage  from  Company 
Accounts,  (London:  Century  Business). 
Soler,  C.,  (1995),  "The  Subject  and  the  Other",  in  Reading  Seminar  XI.,  Lacan's  Four 
Fundamental  Concepts  of  Psychoanalysis,  R.  Feldstein,  B.  Fink  &  M.  Jaanus  (cds.  ), 
pp.  39-44,  (Albany,  New  York:  State  University  of  New  York  Press). 
Solomons,  D.,  (1978),  "The  Politicization  of  Accounting",  The  Journal  of  Accountancy, 
Vol.  146,  No.  5  pp.  65-72. 
Solomons,  D.,  (1983),  "The  Political  Implications  of  Accounting  and  Accounting  Standard 
Setting",  Accounting  and  Business  Research,  Vol.  13,  No.  50,  pp.  107-11  8. 
Solomons,  D.,  (June  1986),  "The  FASB's  Conceptual  Framework:  An  Evaluation",  Journal 
of  Accountancy,  pp.  114-123. 
Solomons,  D.,  (1991a),  "Accounting  and  Social  Change:  A  Ncutralist  Vicw",  Accounting 
Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  16,  No.  3,  pp.  287-295. 
Solomons,  D.,  (1991b),  "A  Rejoinder",  Accounting  Organizations  and  Soclcty;  Vol.  16,  No.  3, 
pp.  311-312. 
Sorrell,  T.,  (1990),  "The  World  from  its  Own  Point  of  View",  in  Reading  Rorty:  Critical 
Responses  to  Philosophy  and  the  Mirror  of  Nature  (and  Beyond),  A.  R.  Atalacho%vski 
&  J.  Burrows  (ed),  pp.  11-25,  (Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell). 
Stamp,  E.,  (1981a),  "Why  Can  Accounting  Not  Become  a  Science  Like  Physics?  ",  Abacus, 
Vol.  17,  No.  1,  pp.  13-27. 
346 References 
Stamp,  E.,  (July  1981b),  "Accounting  standards  and  the  conceptual  framework:  a  plan  for 
their  evolution",  The  Accountant's  Magazine. 
Sterling,  R.,  (1970),  Theory  and  Measurement  of  Enterprise  Income,  (Lawrence,  Kansas: 
University  of  Kansas  Press). 
Sterling,  R.  R.,  (August  1976),  "Accounting  at  the  crossroads",  Journal  of  Accountancy, 
pp.  82-87. 
Sterling,  R.  R.,  (1979),  Toward  a  Science  of  Accounting,  (Houston,  Tcxas:  Scholars  Book 
Co). 
Sterling,  R.  R.,  (1993),  "The  subject  matters  of  accounting",  in  Philosophical  perspectives  on 
accounting:  Essays  in  honour  of  Edward  Stamp,  M.  J.  Mumford  &  K.  V.  11casncll 
(eds.  ),  pp.  123-155,  (London:  Routledge). 
Strawson,  P.  F.,  (1950),  "Truth",  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  Sure.  Vol.  24, 
pp.  129-156,  reprinted  in  Truth,  G.  Pitcher  (ed.  ),  1964,  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-I  Tall). 
Street,  D.  L.,  Fordham,  D.  R.  &  Wayland,  A.,  (1997),  "Stock  options  as  a  form  of 
compensation  for  American  executives:  Impact  on  accounting  rules  of  themes  and 
arguments  reported  in  newspapers  and  business  magazines,  1975-1993",  Critical 
Perspectives  on  Accounting,  Vol.  8,  pp.  211-242. 
Study  Group  on  Business  Income,  (1952),  Changing  concepts  of  business  Income, 
reproduced  by  1975,  (Houston,  Texas:  Scholars  Book  Co). 
Summers,  L.  &  Carroll,  C.,  (1987),  "Why  is  the  U.  S.  Savings  Rate  So  Low?  ",  Brookings 
Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  pp.  607-635. 
Swieringa,  R.  J.,  (Winter  1997),  "Should  Accounting  be  "Green  and  Smooth  and  Inviting", 
The  Journal  of  Financial  Statement  Analysis,  Vol.  2,  No.  2,  pp.  75-87. 
347 References 
Tarski,  A.,  (1944),  "The  Semantic  Conception  of  Truth",  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological 
Research,  Vol.  4,  No.  3,  pp.  341-376. 
Thaler,  R.  H.,  (1980),  "Towards  a  Positive  Theory  of  Consumer  Choice",  Journal  of 
Economic  Behaviour  and  Organization,  Vol.  1,  pp.  39-60. 
Thaler,  R.  H.,  (1985),  "Mental  Accounting  and  Consumer  Choice",  Marketing  Science,  Vol.  4, 
No.  3,  pp.  199-214. 
Thaler,  R.  H.,  (1990),  "Savings,  Fungibility,  and  Mental  Accounts",  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives,  Vol.  4,  No.  1,  pp.  193-205. 
Thaler,  R.  H.,  &  Johnson,  E.  J.,  (1990),  "Gambling  with  the  house  money  and  trying  to  break 
even:  the  effects  of  prior  outcomes  on  risky  choice",  Management  Science,  Vol.  36, 
No.  6,  pp.  643-660. 
Tinker,  T.  (1982),  "The  Normative  Origins  of  Positive  Theories:  Ideology  and  Accounting 
Thought",  Accounting,  Organizations  and  Society,  Vol.  7,  No.  2,  pp.  167-200. 
Tinker,  T.,  (1985),  Paper  Prophets  -A  Social  Critique  of  Accounting,  (London:  1  colt, 
Rinehart  and  Winston). 
Tinker,  T.,  (1991),  "The  Accountant  as  Partisan",  Accounting,  Organizations  and  society, 
Vol.  16,  No.  3,  pp.  297-310. 
Tinker,  T,  Lehman,  C.  &  Neimark,  M.,  (1991),  "Falling  down  the  Hole  in  the  Middle  of  the 
Road:  Political  Quietism  in  Corporate  Social  Reporting",  Accounting,  Auditing  & 
Accountability  Journal,  Vol.  4,  No.  2,  pp.  28-54. 
Touche  Ross,  (1995),  Comment  on  -  Accounting  for  tax;  Discussion  Paper,  (London: 
Accounting  Standards  Board). 
348 References 
TT  Group  PLC,  (1996)  Comment  on  -  The  Statement  of  Principles  for  Financial  Reporting: 
Exposure  Draft,  pp.  669-674,  (London:  Accounting  Standards  Board). 
Tversky,  A.  &  Kahneman,  D.,  (30  January  1981),  "The  Framing  of  Decisions  and  the 
Psychology  of  Choice",  Science,  Vol.  211,  pp.  453-458. 
Tweedie,  D&  Whittington,  G.,  (1990),  "Financial  Reporting:  Current  Problems  and  Their 
Implications  for  Systematic  Reform",  Accounting  and  Business  Research,  Vol.  21, 
No.  81,  pp.  87-102. 
UK  Companies  Act,  (1985),  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office). 
Velasquez,  M.  G.,  (1983),  "Why  Corporations  are  Not  Morally  Responsible  for  Anything 
They  Do",  Business  and  Professional  Ethics  Journal,  Vol.  2,  No.  3,  reproduced  in 
Collective  Responsibility:  Five  Decades  of  Debate  in  Theoretical  and  Applied  Ethics, 
May,  L.  &  Hoffman,  S.,  (eds.  ),  1991,  pp.  l  11-131,  (Savage,  Maryland:  Rowntan  & 
Littlefield). 
Walker,  R.  C.  S.,  (1997),  "Theories  of  Truth",  in  A  Companion  to  the  Philosophy  of  Language, 
B.  Hale  &  C.  Wright  (eds.  ),  pp.  309-330,  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  ) 
Watts,  R.  L.,  &  Zimmerman,  J.  L.,  (April  1979),  "The  Demand  for  and  Supply  of  Accounting 
Theories:  The  market  for  excuses",  The  Accounting  Review,  Vol.  LIV,  No.  2,  pp.  273- 
305. 
Westwick,  C.,  (August  1994)  "Directors'  share  options:  the  next  steps",  Accountancy,  p.  88. 
Whittington,  G.,  (1989),  "Accounting  Standards  Setting  in  the  UK  after  20  years:  A  Critique 
of  the  Dearing  and  Solomons  Reports",  Accounting  and  Business  Research,  Vol.  19, 
No.  75,  pp.  195-205. 
349 References 
Whorf,  B.  L.,  (1956),  Language,  Thought  and  Reality:  Selected  Writings,  J.  B.  Caroll  (ed.  ), 
(Cambridge  MA:  University  of  California  Press). 
Wilcox,  D.  W.,  (1989),  "Social  Security  Benefits,  Consumption,  Expenditure,  and  the  Life- 
cycle  Hypothesis",  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  97,  pp.  288-304. 
Williams,  B.,  (1978),  Descartes:  The  Project  of  Pure  Enquiry,  (Hanmondsworth:  Penguin 
Books  Ltd). 
Williams,  B.,  (1985),  Ethics  and  the  Limits  of  Philosophy,  (London:  Fontana  Paperbacks). 
Williams,  B.,  (1991),  "Terrestrial  Thoughts  Extraterrestrial  Science",  London  Review  of 
Books,  Vol.  13,  Iss.  3,  pp.  12-13. 
Williams,  B.,  (1995),  "Replies",  in  J.  E.  Altham  &  R.  Harrison  (eds.  ),  World,  And,  and 
Ethics:  Essays  on  the  Ethical  Philosophy  of  Bernard  Williams,  pp.  185-224, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press). 
Williams,  P.  F.,  (1992),  "Prediction  and  control  in  accounting  "science",  Critical  Perspectives 
on  Accounting,  Vol.  3,  pp.  99-107. 
Willmott,  H.,  (1990),  "Serving  the  Public  Interest?  A  Critical  Analysis  of  a  Professional 
Claim",  in  D.  J.  Cooper  &  T.  Hopper  (eds.  ),  Critical  Accounts,  }ßp.  315-331, 
(Basingstoke:  MacMillan). 
Wittgenstein,  L.,  (1967),  Philosophical  Investigations,  3rd  edition,  (Oxford:  lllackwcll). 
Wright,  E.  O.,  (1978),  Class  Crisis  and  the  State,  (London:  New  Left  Books). 
Young,  J.  J.,  (July  1997),  "Accounting  as  it  intertwines  with  the  political:  The  case  of 
accounting  for  stock  compensation",  Working  paper  presented  at  Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives  on  Accounting  Conference,  (Manchester). 
350 References 
Zeff,  S.,  (December  1978),  "The  Rise  of  Economic  Consequences",  Journal  of  Accountancy, 
pp.  56-63. 
Zeff,  S.  A.,  (1997),  "Playing  the  Congressional  Card  on  Employee  Stock  Options:  A  Fearful 
Escalation  in  the  Impact  of  Economic  Consequences  Lobbying  on  Standard  Setting", 
Working  paper. 
Zizek,  S.,  (1997),  The  Plague  of  Fantasies,  (London:  Verso). 
351 